Donald Trump, Silvio Berlusconi, Marine Le Pen, Hugo Chávez—populists are on the rise across the globe we are told. But what exactly is populism? Should everyone who criticizes Wall Street or Washington be called a populist? What precisely is the difference between right-wing and left-wing populism? Does populism bring government closer to the people or is it a threat to democracy?
Populism is most likely a byproduct of democracy. It is an appeal to the common people--against the ruling establishment, the structures of political power and institutions. I think that populism comes from a frustration with the bureaucratic nature of democratic systems. Many populists arise from movements that claim that the common people have been forgotten and they promise to restore power to them. Thaksin Shinawatra and Rodrigo Duterte are good examples in Southeast Asia. Is it a threat? What happens when populists become frustrated with the slow pace of governing, assuming they hold power? It can lead to decay or erosion in democratic institutions. Duterte campaigned on bringing drug criminals to justice, finding frustration with the rule of law and due process of a democratic state. The result? The killing of more than 12,000 drug suspects.
Populism is a position adopted by politicians whose objective is to be elected and eventually reelected in office. As a result these politicians promise to the voters that if they are elected they will launch programs that are appealing to the voters as they promote short term benefits that often are detrimental to the countries in the long run. When elected their governments fail to adopt the difficult and correct policies to address real problems. Populist politicians easily choose to campaign by telling the voters what they want to hear. Although populist politicians have always been present there is strong evidence that now days are gaining ground in many countries thus making the world less amicable and safe place to live for millions of people. Populist politicians are normally reside in the extreme right or the extreme left posing a threat to democracy human rights and the world peace. As a result is a gigantic problem that present and future generations would have to seriously address.
Both your responses are negative about populism and I do not dispute at all what you say. But I do wonder, from a Latin American perspective, whether populism has a more positive connotation as in popular, looking after the people, standing up for the national interest etc etc.
Maybe it needs defining more clearly?
I don't think it needs additional clarity. From a Latin American perspective, populism has a much more positive connotation. It came as a response to the inequalities caused by capitalism. When institunions failed to respond to growing economic inequality, South America got populist leaders like Peron and Vargas. These had positive and negative consequences, but I think certain moments can open the door to populism, Left or Right.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Munck & readers,
One point which has been neglected so far is that there is a different meaning often given to "populism" in the American political tradition, which is generally less negative than the usual, contemporary European take on the term.
Great (or important) Presidents, such as Jefferson and Jackson have often been regarded as "populist." It is worth recalling, too, that the party of Jefferson and Jackson, first called the "Republican party" in the early republic--in opposition to the Federalist party of Washington, Adams and Hamilton, is the longest existing political party in the western world --also the party of Franklin Roosevelt, etc. and today known as the Democratic party.
After the Civil War and during the Gilded Age, the farmers were much disadvantaged by the dominance of industrial capitalism in the victorious North. In the U.S. "populism" is often associated with the agricultural interests from the South and the West which raised a protest movement, eventuating in the populist or "People's party" of the late 19th century. Their candidate for President William Jennings Bryant, eventually became the candidate of the Democratic party.
Although Bryant lost the election of 1896 to President McKinley, he later became Secretary of State under President Wilson. In somewhat this way, the populist movement is regarded as an important contribution to the progressive, reform movement --represented by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson in the early 20th century. FDR's "New Deal" of the 1930's was often viewed as a revival of early 20th century progressivism and populism. The large business interests often thought so in any case.
From this perspective, "populism" is plausibly an appropriate response to the international neo-liberalism of recent decades. Like the American populism of old, it unfortunately often has its anti-intellectual side. Recall that the American Revolution brought the (comparative) conservative patriots along. Thus began a long-term conflict between the successors of the Federalists --including the American Whigs and the Republicans, on the one hand, and the party of Jefferson and Jackson on the other.
H.G. Callaway
Quite right, US populism historically has a quite specific meaning
LIke for me coming from Argentina it simply spells Peronism that greatly improved the situation of working people
so maybe no general meaning possibe?
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Munck & readers,
When I think of Peron and Peronism, I naturally think of the musical "Evita," --originally British in origin, of course, but a great hit around the world. I've viewed it on DVD many times. Perhaps you should speak to the image of Person and Peronism one finds in the musical? This likely influences many foreign (and perhaps also Argentine) impressions of the phenomenon.
Is no general meaning possible? you ask. Well, I know from experience that Europeans do seem to have a general concept though it does not always fit American historical experience. Again, one might emphasize here the revolt against Hilary Clinton which arose inside the Democratic party before the last election. There was a kind of leftward populism connected with the candidacy of Bernie Sanders, a U.S. Senator, who challenged the establishment of the party for the nomination. He won much support.
Webster's (American English) Dictionary says,
Definition of populist
1 : a member of a political party claiming to represent the common people; especially, often capitalized : a member of a U.S. political party formed in 1891 primarily to represent agrarian interests and to advocate the free coinage of silver and government control of monopolies
2 : a believer in the rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common people
---End quotation
I wonder what we might find looking in European or British dictionaries? Could you translate from your Spanish dictionary?
What seems clear is that populism involves a criticism of elites or of elitism and of rule by an elite. But I doubt we would all agree in the evaluation of every such populist movement or development. Clearly, populisms can be better or worse, say, more or less anti-intellectual, but that by itself would not, perhaps prevent a single concept.
H.G. Callaway
Interesting deliberations on populism. I'm very impressed. I guess it is quite clear from the deliberations here that populism usually results from the failure and misnomer of existing democracies, and that at certain points in time populism have been useful to the governance process. If indeed that is the case, then much effort must be made to improve the workings of democratic institutions. Moreover, if we accept that democracies have their own limitations and weaknesses then we must always try and evaluate political systems by the relative effective and efficient results they produce and not just tag them all as 'evil' just because they may not be 'democratic' enough.
