We all know what it is like to have a mind, and are equally aware of what cognitive machineries are essential for the embodiment of mental process that allow us to think, feel and behave the way time demands. Our systems of thought, intelligence and emotions are all due to the organization of our mental processes which are modulated by control mechanisms and supported by a well-organized system- the human brain.

For ages, we have attempted to understand what are such mental processes which generate human behavior, and how such mental processes are supported is perhaps, still counted as a mystery. Though unraveling of human cognitive processes with the aid of cognitive neuroscience and neuroscientific tools help us to understand that it is the organization of neural networks inside the brain which supports all such processes, but what still remain confounded is, perhaps, how our consciousness is supported, the mental correlates of consciousness and what constitutes a human mind that makes us feel what it is like to feel.

See;

What it is like to be a bat? By Thomas Nagel.

We all know what it is like to have OUR OWN mind.

Although it's quite a dense book, I found Demasio's " The feeling of what happens" to be a landmark work in this subject area. I would recommend it to anyone interested

Hello Lyn,

Yes indeed as you are correct to note what it is like to have "our own" mind, but it could be wonderful if we ever know what it is like to be someone else...or say, a machine. This metaphysical debate has quite a long history, similar to the history of mind itself, but scientific physicalism has given it a new shape ever since U.T. Place's (1956) classic "Is consciousness a brain process", and again following Feigl's "The Mental" & The Physical, until Thomas Nagel, Daniel Dennett, Damasio, Chalmers, Shearle,and other philosophers of mind took over the debate on Mind-Brain identity problem.

It seems to be strange enough that even materialists are not happy with some of the materials of the brain which they assert to be the cause of mental processes. Since non-physical properties are irreducible, one must be careful enough to place any premature assumptions regarding mental processes like how we feel what we feel, what are the content of subjective states, why Qualia must occur at the first place, what is its neural basis, and perhaps, whether if mental processes as like "our own" mind is reducible or not. If that is, we may well assume that we may be able to feel what it is like to be you, me or someone else, or even some animals which have brains.

These aspects of mental-physical correlations between consciousness, sensation and perception has created a lot more problem that solving the primary one, which is, What is Mind, and what is its origin? We can't afford to solve a problem by saying that hey, these are no problem at all...just by denying that there are some problems of Mind-Brain identity when others have diverged on Mind-Brain duality. These aspects makes the subject more ontic.

Reference:

Chalmers, J. David; Consciousness and Cognition.

Thanks

Warm Regards,

Sidharta