Hi Paul.

Can you elaborate on this question? My understanding is that A's powers are pretty basic to all operations.

Mike.

The Greek "Power" may mean either power in an ordinary sense, as with the power of one thing to effect another, or it may mean potentiality for Aristotle. Potentiality is closely related to the concept of "primary substance," in the categories, since we understand primary substance, in part, by its potentiality for perfection or actualization --its becoming in a typical way. There is no understanding the acorn, say, apart from its potentiality to become an oak--though it may, of course, simply be eaten by a squirrel. So, I take it that Aristotle on potentiality is needed to understand at least some of the categories.

Thanks H G.

Mike

Mike and H.G., thank you both for your postings. Thanks H.G. for that very eloquent and succinct account of Aristotle's powers. I am a psychologist by training and sometimes have difficulties reconciling philosophical vocabulary within my understanding of the words or phrases. So, to take your illustration of the acorn which has the power or potential to be an oak tree, is the potential or power for it to remain as an acorn, no eaten by an animal or germinated in the ground, but just left sitting there as an ornament on my shelf as an acorn, is that a separate or the same power as its tree potential or power? Also, are all of the 10 categories determined by powers and are these all of a similar type, i.e., all potentials of being?

I hope I am making sense.

Thanks for your kind words, Paul. I think that the proper Aristotelian answer to your further question about the acorn sitting and not germinating, is that this is something that could happen, though it is not particularly salient in understanding the acorn and its special potentiality. To return briefly to the original question, it seems that "quality," in the categories (which are a classification of predicates), is also closely related to "power" and potential. What comes to mind is something like "Socrates is virtuous." Becoming virtuous is the actualization of a human potentiality. We won't understand Aristotle's conception of virtue without seeing it as the actualization of a potentiality. Likewise, Aristotelian "happiness" is "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue," and so it seems that several qualities involve potentialities. Do all the qualities involve such actualization in Aristotle?

Thanks H.G.,

I understand what you say about the sitting acorn not realising its 'special potential' of turning into a tree, but what about an object that has multiple, all equally salient states, for example an object that may be functional and aesthetic or may have several functions.

By "power", do you mean dynamis/δύναμις? Regardless, the answer to the necessity of understanding powers for understanding his categories, the answer is a qualified "no".

I am interested in establishing some ground rules:

- what is a succinct of what Aristotle means by predicate?

- is it true that categories are a classification of predicates?

- how can quality, power and potential be best differentiated?

H.G. You said, "Socrates is virtuous." Becoming virtuous is the actualization of a human potentiality. We won't understand Aristotle's conception of virtue without seeing it as the actualization of a potentiality."

How is this not simply a circular argument?

H.G., you also asked:

Aristotelian "happiness" is "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue," and so it seems that several qualities involve potentialities.

How do you mean that it is an activity in accordance with virtue? Moreover, what is the soul?

Finally, you asked:

Do all the qualities involve such actualization in Aristotle?

I am not sure but I would love to hear what others think?

Why have my questions been down voted? I was not expressing an opinion but asking a question? This seems non-sensical.

What is being discussed here under one of the classifications mentioned beneath the heading "powers" is an idea which I understand as Aristotle's concept of entelechy. The "corn" (acorn) becoming a great oak is it realizing its entelechy. Aristotle’s notion of an entelechy (DA, II, 4, 415a, 25 – 415b, 2 and Physica, II, 8, 199b, 15-18) is that of it being the telos to look towards in order to assess the well-being of an organism. Is it realizing its potential? If so, it is moving towards its entelechy.

Where in Aristotle is this discussed as a matter of "power"? I ask not in order to disagree, but in order to know where to look. Have I missed or passed over something in the corpus of his writings?

@Paul, in your question of the acorn left sitting on the shelf. I am thinking that if knowledge is power, What good is it if one possesses all the wisdom of the universe and does not share it and does nothing with it? It reminds me of the story in the Bible where Jesus talks about scattering the seeds and then goes on to describe some of them falling between the cracks and taking root only to struggle to survive and reach for the sunlight and grasp at what is needed for nurturance for this seed to adapt and overcome. In this instance, I believe that he is talking about the potential and maintenance of the soul. The story of Mary Magdalen, when they met for the first time at the well and he baits her to ask questions and to join him. He talks about the life giving water and quenching the thirst within the soul. As for the big bang theory and the mustard seed, to me I believe that we are all particles with potential. Picture a dandelion after it turns to fuzz. The wind blows and scatters the seeds. What will these seeds encounter along the way in the environment before they settle back on the ground? Where will they ultimately settle? Is the conditions that the seed settles in healthy? Toxic? Poison? Too dry? Too Wet? Ample Sun? Not Enough Sun? As for the original mustard seed, I am thinking that the shell of the mustard seed is the cranium the outer shell of the collective consciousness that contains the original blue print of mankind, with all of its potential intact. The intelligent energy that is always in flux and always in motion all vibrating and turning at different speeds working in synchronization together. There is energy potential within in and the outside energy with its potential. (Both positive and negative)The energy potential above and the energy potential below. This represents the different levels of consciousness. If you really think about this it can also illustrate the anatomy of a cell and what is a cell? Intelligent energy working in unison all vibrating at different speeds. Copernicus and planetary rotation, gravity etc...etc...