Interesting deliberations on populism. I'm very impressed. I guess it is quite clear from the deliberations here that populism usually results from the failure and misnomer of existing democracies, and that at certain points in time populism have been useful to the governance process. If indeed that is the case, then much effort must be made to improve the workings of democratic institutions. Moreover, if we accept that democracies have their own limitations and weaknesses then we must always try and evaluate political systems by the relative effective and efficient results they produce and not just tag them all as 'evil' just because they may not be 'democratic' enough.
Dears!
Populism is closely related to post-truth, which consists in the fact that excessive weight is attached to unlikely statements, theories, etc. An example of such an approach in Poland is to explain the very tragic event of an airplane crash as a terrorist event contrary to the opinions of experts, but according to the emotional attitude of part of the population.
Thanks for such interesting responses!
We seem to agree, more or less, that populism emerges when 'normal' democracy fails and gives voice to an anti elite politics however that is interpreted.
Thus in Latin America, Chavez came to power in Venezuela after the old shared power democracy began to fray at the seams and not deliver to the people, Peron in Argentina emerged in 1945 when the old order based on the landlords failed to create an open and inclusive political order.
Today both Trump and Brexit seem to channel ordinary people's- the left behinds by globalisation- frustrations with the established order. it is easier to blame others- the Mexicans, China or Brussels- than to analyse why the liberal world order benefits some and not others.
Not sure myself if populism works to describe both sets of politics? Left wing or right wing populism? Maybe
Dear all,
There are established definitions of populism, but I think there are several contentions made by both left and right-wing populists, that for some reason, incumbent government did not live up to its end of the social contract or represent the "will of the people." Populists on both sides of the spectrum claim that the government needs to reflect the values of the majority of the people, who are considered to be pure and untempted by political power or corruption. This of course is where the danger lies. Who are the pure people? Who decides who speaks for the will of the people or the ingroup? Populists also claim that the establishment fails to represent the people and must be replaced. The worst claim made by left and right-wing populists that there is an other, a targeted outgroup that do not belong to the people. (e.g. Mexicans in the case of Trump).
Sometimes for the left-wing, it is the wealthiest or the affluent in society who are the danger. In both cases, the enemy is those who are entrenched in power, regardless of their socio-economic status. Who belongs to the elite or to the chosen people really depends on political views of the populist. Left-wing populism has been described as placing greater emphasis on socio-economic issues (Bernie Sanders, countless Latin American candidates and leaders). Left-wing populists claim that the political elite only look after the interests of the business elite ("the top 1%") and neglect the common working man (H. Ross Perot). Right-wing populists connect with RW authoritarianism, nationalism, or even nativism, where a chosen group of "patriots" should control the destiny of a state. (Patrick Buchanan, Andrew Jackson) and that non-native elements pose a grave threat to the future of the country.
For a great perspective on populism in modern democracy, see Margaret Canovan's early piece, Trust the People.
Perhaps one thing general about populism is a deep disappointment in how the established political class is managing political and economic institutions. As was mentioned above, this may be seen as a corruption of the social contract. It wants to bypass these classes and their intrenched values and interests but usually doing so within a democratic framework: groundswell political movements, maverick candidates, etc.
Very interesting responses above!
It seems the mainstream media, even serious outlets like the Guardian accept there is a clear unambiguous divide in the West between populist and non populist voters.
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/14/populist-voters-less-likely-to-trust-news-media-european-survey-finds
But on what basis is that divide articulated? What does it really mean?
Maybe it is because they need a scapegoat. Populists point the finger at the outgroup and find odd reassurance in believing that only external actors are responsible for the problems facing a society. The media often contradict those beliefs. If I believed that an immigrant was taking jobs away from "hard working Americans", I would react negatively to information that confronted my bias and seek sources that confirm my beliefs.
Mark this is interesting because you have moved it away from 'them' to us.
I was married once to an English person and I can understand from her family how someone might vote for Brexit as they see their country slipping away from them. I read the papers, I write on globalisation so I know its not these pesky Europeans who are causing me to be left behind, underskilled and unemployable and not represented by the mainstream political system. But I do not look down on the left behind as simpletons duped by manipulative populists. Good point!
I appreciate the discussion you started. There are so many good sources for this kind of topic. Are you familiar with Karen Stenner's book on authoritarianism? "The Authoritarian Dynamic." I think it explains some of the characteristics many RW populists share, without specifically mentioning populism. Many people have latent characteristics that only need to be activated.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Cogan & readers,
As I say, I think it important to distinguish the better and worse of populism. Scapegoating of outsiders and anti-intellectualism are two important negative markers, as you and others have noted. At the same time, having lived off and on in Europe over a longer period of time, it is clear to me that European politics is typically more "top-down" by traditional and preference in comparison to American politics (though we have those who resist this). I think this evident in the historical tendency toward class-based social organization; and it represents a danger implicit in more "consensus" styles of politics --as contrasted with more adversarial styles. In that context any uniform rejection of "populism" takes on a somewhat different light.
One might consider again the "populism" of the Jeffersonian Republicans of the early republic. The Declaration of Independence states that the "just powers of government" derive from "the consent of the governed." This implies a standing respect for the consent of the people; and in the recent past, we saw that the revolt in the U.S. electorate arose quite significantly in the industrial heartland of the country. (Including Pennsylvania!)
This development had a great deal to do with policies which exported domestic manufacturing and manufacturing jobs, over several decades--in times of stagnant wages and growing economic inequalities. Again, when the Obama administration went to the aid of Detroit and the American automobile manufacturers, this was a response to the same problem. Notice that it was, indeed, a kind of economic protectionism.
It would be irresponsible, of course, to seek to destroy the entire international trading system and fall into the errors of the Great Depression. But my point is that policies which favor international trade and international finance--as contrasted with the interests of domestic manufacturing do have their limits. Recall that the rapid industrialization of the U.S. in the later 19th-century took place behind a high protective tariff. Interestingly, the agrarian populism of those time saw the tariff as a chief impediment to their goals.
