RE: «Isn't it better to speak & write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?»

Wouldn't the conditions have to be casual conditions? Sure, causal explanation is pragmatic or interest-relative, and we focus on a causal factor that's relevant to us. So to light a match I think of causing it to light by striking it, our usual practice. I suppose in a certain kind of anaerobic environment, a more salient action might be injecting oxygen at the moment and point of striking.

Dear Brad, you are back to Skinner! Did not take us far, did him?

Dear Vera Maura Fernandes de Lima

I do not really even know what you are talking about. I cover explaining ALL cognitive behavior (observable and non-[presently]observable) behavior PATTERNS -- significant aspects of ALL OF THAT. (You obviously have not read ME.)

About the science of behavior PATTERNS (and patterning, etc.): It is more than possible that there can be a science of THAT PER SE (and it is arguable that THERE MUST BE). (The inter-disciplinary crap relies at key times on intuition AND THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE. [ Damn it: please give informed replies (RG can be Sooo bad) ].)

[ I never ever liked Skinner and my college education was in the early seventies; in fact I never did anything but fight against that non-sense. I never even respected him (that English major turned demagogue) . If ANY intuition (e.g. for definitions of "rewards" and aspects of the environment, i.e. "rewards", etc.) is INVOLVED, THEN THAT IS BAD. Do you know what an ethologist is? Between 1980 and 1995 educated people in behavior science did. NOW THEY HAVE FORGOTTEN THIS AND HAVE ALSO (FATALLY) FORGOTTEN ONTOGENY -- ridiculous and absolutely unacceptable ! (Ethologists do not define the PATTERNS; the Subject defines ALL.)]

(P.S. Have you noticed that, even today, "theorists" and researchers define "rewards" and "[aspects of] the environment" and sometimes use the term "reward", etc. GENERALLY as if doing so IS MEANINGFULLY A THING (non-contextualized), just by conforming to a pattern? This is analogous to saying all logic is sound because it is logic. (

RE: «Isn't it better to speak & write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?»

Wouldn't the conditions have to be casual conditions? Sure, causal explanation is pragmatic or interest-relative, and we focus on a causal factor that's relevant to us. So to light a match I think of causing it to light by striking it, our usual practice. I suppose in a certain kind of anaerobic environment, a more salient action might be injecting oxygen at the moment and point of striking.

It should be 'mental causation' or 'made-up causes' that depend on the individual holding the causal relation. Conditions also imply some fixed set of circumstances in outer or inner world. But mental causation is transient and exists only in mind for a limited duration. Why assume, first of all, that any external things exist for causes to apply? If it is all in the mind of the observer, then causal attributions are highly subjective and personal. They become reality only when perceived and acted upon in certain ways, as held suitable during the moment of action. So mental causation seems apt.

Dear Karl Pfeifer

The word 'cause' is useful in many situations, but not so much in a biological science, like Psychology, or in other biological sciences (like Biology) **. Also, there is a bit of over-contentment with the word kind of generally. Still, I take your point. (Maybe, I have at least shown, and admitted, I am not always completely right; that's ok.)

** FOOTNOTE: It is better to think in terms of "conditions-for", where there are processes NOT very well understood. Biology fields, including Psychology, are where there are typically more things (including important stuff and related stuff) YET to discover; here, there are processes of a biological nature. Something to bolster this position is: There are no "mechanisms" really known in Psychology (and one should definitely not get carried away by/with any idea of "mechanisms", here OR in biological fields). [( Someone I once interacted with said he does not believe in mechanisms, strictly, except for things like clocks. There, in a very general context, I agreed.)] Relatedly: this puts "models" (in biological sciences) in the proper perspective. And, that's important: This also (at the same time) really puts all hypothetico-deductive systems of thinking in their proper perspective (such systems involve things (aka premises) of supposed great certainty, which do NOT come up clearly or centrally, or in necessarily truly significantly ways, in Psychology, but yet come up WAY MORE OFTEN in Psychology writings, many times out of desperation). I often say such thinking should be used only when one is forced to -- this leaves observations central and in their proper role, AND this attitude is a safeguard of a good empirical approach. Here (in this footnote), I may provide things to think about. Karl, yet, I still take your point about "pragmatic or interest-relative".

