I will mention some books which are directly related to expreriance.

Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, Pierre Vermersch, On Becoming Aware:A pragmatics of experiencing

"In this book we seek the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience."

One can see also that phenomenology is directly related to experience and awareness. Experience is also related to “practice” and so the following book is strongly related with experience: Danielle Macbeth. Realizing Reason: A Narrative of Truth and Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. ISBN: 9780198704791. Pp. xii + 494

The  first activity of ours is the grasp of the senses upon reality. We must grasp firmly what is offered to the senses, for it is only this that we can call pure experience.

The more we grasp and accumulate from reality the bigger the "reservoir" of experience.and the greater awareness is achieved,

Experience is nothing but "acquired knowledge".

This is, indeed, a high class question which requires deep thinking. I shall approach it from an angle which points to the "move ahead" path. 

Changing or adding  innovative new functions leads to what is called "ontological uncertainty". This differs from normal uncertainty & is an uncertainty upon introducing a new thing into the current ontology, a thing that is unknown & unfamiliar to others and therefore needs to be not only learned but incorporated into an individual’s mind set and also made relevant.

If the concept of artifact functionality (including per formative functionality) is recast into the concept of experience, it becomes obvious that what is carried out is the introduction of new experiences and how different those experiences are from what people have experienced before & their mental model of their previous experiences.

Probably, a new experience will not fit nicely into existing mental models & existing experiences. A new artifact may create a new experience that is unfamiliar to the potential adopters. The degree of uncertainty depends on the degree of novelty of the experience to the adopter. Therefore, ontological uncertainty is one that resonates with anyone who has tried to introduce a disruptive innovation. One of the most difficult tasks is to try and explain what the new product offers & what people’s experiences will become when the innovation is made real. The more radical the new experience, the more difficult it is to get others to understand it without actually experiencing it.

When ontological uncertainty is related to the expansion of experience, 2 possibilities arise :(i) Those easy to process experiences that are a change in an existing & well known experience. Something is faster, more responsive, easier to use etc., but you know what to expect. (ii) Those hard to process experiences that are entirely new or have never seen before.

The expansion of experience& and the ontological uncertainty it creates are a major source of predictive variability  & decision confusion on the part of both external adopters (e.g. customers) & internal adopters (e.g. the stakeholders, sponsors and executives who fund & promote novel  product). In general, the more strategic the innovation, the more it will create new experiences & problems for both the external & the internal adopter. In other words, experiences ought not to be "static" but "dynamic" in order to seize the opportunities for progress whatever it takes. I am an example : I had long experience with the old typewriters but the new experience of using computers to typewrite was a must for me & I was obliged to adapt early.

Our Mind 'Actor" reacts differently to incoming representations of entities and their interactions .thus experience gaining is always dynamic in nature.

I think discovery always precedes knowledge. Especially pronounced for development, of the rational facility, is the discovery by the baby(or instantaneous learning-knowing from first sensation), that his front is different from his back, himself different from others, are central disparities  from which the world becomes constructed.

   Though it can be asked if thought alone with sensation can exist, I think it is important to understand that the world cannot be deduced from thought alone. It is also important to make a distinction between discovery of the scientific type and, ordinary discovery from experience.  It is not wise or practical to extend views specifically from the perspective of scientific discovery. 

,    initially a natural scientist,  I can say that an awareness, not especially of the details of scientific interpretation/world view, but  of the existence of science and science method, the intimate study of it,  expands  experience.  

From my naive pint of view, it would seem that "experience" should have to do with the senses (including internal responses of the body) only.

Interpretations of what was experienced, based on reasoning or intuition, should not be considered "experience".

The Scientific Method has been so successful because it makes a point of separating "experience" and "interpretation".

An example:

                      Experiences: The thermometer reading was 101 degrees Centigrade.

                                            The liquid was not boiling.

                     Interpretation: The liquid was not pure water.

Un-scientific Method: (Combining Experience and Interpretation):

                                  The liquid was not pure water because it had a boiling point         higher than that of water.

This latter Un-scientific Method was not really what was experiened.

Norwood Hanson's recognition that observation is theory laden was a salutary revision of the  idea of uninterpreted sense data that logical positivists had inherited from 17th and 18th century British empiricism.  As Hanson noted, you have to strip away interpretations to get down to barer data, but you never get to absolutely bare data. Thus, we moderns see the Eastern horizon go down where earlier folk saw the sun rise. Stripping both interpretations yields increasing distance between the sun and the horizon, but even this result involves interpretation, which is inescapable.  As Kant had said, "Percepts without concepts are blind."  I take it this is now recognized by most philosophers of science.   It is, I think, also closer to our workaday idea, which counts as an experience an action engaged in (climbing a mountain) or an event endured (getting shot in combat), not just a subjective but meaningless feeling felt.   Whether this broader idea of experience has been incorporated into continental phenomenology, which seems still rooted in Cartesianism, I cannot say.  It was certainly alien to Husserl, who meant to stick to the bare data of immediate uninterpreted consciousness, surely an impossible task.

 i agree on the whole Kanrian quote "concepts without percepts are empty percepts without concepts are blind"

@Constantine, Max  "Percepts without concepts are blind".....Concepts without percepts are empty"

   Seems to go on forever. 'concept-percept' -'percept concept'.   I think we cannot assume that an infinite physical connecting line exists  or that science has a coherent way to capture it. 