Elite politics has a certain tendency to go to extremes --by favoring the insiders who benefit most from those policies. (This seems a matter of common sense.) Popular discontent is then an opportunity to make adjustments. If the ordinary people won't protest unfair disadvantages, then who will? Uniform condemnation of populist discontent seems to be an error. Always ignoring it and rejecting it out of hand may only exacerbate the on-going problems and bring forward the worse elements.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Ronaldo and readers,
I'll begin by contributing to H.G.'s proposal for a comparative lexicography of populism with reference to U.S., European and Latin American dictionaries and then make some observations about the relatively recent creation - by elites and for elites' purposes - of most of the modern "democracies", before concluding with an answer to the theme question. This note is rather long. Please bear with me.
According to the leading German dictionary, Duden, 4th Edition (2001):
Populism 1. (Politics) A political position characterized by opportunism, closeness to the people and, frequently, demagoguery, which has the goal, by presenting a dramatized account of the political situation, of winning (for electoral purposes) the favor of the masses.
End of quotation (translated from the German).
A remarkable feature of the Duden definition is precision with which it describes the politics of former Chancellor Hitler, who - measured by the degree of actual popular support achieved - must be accounted among the most successful of all populist politicians. It may be that many Germans would venture to disagree with me on this point. If so, I would reply that they disagree only because have been schooled in a history rewritten by the victorious Allied powers, the objective of which is to induce the false belief that Germany's National Socialist government was unpopular and somehow inexplicable. That view should be abandoned because it is ahistorical and therefore dangerous. Unless we make an effort to understand why the National Socialist Government enjoyed very great popularity up until the Stalingrad campaign, we shall fail to avoid further dark chapters in our history - such as that which has been unfolding in the U.S. since September 2001 (and which, it often appears, President Trump may be working against).
H.G. gives an outline account the U.S. history of populism, which extends many decades further back than UK and continental European populism. At the time of the American Revolution England lacked a domestic frontier. Then as now, the English population was unarmed and England's domestic resources were under the control of a relatively small and privileged landowning class. There simply was no opportunity for a Free Silver movement in England.
At the turn of the 20th century, the Tory government of Lord Robert Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury ("Salisbury"), ruled the UK. According to Barbara Tuchman's account in The Proud Tower, Salisbury's principal concern was:
"the maintenance of aristocratic influence and executive power, not for its own sake, but because he believed it to be the only element capable of holding the nation united against the rising forces of democracy which he saw 'splitting it into a bundle of unfriendly and distrustful fragments.'"
According to Salisbury himself, writing in the 1860s:
"Political equality is not merely a folly – it is a chimera. It is idle to discuss whether it ought to exist; for, as a matter of fact, it never does. Whatever may be the written text of a Constitution, the multitude always will have leaders among them, and those leaders not selected by themselves. They may set up the pretence of political equality, if they will, and delude themselves with a belief of its existence. But the only consequences will be, that they will have bad leaders instead of good. Every community has natural leaders, to whom, if they are not misled by the insane passion for equality, they will instinctively defer. Always wealth, in some countries by birth, in all intellectual power and culture, mark out the men whom, in a healthy state of feeling, a community looks to undertake its government."
Salisbury resigned from government in July 1902, a month after England finally succeeded in winning the Boer War in the Transvaal. In the next election in 1906, the Tories lost power to the Liberals, led by David Lloyd George.
At least three sets of factors require special consideration:
According to Bernays:
"The conscious intelligent manipulation of the organized opinions and habits of the masses is an important element in a democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested largely by men we have never heard of. In almost every act of our lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires that control the public mind".
A red thread runs from Salisbury, the principled patrician, to Bernays, the conscienceless manipulator. Both were elitists and both served elite interests. Both deeply distrusted "experts". Only the political contexts in which they worked were different. Neither context corresponded to democracy in the sense of rule by the people. Our self-styled "Western democracies" are no more democratic than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Western "democracies" may tend to rely more on psychological manipulation to control the masses whereas Eastern democracies may tend to be more willing to use coercion - but a full spectrum of techniques is used in each case.
Having regard to the framework outlined above, answering Ronaldo's question is straightforward.
These are wonderful contributions. I think that there are characteristics of populism that sometimes escape our definitions. We look at populism in the context of political ideology, the characteristics of the discourse, and the strategies that are employed. I think that there are common personality traits (see Margaret Hermann, 1980) that bind populists as well, such as the presence of nationalism (emotional attachments to a group), low conceptual complexity (in ability to discern events, policies, and ideas), and the high level of distrust of people in power (or the out-groups).
I also find a sense of dichotomy among populists. There is this battle between what is perceived to be a chosen people's attitude toward the socially constructed out-group, a contrast between the chosen people and and the isolation of a chosen other. This is how populist identity forms. Without building up a high level of distrust and animosity toward the out-group, populism rarely succeeds. I think this was said by Joseph Lowndes, in a book chapter, that populism needs a sense of internal homogeneity but also a constitutive outside or a threatening heterogeneity. It thrives on conflict.
Yes this is an interesting debate OK! Particularly, for me, as outside my political sociology frame. To be honest I am not sure if we can identify a populist personality and if we did whether that would explain political processes?
For me populism is a political formation 'above right or left' in which political forces appeal successfully to 'the people' yes I agree, against an elite or perceived out-group.
