Thanks very much for that, Nancy.  I have downloaded the article from JSTOR, and it is very helpful.

I've scanned through lots of other articles, both old and recent,and it's interesting that so far this is the only one to address, albeit briefly, the question of the military protection of such colonies.  I'd have liked more, but can still build a case for where my own thoughts have been taking me.  And the reference to the Urso charter (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dr_LASSARD/publication/259757537_Charter_of_Urso_%28ARS%29/links/02e7e52da5a3a26c02000000.pdf) was also very helpful.  I'd already looked at this, but got lost in the legalese.  The footnote in this article points me straight too the relevant sections.

Will leave the question open, though, in case someone else has helpful suggestions to offer.

You find plenty of references to the military importance of such colonies, and the vital role they played in providing recruits for the legions.  But very little modern work seems to have been done on how they defended themselves in hostile regions .

For anyone following this trail by the way, the author of the article cited by Nancy is Nicola Mackie, not Verlag.  He's the Historia publisher.

Data Charter of Urso (ARS)

P.S.  Would give your answer a double up vote, Nancy, but the system won't let me, so hopefully someone else will.

The question of (self?-)defence of Augustan colonies has perhaps a connection to a Lex de Vi Publica...

Thanks, Josef.  Have done some investigations on the line you suggested, but so far my feeling is that the laws de Vi were intended to address internal (i.e. within the State) private, pubic and political violence, rather than the issue of defence from external threats.

I think what I am looking for lies more in the area of the laws and charters on the foundation of colonies.  The issue is addressed in the Charter of Urso, founded under Julius Caesar, and I have today found a new book on line that may help to make things a bit clearer.  Will let you know.

Buongiorno.

Personalmente non condivido l'impostazione del problema: l'idea che le colonie di veterani potessero essere usate a scopo difensivo potrebbe forse essere vero ma non credo sia un'impostazione generale. Nel caso specifico della Mauretania non funziona giacché le colonie furono fondate in un regno che solo temporaneamente era stato ereditato da Ottaviano e che in seguito fu ceduto al re Giuba II (e le colonie furono infatti annesse amministrativamente alla vicina Baetica), cfr. Coltelloni-Trannoy 2002: M. Coltelloni-Trannoy, Le Royaume de Maurétanie sous Juba II et Ptolémée, Paris. Teoricamente questo potrebbe valere per Simitthus in Proconsolare ma come pe.e spiegare la colonia di Uthina, Thuburbo Minus, Maxula, Neapolis in una regione perfettamente sicura, alle porte della neonata Cartagine ? (cfr. L. Teutch, Das Städtewesen in Nordafrika in der Zeit von C. Gracchus bis zum Tode des Kaisers Augustus, Berlin 1962; Lassère Ubique Populus, Paris 1977), o la stessa Thabarca... In realtà credo (ma è una mia opinione) che le ragioni militari / di ordine pubblico siano secondarie rispetto a quelle più urgenti di sistemare un gran numero di veterani dopo le guerre civili, possibilmente in aree non ancora ben occupate oppure (questo è possibile) dove il consenso per Augusto non era al massimo. Cfr. in proposito (Rizakis 1996: A. D. Rizakis, “Les colonies romaines des côtes occidentales grecques. Populations et territoires”, DHA, 22, 255-324)

Hello, Antonio.  Thank you for your contribution, and my apologies for taking time to get back to you.  I am currently preparing a paper for presentation in a couple of months time (not on Roman History) and that's demanding much of my time.  Also, I regret I do not read Italian, so have had to work your text through Google Translate to get some sense of what you were saying.

I was aware of the issues you raise about Mauretania.

Initially, as my question says, I was initially interested in how colonies protected themselves in more troubled areas, such as Antioch in Pisidia and its sister colonies, at the time of their foundation.  But as I went in to the matter I also found myself wondering how the sons of men of equestrian rank fulfilled their military training obligations under the Principate in the remoter parts of the Empire.