@Max     "Thus, we moderns see the Eastern horizon go down where earlier folk saw the sun rise. Stripping both interpretations yields increasing distance between the sun and the horizon, but even this result involves interpretation, which is inescapable."

    Perhaps this is the source of expansion cosmology.  I think, looking from the percept end there is a much better, more immediate view of death, of the setting sun, than of birth, of the rising sun.  Instead of looking from a perspective of birth perhaps it would be sounder and more productive to look from a perspective of death. The geneticist knows that his topic is carried on from death, yet pursuit of a mechanism of birth seems to captivate scientists while at the same time it is evident that such approach intersects with the theological, not necessarily from a Darwinian point of view involving evolution and time frames, but it follows that a more stringent view is entailed that involves more native aspects of 'what is'; not surprising creationists would be motivated in defense of a perceptually uncaptureble innateness of the spirit.  At least Bertrand Russell concludes that a specific form must be involved; it is form only that is visualized to contain perceivable features.  

     History seems to follow likewise to ignore the conceptual seeking to bury conflicting concepts on the battlefield, as the not so dead, immortal concepts possessed to the corpses accumulate in the eye, and associated medical disease exacerbates the lack of sterility/autonomy/sovereignty to incite further political contest in a viscous cycle.

            "Percepts without concepts are blind"

    I am of the opinion that this entire scenario paradoxically/ironically  involves a pathology of the eye, space radiation, an inversion (a recognized genetic facet of eye physiology and pathologies) ...to think that a piece of the whole had simply been swallowed, e.g. a gene associated with cannibalism is reported discovered to exist in all modern humans....behaviors are not impossibly connected with a failing structure in space, radiation emitting.

     If you can call DNA 'a physical piece of path', perhaps some had been swallowed? on threat of starvation? within a viscous cycle of  bottlenecks, evolution bottlenecks.

    Is not healthy to preoccupy the self investigating its' 'birth', realizes an other than conceptual, gain' on death, better a pathology of its' death.

to add: It is obvious that topics such as Freud and psychology, biology/genetics, Newton/Einstein/physics/cosmology, thermodynamics, chemistry etc. have expanded modern experience, though computers with fast communications across natural sovereignties may have added an extra inertia to toughen the test. 

@Max   " It was certainly alien to Husserl, who meant to stick to the bare data of immediate uninterpreted consciousness, surely an impossible task."

        Though it involves a little interpretation (though a single following deduction returns the rationale to a possible, if not a single unique possibility) it is possible to conclude that the heavens, all beyond, all that is internal, possesses motion that is parametrically of the same order or range of values that are familiar to perception.  Thus the self in knowing itself can know via disparity what is but familiar also, other than the self.  If perceivable it necessarily bears a familiarity of motion in a world in which relative motion defines strictly. In this view all is form in motion, matter is built of motion, volume is built of motion, concepts are built of motion. ..     

   It is clear that, as we  think about things within the conceptual framework of our fact-oriented thought and discourse, any object in the real world has more facets than it will ever actually manifest in experience. For every objective property of a real thing has consequences of a dispositional character and these are never completely surveyable because the dispositions that particular concrete things inevitably have endow them with an infinitistic aspect that cannot be comprehended within experience.

    A desk, for example, has a limitless manifold of phenomenal features of the type: “having a certain appearance from a particular point of view.” It is perfectly clear that most of these features will never be actualized in experience. Moreover, a thing effectively is what it does: entity and lawfulness are coordinated correlates. And this fact, that real things involve lawful comportment, means that the finitude of experience precludes any prospect of the exhaustive manifestation of the descriptive facets of any real things (Kantian view)