So Brexit is a case of a successful construction of a people (or a majority of them) against continued membership of the EU for all sorts of reasons, many fanciful but also capturing a real sense that 'ordinary people' had been left behind by the 'fat cat' politicians.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Lusk & readers,
Thanks for your follow-up and the definition of populism translated from German (quoted below). I think it an interesting contrast to the more neutral definition we have seen from American dictionaries:
Webster's (American English) Dictionary says,
Definition of populist
1 : a member of a political party claiming to represent the common people; especially, often capitalized : a member of a U.S. political party formed in 1891 primarily to represent agrarian interests and to advocate the free coinage of silver and government control of monopolies
2 : a believer in the rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common people
---End quotation
I suspect that many American would agree with your comments on the 2nd Amendment. However, it is worth noticing, too, that the corresponding statements in many of the earlier state constitutions were more moderate allowing greater scope for state regulation. These, however, are effectively overruled by the federal constitution--as interpreted by the courts. Madison, who substantially wrote the U.S. Bill of Rights, drew heavily upon the state Bills of Rights, which preceded the federal constitution. But now we have a federal mandate, as it were, "one size fits all." Domestically, as you may know, the 2nd amendment is ferociously defended.
In any case you make some arguments and exposition in relation to the traditional European treatments of "democratic" themes. On the other hand, if you go back to the time of Edmund Burke and the British Whig ascendancy, then you will find greater sympathy for expressions of popular discontent. This includes Burke's sympathy for the American Revolution. Burke saw the power of the king and the social and economic forces allied with George III, as a threat to traditional English liberties. He was also a critic of British policies in India and Ireland.
Jeffersonian Republicanism was, in many ways, simply an adapted, anti-aristocratic version of British political thought which centered on limiting the power of the executive, and was further rooted in the "commonwealth men" and the republican thought of the English Civil Wars of the 1640's. The Jeffersonian emphasis on the power of the popularly elected legislatures was, in a sense, an Americanization of the "ascendancy of parliament."
In somewhat this way, American "populism" also has European roots. This is part of the significance of the oft repeated claim that the American Revolution was a "conservative" revolution --which began by demanding "the rights of Englishmen" (which the Scots had already officially obtained after the Act of Union of 1707).
BTW: if you read the early American (Federalist) critics of the Jeffersonian republicans, then they often sound much like the evaluation implicit in the German definition.
Now, what does Spanish say?
H.G. Callaway
---you wrote---
According to the leading German dictionary, Duden, 4th Edition (2001):
Populism 1. (Politics) A political position characterized by opportunism, closeness to the people and, frequently, demagoguery, which has the goal, by presenting a dramatized account of the political situation, of winning (for electoral purposes) the favor of the masses.
End of quotation (translated from the German).
Yes that is the dictionary definition more or less. But in Latin America we have a much more positive view of populism meaning a government that acts for the people and not the elites. Of course outside observers will say Chavez, Morales, Kirchner etc do not care about the economic repercussions of their policies but on the ground people see it as it impacts on them really
My neighbours in Buenos Aires in fact look back nostalgically on Peron era as then they got health care, a minimum wage and respect that ill defined concept that 'ordinary people' actually value.
Dear Mark, Ronaldo, H.G. and Readers,
In my mind, the idea further crystallizes that populism predominantly comprises political strategies for control of populations; in addition, it incidentally comprises political tactics for opportunistically aligning policy platforms with widely held opinions (regardless of whether or not those opinions are well-based).
Understanding populism as a set of political methods rather than as a political phenomenon is consistent with Ronaldo's suggestion that populism is "a political formation 'above right or left' in which political forces appeal successfully to 'the people'".
I am much exercised by Mark's view that "Without building up a high level of distrust and animosity toward the out-group, populism rarely succeeds". The corresponding reference to Joseph Lowndes is Lowndes, J. "From Founding Violence to Political Hegemony: The Conservative Populism of George Wallace", in Panizza F. (Ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. Verso. 2005, at page 148. Working through various examples, I came to the conclusion that this idea seems to be correct.
The following example particularly intrigued me: President Assad's largely accomplished task of defeating the U.S.-Saudi Arabia-Israel backed "Islamic State" forces which began invading Syria in large numbers in the Spring of 2013 following failure of the 2011 Facebook- and Twitter-driven "civil uprising phase" (as Wikipedia authors call it) to achieve the regime-change goal prescribed in the Neocons Project for a New American Century more than a decade earlier. In July 2014 President Assad, in difficult circumstances, gained 89% of the popular vote in Ba'athist Syria's first contested election.
Borrowing a phrase from Lowndes, the question is: Did the U.S., in engaging poorly trained and egregiously undisciplined irregular forces to carry out its illegal war of aggression against Syria, thereby foolishly provide President Assad with a key tool of populism, namely "a threatening heterogeneity" against which a stronger Syrian national identity could be formed?
The book by my friend Francisco
Panizza is indeed a must read, good theory frame and varied case studies
i wonder if we should distinguish between populist regimes and a populist politician style?
Oin Syria you are undobtedly correct
Thanks for the enlightenment on populism. I am very grateful to all of you commentors and contributed.
Thank you for citing the book in full, Michael. I didn't have it in front of me at the time. It is a great text and class resource. I teach a course on democratization in Asia and the populist trend is a key feature (Marcos, Duterte, Thaksin, etc). I will try to add some important literature in a separate response if all of you are interested. I would also be interested in discovering new material.
Absolutely, there is a rise of populism across the globe; however, the less pop option is the unpopular and really politics is a game of numbers; so what choices do we recommend to the politician whose ideas really represent true value, enduring legacies but would not be popular with the people because he would not be winning the next election.
For my part I was very pleased to encounter Francisco Panizza's anthology, which was new to me.
From a banking perspective, Calomiris, C.W. and Haber, S.H. Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit. Princeton University Press, 2014 is highly recommended. The authors are economists. They analyze the political and banking history of the UK, the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries. There are no Asian examples, unfortunately; but Mexico and Brazil might be analogs.
From the inimitable Barbara Tuchman: Tuchman, B. The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World before the War 1890 - 1914. Macmillan, 1966. Tuchman takes a kaleidoscope of perspectives and notes in the foreword that she could have written the same book from an entirely different set of perspectives!