Dear Paul Hubert Vossen

What a great answer you provide, especially with the quite clear and interesting example! There is one thing I need to clarify:

When I write/speak of 'conditions-of' my concept is basically "condition-of/for" what is then seen in direct observations (

Dear Paul Hubert Vossen

I agree with my friend, Orlando M Lourenço , that Psychology is pre-paradigmatic (or in a non-scientific stage) . What is contrasted is simple, limited, unjustified crude belief sets (based on pseudo-assumptions and presumptions that are much more comparable to superstitions, than to good, REAL assumptions). It is these which are in some conflict (ALL DAMNED BORING). So, it is NOT "many incompatible paradigms" involved.

My Main Project offers (really for the first time in history) a paradigm FOR PSYCHOLOGY [(which totally, thoroughly, relies on a better and strict empiricism ALWAYS (for each and every concept or construct) -- and which would finally give Psychology a science. )]

I read and reviewed Davood Gozli's Experimental Psychology and Human Agency, (2019). See https://dgozli.com/ and October 2019

You say "... to start a new discussion here on RG focussed on installing a (new) paradigm in psychology... ". I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING NOTHING BUT THAT FOR *** FOUR YEARS ** (nobody listens/reads well or they are too lazy to look into it; they appear content with their already "complex" theories (actually the "theories" are confused and confusing because they are nearly baseless)). If you can read 1000 pages of my essays, all HERE on RG, YOU can find out.

Dear Paul Hubert Vossen

Part of the reason I push my system hard is that "it works" in many senses, one BIG one being that it allows for actual direct observational grounding FOR ALL CONCEPTS, ETC. __AND__ it allows a fit with a definition of SCIENCE-IN-GENERAL. NO other existing system works in these ways.

Part of my motivation starting in 1985 was to not only find a way to merge theories, but with the greatest empirical concerns INCLUDING YIELDING TESTABLE HYPOTHESES.. I accomplish BOTH these goals : it ( a system like mine) is what IS REQUIRED to accomplish these goals. Of course, these features are indicative of a good, real science.

P.S. It was Orlando M Lourenço who first stated what I stated about preparadigmatic . I readily agreed and adopted this view; HE was the first to bring up this term.

(Paul: Seems like you are looking for a way to stay with the status quo, which from my perspective is insane -- like so many other psychologists OVER several YEARS : psychologists are babies, matching their field which is in its infancy even after 130 years (I have an essay on this "infancy" outlook, explaining it, just as I reinterpret or explain so many things (a big one being: abstraction (abstract thought)).)

Am in agreement with your methodical thoughts on the analysis of conditioning as scientific research model, in terms of basic methodological assumption.

Causation (as any model of cause and effect) implies a temporal attribution gap, e.g. we can understand time as the gap between cause and effect.

Considering our human life-span, we are better able to focus on conditioning than on causation (which covers longer gaps of duration/between any given cause and effect).

https://www.conservapedia.com/Cosmological_special_relativity

Article Cosmological Special Relativity: Fundamentals and Applications

https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/4948

I keep thinking that globally speaking, the science of psychology still remains at a preparadigmatic state. The existence of countless theories or, better, mini-theories, speaks in favor of my idea. If scientific progress in a scientific domain were assessed as a function of the number of theories it contains, then psychology would be a serious candidate to be the queen of sciences, which is not clearly the case.

Back to the distinction between conditions and causes. This is an issue that has been highly debated, for example, in philosophy of science, psychology, and philosophy, just to mention three examples. It suffices to refer to David Hume's attack on he idea of causality and to Immanuel Kant's reaction to D. Hume's position. To elaborate on this issue is beyond the scope of this post and my expertise.