     Physical things in particular have not only more properties than they will ever actually manifest but also more than they can possibly manifest. This is so because the dispositional properties of things always involve what might be characterized as mutually preemptive conditions of realization. A cube of sugar, for example, has the dispositional property of reacting in a particular way if subjected to a temperature of 10,000 degrees Celsius and of reacting in a certain way if emplaced for one hundred hours in a large, turbulent body of water. But if either of these conditions is ever realized, it will destroy the lump of sugar as a lump of sugar and thus block the prospect of the other property’s being manifested. The perfectly possible realization of various dispositions may fail to be mutually possible, and so the dispositional properties of a thing cannot ever be manifested completely—not just in practice but also in principle. Our objective claims about real things always commit us to more than we can ever actually determine about them. The existence of this latent (hidden, occult) sector is a crucial feature of our conception of a real thing. Neither in fact nor in thought 3 can we ever simply put it away. To say that an apple possesses only those features it actually manifests is to run afoul of our conception of an apple. To deny—or even merely to refuse to be committed to the claim—that the apple would manifest particular features if certain conditions came about (for example, that it would have such-andsuch a taste if eaten) is to be driven to withdrawing the claim that it is an apple.

   This cognitive depth of objective factual claims—inherent in the fact that their content will always outrun the evidence for making them— means that their endorsement always involves some element of evidence-transcending conjecture. That immediate experience bears upon and relates to an authentically real item that lies objectively outside the experiential domain—that it authorizes me to make claims about such an experience-transcendent reality—is accordingly something we cannot establish solely on the basis of considerations invoking such experiences themselves. The very concepts at issue (namely, “experience” and “manifestation”) are such that we can only ever experience those features of a real thing that it actually manifests. But the preceding considerations show that real things do and must always have more experientially manifest properties than they can ever actually manifest in experience. The experienced portion of a thing is similar to the part of the iceberg that shows above the water’s surface. All real things are necessarily thought of as having hidden depths that extend beyond the limits, not only of experience but also of experientiability. To say of something that it is an apple or a stone or a tree is to become committed to claims about it that go beyond the data we have—and even beyond those that we can, in the nature of things, ever actually acquire. The “meaning” inherent in the assertive commitments of our factual statements is never “fulfilled“ by verification. Real things are cognitively opaque; we cannot see to the bottom of them; our knowledge about them can thus become more extensive without thereby becoming more complete.

@Constantine   I agree that we can never know all of the manifestations of an existence, but I believe we can get by with, in a complete sense, saying what is beyond witness, existing or otherwise, apparent from one perspective or otherwise another, cannot be discussed with any coherence if unwitnessed or unwitnessible, i.e. is beyond perception ability.   What we do need is to assert that thee is but one of anything whether it belongs to a particular class (e.g. apple, every apple is different from any other apple) or not.  This gives a clearer view enabling us to say if we cannot witness it, it is beyond the jurisdiction of natural law applied to topics of study, though it cannot be excluded to also be governed by identical natural law.  The world of any perceiving agent is contained to the perception of the agent, is self contained.  In my work I have tried to establish that anything pertaining to us must be witnessible from some perspective whether that perspective is attainable or not, have tried to show that the possession of volume is innate to all that pertains to us and nothing else need concern us.  An electron does not possess volume, it is a definitional tool (I do not think it is known what it is meant to refer to by those who use it, or considered to refer to anything but itself), but its knowing is not essential to experience seeking understanding of nature.   Whether something is an apple or not I don't think is essential, whether it is an electron or an apple is not coherent, an electrons lives always an invisible life. Looking in retrospect, classifications may help us sort lines of emergence in seeking to understand emergence, what it is we are witnessing, something familiar? ..we do base our passages on familiarity. Brain coral for instance as an example of an apple that that is not an apple. Otherwise, if we cannot  perceive it, need to invent it, is not a part of the barrel . 

When reading the question, I initially rejected the idea that having scientific understanding of the world could lead to any greater expansion of 'experience' than experiential existence itself, but on reflection I have changed my mind. "Experience" refers to exposure of the senses of any individual to something real in the outside world. The issue then is whether scientific knowledge can change the ability of our senses to perceive. I think it can, and I think other forms of training also expand experience. For example, the experience of music by musicians is potentially richer and more meaningful in a spiritual sense than that of non-musicians (and the same applies to all arts). Is this the same phenomenon, and if so, is it also an expansion of the concept of experience (rather than simply an expansion of experience itself)?

Experience as a construct becomes amendable to scientific inquiry once we start thinking about consciousness. Yet this bridge into science has widened the mind-body debate further as efforts are made to tie consciousness to neural-centric cognitive psychology. Since the scaling of consciousness from its neural roots is lost to its emergent properties.So while we are able to explain the projective qualities of experiences in the form of philosophical and sociological constructs such as:alterity & hyperreality; we are unable to trace its source through a reductionist program. Thus far progress has been made through a kind of excitable medium approach to the brain. Using fMRI scans as noninvasive methods to study consciousness as a function of brain activity.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_are_the_drawbacks_of_modeling_the_brain_as_an_excitable_medium?_tpcectx=profile_questions

That's grate