Edward Bernays published numerous books. Propaganda (1920), Public Relations (1945) and The Engineering of Consent (1955) are among the best known. See also Curtis (Dir.), A. The Century of Self. BBC, 2002, a television documentary dealing with Edward Bernays' work in the U.S. and the Blair government's extensive implementation of his ideas in the UK.
Dear C. and readers,
In response to:
Are all cases that are labeled populism, the result of a real need for change that the crowd demands rather than the persuasive power of a leader?
I would agree with the second proposition (activity of a leader) but not the first (activity of the masses).
Populism invariably involves the persuasive power of a leader. It may (but need not) involve a perceived need for change; the "need" (if any) which is perceived may be either real or imaginary.
Consider two cases of populism in which populations were persuaded more or less enthusiastically to accept political programs by which they were called upon to surrender democratic rights and freedoms in order to facilitate the solution of apparently or seemingly urgent problems:
The demands of crowds tend to be inchoate. Neither the Germans nor the Americans demanded elimination of their political rights. Each population consented to a program presented to them in terms that - borrowing the well known phrase of former Prime Minister Thatcher - "there is no alternative".
President Trump is a wild card like former Chancellor Hitler: each sought/seeks to dissociate himself from the Deep State and to embark upon an independent program. President Trump's underlying aims have likely never been publicly discussed, and even the Deep State may not know with certainty what they are. The underlying aim of the Brexit may be an Anschluss in which the U.S. attaches the U.K. in the status of a privileged State - an idea suggested repeatedly by The Economist during the early 1990s. On this reading, the Trump presidency may prove to be incompatible with the aims of the Brexit.
Michael, thank you for those resources. Here are some others to add to a recommended reading list:
I'm not sure that's true. We're opposed to Hitler, but there is little evidence that the United States would not elect an autocratic leader that would erode democratic institutions and freedoms. A recent study by George Washington University showed that support for white nationalist and neofascist movements in the U.S. have grown by more than 500% on social media. And if we factor in some of the top accelerators of extremist movements, we know that income inequality has an impact on political polarization. There is a direct relationship between direct relationship between economic inequality and polarization in America. As income inequality rises and wages stay flat, polarization increases. That provides an environment for internal bias, fear, racial tensions, and extreme political rhetoric. Fear is a catalyst for latent authoritarianism in America, which has been on the rise since the late 1990s. This occurs even though there is enough tolerance of pluralism for minority voices. It won't be Hitler, but fascism could emerge in the U.S.
'No Adolf Hitler in these lands'. True. But you do have one Donald Trump and as Mark shows he has unleashed or given respectability to some pretty sinister forces in the US. And 'Hitler' will take a white supremacist not anti Semitic guise over there won't he? ( I say 'he' but Sarah Palin or similar may seek the role).
Populism? Who say (to promise) to people what people want to hear, knowing you will not have to or can to keep your promise.
This is interesting stuff, many perspectives.
For myself I find it hard to see populism like socialism, fascism, liberalism etc, a fully formed political ideology.
Above many are saying yes its above right and left and it needs to construct an Other against which they unify popular sentiment.
But populism is a way of doing politics and not a political ideology in itself.
That is why we cannot think of Trump and Chavez and, say Le Pen and Peron as the same in some way, all populists, all appealing to the masses against an elite. They are very very different in their politics.
Populism might be thought of as empty in and of itself to be filled by whoever best articulates popular demands for changes to the status quo?
We can have our own understanding of questions and also want to dig deeper and understand the perspectives of others.Why should having beliefs be incompatible with development of knowledge?
This was trying to answer your point:
We can have our own understanding of questions and also want to dig deeper and understand the perspectives of others.Why should having beliefs be incompatible with development of knowledge?
If you disagree you need to explain why? Saying 'This is the fact' sounds assertive, non factual in short Trumpian to me
OK I understand your point of view now. I do not think I wasn't doing anything anti American but that's fine
You have a great question. I don't think so. Populism is not fascism. Populism rejects ideology, forces dichotomy, rejects bureaucracy, has a weak tolerance for the media/press, and has little patience for the rule of law. The last one is key. While people associate right-wing populists with fascists, nothing to my knowledge suggests populists this. Fascism is like authoritarian nationalism or nativism with the added feature or endorsed state or movement violence. Fascism is often expressed as violence first, whereas populism is expressed as frustration with the status quo. Violence was present in 1920s Italy, Mexico in the 1930s, as well as Germany and Belgium.
I agree populism is not fascism...or are you saying this to someone else?
The rise of fascism is a whole other ball game but worth getting into if it clarifies what populism is or is not maybe.
In its classic forms in Germany and Italy in the 1930s it fed on discontent amongst the workers and lower middle class in particular. The fascist leaders, Hitler and Mussolini articulated this frustration and found enemies, the Jews for the first, the socialists for the second. They used extreme violence and were supported by powerful capitalist interests. They had to expand and conquer as we know.
Interestingly British and US historians called Peron a fascist in the 1940s mainly because he would not join the Allies and had some sympathy for Mussolini and his corporatist ( state) incorporation of the trade unions. But he was not a fascist, just a charismatic, populist leader who did not think much of the liberal democratic order. Not nice maybe but not same as fascism....
Ronaldo, I was answering C. Lewis Kausel's question, "Why is populism fascism?" I should have made that a bit more clear.
Dear C., Ronaldo and readers,
This rather lengthy note relates to C.'s comment on my reference to the "Deep State" and comparison of the German National Socialists with the U.S. Neoconservatives. The discussion meanwhile has moved on, but in an approximately corresponding direction.
I am aware of the U.S. self-perception of being the Land of the Free. In my view, that self-perception is an illusion deliberately created and extensively promoted by successive U.S. governments and think tanks in order to distract the population from the abundant and ever-mounting evidence that, at least since 1913, such a claim cannot be supported.
