Some counterfactual or partially counterfactual sort of modal statements, if they imply possible worlds, imply also some really (probabilistically with high truth value) possible worlds, and some necessary worlds. In which circumstances at all can there be other counterfactually possible worlds in reality? All possible worlds need not be necessary, but some of them might be, are, and will be necessary.

To find out in which all cases these causal possible worlds are real as past, present, and future necessary worlds, we need to investigate the possibilities that the physical laws with the presently available contingently physical and ontological information will permit us to accept the existence of other worlds as causally really existing.

But it is impossible to differentiate between counterfactual or partially counterfactual sort of modal statements!

Hence, visit the basic discussion text of: https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Irrefutable_Argument_for_Universal_Causality_Any_Opposing_Position

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