I'd say your question is effectively answered by Andy Clark (for example in his book “Being There”).His answer would be “no”. Clark shows how AI’s focus on creating representations hindered the field for quite some time. My reading of his work (or my reading of Piaget’s work for that matter) is not that he rejects the existence or use of internal representations, he simply shows these co-evolved with the external wiring of organisms, and he suggest AI can be forwarded by taking into account mind, body and environment as sources of intelligence, rather than just the mind.    

Dear Koen Van Turnhout  

The matter of representation (which I, of course believe is essential) becomes much easier when one understands the possibilities of visual-spacial memory and how much that is part of what is going on -- it is kind of like a frequent-picture-taking camera, but has selective aspects (which need to be discovered); dealing with processing it will be something like face-recognition software.

I most certainly WOULD say that virtually nothing should be based on models WITH WHICH ONE ENTERS A FIELD OF STUDY OF THE SUBJECT.  Models are bad, unless literally "called upon" by other data.  Perhaps this was part of the concern. Inductive work always precedes hypothetico-deductive systems, if things are done correctly; thus, this said, the Subject will force the definitions of any "models" needed (and how needed, and as needed).

Psychology, by definition, is study of behavior patterns and the associated environmental aspects (and at some points this must be DIRECT observation of EACH -- for empirical grounding) .  You will NEVER find this writer ever just talking about "the mind".

Evolution is WAY to far from any direct behavior pattern/environmental aspects to be any kind of big issue for me.

The way I see it, 'embodiment' wants to bring 'hardware' into the discussion. 'Software' written on top of dedicated 'hardware' runs more smoothly, because it has evovled to make the best of what it has available. We should be talking about how 'hardware' affects software design and optimization, so 'embodiment' is relevant.  

It's like driving a car. You know what a car is and how to drive one. Yet, you know about all the peculiarities of your own car a little bit better: its shifting, its handling, etc. Other drivers would need time to figure them out and adjust their driving style. Still the car won't drive exactly the same with them behind the wheel instead of you. You won't drive other people's cars exactly like they do either. You'll try to drive them like you drive your car. And that's 'en-car-ment' for you. ;)

Dear Asterios Chardalias 

My question very much included addressing AI (even mainly), but I guess only some psychologists MAY realize the repercussions of "embodiment" (as the "embodiment theorists" mean it) versus alternative views.  In its lay meanings (and meanings in other fields), "embodiment" seems/sounds good and in some senses may well be good.  But the interpretation others in other fields (other than psychology) give it is either a different and/or a very generous interpretation, since it does sound nice and holistic.  The problem is: in psychology they make it up, though it is supposed to represent the way behavior is; in psychology this is an unjustified conceptualization and arguably not due to the facts (or good or necessary) but due to assumptions.  AND: AI being "saddled" with this means AI would have to simulate/emulate sensori-motor behaviors as the basis for all developments of cognition (in ontogeny) -- and it is very hard to build all that musculature (etc.) sort of things into AI.  While I think AI people will, in some sense, have to imitate ontogeny factors (and as they relate, and as they are ordered) THESE ARE NOT THE TYPE you would want to deal with NOR is it necessary: there are alternatives that would require less and be more accurate and real and more justified by the facts.  Perhaps, as far as AI is concerned, my post (Question) was mainly to warn AI people what psychological "theories" you should not try to emulate, for several reasons.  [ To warn AI was one of the intentions of the Question (as just described), but to point up undue problems due to unjustified conceptualizations is what it was to point up for psychologists (though perhaps they will not read the Question, and if they do, the likelihood is they won't care). ]

It is natural that AI people would not know this sort of instantiation of the meaning.  I guess, ideally, I would have people who have studied cognitive psychology and human (child) development in detail, but who have now turned to AI, reading and thinking about the Question.  (I could only be so lucky that such persons with that background would be ones to follow me and my Questions; the Question being categorized, among other things (Topics), as relevant to "Embodied Cognition" was supposed to attract the psychology researchers/theorists. )

My background is in Cognitive Linguistics and my current interests lie with Computational Linguistics, so your question is spot on! Cognitive Linguistics has appropriated a lot of its basic terminology from Cognitive Psychology. 'Embodiment' and 'Embodied Cognition' are massive landmarks for Cognitive Linguistics. I never understood 'embodiment' as trying to describe how '(linguistic) behavior is', but rather how 'it was set on track'.  