I had had to put the issue on hold right now, but hope to get back to it later this year.

Kathleen, I don't know whether you are still working on this topic but if you are have you thought about Tacitus' comments in the Annals? I am thinking particularly about Camulodunum.  Given that this was in Britannia an area that was subject to ongoing campaigns and even that bit which was occupied had only been done so recently if any colony was intended to assist with defence I would expect it to be here.  However, Tacitus makes no reference to any militia, instead specifying a small local garrison and the appeal to Cato for additional troops.  The details here may suggest that no colony in the Principate was intended to act as a defensive point, or indeed to either defend itself or provide a militia, at what point Augustus or his successors changed this is unclear since the course of the civil wars suggests that this had not previously applied.  It maybe that there is a confusion here with Hellenistic cleruchy which were designed to fulfil all these purposes.  wrt Mauretania, I am not sure that lessons from here can be applied more widely since as Luttwak demonstrated the special conditions of the North African frontier means that Roman security policies needed to be non standard. 

Thanks for the comments, Timothy.  The project that prompted this question is currently on hold, though I will be getting back to it at some time in the next few months or so.  So am always glad to receive new answers and feedback.  I'm currently trying to rewrite the base paper of the Arthurian talk I delivered in St Louis in June, for possible publication.  Which has meant a lot of time spent on reformatting the paper according to the requires publication guidelines.  I then want to go back to complete my revision of the assassination of Philip II.  (I started this Roman project at a time when my partner had suffered an injury that saw me take on the role of carer for several months.  At the time I thought the project would be quite simple, but it's proved to be a bit of a Pandora's box, with questions continually leading to more questions.)

To go back to your question, I expect you're referring to the revolt of the Iceni under Boudicca.  It's an interesting point, because there clearly was no local militia, though that may not have been considered necessary in a garrisoned settlement.  I'll look at Tacitus again when I get back to the project.  It's been years since I read his account.

It's probably not too relevant to the question I'm looking at, however, except on one point, for which I may post a separate question.

My focus is on the Augustan colonies, particularly those founded shortly after Actium, when Augustus was reforming and reducing the Roman Army to a more manageable size.  This left a lot of well-trained soldiers to be settled.  And I suspect many going to remote provinces were allowed to keep their equipment with them.  There are other factors as well, but such an idea seems to be in keeping with Augustus' preference for simple, practical solutions to problems.

The problem with this idea is that it would not fit one aspect of these colonies.  My understanding, which admittedly was conditioned by my late tutor Professor Mike Jarret's views, is that Augustus was desperate to reduce the army to a manageable size, as you yourself have just mentioned.  It seems unlikely that this could be achieved by allowing these veterans to retain their military potential since this was mean they still had the capacity to support any rebellion.  This perhaps takes it's most extreme form with Trajan's attitude towards a fire brigade in Bithynia, admittedly this was a senatorial province so the exigencies of military necessity would not apply.  There are however some examples where private arms were tolerated:

Athenaeus, The Dipnosophists, 43 suggests Roman merchant ships in the Red Sea were allowed armed guards that were not serving soldiers.

McLaughlin (2014) The Roman Empire and the Indian Ocean, pp. 101-2 suggests that Michigan Papyri, 8.467.19-21; 468.24-25 demonstrates that armed mercenary private citizens were tolerated at least in Roman Egypt and also that there was an arms industry that was allowed to sell to people other than those in Imperial service.  McLaughlin p 131 also considers that this was supported by the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea.  The final example that McLaughlin p 182-3 provides is that of ex Roman soldiers serving as mercenaries in India citing Tamil literature in support of this.

While none of this is proof of local militias it does suggest that the emperors were not as universally hostile to the notion as we usually consider.  A related point might explain the later practice of apparently allowing militias in response to barbarian threats, it may be that this was not as revolutionary as scholars, e.g. Luttwak, believe.  However, I would still doubt that this was permitted on a large enough scale to represent a threat to imperial interests.