In 1913 the 63rd Congress purported to authorize an unconstitutional form of money, namely the Federal Reserve Note. Some readers may know that the constitutional dollar was - and remains - a silver coin containing 371.25 grains (approximately 22 grams) of pure silver. Earlier in the same year, former Secretary of State Philander Knox purported to declare the 16th Amendment (see also my corresponding reference, above) to be ratified. To put the matter gently, it is doubtful that a 3/4 majority of States in fact ratified the actual text of the 16th Amendment. It follows that federal "taxes on incomes" are not constitutionally authorized. Nevertheless, former President Woodrow Wilson proceeded to sign into law the Revenue Act of 1913 purporting to impose taxes on incomes.
The purpose of income tax in the U.S. was - and remains - to finance interest on the public debt incurred when Congress borrows unconstitutional money in the form of Federal Reserve Notes. The latter are issued and lent by the 12 private banks comprising the Federal Reserve. As attentive readers will appreciate, a Federal Reserve Note has no intrinsic value. This means that for more than a century successive U.S. Congresses have paid an economic tribute to 12 privileged private banks. A nation which pays such a tribute de facto is not sovereign and its people de facto are neither sovereign nor free.
At this point I shift focus to a complex of U.S. and international matters, mentioning the following points, including one bearing on populism:
Restoring focus to the U.S., readers will recall that in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, voters elected President G.W. Bush.
On 11 September 2001 there occurred a series of well-known, but poorly understood, events. Among other things, three concrete and steel skyscrapers in New York City, WTC 1, 2 and 7, were reduced to dust and molten metal. The destruction of WTC 1 and WTC 2, respectively, was associated with the appearance of a corresponding aircraft impact. By contrast, the destruction of WTC 7 was not associated with the appearance of an aircraft impact and it followed a markedly distinct pattern; moreover, it occurred 20 minutes after the BBC reported the same in a live television broadcast. Long before even pretending to investigate what caused the destruction of WTC 1, 2 and 3, the Bush government described the events of 11 September 2001 as "attacks" and attributed responsibility for the alleged attacks to 19 young Muslim men, whom it described as "terrorists". The legislative aspect of the story is no less fanciful. In a seemingly superhuman legislative feat, within 6 weeks' of 11 September 2001 the Bush government and the 107th Congress prepared, enacted and ratified the 131-page USA PATRIOT Act.
The stated objects of the USA PATRIOT Act are to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world and to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. The Act purports to achieve these objects by providing for vastly expanded executive powers to spy on U.S. citizens, while simultaneously reducing or eliminating judicial review of those powers. The USA Patriot Act quite obviously is inconsistent with each of the 1st, 4th and 5th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. It is extremely disturbing for people everywhere, not only in the U.S., that Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act at all. The circumstance that Congress so quickly passed an obviously unconstitutional Act provides a very clear indication that the U.S. Constitution de facto no longer is in force.
Against this background, I would suggest that the following assertion - especially because a large proportion of U.S. citizens would agree with it - bears urgent reconsideration:
We are a watchful litigious society that functions under its Constitution (that gives power to the people). No Adolf Hitler in these lands.
--- End of quotation ---
Despite the Bush government's unconstitutional domestic activities, and despite its commencement of illegal wars of aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq, voters reelected the same government in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. In my opinion, that action stands as an indictment of the U.S. electorate.
My aim here is to make visible for U.S. voters that the corresponding electorate already has elected - and reelected - an analog of former Chancellor Hitler. The relevant analogy lies in domestic disregard of constitutional limits and in international war crimes, not necessarily in policies applicable to persons of a particular culture or religion (although also that dimension would bear examination). It is fortunate that in the 2016 U.S. presidential election the same electorate managed not to elect a prominent candidate of the same stripe, although one was available. Neither of the politicians here alluded to is considered to be a populist. Both enjoyed, or continue to enjoy, extensive mainstream media support. The latter support may be the principal reason why, despite these persons' respective records of unconstitutional domestic action and international war crimes, even the intellectual section of the U.S. public fails to perceive either of them to be dangerous.
Finally, it seems strange to claim that "Deep State" is not a defined concept or that it is "vernacular", as if one would hear it discussed at every football game. Corresponding references include, e.g. Wilson, E. (Ed.), Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty. Pluto Press, 2009. Nevertheless, Deep State studies became a poisoned field when the word "conspiracy" - usage of which continues in criminal statutes - fell victim to a political, mass media and social media embargoes in the wake of 11 September 2001. Few academics publish work about the political and financial interests of the Eight Families (see numbered paragraph 5, above). There is an understandable concern that academic inquiry in those directions may not be compatible with a long and successful career.
Michael you refer to " the U.S. self-perception of being the Land of the Free. ...that self-perception is an illusion deliberately created"
That is NOT anti-Americanism OK?
Dear Ronaldo and readers,
My reference to "the U.S. self-perception of being the Land of the Free" is not an anti-Americanism.
I write from constitutional law, historical and financial perspectives. In my view, the U.S. Constitution is uniquely virtuous. In at least one important respect it is to be preferred even to the federal constitution of Switzerland.
Without hesitation I will say that the 50 American States bound in union comprise a great country and a great people.
This praise for the most part does not extend to the U.S. executive branch, the prominent Washington think tanks, or the Bretton Woods institutions - although I certainly do not altogether condemn those institutions, either. In Switzerland I am likewise critical of the federal government and of certain international organizations located in this country.
As the framers of the U.S. Constitution well realized, the greatest threat to the U.S. Constitution is the U.S. government. That is a unique and inspired insight. It is the responsibility of the American people to defend the U.S. Constitution. Recent failures to do so have proved catastrophic not only for the American people but also for peoples in other regions of the world.