AI doesn't have to be human-like. It may as well be its own thing altogether. People assume it will be 'safer' for it to be human-like, as if we understand humans full well. So there's a critical difference between a 'body' and a 'human body'. 

Dear Asterios Chardalias  

I would maintain that as far as cognitive capacities and abilities (and their development) are concerned, AI could not likely have a better idea of how to do that than by knowing what unfolds in the ontogeny of a human.  There is obviously a lot of potential there; and, imagine THAT nearly error-less and without the irrationality -- emulating the very best of humans !

Thus, it is my concern not only for psychology, but for AI (and other related fields), that the nature of cognition and cognitive development have a proper, justified, most-empirical "account" (with the key points of assertions directly observable and replicable).  "Embodiment" 'theory' has ONLY supposed _and_ indirect evidence everywhere, for everything -- except, of course, during the (Piaget's) sensori-motor Period of infancy.

As I have maintained, there are extremely unnecessary reasons why "embodiment" of 'thought'  IN SENSORI-MOTOR ACTIONS is the ONLY idea some psychologists have; I see it as because of  false "assumptions".  Because of THESE certain UNFOUNDED likely-false "assumptions", these are the only ideas THEY CAN HAVE (you cannot bend your thinking "out of line" with your 'foundational' 'assumptions'/presumptions -- even if those "assumptions" are without any good foundation OR even if they are FALSE).  These "assumptions" include (1) "all that is innate is largely present at birth" and (2) "the more 'learning' there is, the less innate guidance" -- also including taking that to mean: less (or no)  innate guidance involved in the inception of qualitatively new ways of categorizing and relating things.  I BELIEVE BOTH THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE both UNFOUNDED AND FALSE.  They are certainly unproven.  AND: the natural consequences of having to have ones conceptualizations being IN ACCORD with these "assumptions" basically eliminates the possibility of thinking of new significant innate guidance involved with/in the inception of qualitatively new types of learning/thinking. This is what I believe (at the root) leads to stilted, inadequate, not-directly-testable, and down-right-weird conceptualizations, such as that of the "embodiment" 'theorists'.

My perspective (in "A Human Ethogram ... " ), though justified by assumptions that are more-likely true and are more consistent with biological principles, CANNOT EVEN ENTER THE MIND OF THE EVER-PRESUMPTIVE psychology researchers/'theorists' (even for proper consideration).  This wrong-"assumptions" problem is basically a historical problem in "Western" psychology/culture, DUE TO THE SAME GROUNDLESS PRESUMPTIONS in classic philosophy (there, also not empirical-grounded or well-related to direct observations AT ALL, at any point).

My perspective is a more parsimonious, clean, well-justified perspective, HYPOTHESIZING clear directly observable behavior patterns (and environmental aspects) AT ALL THE KEY POINTS OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT.  This perspective, involving perceptual "shifts" and/or perceptual/attentional "shifts", not only has a better foundation (arguing strongly against "embodiment" 'theory'), but also FIXES SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN what is known as Perceptual Control Theory -- another presently skewed-by-false-'assumptions' 'theory'.  To read the core of my approach to understanding cognition and cognitive development, see: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286920820_A_Human_Ethogram_Its_Scientific_Acceptability_and_Importance_now_NEW_because_new_technology_allows_investigation_of_the_hypotheses

For more of the "kit" I have developed for true artificial intelligence people (including a good, verifiable perspective on the NECESSARY types of human memory -- much of that coming from some of the GOOD research in Psychology), see: https://www.researchgate.net/project/Developing-a-Usable-Empirically-Based-Outline-of-Human-Behavior-for-FULL-Artificial-Intelligence-and-for-Psychology

Article A Human Ethogram: Its Scientific Acceptability and Importanc...