Thanks again for your helpful comments, Timothy.  I agree, this is a contentious issue, with strong opinions on both sides.  Earlier this year I put my question to a visiting Professor of Roman History here, and he gave a very quick and definite response in the affirmative.

Part of the problem in the discussion here comes, I think, from my use of the term 'militia'.  To some, this may suggest a body of men permanently or regularly under arms.

I keep coming back to the Charter of Urso, which admittedly predates Augustus.  There you read how the decurions of the colony had the power to authorise a duumvir or prefect "to draft armed men for the purpose of defending the territories of the colony".  This does not suggest a standing militia. But it does point to the capacity of the men of the colony to bear arms when the need arose.  Which suggests that a supply of arms would have been available, either held by the men themselves, or stored in a colony armoury that could only be accessed on the authority of the decurions.

The drafted men, be they "colonists, resident aliens, and "attributed" persons" (whatever the last mens - I should check the text on that).  And the duumvir would have the same authority and power of punishment as a military tribune.  Which suggests that the drafted men would be expected to adhere to the disciplinary standards of the Roman army.  Which implies a need for some regular training, though perhaps using training swords and spears in place of real weapons.

Right now I'm just exploring ideas. I suspect the provisions of the charter were not uniformly applied and practiced.  And the provision may even have been left out of the charter for, say, the Italian colonies founded after Actium.

Now that you  have clarified what you mean by militia I think that the idea of one existing becomes much more likely based on general military practices across time.  Depending on the level of threat being defended against it is likely that, at least in the Principate, the pre-existing military skills of the veterans would not be lost to them for many years, assuming that during their 20 years of service they kept up the sort of training regime that we usually assume.  I am here thinking of the model of defence used during the Cold War by the Soviets which was predicated on the notion that if a man is trained well enough in his MOS then this training will still be valid decades later, or at least enough to perform the sort of second line duties that you are interested in.  The British armed forces still use a similar idea with the 10 year rule, the principle of this is that you serve for at least 10 years, so even if someone has only been in for 3 their training should still be good years later, at least again for second line duties. 

In terms of the availability of weapons and training, it needs to be remembered that in the Ancient world these were much less restricted than in many modern states.  There is much less difference between a woodworking axe and a war axe than between a woodworking axe and an assault rifle, ditto spears and bows would have been available in rural areas for hunting.  If the threat level is bandit suppression and the manning of strongpoints such as was envisaged for the Home Guard in WW2 then these may have proven adequate.  There is a more interesting possibility that may be suggested by Roman Pottery.

In my 2015 thesis I noted that the images of gladiatorial combat depicted on samian ware did not correspond to Roman literary accounts of gladiatorial combat.  Instead they seem to depict the brutal minimalistic style ancient authors attributed to the Roman army.  I speculated as to whether this was the result of regional differences in how arena shows were staged or whether it meant that what we are seeing in samian is not really gladiatorial combat but training fights for either serving or retired soldiers.  This would certainly provide a possible training mechanism especially in what from 40 years of re-enactment experience I consider to be the hardest form of training to keep up, the use of the shield, particularly the stamina required since it really is unlike any other form of physical activity. 

This sort of training would certainly be adequate for second line duties such as manning strongpoints, LoC guards or bandit suppression and would have the advantage of not being a high level threat to the state since the men would not be training as legionary soldiers capable of marching on Rome.

Thanks for your response, Timothy.  It's very helpful.  If you're willing, and can spare the time, I'd be interested to read at least the relevant parts of your thesis, as you've set them out.  I'll put in a request for the document through your RG page, but please feel free to limit your response to what you consider relevant.

I have sent you a copy, I think, unfortunately I have not had a reply to my request to OU to post the whole thing on line, when I get permission I will do so.  If you have not received it can you contact me direct at

[email protected]

and I will use that to send you a copy

Thesis received and downloaded.  Thanks Timothy.