As I see it, it makes sense to distinguish between cause and condition. To illustrate, let us suppose that a given phenomenon, B, for example, only occurs when another one is present, A, for example. If A and only A explains the occurrence of B, it seems that we can say that A is the cause of B. If the occurrence of B is due, for example, to the previous occurrence of C, D and E, then we can say that C, D, and E are conditions for the occurrence of B. To put it simply, cause is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to occur. In contradistinction, condition is a necessary but not sufficient cause for something to occur. Of course, it might be argued that a cause is a set of conditions for something to occur. But, in this case, we would have many causes, not a cause. Is it not better in these cases to speak of conditions, instead of a cause? Because in psychology, for example, a psychological phenomenon is due, in principle, to several antecedents and conditions, one might think that the notion of causality does not make much, if any, sense in the psychological domain. In addition to this, we can say that when A causes B, there is a sense of necessity that is not present when we say that A conditions the occurrence of B. Here we have a sense of probability, but not of necessity. I wonder whether the idea of causality is not without problems even in some, say, paradigmatic sciences. It it highly probable that the Sun rises tomorrow, but there is no necessity for this to be the case. Just doing brainstorming. Needless to say, I am not philosopher.

Dear Orlando M Lourenço

I greatly liked your post and, I think, I could agree with your positions. Yet (as you also indicate) Psychology is a special case. I have argued it not only is, but will remain so when Psychology is a science. This is because inter-related PROCESSES (behavior patterns and patterns of patterns) are involved. Biological things like that are rarely fully defined and the inter-relationships (between behavior patterns) would show up more-and-more, as a matter of course. No absolute cause to pinpoint.

Thank you again for your marvelous, insightful reply.

Dear Brad Jesness,

Thank you very much for your prompt reply. Happy to know that you find that my post was marvelous and insightful. Let us wait for others' reaction to my post

Dear Paul Hubert Vossen

You say : " I am not interested in any particular sort of purely experimental or empirical psychology ". I cannot agree with the "empirical" part; ALL must be strictly empirically grounded/founded (e.g. at its inception) for an endeavor to be considered a science at all. You are basically saying: I do not care if Psychology is a science.** I just think you have not been able to see it that way (but let me not "trouble you" about this -- I have seen such a response many times). Let me add:

THERE ARE NO SHORTCOMINGS IF YOU DO THINGS CORRECTLY (e.g. define NOTHING yourself, but let the Subject define all -- a good outlook in a biological field).

P.S. Re: "Methodological behaviorist": The philosophy instructor I paid to help me edit "A Human Ethogram ..." back in 1984 or so, described my work that way and I liked it, so I used it.

** FOOTNOTE: You are, thusly, just as I characterized you.

Dear Orlando,

in philosophy of science more recent than Kant and Hume, causal explanation is regularly treated as interest-relative. See e.g. Davidson („Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective“, 2001, p. 216), who says that psychological concepts „appeal to causality because they are designed, like the concept of causality itself, to single out from the totality of circumstances which conspire to cause a given event just those factors that satisfy some particular explanatory interest”. According to Davidson, this applies to every science but „ultimate physics“ (i.e. the ideal final physics of the future). We might say it will also apply to every science ultimately reducible to physics. The attached image also humorously illustrates the problem with the notion of cause in any higher-level science: is the „true“ cause not always the ultimate physical one?

In any case, I am highly skeptical that psychology is especially problematic. Indeed, all sciences but physics and chemistry are problematic in the sense that their causes are interest-relative and that their „laws“ (i.e. the explanatory generalizations in which these causes are invoked) are notoriously exception-ridden, require non-specifiable ceteris-paribus-clauses to be workable and are „only“ probabilistic. I mean, if you think psychology is problematic, what about biology? Sociology? History? Linguistics? Anthropology? Economics? Etc. Are these any better off...?

Dear Joachim Lipski

One problem people have is they claim (basically) that philosophers have thought things out for them. REALLY ! Someday, we will realize (and be able to "peg" as fact) they all have biases that seriously taint their views OR they have an "ax/axe to grind". AND: This comes with just "believing them"; it is self-limiting, yet you may not know how (likely even more self-limiting than for any particular philosopher him/herself): that is because you think you can read something you totally agree with it and then use it for many or all purposes

Dear Orlando M Lourenço

Some things about "cause 'A'" : "A" could also be a cause of other things; other things could cause "A"; "A" could be a cause, as you say, but other things might (in reality) be involved and be important. Have I missed anything? ** As some or all of these may be true, it might be better to talk about "conditions-for/of". Also: It might be OK to say that "A" is A cause, as we understand it, but not good to say: THE cause. Thus, as you say, "... the notion of causality does not make much, if any, sense in the psychological domain".

