Any theory of mind would have to tell a story about imagination, even if a deflationary one. Perhaps you mean something else? Empathy ("imagining yourself in another's shoes") is sometimes used to explain or predict another's behavior. That is based on an "inference to the best explanation" (a.k.a. abduction) — others are physically similar to me, therefore certain of their mental states must be similar to what mine would be like in their circumstances. More generally, this is also an answer to the philosophical problem of other minds.

I don't think there is a mere correlation between empathy and imagination, any more than there is a mere correlaton between being a bachelor and being male. The relationship is conceptual rather than empirical. Empathy is explained in terms of imagination.

I am not sure, but from my point of view, all imaginations are based on a combination of previous memories and on-going environment stimulations, then these impressed kinds of imagination will be consolidated as fake memories. Our normal and healthy neural network could function to distinguish the fake memory and real memory based on reality. Thank you

Any theory of mind would have to tell a story about imagination, even if a deflationary one. Perhaps you mean something else? Empathy ("imagining yourself in another's shoes") is sometimes used to explain or predict another's behavior. That is based on an "inference to the best explanation" (a.k.a. abduction) — others are physically similar to me, therefore certain of their mental states must be similar to what mine would be like in their circumstances. More generally, this is also an answer to the philosophical problem of other minds.

I don't think there is a mere correlation between empathy and imagination, any more than there is a mere correlaton between being a bachelor and being male. The relationship is conceptual rather than empirical. Empathy is explained in terms of imagination.

Mr Karl Pfeifer, I just wonder if there is a recommended way to empirically experiment this relation, and as my second question, is there a causality relation between imagination and Tom? In other words, if someone lacks imagination, will be a zero-ordered ToM person?

Dear Fayang Ma ,

That would be a great idea that if there is such relation between imagination and ToM, then ToM may be interfered by our memories and the false ones. Thank you for your answer.

Yasaman Hassanzadeh

Some of the older literature on primates may help you answer that question; here's two opposing views:

• https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/0/236/files/2017/04/precis-hmsw-bbs-1992-rm3gsf.pdf
• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog2004_4

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pfeifer & readers,

I'm inclined to think that "conceptual" and "empirical" relations are not so distinct as you take them to be.

You wrote:

I don't think there is a mere correlation between empathy and imagination, any more than there is a mere correlation between being a bachelor and being male. The relationship is conceptual rather than empirical. Empathy is explained in terms of imagination.

But surely it is possible for someone to be very imaginative, say, though not very empathetic. Empathy depends on imagination, perhaps, but there can be imagination without empathy. More generally, what is an "empirical" relation today, may become a conceptual relation tomorrow --if the relation stands up uniformly; and our adoption of particular theories, on empirical grounds, does have a proper influence on the concepts we adopt or discard. One example is the concept of "simultaneity," linked to universal time in Newtonian theory, but discarded in Einstein. "Simultaneity" once belonged to the concept of time, such that every event was either simultaneous or not with any other. But that notion was discarded and a new concept of time arose which does not employ it.

Could we have empathy without imagination? Well, it seems that that would be a sort of dumbed-down concept of empathy --perhaps a gushing, habitual empathetic expression without any notion of the thoughts, feelings or character of the other. But, on the other hand, it seems that there is, not infrequently a kind of enmity which arises without imaginative insight or consideration. Sometimes, unfortunately, people may just want to get you out of the way. But if there can be enmity without imagination, then it stands to reason that there can be empathy without imagination.

However sophisticated the theory of mind may be, and whatever the possible uses of imagination, it doesn't seem to be true that imaginative power will lead to empathy. Likewise, excesses of empathy (or apparent empathy) need not involve imaginative insight.

H.G. Callaway

H.G. Callaway

RE: "But surely it is possible for someone to be very imaginative, say, though not very empathetic."

Of course; after all, there are creative sociopaths among us. And my analogy applies: It's possible for someone to be male without being a bachelor.

RE: "But if there can be enmity without imagination, then it stands to reason that there can be empathy without imagination."

I think you'd have to explain first what constitutes empathy. I'll even agree empathy might be very "dumbed down" and minimal, but it would still have to somehow involve placing yourself in the other's shoes. Sympathy, on the other hand, need not require imagination of that sort and might be considered as a counterpoint to enmity of the sort you suggest.

Actually enmity may sometimes employ empathy: If I want to do something to make you suffer, I might consider how much it would make me suffer if I were in your place.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pfeifer & readers,

Part of my point rests on the fact that "empathy" has become a term of political discourse; and in consequence its application tends to be stretched --or you might say, it tends to be instrumentalized. But our criteria for attribution of empathy, actually involving sympathetic or imaginative understanding are rather weak. So, take the cases where "empathy" is expressed or attributed, and theorize on those cases.

My point was that expression or attribution of "empathy" like the expression or attribution of enmity may have no basis in either fact or imagination. In consequence, given a proliferation of the political or instrumentalized usage, we might cease to explain "empathy" in terms of imagination and see attribution of empathy as merely a sign of linked political affiliation.

Generally, definitions are fallible in light of empirical-theoretical developments concerning the relevant domain.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

The relationship is conceptual rather than empirical. Empathy is explained in terms of imagination.