Similar values - yes: the ancient Greek city-states, or self-governed merchant republics in medieval Europe, eastern Europe and Russia included (e.g., Novgorod the Great). The whole combination of the traits you have drawn out is unique, though, and belongs with the modern era. I am not sure about hegemonic civilization, but I am sure about industrial and post-industrial modernity as the necessary precondition for liberal democracy.

Mikhail

Thank you for your reply, and with apologies for length:

As there seem to be no closely-comparable historical exemplars of liberal democracies, I can proceed to the subtext of my question concerning the role of a hegemonic power in guaranteeing the survival of liberal democratic values. (For now, I’m assuming this hasn’t already been covered in the almost book-length thread started by Professor Callaway).

I’m not a political scientist, but I believe this issue underlies others closer to my own areas, especially how information and mis-information structure organisations, especially given the increasing trends towards a post-truth, cyber-vulnerable world. Indeed, this week’s Economist [Dec 17th-23rd] discusses “China’s digital dictatorship”.

My starting point in arguing that the survival of liberal democratic values requires a hegemonic power is the long-term resource pressures that I believe all big governments and companies perceive (rightly or wrongly) in their need to sustain an increasingly populous world.

I refer both to:

-          external material resources (e.g. in the Arctic and South China Seas, Himalayan water supplies,…)

-          and internal resources such as educational, welfare and some health services, under pressure from e.g. immigration

…for a world undergoing demographic transitions – not just the developing world but also as a result of the ageing of developed-world populations.

I believe these concerns have become more urgent after the 2008 financial crisis, when opportunities for economic growth and international trade have slowed, as a result of which the larger economies start to become more autarkic and the whole tilts towards a zero-sum world, in which sanctions and loss of trade-opportunities become weaker inhibitors of actions that would be contrary to the pre-existing international order.  

Not only might these changes fail to discourage the more buccaneering and authoritarian states, but I believe the resulting pressures on liberal democracies will force them too into domestic actions where (to borrow a phrase from the Leader in today’s Economist) “values cannot hold back the chaos and anarchy of [i.e. resulting from] geopolitics”.

In a little more detail, as I see it: Britain in the C19th represented, however imperfectly, something approaching a hegemonic Liberal Democracy, and no later than 1945 the baton passed to the US.

During the Cold War, most regions of strategic significance were under the sway of either the USSR or the US, and with a few exceptions (e.g. Iran) there was a motivation – especially at a time when world trade was expanding rapidly – for all sides to seek stability through international diplomacy.

The Cold-War fear of a hot war evaporated and now, after the 2008 financial crisis, in contrast, I believe a resurgent China sees increasing US vulnerability (not least via its financial indebtedness to China), while Russia sees a lack of resolve in the EU and the beginnings  of EU fragmentation. With China and Russia both having significant internal problems, it makes sense for them to raise domestic perceptions of external threats to themselves by confrontation with the US and EU.

It seems therefore that both Russia and China are becoming emboldened to act increasingly in narrow nationalistic self-interest and disdain the international order, such as it was. With an apparent a lack of resolve in the EU for international action and now a potentially isolationist US, there appears to be nothing to hold a line against further unravelling of the world order.

My conclusion is that the EU and US are both going to be tested by increasingly unrestrainable China and though itself not as strong as it was, an adventurist Russia. Without the US acting, however imperfectly, to defend Liberal Democratic values as some sort of “world policeman”, they and the EU will either have to submit to foreign threats, or harden themselves in a way that will end up by eroding the values to which the West generally subscribes.

Hence, my suggestion that it is only when there is a self-confident and dominant world power that is not afraid to intervene (pre-Trump, if not pre-Obama) when such values are under threat that the narrower forces of naked self-interest can be held at bay and encouraged to see the benefits of returning to diplomatic solutions.

In conclusion, mid-C20th Germany can be seen as a failed modern liberal democracy; had Britain not held out, with the aid of the US, and had Germany swallowed Soviet Russia then perhaps there would have been a counterfactual example to consider in which a much empowered and expanded Germany could have taken on the US – which seems to support my thesis…?

Regards to any who've read this far.