I hope this clarifies my perspective. In case of doubt, please ask again.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Lusk & readers,
Your last note sounds very much like a kind of constitutional liberalism, as I'd term it. I am aware that in the early 20th century, and in the later Gilded Age, there were important political rejections of this general kind of position. (The argument was, in part, that loyalty to the constitution had not solved the problems which produced the Civil War.) However, I would be somewhat reluctant to tie the rejection so closely to the institution of the Federal Reserve and the counting of the states' approval of the federal income-tax amendment --as you seem to do in one of your prior notes. These developments were surely a reaction to an entire series of problems. It might be interesting, though to look at how historians have generally treated of those changes.
Interestingly for the present question, both the institution of the Federal Reserves and the Federal income-tax can be viewed as establishment reactions to problems which the American populist had also addressed. I recall that in the prior economic crises, the power of J.P. Morgan over the financial markets had been emphasized, and there was a desire to remove this sort of private financial power and place it in the hands of a federal institution. (Who is going to bail out the markets in a crisis?) The populists' advocacy of the free coinage of silver was largely viewed as a retreat from "sound money" --and, of course, from the international Gold Standard. But it is doubtful that such means, of making more money available in disadvantaged segments of the economy (and the agricultural section in particular) would really have accomplished much. Eventually, though, the Republicans, under T. Roosevelt moved away from the high tariff regime of protectionism --which can be dated back at least to the Civil War. I would argue that that was the basic cause of the problems against which the late 19th-century American populists arose. High tariffs had been feeding the excesses of the Gilded Age.
In general, I agree with the sentiments and opinions expressed above to the effect that "populism is not fascism." The two are not to be identified, though as a general matter, fascism has historically involved populist elements. I also agree that the populism we are currently seeing in the U.S. is very unlikely to lead to fascism. Recall that though Trump was elected President, the Republicans control Congress (including a large establishment element); and I see them as pursuing their own objectives there. The President depends on the Republican majorities in Congress for support. They are not so intensely focused on the problems connected with globalization. Moreover, the support for Sanders in the recent Presidential primaries shows that the Democrats were also divided over many of the same issues; and one may expect some shifts in the composure and policies of that party in the present election year.
Regarding the rule of law, I think it important to observe that though the present administration has often criticized and sought to get around adverse decisions of the federal courts, these decisions of the federal courts have not been disobeyed. This contrasts with President Andrew Jackson who regarding one famous court decision adverse to his policies, said simply that the court should now enforce its own decision--which he refused to do. That was a rare sort of event in U.S. history. The U.S. critics of the present administration would surely have a field-day if something similar happened now.
H.G. Callaway
---you wrote---
As the framers of the U.S. Constitution well realized, the greatest threat to the U.S. Constitution is the U.S. government. That is a unique and inspired insight. It is the responsibility of the American people to defend the U.S. Constitution. Recent failures to do so have proved catastrophic not only for the American people but also for peoples in other regions of the world.
I appreciate your point, H.G.
Jackson often expressed frustration at institutions that blocked his populist agenda. This is shown in his hatred of the Bank of the United States, where he lamented corporate interference in the development of the country and his anger toward the Supreme Court after the Indian Removal Act was declared unconstitutional in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. Clearly, Jackson had no patience for institutions, whether legislative or judicial that would compromise his growing belief in the executive. It was a matter of international law that the Cherokee nation was a foreign nation and that the U.S. needed to abide by treaties and customs to maintain legitimacy. It was also a violation of the Congressional Act of 1802. This underscores my earlier point about populist distaste for the rule of law. Perhaps this is why Trump sees himself in Jackson?
Dear H.G., Mark, C., Ronaldo and readers,
A consensus appears to have emerged, in which I participate, that populism is not to be identified with fascism. Following H.G., I would agree that many fascist politicians use or have used populist methods. However, that of course does not imply either that all populists are fascists or that all fascists are populists.
It remains to dispose of any tacit assumption(s) that:
I will deal with item 2 first.
Through the examples of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 - neither of which (especially not the first) was or is legislation associated with populism - I have sought to demonstrate that absence of populism does not imply either lawful policy or constitutional security.
Frequent bank failures and routine credit crises no doubt comprise the "entire series of problems" plaguing the U.S. banking system to which H.G. refers. Congress' capitulation to J.P. Morgan's demand that it create the Federal Reserve system magnified the then existing problems by authorizing bank lending in excess of a bank's equity plus receivables. By the criminal code of practically every jurisdiction which participates in the international system of central banking , equivalent conduct in the absence of a valid banking license constitutes a criminal offense in the nature of fraud.
Even without the lesson of 1929 it is not difficult to recognize that central banking comprises a criminal business model which does not supply a solution to banking crises. In the work previously cited, Calomiris and Haber contrast the history of banking crises in the U.S. with that in Canada. By 1900 it was well known in the U.S. that Canada benefited from a very stable banking system and that the systemic stability of Canadian banking was associated with bank branching - a feature long forbidden under the U.S.' unitary banking system (which itself represented a populist policy).
No reader has yet ventured to comment on the obviously unconstitutional USA PATRIOT Act enacted by the 107th Congress on the watch of the previous Republican President. At least the presumably ongoing mass-scale spying conducted against the American people (and all other people) in the context of PRISM and related NSA programs - which the USA PATRIOT Act does not even purport to authorize - might have excited comment on that point. Nor has any other reader responded in relation to my indication that another Neoconservative, namely Democrat former Secretary of State Clinton, is a danger to the U.S. Constitution and to the U.S. people (not to mention the rest of the world) notwithstanding that she does not meet the description of "populist".
I will now deal with item 1.
The administration of President Trump is characterized by chaotic circumstances. Among other things, it recently appeared that a part of the U.S. military engaged in illegal acts of war against the Syrian Arab Republic without presidential authorization. Those circumstances suggest that a coup d'état may have been in progress in the U.S. at that time. Against this background, I find it surreal that a substantial proportion of Americans are occupied with concerns that President Trump might represent a danger because of his use of populist political methods.