Orlando, Thanks for not indicating over-certainty. That was helpful.

** FOOTNOTE: I did try to cover before, after, in-between and "other" (and these possibly at the same time as "A" and/or "B", as well as whenever else). Ask: are there clear distinct cases of "other"? (examples (just examples) here might be: "modulators", depressors (inhibitors), and augument -ers -- and these could be before, after, or in-between (between "A" and "B") (and these would be dependent on how well-defined and/OR fixed "B" is and similarly for "A" -- let's concentrate on well-defined (see my writings for how to arrive at good definitions)).)

Also, as interest-relative , I can also see room for the type of cause .Karl Pfeifer described

To say that A is a cause of B does not entail A is the cause of B, although we may call it that if it is a salient cause of interest in a pragmatic context (cf. Joachim Lipski above). When we speak more broadly of the causes (plural) of B, we presumably speak of a number of things each of which is a cause. Also, causation is transitive: if A causes B and B causes C, then A causes C (which already gives us two causes of C). If we really want to say the cause of something must include everything, then we'd better start with the Big Bang.

Dear Paul Hubert Vossen

A truly clear (becoming more and more clear by itself (in a sense), by design) is exactly what I provide.

You ask: " I guess you want to be such a paradigm changer, don't you? ". Actually more than THAT (beyond what Kuhn described). My system too much replaces how Psychologists look at and approach things in research , so much so it would be a revolution -- something Psychology may well not be able to cope with; thus, I may have to be more of a replacer rather than any simpler kind of win-them-over-er (I may end up wanting to defeat them rather than enlist them). I have tried several types of incentives to move them and my writings provide clear counters to several of the poor conceptualizations and more, yet the poor conceptualizations are the centerpiece of some branches or variations of the field : it is who they ARE.

About " psychology without a clear theoretical framework " -- yes all of Psychology is exactly such. AND: Psychology is not a science because everything is not clearly and agreeably (reliably/validly) based and founded/grounded/or stemming from DIRECTLY OBSERVABLE OVERT BEHAVIOR [PATTERNS]

Dear Karl Pfeifer

You say " To say that A is a cause of B does not entail A is the cause of B, although we may call it that if it is a salient cause of interest in a pragmatic context ". I KNOW that and THAT is exactly (in part) what I said. BUT I gave a much more detailed and full description of causalities in my last response to Orlando M Lourenço (a much clearer and fuller answer). For example, you say " When we speak more broadly of the causes (plural) of B, we presumably speak of a number of things each of which is a cause " . I describe various types of CASES of that.

Philosophy is such a disease, and in my writings I illustrate how and why. You always try to over-generalize the inadequate. In some regards you and your philosophy "stuff" remind me of Psychology OR rather I should say it the other way around: Psychology reminds me of your philosophies.

Dear Brad Jesness,

thanks for your reply. I did not mean to argue from Davidson‘s authority (which is not negligible, but of course in rational discourse still defeasible), but rather quoted him because I feel he expressed well what I also suspect. I also feel it is often beneficial to point to a certain tradition of thought rather than arguing for a claim from zero; not necessarily because it carries more argumentative weight, but because systems of thought which stand on the shoulders of intellectual giants are usually better developed than what we, in our limited (and as you rightly say: biased) cognitive capacity, could hope to rationalize from scratch (if we ever truly can have a completely original thought, which I also doubt).

In any case, feel free to remove the quotation marks and the reference to Davidson and treat what I wrote as an honest expression of my own thoughts on causality and interest-relativity in science, or at least of what I think of as a strong contender among my own often conflicted thoughts.

Dear Joachim Lipski

I stand on the shoulders of Darwin, the classical ethologists, and Piaget (AND with consideration of all major so-called personality theories, including Freud) AND I DO SO TRULY, PERSONALLY, AND THOROUGHLY.