Liberal democratic values existed previously in the Scandnavian areas, in particular Iceland. However, also in Sweden and Norway the Kings had mostly influence on the (reachable) costal areas, leaving the inland on its own (Besides from this fact I don't know what political structures existed there, but probably smaller selfgoverned groups). Nevertheless, I think that the situation of our (western) democratic liberal values is rather unique and lacks comparable examples, in particular when regarding the scale.

In the case of Iceland (and Scandinavia) people found themselves in a very harsh environment, which made cooperation a vital issue for survival. A proper cooperation (with a person that is not replaceable) demands for the acceptance of each others values, as it still can be seen in Scandinavian societies today, while in central europe the population density and resource availability was high enough to "replace" people and formulate claims on their goods (taxes, landownership,...).

I think that the self-governed merchant republics in medieval Europe are closest to what we have today. The democratic values where a result of a global economy giving normal citicens wealth and power. This monetary power was separate from the political claims that nobels could make and in order to sustain these monetary values (within the small scale of a city) every individual needed to contribute. You need a mass of educated wealthy people to sustain this system compared to the surrounding monarchies.

When democratic values came up in Europe in the late 18th century, common people were in a very bad economic situation due to exploitation from nobels. Thus, my assumption is, that (besides humanistic values) economic values played and important role in forming the democracy today.(When would you start a revolution? This would support your theory of a hegemonic civilisation to sustain liberal democratic values (within the European cultures). In case of the European Union we can say for sure that the inicial interest was economic, especially since (in the beginning) public interest was rather low and the European goverment did not ask for it.

As it appears, in the last years the world economic situation drastically changed towards a more equal world than only a decade ago. The formerly poor China has become a stron economic power, most African countries managed to form stable governments starting to claim their rights for their goods and so on. In this equalizing world it at least seems that the driving force behind western liberal values (as I assume them), the economic power (or hegemonic civilisation) is compromised and formerly irreplacible political and trade partners got replacible. I think that this is an important driver (yet not the only one!) of the falling appart of the EU.

These formulations of mine are of course just loose theories lacking proofs, but it is worth thinking about it. Regarding your question about the necessity of a hegemonic civilisation I would say

- not forestablishing it (see Iceland)

- But at least necessary for the philosophical mindset in the western world today.

I can immagine, that liberal democratic values with increase vastly over the next decades especially in Asia and Africa. People there have different mindsets and attitudes, so we will (hopefully) know the answer in the future.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Ellis, 

It strikes me that interpreting and trying to answer your question depends much on one's understanding of the term "hegemonic." The term is, of course, frequently used to translation of Chinese criticisms of the U.S. or of the West. The word seems to vary in meaning from something like "preponderant leadership" to something more like "domination": 

Webster's says,

Definition of hegemony

1:  preponderant influence or authority over others :  domination

2:  the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group

---End quotation

My first inclination is to ask what you mean by hegemonic civilization. Anything excessively hegemonic might plausibly be viewed as inconsistent with liberal values. I'd hate to think that we require a world policeman to maintain liberal values, but this does seem to be your suggestion. Again, being the world policeman might itself be inconsistent with liberal values for any country taking up the role. Much seems to depend on how strong a conception of hegemony you think to evoke here. 

Can you clarify on this point of meaning?

H.G. Callaway 

Not my field by any means, but while we're at it, I'd offer a more optimistic view. It seems to me that both China and Russia, in the past 20+ years, all on their own, without any overtly aggressive moves required from the West, have been heading in our general direction (culturally). I think global communications have a way of showing people what the other side is doing, and the people have a way, sooner or later, of demanding what they see as "better," from their so-called leadership.

People the world over wear blue jeans, and like rock and roll or hip-hop, not to mention television. The West didn't have to insist on anything, for this to happen.

Vox populi est vox dei.

Dear Professor Callaway

Thank you for your incisive question, highlighting the potential contradiction in my use of the term “hegemonic civilisation”.

