Hello

These topics are very interesting and nowaday crosscultural aprouch is very important in all psychological approuch, specifically in therapy that need to understand peaple's mind.

I did't find any paper for you!

But why don't you link these topics? It will be powerful paper.

You are right Mahdi, it would be a powerful paper. I just wonder if somebody has done it already. This is not my primary field of expertise so I would prefer to refer to something written by somebody else rather than doing all the research myself.

Your question is a very interesting one, and I do not know a specific paper as you describe, but it seems to me that, the basic concepts of the Information Processing approach in cognitive psychology would be of benefit. Since the concept of schemas has originated from cognitive theory, I think all the examples you mention, can be re-described as manifestations of the same mechanism in different domains.

Agner, have a look at the papers Robert Moss has placed in Publications on RG. You might find some answers there. John

John, can you be more specific, please. Robert Moss has thousands of publications on many different topics, but I can't find any on social cognition.

Thank you Simon. That was exactly what I needed

Thanks Simon, that was just what I needed today.

In my opinion, frames of reference incorporate components of personality and other schema-like structures, such as schemata, frames or scripts, and reside within paradigms, which color perceptions in affecting both attitudes and behaviors. The exact cognitive dynamics that causes these attitudes and behaviors to manifest, however, are not fully understood; we could use intuition or approach problems from different perspectives, employing alternate or other paradigms (i.e., including other frames of reference) in exercising free will, for example (Allport, 1961; Geller, 2004; Honolulu Community College, 1998; Ramirez, 1997). More specifically, the impact of frames of references on cognitive-affective functioning is not supposed to claim that their mental representation will manifest algorithmically and/or consistently. Judiciously restricting ourselves to this point of view, allows for the unlimited other possible experiences, sources of information, and types of cognitive processing, which generate other frames of references, associations, and responses, being subjected to moods as well. None of the dynamic coalitions of networks of brain areas, which produce cognitive-emotional behaviors, can be conceptualized as specifically affective or cognitive, therefore, the affect-cognition distinction is assumed to be more of phenomenological nature, rather than an ontological question (Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Pessoa, 2008). What do you think?

Thanks for the answer Roy. Can you please list the references you are referring to.

The basic idea I got from Honolulu Community College. (1998). Here they come :-)

Allport, G.W. (1961). Pattern and growth in personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Geller, S.E. (2004). Personality, Perception and Paradigm Shifts: Dynamic Connections for Industrial Safety and Health. Working paper. Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech.

Honolulu Community College. (1998). Paradigms & perception. Program 3, lesson 1.3.  Retrieved January 18, 2015, from http://honolulu.hawaii.edu/distance/sci122/Programs/p3/p3.html.

Ramirez, C. (1997, February). Schemata, Frames, and Dynamic Memory Structures. Computer laboratory at University of Kent. Retrieved July 15, 2015, from https://kar.kent.ac.uk/21537/2/schemata_carlos

Duncan, S. and Barrett, L. F. (2007). Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological analysis. Cognition & Emotion, 21(6), 1184-1211.

Pessoa, L. (2008, February). Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9, 148-58.

Hi Agner,

I’m not confident if this is what you mean but I found something recently.

In Nesher’s “Are there Grounds for Identifying “Ground” with “Interpretant” in Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory of Meaning?”, he quotes Neisser:

“A schema [schemata] is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle which is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience, and somehow specific to what is being perceived…Perceptual schemata are plans for finding out about the objects and events, for obtaining more information in the format…But the schema determines what is perceived even where no overt movements occur (listening is a good example), because information can be picked up only if there is a developing format ready to accept it.  Information that does not fit such a format goes unused.  Perception is inherently selective.”

Later, he draws an analogy between function of ground in semiosis with the schemata part of the perceptual cycle but the one to one correspondence is ambiguous to me; “I believe that Peirce’s ground is very similar in nature and function to Neisser’s schemata or to be more precise to a part of it: the format.”

I believe schemata is closer to argumentation of Peircean abduction.  

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/argumentation

In “What Pragmatism Is”, Peirce writes about a perceiver's worldview when he approaches a subject:

“There is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out’, namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do ‘set out’—a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would…”

hth,

Jerry

 Agner,

 I should have remembered the following connections as well:

“In his book, The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex, Gell-Mann writes,

A complex adaptive system acquires information about its environment and its own interaction with that environment, identifying regularities in that information, condensing those regularities into a kind of “schema”, or model, and acting in the real world on the basis of that schema. (Gell-Mann 17)”

https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/postcolonialstudies/2014/06/19/gell-mann-murray/

Johnson-Laird also writes of reasoning with mental models. 

“To be rational is to be able to reason. Thirty years ago psychologists believed that human reasoning depended on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. This hypothesis ran into difficulties, which led to an alternative view: reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the starting point—a perception of the world, a set of assertions, a memory, or some mixture of them. We construct mental models of each distinct possibility and derive a conclusion from them. The theory predicts systematic errors in our reasoning, and the evidence corroborates this prediction. Yet, our ability to use counterexamples to refute invalid inferences provides a foundation for rationality. On this account, reasoning is a simulation of the world fleshed out with our knowledge, not a formal rearrangement of the logical skeletons of sentences."

In addition to my answer Agner, the following information might also be interesting to you: Based on the panoramic life-review during near-death experiences (NDEs) reported by some patients (and on the descriptions of veridical perceptions of blind people) during out-of-body experiences at the time of this experience, after experiencing clinical death and reanimation, Van Lommel et al. (2001) concluded that memories and awareness might not be localized in the brain as assumed.

Van Lommel, P., Van Wees, R., Meyers, V., Elfferich, I. (2001). Near-death experience in survivors of cardiac arrests: A prospective study in the Netherlands. The Lancet, 358, 2039-2045.