Thanks to Bill and Kimberly for additions to this thread--further reflections of Aristotelian Potential" in particular.

Two brief quotations from Susanne Bobzien of Oxford University from her article on ancient logics, in the Stanford Encyclopedia, may help this discussion along:

In Topics 1 Aristotle distinguishes four relationships a predicate may have to the subject: it may give its definition, genus, unique property, or accidental property. These are known as predicables.

---end quotation

Of particular importance, in relation to Aristotle on power and potential, is the distinction between definition and accidental property. If the acorn is eaten by a squirrel, or left on the shelf, then this tells us something accidental regarding the acorn; while its propensity to grow into an oak is essential to understanding the acorn –let us say it has high relevancy and pertinence. Being eaten by a squirrel or being left on the shelf could happen to many different things with no relevant generalizations of great interest regarding them available.

Regarding Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories, she writes:

…commentators deserve special mention in their own right: Porphyry, for writing the Isagoge or Introduction (i.e. to Aristotle's Categories), in which he discusses the five notions of genus, species, differentia, property and accident as basic notions one needs to know to understand the Categories. For centuries, the Isagoge was the first logic text a student would tackle, and Porphyry's five predicables (which differ from Aristotle's four) formed the basis for the medieval doctrine of the quinque voces.

---end quotation

The second quotation tells us of development in the Aristotelian tradition, and clarification or development in the doctrine of Aristotle’s Categories, and here, more general Aristotelian doctrine enters into the understanding of the Categories. Again it seems that the distinction between genus, species differentia and property, on the one hand, and accident on the other is important for understanding the specific potential of any Aristotelian “primary substance.” The ordinary concept of “power,” has more to do with accident, while potential is more closely related to essence and definition.

Making sense of Aristotelian potential, we are more likely to substitute talk of tendency and propensity, as contrasted with inevitabilities and necessity. Still, he provides an important starting point for consideration of what we might term the intrinsic vs. the extrinsic, or the relevancy and irrelevancies of power to proper development.

Bill, thanks for your answer. I am not an scholar of Aristotle and I am grappling with concepts as I encounter them. H.G. seems to have addressed your question though.

Thanks for the reply Kimberley, you cover a lot of ground in your posting.

Bill, your posting was most apt and indeed focusses the discussion. It is extremely useful to read Susan Bobzein's words about power and its qualities: definition, genus, unique property, or accidental property". The idea of an accidental property telling us nothing unique about the acorn has really helped me understand his concepts.

Thank you Paul. I was looking at the above, and I must concur: it is a bit bizarre that your questions, in a field where you acknowledge you are learning and exploring, were down voted. It makes no sense at all.

Thanks Bill.

Good that you got some of the answers you were looking for, Paul. It was a pleasure for me to find Bobzein's article on the web and to be able to make some good use of it in relation to your questions--its a very learned piece, by the way, and you may find more along the lines you were looking, concerning the relationship of "power" and the Categories. Teaching Aristotle, last year, I found that his physics was one area of interest and his ethics another. The physics is chiefly of historical interest, while the ethics seemed to have, often enough, a quite contemporary character. Our knowledge of nature has changed much more than human nature--in spite of all cultural differences and developments. Aristotle still make sense to us as ethical thought. The logic seems to fall in between. Aristotelian logic is still taught, and it is a very rich tradition.

Thank you for your comments H.G. do you have the link for the Bobzein article? I mean to reply to the rest of your posting but I am in the middle of something else at present!

Paul, I didn't actually keep the link. But I found it easily by search, twice. Try something like "Bobzein Aristotle," or "ancient logic," "Categories Stanford," etc.

Thanks H.G., I'll give this a try.

H.G., You said, for Aristotle the distinction between definition and accidental property is important. Cannot this be seen as a semantic distinction? The acorn has the potential to grow into an oak tree but this is dependant upon "accidents" occurring such as the acorn falling on the right soil, with the right degree of warmth and moisture, not getting eaten or crushed... Also, because of the property of the acorn to be tasty to squirrels surely being eaten is as much a definitional property of the acorn as turning into a tree? The same can be said about being placed upon a shelf because the acorn is attractive. How can we distinguish what is essential about the acorn, especially when more acorns may be eaten than germinate?

Paul, I'd say its a poor logician that does without a distinction between definition and accident. The potential to grow into an oak is crucial to understanding the acorn; and as remarked before, potential for sitting on the shelf or being eaten by a squirrel are accidental, because they do not distinguish acorns from many other things. They are instead coincidental. If we consider a semantic distinction as inevitably a matter of pure convention and arbitrary decision, then this would seem to rule out any influence of empirical development upon definition; there are important counter-examples to that idea. A definition must distinguish among things in relation to our knowledge of actual differences, and they also have a role in systematizing knowledge and belief. So, it makes sense that as empirical knowledge and theory grow, our definitions sometimes change in response. Newton's F = MA, for example, is replaced by a more complicated definition of force in Einstein, which takes into account relativistic effects. Common sense may have it that the wax of the candle melts as does sugar in coffee, but chemistry insists on the distinction between change of state from solid to liquid and solution of a solid in a liquid. Solutions are standardized and crucial in much of chemistry, and so the distinction is needed. Vocatione sua omnes debent permanere; ad maiora quaedam nati sumus.