A short preliminary* answer for the moment:

By a ‘hegemonic civilisation’ I mean something like modern Western civilisation displaying:

-          Leadership for others to aspire to – showing a better way to order e.g. economic and some aspects of social affairs

-          Powerful enough that others would be cautious challenging it

-          Being willing to intervene in extreme situations e.g. on humanitarian grounds

I recognise that still leaves the question of who defines “extreme”.

Hoping this goes some way towards answering, for now – more later

Regards – P G Ellis

*   It’s nearly 3 am here, with a deadline looming later this week, and I owe a reply to another

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Ellis and readers, 

Many thanks for your reply and further comments. 

I wonder if you might agree to the following sort of division of your initial question:

1) Is American (West European?) leadership of the liberal democracies needed or desired?

2) What are the appropriate means and limits of international liberal democratic leadership?

Issues connected with interventionism will likely be prominent. I would think that issues connected with mass surveillance would also be important.

H.G. Callaway 

Let me look the other way, from non-western side

Western governments seem to be sympathetic toward the rising demand for locally distinctive politics and claim that they agree with the quest for alternative forms of democracy. They also know that in many non-Western countries international democracy-support strategies have failed, with even the most sincere local democrats criticizing their rigidity and “one-size-fits-all” uniformity. .

http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/10/25/exploring-non-western-democracy-pub-61825

Interesting question.

There is at least three/four civilisations that can be compared to the West in terms of quality of life and political climate, Japan being the prime example.

This means that in order to emulate the success of the West, a country need not to be "Christian" or  "Protestant" or "White"!! 

Another examples Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan!!

So my answer to the question: No

In this discussion we should also consider about which values we are talking. E.g. in the USA we have a liberal democratic society, but the inequality within the population is very high, tendency is increasing. European countries currently go in the same direction. Also, Western lifestyle is far from being sustainable. The excessive use/need of (international) resources was the initial motivation for the dominance of a few nations in the world. Today, the west needs a drastic shift of mindsets and values within short time to adapt to the current situation of climate change, loss of biodiversity and resource depletion (e.g. agricultural soils). Hence, western lifestyle (including our model of democracy) seems to fail the biophysical reality and many social issues and it is questionable whether we should promote this particular system in the rest of the world. In that respect I agree with Krishnan Umachandran.

Liberal democratic values however are probably the most valuable achievement of humans throughout the history. I think, in this respect we are at a point where we need to reinvent democracy in a way that is not based on the principle of "Bread and Games" --> Keep the electors occupied and distracted and the government can do whatever it wants.

What kind of mindset do you think would be necessary for a democratic equal (world)society that is based on humanistic values and a sustainable lifestyle?

Paul G. Ellis,

Your question is interesting. I have the following hypothetical responses - hypothetical because the issue can be debated - to your question:

The debate can be endless, but this does not discourage one from developing and testing an hypothesis leading to preliminary conclusions. Sometimes it is difficult for humanity to judge its age; always history judges past generations. Sometimes as a non-westerner (African) I find difficulties establishing what "Western" civilisation is or looks like given the historical and historic transference of non-western values (e.g. Judeo-Christian belief systems) and their appropriation by western states and societies. How, then, do western values differ from non-western Judeo-Christian values that originate in other parts of the world? Or when did these Judeo-christian values become western? ETC. But for academic purposes, one can conceptualise - I mean conceptually theorise - western values, test them empirically, and make conclusions. Most-times, academic inquiry is unable to delve deep into the nuances of non-hegemonic paradigms. And paradigms are propagated, in large part, by resources and technologies: whoever controls resources and technologies can propagate paradigms - it's like patenting. 

All the best.

I also struggle with the concept of 'Western' in this context. It is too slippery and vague, and foundations for many of the values underpinning liberal democracy can be found other places than the 'West'.

On how values and norms emerge and are maintained in a global system, a good starting point would be to go back to Hedley Bull's classic 'Anarchical Society'. Hegemony is one way in which global norms can be promoted and maintained, but not the only one. It is not clear that attempts at imposing democratic values on a society from the outside have ever been successful (for a classic on this topic, read John Stuart Mill's On Liberty).

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all, 

I think this question may still benefit by clarification of the concept of "hegemony." Otherwise, the idea seems to slip back and forth between "leadership" and "domination."  I take it that these are two ideas that we do not want to confuse.

