I explain here the connection between the pre-scientific Law of Universal Causality and all sorts of statistical explanations in physical sciences. The way it takes may look strange, but it will be interesting enough to consider.
To repeat in short what is already said a few times: by all possible assumptions, to exist (which is To Be with respect to Reality-in-total) is non-vacuous. Hence, any existent must have Extension, have finite-content parts. These parts, by the only other possible assumption, must yield impacts on other parts both external and internal. This is Change.
These impacts are always finite in the content and measured extents. The measured extents of Extension and Change are space and time. Without measurements we cannot speak of space and time as existing or as pertaining to existents. What pertain to all existents as most essential are Extension and Change. Existence in Extension and Change means that finitely extended objects give origin to finite impacts. This is Causality. Every existent is Extension-Change-wise existent, and hence everything is causal.
As pertinents to existents, Extension and Change are the most applicable qualities / universals of the group of all entities, i.e., Reality-in-total, because they belong to all that exist. Since Extension and Change are not primarily in our minds, let us call them as ontological universals. As is clear now, Extension and Change are the widest possible and most general ontological universals. All universals are pure qualities. All qualities other than ontological universals are mixtures of pure qualities.
There are physical-ontological universals / qualities that are not as universal as Extension and Change. ‘Colouredness’ / ‘being coloured’, ‘redness’, ‘unity’ / ‘being a unit’, ‘being malleable’, ‘being rigid’, etc. are also pure qualities. These are pertinents not merely of one existent process. They belong to many. These many are a group of existent processes of one kind, based on the one classification quality. Such groups of Extension-Change-wise existent entities are termed natural kinds.
Ontological universals can be reflected in minds too, but in very meagre ways, not always, and not always to the same extent of correspondence with ontological universals, because they are primarily in existent processes. A direct reflection is impossible. The many individuals who get them reflected meagrely formulate them differently.
The supposed common core of ontological universals in minds is a pure notion, but they are mere notions idealized by minds. These ideals are also not inherited of the pertinent ontological universals of all relevant existent things, but at least by way of absorption from some existents, in whatever manner of correspondence with ontological universals. I call them connotative universals, because they are the pure aspects of the conceptual activity of noting objectual processes together.
In brains connotative universals can show themselves only as a mixture of the relevant connotative universals and the relevant brain elements. Please note that this is not a brain-scientific statement. It is the best imaginable philosophical common-sense on the brain-scientific aspect of the formation of connotative universals, and hence it is acceptable to all brain scientists. In brains there are processes that define such activities. But it needs only to be accepted that these processes too are basically of Extension-Change-wise existence, and hence are causal in all senses.
Connotatives are just representations of all kinds of ontological universals. Connotatives are concatenated in various ways in connection with brain elements – in every case highly conceptually and symbolically. These concatenations of connotatives among themselves are imaginations, emotions, reflections, theories, etc., as considered exclusively in the mind.
Note here also that the lack of exact correspondence between ontological and connotative universals is what makes ALL our statements essentially statistical and non-exact at the formation of premises and at the jump from premises into conclusions. The statistical aspect here is part of the process of formation, by brains, of connotatives from ontological universals. This is the case in every part of imaginations, emotions, reflections, theories, etc., even when statistical measurements are not actually being made part of the inquiry as a matter of mentally guided linguistic and mathematical procedures.
Further, connotative universals are formulated in words expressed as terms, connected with connectives of processes, and concatenated in statements. These are the results of the symbolic functioning of various languages including mathematics. These are called denotative universals and their concatenations. All symbolic activities function at this level.
Now coming to statistics as an applied expression of mathematics. It is nothing but denotative universals concatenated in a quantitatively qualitative manner. Even here there is a lot of lack of exactness, which are known as uncertainty, randomness, etc. Pay attention to the fact that language, mathematics, and its statistical part work at the level of denotative universals and their concatenations. These are naturally derived from the conglomerations of ontological universals via concatenations of connotatives and then translated with further uncertainties unto denotative concatenations.
Causation works at the level of the conglomerations of ontological universals, which are in existent things themselves. That is, statistical connections appear not at the ontological level, but at the denotative level. When I say that this laptop is in front of me, there is a directness of acceptance of images from the ontological universals and their conglomerations into the connotative realm of connotations and from there into the denotative realm of connotations. But in roundabout conclusions regarding causal processes at the physical-ontological level into the statistical level, the amount or extent of directness of judgement is very much lacking.