What if I asked you : what greater thought-system you incorporate the views of your philosophers into ? (no answer here indicates no personal and true understanding).

Brad Jesness Sorry, I had too many overlapping windows open on a small screen and maybe I should have hit 'refresh' too. I was responding to Orlando M Lourenço's long post and not your particular reply to him which I somehow missed in the clutter. I agree that my remarks are almost like a précis of yours.

Dear All,

Good to read all the previous posts. I thank all posters for their challenging posts. Disagreements about heated topics are more than natural. Among other domains, in the domain of science, two concepts often appear: cause and condition. In my initial post, I make an effort to distinguish them. I would like to know of our ideas about such a distinction. So, I keep following. Be that as it make, it seems that causality is to necessity as condition it to probability. Will it be that necessity only exits in formal sciences (e.g., logic, mathematics), and not in any natural science, and obviously in psychology?

Dear Paul Hubert Vossen

If I was insulting you (if that is what it was, I'd call it rather: righteous frustration, with a touch of anger) it was for a VERY GOOD REASON. You have apparently no knowledge and/or appreciation for the ways of classical ethology. You make assertions which basically imply the ONE MUST adhere to your sort of model and associated understanding conjured by people. ( I hate models.) I have indicated that THAT does not "mesh" at all with my outlook. To say a bit more about NOT defining (seemingly so very hard for Western man who likes to conjure intuitively, in his head -- which will NEVER TURN OUT TO WORK WELL) MEANS:

An ethologist ** looks for types of things and eventually for very specific types of things; if he finds THE actual behavior patterns, if they match his expectations, then they EXIST (only then) and in a weak sense IT (whatever pattern IT is) is defined; BUT rarely are things so-defined without refinement or elaborations necessary, PROVIDED BY THE ORGANISM; when THOSE/THAT are found, this contextualization is part of the "definition" (in quotes because, again, most Western people cannot understand this; certain Biologists can understand this ***). This turns out to be a damned good definition for proceeding with observational studies and from that ALL sorts of studies).

I am sorry and I am sorry I do not delete most of my Answers in response to your posts; I worked too hard on them and believe they are generally informative.

** FOOTNOTE: Two classical ethologists were, in 1973, given the Nobel Prize for their behavioral science work; this is the ONLY Nobel Prize ever given to behavioral scientists, or (at least) the only one given in the last 50+ years. The Prize was in "Physiology and Medicine" BECAUSE that is the closet category for behavior science.

*** FOOTNOTE: Heck, Psychologists do not even know OR ACT LIKE, or even congruently, with the FACT that behavior patterns (including ALL significant behavior, i.e. clear and necessary patterns (aka species-typical or species-specific)) ARE AN ASPECT OF BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING. Today, psychology is a game played by cult members.

Dear Karl Pfeifer

I am sorry for the rough response. And, take no characterization of a field(s) personally.

Dear Orlando M Lourenço

Conditions may be just conditions; BUT they are not necessarily probabilistic (at least in a given circumstance OR (sometimes) type of circumstance) and some of the most important ones, like the capacity-conditions of the Memories are not in certain situations: think of the limits of the Memories in a certain high-demand situation; the LIMITS are not just probabilistic, given a certain tested and established status at a point in ontogeny . That you can hold only so much in mind and of certain types of things is a very important and necessary condition for learning, but obviously not a direct "cause". Perhaps more clearly: A similar case can be made at least for types (real solid concrete types) of environment aspects making for a condition for clear, distinct types of behavior pattern response (think of someone hitting your toes with a hammer); the same response can be to other things. Maybe anger responses can be a clearer example here. (It has been argued that all the emotions (universal emotional responses) are to some clearly definable type or types of situations -- still they are quite clear and these types of situations can be concretely defined __OR___ there is good reason to believe they can be. Here we have conditions reliably leading other conditions and these perhaps (but not just probabilistic) leading to a variety of possible responses, and being necessary conditions for some type(s) of response, perhaps more primitive responses. )

P.S. Dear Orlando M Lourenço

Sorry for 2 hr. of editing my last response to you, but with such kinds of situations where all the data (needed observations) are NOT in, it is hard trying to make the point clearly.