From the on-line etymological dictionary: 

hegemony (n.)

1560s, "preponderance, dominance, leadership," originally of predominance of one city state or another in Greek history; from Greek hegemonia "leadership, a leading the way, a going first;" also "the authority or sovereignty of one city-state over a number of others," as Athens in Attica, Thebes in Boeotia; from hegemon "leader, an authority, commander, sovereign," from hegeisthai "to lead," perhaps originally "to track down," from Proto-Indo-European *sag-eyo-, from root *sag- "to seek out, track down, trace" (see seek). In reference to modern situations from 1850, at first of Prussia in relation to other German states.

---End quotation

Could it be that the question is rendered defective by the ambiguity? What is the question? Does the west need someone to lead? Does the west need to be dominated?  

H.G. Callaway

I think Sabastiano makes some excellent points, regarding what people mean by "western," and the influence of non-western ideals in this "Western Democracy" notion we're trying to pin down. My only suggestion would be, we're only using this label because western countries have adopted this way of governing themselves universally. But some other countries have too. So I would not assume that the label "Western Democracy" attempts to imply that it only exists in the West.

Other countries have the same or very similar schemes. Japan? Yes. Taiwan? Yes. Hong Kong is trying to as well, to the extent they are permitted these days. Singapore? South Korea? Is Vietnam not heading in this direction too? And on and on.

How does religion play in this? I would downplay religion, other than how it might have impacted on these fundamental elements that need to exist:

1. The Ten Commandments, in general. Many people can accept them as guidelines that are "good for society," without having to load on any supernatural provenance. They provide a foundation for the secular laws of the land.

2. The concept of the Golden Rule, cemented in Christianity via Matthew 7:12: "So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets." Again, without necessarily having to insist on supernatural provenance, and also without making claims that this is unique to Christianity. Also a foundation for secular laws.

3. And yet, strict separation of church and state. This is extremely important, in that the power has to remain with the people, not with any person or entity claiming to speak for the Almighty.

4. The rule of law. Meaning, no individual, no matter how high in the political or religious hierarchies, can summarily change laws or disobey them. Even monarchs, such as they are in the West these days (mainly figureheads, not replacing or overriding representative governments).

5. And of course, the main ingredient being that the voice of the people has to be represented in the government and in the laws.

I contend that people from any part of the world would, and do, gravitate to this type of political system. I also think that as populations are better educated, they demand this on their own, without having to have anyone else impose anything.

In reply to Professor Callaway’s answer above:

While I cannot at present improve upon the attempt to clarify my meaning in using the word ‘hegemony’ in my answer on p. 1 (and appreciate Professor Callaway’s early upvote for that answer), I am content to accept the definition he provides from the on-line etymological dictionary (in his post above) along with any ambiguity it involves.

To my way of thinking, the question is not necessarily rendered defective by the ambiguity of the term, but rather calls for a better resolution of it. (While I am far less competent in philosophy that physical chemistry and physics, I have come to think that ambiguity is an unavoidable characteristic of natural language when applied to complex matters)

I aim to return to the other two questions posed in the above answer as time allows.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Ellis & Manfredi, 

I still see the usage of "hegemonic" in the question as problematic. It simply reminds me too much of the authoritarian's or dictator's claim for legitimacy, which consists of insisting, "Well, its either me or anarchy." Clearly, the international system of the liberal democracies will call for leadership, but it is an entirely different matter to ask if it requires domination. The point is very close to that involved when insisting on the distinction between unilateralism and multilateralism. 

Some level of ambiguity or lack of clarity may, indeed, come along with natural language and discussions of human affairs generally; but that is far from saying that no improvements are possible or that there is no room for objecting to ambiguity. It strikes me that there are two questions involved, suggesting the need to look into distinct concepts, considerations and debates. Even vigorous democratic leadership is something distinct from domination. 

Instead of addressing "western liberal democracy," why not simply leave it at "liberal democracy"? This terms also has its range of exemplars and possible ambiguities, but it is pretty standard in political science. In that way, we avoid the suggestion of excluding consideration of the larger range of liberal democracies.

