Human dispositions determine moral value?

There are several premisses not stated that might be contested with good reason:

- that natural selection is the only crucial factor influencing human dispositions and attitudes (wrong)

- that in the case of human behaviour conditions of natural selection do not change much over time (wrong)

- that natural selection necessarily leads to moral goodness (linking morality to natural selection might be ill-advised even if it is possible to develop such kind of ethics)

- that the effects of natural selection on human behaviour occur without lag and thus are fast enough to ensure that the resulting attitudes/dispositions are still appropriate under rapidly changing environmental conditions (at least doubtful)

- that human beings and societies do not emancipate from/ overcome/ transcend/ mitigate at least some mechanisms of nature (matter of debate).

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Huebner, 

The sketch of an argument is provocative, but I think it is doubtful that it can be easily filled in generally in any simple and plausible way. That human beings have particular dispositions through natural selection is surely a morally interesting sort of fact--if fact it be. Yet such a fact is unlikely to be considered morally conclusive on its own. The argument appears too abstract, in the first place. What, after all, might "attitude A" be? Might it be anything at all? Might attitude A, be "hatefulness" then? If we can fairly substitute just anything here, of "A" and for "Φ," then the scheme could produce a lot of implausible non-sense, along with the sorts of thing you may have in mind. For instance, let "A" be "hatefulness" and "Φ" be "mother-in-laws."

It seems you might be asking us to fill in the premises needed to get from "Human beings, by virtue of natural selection, are disposed to have attitude of hatefulness towards things like mother-in-laws" to "Mothers-in-laws" are "morally good." (-bad?). 

I have a sense of what you are trying to get at with this question, but I don't think you have a good formulation of the problem you want to pose.

It is more that you want to ask what role (if any) "natural" attitudes should play in moral evaluations.  

H.G. Callaway

Dear Both,

 Thank you for your thoughtful comments. I do agree that this formulation is far from ideal (although the “Mother-In-Laws” example is about perfect).  Let me try to explain my position a bit more clearly. My premise is a dispositionalist one that sees ‘moral truth’ as reducible, empirically discoverable patterns in human response tendencies (i.e., dispositions). Thus there is no morality apart from human sensibility.

Now the problem here is the is-ought gap (I’ve already addressed, circularity, relativity, etc.)  I have two ways around this paradox. First, my account holds that moral inquiry is eductive (like glass realizing its propensity to shatter under certain conditions). Since values are not deduced (i.e., the theory denies that inferential reasoning is responsible for moral judgment), then one might say that Hume’s law need not apply (call this argument 1).

Secondly, I might simply state that propositions like the following are (contestably) true for the moral dispositionalist:

P1: Human dispositions determine ‘moral oughtness’

P2: Human beings, by virtue of natural selection, are disposed to have feelings of approbation towards things like Φ.

Therefore: We ought to value things like Φ.

This argument now contains the previously unstated premise that “Human dispositions determine ‘moral oughtness’”. Therefore the argument is made ‘formally valid’ (although whether it s "true" is a matter for arguementation).

Thoughts?

Dear Jim, there is still the changeability of natural selection conditions (and other natural factors) that determine human dispositions.

Perhaps an example: Human dispositions shaped under conditions of survival in small competing groups, low population densities and a low degree of human control over natural ressources. 

Why should we value things like 'phi' today under diametrically opposed conditions?

Hi Michael,

I suspect that 'some' human dispositions to value things like 'phi' will prove to be non-adaptive in modern contexts (or - in your terms - under diametrially opposed conditions). I take it that evolution at the speces level is simply too slow to account for changes in our mores since they were formed under the conditions you (quite nicely) describe.

I must admit that I am still struggling to see the distinction between the following arguments. Now, (1) is clearly invalid. But exaclty what property does (2) entail that makes it a valid statement?

(1)

Actions of type Φ are such that humans, by the process of natural selection, are disposed to have feelings of approbation towards them.

Therefore: Actions of type Φ ought to be performed.

(2)

If actions of type Φ are such that humans, by the process of natural selection, are disposed to have feelings of approbation towards them, then actions of type Φ ought to be performed.