Article Causes and enabling conditions

Cause is defined by cure. Conventional and alternative medicine tend to avoid the word cure, and thus avoid the word cause, preferring statistical phrases like causal factors, conditions-for, etc.

Cause actually has two important meanings with respect to illness.

Present causes are the causes which, when successfully addressed, produce a cure. An element of illness has a single present cause, and an element of cure exists when that cause is addressed. Many diseases have multiple present causes - and require multiple cure elements. Simple or elementary illnesses and their cures are often ignored because they are trivial.

Every cause has a cause, but often the cause of the cause is in the past. Past causes are theoretical in specific cases and are generally statistical. Past causes are "conditions-for".

Mental disorders are generally defined as incurable - or perhaps more accurately, "cured is not defined for any mental disorder". The illogic is interesting.

If a mental disorder can be cured, it can only be cured by addressing the cause.

But... If a cause exists that can be addressed to produce a cure, then it was not a mental disorder - it was caused by the cause.

Eg. Depression cured by nutrition was not depression, it was malnutrition - not a mental disorder. The cure is ignored because it was not a mental disorder - and no one tracks nutritional cures.

Eg. Mania cured by removing a poison was not a mental disorder, it was just a symptom of the poison. The cure is ignored, because it wasn't a mental disorder - and cures for poisoning are not tracked.

Eg. Depression or bipolar caused by gaslighting, and cured by addressing the gaslighting, was not a mental disorder, it was a symptom of the abuse. The cure is ignored because it was not a mental disorder. Nobody tracks diseases with social causes, much less their cures.

Autism cured by addressing digestive or nutritional issues was not autism. The diagnosis was incorrect - and the cure is therefore ignored.

As a result of this failure to study the relationship between present cause and cure, mental disorders are assumed to be incurable - and only "condition-for" are currently studied.

To your health, Tracy

Author: The Elements of Cure

Dear Orlando,

This is another way of making my point , specifically, about your assertion that conditions are probabilistic.  I could try to say that that is not the case for some [CONDITIONS]; but, I will say that both you and I may seem to be right.  How could that be?  Well, as I can appeal to you as a stage theorist and invoke the saying of Einstein that "God doesn't play dice", here is my formulation:  It is based on the idea that qualitative changes must have some precision OR "things" would run amuck.  So, how does it work?  Well, as you know, I see stage changes AT THEIR INCEPTION involving truly basic perceptual shifts.  AT THESE INCEPTIONS, these "shifts" must be of some reliable nature.  But, to be of a realistic reliable (and even species-specific) nature, THESE (the "shifts") might well span (and, in later stages, DO span) across times and spaces. 

How?  This is the capability and capacity of contextualization BROUGHT FORWARD "out of" long-term memory and being the context in which such perceptual shifts occur. It is a capacity and capability of long-term memory.  That said, we much realize the non-specificity of specifics. Sounds crazy BUT : The application of the perceptual shifts to settings/situations/circumstances may involve what seem to be different actualities, but, I argue, these still conform (at the beginning) to a TYPE of concrete environmental aspects and the TYPE is strictly and concretely definable. These are, at key points in ontogeny, of a of a concrete nature, and at the inception of a shift, are seen in strictly type-able:  CONCRETE, DIRECTLY OBSERVABLE OVERT BEHAVIOR PATTERNS.  Again, this may only be seen AT KEY POINTS and across and between situations/circumstances (AS IS POSSIBLE, and seems so, IF ONE HAS SUFFICIENT IMAGINATION FOR IMAGINATION). (Things can be of a definable concrete type without all the environmental aspects being  a certain way.)  At some less refined level (and the way we most often really think), the "type of circumstances" may vary and be, IN A SENSE and to a degree, probabilistic.  BUT, at the core, no.  AND, thus, what probabilities there are will be constrained probabilities and will (if important) NEVER BE RANDOM IN THE SENSE OF A RANDOM DISTRIBUTION (so NOT really just probabilistic).