H.G. Callaway 

Dear HG Callaway, I think we are in complete agreement, on both of your points.

Point 1. I still see the usage of "hegemonic" in the question as problematic. It simply reminds me too much of the authoritarian's or dictator's claim for legitimacy, which consists of insisting, "Well, its either me or anarchy." 

Yes, I think the legitimacy should not need to be enforced by anything more than local laws. Certainly not from abroad. Legitimacy should be natural. Just as no one needs to brainwash people to like, you know, blue jeans, smartphones, the Internet, or other western products. This has to happen naturally. It does happen naturally. That's what makes it robust. In physics, this would be called "stable equilibrium," where the system is self regulating. As opposed to "unstable equilibrium," a precarious state, where any minor disruption causes the status to go out of whack.

Point 2. Instead of addressing "western liberal democracy," why not simply leave it at "liberal democracy"?

Indeed. After all, no one seems to need to call this "Athenian democracy." Good ideas get adopted, perhaps tweaked here and there, they evolve over time, without needing to be coerced.

I do not think that an hegemonic civilisation is needed. The western culture has been built since the Middle Ages through an interchange among the national cultures: Greek, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, German, Danish, Russian, Polish, etc etc.... the attempts of Charles V, Philip II, Luis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler who tried to rule Europe by an hegemonic nations failed.... the British empire split in several independent countries of the Commonwealth.... 

Dear All, (Adapted variant of a posting on “Is_liberal_democracy_in_decline”)

There's an interesting 30-minute discussion relevant to this Question (available till mid-January 2017, to those able to access it - pls see below) on: 

       http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08683hg/dateline-london-24122016

It's the year-end review by a weekly discussion on BBC News among three international and one domestic journalist, moderated by a leading news broadcaster. (I'm unsure whether those outside the UK can view this item from BBC TV News. If you can see it and it asks for a TV licence, just click ‘Yes’ - there's no follow-up outside the UK (and probably none within).)

1)     Part of this episode, reviewing the deep political divisions of 2016, discusses in places the end of liberalism in the context of recent events, including one participant of the opinion that:

"…the complacent liberal hegemony is what's given rise to all these populist right wing movements."

(Time, perhaps, for me to think again!)

2)     Additionally, a left-wing historian friend, staying with us for Xmas, suggested that

“…the persistence of liberal values required a return to a “balance of power” such as existed in C19th Europe”.

I disagreed on the basis that (in my opinion)

·         it was the post-WWII US (however it acted internationally), that enabled the maintenance of liberal values within N. America and Western Europe.

·         for the near future, however, we are anyway unlikely to achieve a global balance of power, starting from the current disequilibrium.

HNY - Paul G Ellis

(This answer inserted before answering some posts above, on the basis of the time-limit on access to the link posted here)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08683hg/dateline-london-24122016

UPDATE 

If the link in my preceding post doesn't work, you can get something fairly similar off YouTube [1st link below]: That link is from a November edition of the same programme. Fortunately, it has four of the same participants (only the Middle Eastern journalist differs) as the 24th Dec. edition (repeated 25th and 26th Dec), so some of the expressed views are quite similar.

It may be that the latest edition of the programme, the one I've referenced in the message above, does get posted on YouTube before long. Otherwise, anyone interested can try to pick up and play my 1.37 GB Windows Media Center copy via DropBox, But this might not work for people without software to display a *.wtv file (and I'm not certain the dropbox link will work for undefined users, unless they send me an email address).

Paul

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4ttuoDJYHE

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/pqnedtujnoejc87ot9kf9/AAA3qAlx9s8V0oh4KnosvIaHa?oref=e&r=AARR7r_9xMNzqD8AcFXXfbVQ_l9Fb0sjhhqcTbF2CSkR0Ck8c4Wl0GT8_MtbWYCzoPjNAkquuMtDq8sK-twHdOlCDhgDd_mZW4Kj_ygRpynvGOXQAxMq3zCYmvYF1HlrJ6A26FkS_nesqspLRF--3Ee0-meNWYQ4tWQB9Z7R7EjLcN8MyRMG05rzJWdZJ64QizM&sm=1

I think that, at least in part, the answer to your last question has also an internal, sociological dimension.

