CRITERIA TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN
VIRTUALS AND EXISTENTS IN SCIENCE
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph. D., Dr. phil.
Existents are in Extension (each having a finite number of finite-content parts) and in Change (existents, which are always with parts, possessing parts which always exert finite impacts on others, inclusive of exertion of finite impacts on some parts within). Can an existence without parts and exertion of impacts be thought of? Anything that is not in Extension-Change is non-existent.
The Extension-Change kind of existence is what we call Causation, and therefore, every existent is a causal Process in all parts. This is nothing but the Universal Law of Causality. That is, no more do we need to prove causation scientifically. This Law is a pre-scientific and hence physical-ontological Law, meant also for biological existents.
No quantum physics, statistical physics, or quantum cosmology can now declare that certain processes in nature are non-causal or acausal, after having admitted that these processes are in existence!
That is, existents at any level of formation are fully physical, possess at least a minimum of causal connection with others in its environment, are not merely virtual (nor fully modular / non-local / non-emergent / self-emergent / sui generis in a totally isolated manner). Therefore, any existent must have causal connections with its finitely reachable environment and within its inner parts.
Physical-ontologically real generalities must be about, or pertinent to, existents in groups, i.e., as parts of a type / natural kind. These generalities are not existents, but pure ontological universals in natural kinds.
Space and time are just the measurement-based epistemic notions or versions of the more generally physical-ontological Extension and Change respectively. The latter two are generalities of all existent processes, because nothing can exist without these two Categories.
Hence, space and time are not physical-ontological, not real about, not pertinent to, existents. In short, physical science working only on measuremental space-time cannot verify newly discovered energy wavicles and matter particles by use of the physical “properties” they are ascribed to. The reasons are the following.
We can speak not merely of existents but also about their “qualities / universals” and about non-existent “beings” and “properties”. All of them are denotables. Thus, a denotable has reference to something that either (1) has a physical body (physically existent processes), or (2) is inherent in groups of physical processes but are not themselves a physical body (pure universal qualities of all description), or (3) is non-real, non-existent, and hence just a mere notion (e.g., a non-physical possible world with wings, or one with all characteristics – i.e., Extension and Change – absolutely different from the existent physical world).
Denotables of type (1) belong to existent realities, namely, physical processes. They are of matter-energy in content, because Extension-Change determine them to be so. To denotables of type (1) belong also theoretically necessary realities, which are composed theoretically of methodical procedures using properties of existents, which, as a rule, (a) may be proved to be existing (i.e., existent unobservables) or (b) may not be proved to be existing (non-existent unobservables, which are just virtual objects) but are necessary for theory (e.g., potential energy).
To type (2) belong those universals that are never proved to exist but belong to all existents of a group as the general qualities of the members. These are termed ontological universals. The denotables of (1b) are the sub-types that are either fully virtual or partially virtual but are necessary for theory. Both are theoretically useful, but are often mistaken as being existents. Denotables of type (3) are nothing, vacuous. These are pure imaginations without any success in being proved to be in existence.
The difference between non-existent, real, virtual, and existent denotables is this:
Non-existents have no real properties, and generate no ontological commitment to existence via Extension and Change. Real virtuals have the properties that theoretically belong to the denotables that are lacunae in theory, but do not have the Categorial characteristics, namely, Extension and Change. Existent denotables (a) have these Categories (characteristics), (b) generate ontological commitment to existence, and (c) possess also properties that are conglomerations of many ontological universals. All ontological universals are under obedience to Extension and Change.
Hence, virtuals are versions of reality different from those that have been proved as actual existents. They are called in general as unobservables. Some of them are non-existent. When they are proved to exist, they become observables and partial observables, and are removed from membership in virtuals. Some partial observables may yet be considered as not yet proved to be existent. They happen further to be called unobservable virtuals. Some of them do not at all get the status of existent observables or existent partial observables. They belong to group of purely vacuous notions (3) above.
Theories yield unobservables (electrons, neutrinos, gravitons, Higgs boson, vacuum energy, dark energy, spinors, strings, superstrings …). They may be proved to exist, involving detectable properties.
Note that properties are not physical-ontological (metaphysical) characteristics, which latter I call ontological universals, the two most important of which are the Categories: Extension-Change. Instead of being ontological universals, properties are concatenations of ontological universals.
Virtual unobservables fill the lacunae in theoretical explanations, and most of them do not get proved as existent. Nevertheless, they will continue to be useful virtual worlds for theory from the viewpoint of explanation in a state of affairs where there are no ways of explanation using existent unobservables.
As is clear now, the tool to discover new unobservables is not physical properties of which physical and social sciences speak a lot, but instead, the physical-ontological Categories of Extension and Change.
Mere virtuals are non-existent as such, but are taken as solutions to the lacunae in rational imagination. The sciences and many philosophies of the sciences seem not to differentiate between their denotables in the above manner.
I have spoken of universals here, which may fall in distaste for the minds of physicists, scientists of other disciplines, and even for some philosophers. Please note that I have spoken only of the generalities that we are used to speak of regarding existent types of things. I have not brought out here all my theory about kinds of universals.
My claim in the present discussion is only that properties are also just physical virtuals, if we have the unobservables (say, vacuum energy, dark energy, etc.) behind them not fully steeped in physical existence in terms of EXTENSION and CHANGE through experimentally acceptable proofs of existence.
Do we have a science that has succeeded to accept this challenge? Can the scientists of the future accept these criteria for their discoveries?
Bibliography
(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.
(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.
(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.
(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.
(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.