For sets of values (say, in this case, also the liberal democratic ones) to flourish, and to continue to thrive, population must be willing to support them from within. Values, and the specific culture consistently built on them, are maybe the most important glue keeping a society together.

Now, the liberal values, since the impartiality/neutrality struggle in the 80ies and even more the multicultural turn in the 90ies, are interpreted as preaching equal respect also for the other cultures/sets of values. And putting themselves on an equal standing.

That is, equality and liberty have been pushed from the realm of substantial values to the level of meta-values. And this move, from the point of view of the society's identity, is currently proving to have been a self-defeating one. Society has become weak from an internal, ideantitarian point of view.

"Civilisations die from suicide" (Toynbee, but also, centuries and centuries before, Ibn Khaldun)

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Verza,

Interesting comment.

I suspect it may help to ask, given what you say, about the function of multiculturalism in globalization: Whether liberal democratic values can be given sufficient priority at home, when expansion of international trade (and supporting relations) is the chief aim of policy --and international trade is indifferent to values and politics?

Consider the prestige and incentives of international corporations and their employees, but also, e.g., the internationalization of important institutions of higher education. Internationalizing institutions of every sort have grown in importance in comparison to those specific to and supportive of particular liberal-democratic societies. Such internationalizing institutions have been economically empowered in comparison to more purely domestic institutions; and the results include growing inequalities and a certain de-centering of liberal-democratic values. 

One might say that the domestic politics of the expansion of trade has proved much easier than the international politics of the regulation of economic forces--as evident in the great crash of 2008 and the Euro-crisis. There seems to be an incompatibility between continuous expansion of international trade and the maintenance of liberal-democratic values at home. Time to slow down international, go-go capitalism or time to impose an international hegemony?

Mankind does not live by bread alone. 

H.G. Callaway

I like the reformulation of this question, and would like to make two elementary points: first that a lot hangs on how we are going to individuate "civilizations" (I think that this is implicitly acknowledged by the scare quotation marks around 'Western" in the current formulation); and second that liberal-democratic values may have needed the hegemonic civilization(s) of Greece, Rome, the ancient Hebrews, and the European Middle Ages in order to come into existence, but may now be able to sustain themselves without the help of a cultural hegemon.

It is a very interesting question. However, I believe we need to answer a more fundamental question first. Is Western liberal democracy robust enough as it is?

There are variety of evidence and scholarly works that point to its many shortcomings. The rise of fascism in interwar Europe, partly was due weak democratic values.

There are also studies on the new wave of populism and the rise of Europskeptic parties that point to the fact that our Western liberal democracy is not robust enough. So, even if we accept a need for a hegemonic civilization for survival of Western liberal democracy, this civilization need more robust democratic institutions, which are more pragmatic and less elite-driven.

My apologies for not having been able to continue with this discussion over the Xmas/New year period. 

However, I have since come across "Hegemonic Stability Theory" [wiki link below] and need to consider that (together with a related thread) before returning, to reply to all above, if I think I have any  worthwhile conclusion to offer (after the coming term's teaching is under control).

Meanwhile - thanks to all for contributions to date and for widening my understanding of the question.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory

Dear Paul G. Ellis 

I don't think that Western” liberal democracy require a hegemonic civilization to guarantee and maintain its values. because our cultural background differ from what western values have . some state refuse the liberal democracy and treat with its values as strangers ideas not adaptable with their situation , Egypt , Arab Gulf states  Syria, Libya as best examples . 

Dear Asaad,

I wasn't suggesting for a moment that Western values should be imposed beyond the locations where people have taken to them.

I mean only that those of us who consider ourselves fortunate to enjoy free speech, the rule of law,  etc (however imperfectly in practice), might generally wish to defend them, on their home territory, against the spread of more illiberal systems, and I have raised for discussion the idea that it might take a hegemonic power to preserve them in the places where they are wanted.

If you prefer other values then it's your right to defend those.

However, I do wonder whether places like Libya and Syria, both high on the list of Fragile States, might be better organised...

Regards - Paul

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Fragile_States_Index

Dear All,

Late addition, in brief support of the posted Question:

I've attached a copy of a review in the UK Sunday Times (30-1-17), by the historian/author Max Hastings, of US diplomat Richard Haass' recent work "A World in Disarray" in which he (MH) writes:

"Richard Haass ...  is one of his nation’s wise and great, in and out of government since the 1980s, now president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Stability is the great good, he says. However unpleasant the Cold War might have been, the bipolar universe made us safer than the circumstances of today, when America’s share of world power is much reduced, and the balance is diffused among many nations and interests, some of them non-state players."  

I read this initially as favouring the US role of hegemon. However, Haass is also reported, later in the same review as understanding:

"...that the foremost requirement for stability is that the great nations can deal with each other"

...which throws me back again to the posted question, and wondering whether a multipartite - rather than hegemonic - stability would allow the maintenance of liberal democracy. Would a liberal democratic former hegemon have to make compromises that would undermine its values?

As for Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), mentioned in an earlier post, there is no clear indication of whether or not the theory holds in fact.

Nevertheless, I take comfort from one suggestion therein, that 

"...many argue that China has a symbiotic relationship with U.S. If U.S. declines, it is likely that China also may be in jeopardy. John Gulick points out that China’s prosperity is “deeply ensconced in the 'China produces and lends, the US borrows and spends’ framework.”[34] Economic interdependence of China derives from the fact that they are a producing state rather than a consuming state. China’s economy is export heavy as its driving force lies in “export processing measures”[35] The export dependent structure could severely dampen economic growth if demand for Chinese exports is reduced by another economic crisis in the U.S. Thus, China’s economic woes are one of the barriers to its hegemonic aspirations. "

Regards - PGE

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Hastings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_N._Haass

Dear All

Perhaps the quote below provides the strongest support for the proposition that ““Western” liberal democracy require a hegemonic civilisation to guarantee and maintain its values”

From a senior US diplomat and scholar, Dr Haass's Wikipedia entry [linked in my preceding post, just above] also states:

"Haass most clearly outlined his foreign policy views in his book The Reluctant Sheriff (1997). In his book, Haass argued that the United States should play the role of international sheriff. Maintaining international order often means “assuming the role of international sheriff, one who forges coalitions or posses of states and others for specific tasks,” Haass writes (Haass 1997, 6). In other words, Haass called on the United States to assume the role of an international sheriff that forges posses of states that worked together to patrol the international system. While Haass argued that the approach would largely benefit the international system, he also made it clear that he intended for the United States to play the role of international sheriff to pursue its own preferences for the world. In the years ahead, “what will prove crucial is the ability of the United States to persuade others to adopt and abide by its preferences – and the will and the ability of the United States to act as a sheriff, to mobilize itself and others to insist on them when resistance emerges,” Haass notes (Haass 1997, 44)."

As I interpret it [especially where I've bolded above], the quote implies that this senior US diplomat does seem to favour an effectively hegemonic role for the maintenance of US values.

PGE

The liberal-conservative continuum seems to be based on a latent psychological factor (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309719448_Psychological_Underpinnings_of_Ideology_in_the_Australian_Federal_Parliament_A_Computational_Linguistic_Analysis?_iepl%5BviewId%5D=qRTn1yYqcWvHEcYOtDfgKTTd&_iepl%5BprofilePublicationItemVariant%5D=default&_iepl%5Bcontexts%5D%5B0%5D=prfpi&_iepl%5BinteractionType%5D=publicationTitle).

The liberal-conservative divide seems to appear in societies with a reasonably sophisticated polity. Think of the Populares and Optimates in Ancient Rome.

Data Psychological Underpinnings of Ideology in the Australian Fe...

The hegemonic state already exists - this is the United States. And so far they have retained their hegemony, Western democracy, and neoliberal ideology.

Thank you for your answer.

My question is whether the Enlightenment-originated values that the US professes to maintain (which it does, but imperfectly) can survive if the US ceases to be the hegemon...