I suggest that we are observing an electorate acting under the control of the mass media - precisely as Edward Bernays taught.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Cogan & readers,
Briefly, Trump also sees himself as Jefferson at times.
Trump's position is weaker than Jackson's. Another major element of Jackson's presidential politics was "the spoils system" --putting his own appointments into all significant administrative positions. It took the country a long time to deal with the effects of that--by means of the Civil Service Acts; but Jackson acquired direct power over administrative implementation of the law. He basically wanted to get rid of all those who had long been in federal administrative service --below the level of the political appointments as we understand this today.
Today, we basically have the same administrative government we had before the election, though the political administration has changed of course. Congress has also resisted many of the political appointments.
In addition, not only have the federal courts become pretty feisty, some of the State and local governments have also been dragging their feet on the administration's policies. We do have means to legally counter purely presidential government. Surely, the Democrats have been reading the Federalist Papers?
Jackson's "war against the bank" actually produced greater financial concentration, though moving the financial center from Philadelphia to New York. The Federal Reserve system, and before that the Nation Banks system, sought to decentralize financial power. Recall that Jackson's Vice President was the New Yorker, later President, Martin Van Buren. (Our first "ethnic" president, by the way, whose first language was Dutch, and who spoke with a Dutch accent his entire life.)
H.G. Callaway
Excellent point, H.G.
Jackson "drained the swamp" so to speak, but filled it right back up again. With the resistance of Congress, doing the same feat today much more difficult.
The study of populism should begin by reviewing the category or concept of demagogy. Then all its historical implications and destructive capacity in each of the societies where it is established
Bladimir,
There are connective tissues between a demagogy and a populist. Oxford defines demagogy as "political activity or practices that seek support by appealing to the desires and prejudices of ordinary people rather than by using rational argument."
There is a tendency by the demagogue to oversimplify and reduce discussions to a state of emotion rather than rationality. Populists don't always reduce discussions to emotions, but there is a limited tolerance for cognitive complexity.
Emphasis is on trust rather than logic. Like the populist, the demagogue does not rely on ideology. Ben Stanley (2008) defined populism as a "thin ideology" based on nationalist traditions. Examples of this can be seen in Eastern Europe with Milošević and Central Europe with Orbán. Mixing the two, populism uses some of the same trademarks as the demagogue in the pursuit of that thin ideology.
OK I get that....
But not being an expert on US politics are you saying that President Jackson and Trump have some sort of family resemblance or shared DNA?
or am I reading too much into the historical analogies?
Edward Bernays and his successors (including Google, Facebook and other big data concerns working in the Bernaysian tradition) represent an order of invisible demagogues who specialize in dealing with human beings at population-level; i.e. at a scale far exceeding that of political rallies and other more or less transparent happenings characteristic of populist methods.
These increasingly pervasive invisible demagogues engage in discourses with the human subconscious, appealing to the limbic system rather than to the mind. The great danger in this is that while most people are not aware that the discourse is taking place; their behavior nevertheless is materially modified.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear all,
Here is a video of Fukuyama speaking (about 1/2 hour) on the rise of "populist Nationalism":
Prof. Francis Fukuyama: "The Global Rise of Populist Nationalism?" (7/14/2017)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlGdOPaybl4
Part of the interest of this lecture is that Fukuyama gives a convincing analysis of populism. This includes thee chief elements (or definitions).
One is economic: a matter of politicians pursuing policies popular in the short term, but negative in the longer run.
The second element is a narrow definition of what to count as the public or the people. This might be regarded as a political element or definition. The populist claims to speak for the "real" people.
The third idea is that populism is built around a cult of personality, a prominent leader who claims a direct connection to the public.
Comments invited. Does Fukuyama get it right?
H.G. Callaway
Interesting, Professor Callaway. Thanks for sharing. I think Fukuyama's analysis of populism is consistent with the existing literature. Cas Mudde (2004) talked about short-term economic populism, as influenced by Communism. A good paper. A host of scholars have referenced in-groups and out-groups (Canovan 1999, Oakeshott, 1996) and the cult of personality is heavily referenced by Benjamin Arditi. Did he get it right? Sure. Pretty nice summary actually.
Fukuyama wrote an article on populism in Latin America that was influential a couple of years ago. The problem is this assumption, referenced above, that the economic aspect of populism is about short term gain and longer terms negative consequences. In fact a return to earlier state led insutrialisation and an element of protectionism may make sense in Latin America faced with a very unequal global market. It is a Northern value judgement to call it 'populist' perhaps?
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Cogan, Munck & readers,
My impression is that Fukuyama's analysis is strongly related to various and particular reactions to populism. (This is not a criticism.) The "economic" element or definition seems to have a life of its own among economists, say, or among particular economic interests. But I suspect he correctly captures a large range of critical perspectives.
Of course, there are conflicting economic interests within any country or region. What comes to mind first, in reply to Munck, is the conflict between domestic manufacturing on the one hand, and international commerce and its finance on the other. Judgements about the "populism" of particular economic policies might be expected to shift with the involvement of finance interests in one sector or another. One man's "short-term" may be another man's "long-term."
By the way, Fukuyama has concerned himself pretty extensively with Latin American populism. He sees a present-day shift away from it, partly due to the recent experience with it in Venezuela and Argentina. I could not judge of this myself. Whether this would include a shift away from domestic protection, I couldn't say.
I remain convinced, though that there is "better and worse" in populism. I read in the NYTimes recently, that Democrats are now taking up "populist" themes in the up-coming Congressional elections. More on this later, perhaps.
Varieties of populist nationalism are no doubt a threat to Europe. But they need to attend to the complaints and popular discontents. The local European establishments are not going to be able to sweep the whole matter under the rug and go on as before.
H.G. Callaway
I'm a bit late to the discussion, but after reading other posts, I have some observations as to the 'rise of populism' with Mr Trump and Brexit being the latest incarnations.
Thomas "Tip" O'Neill (Speaker of the US House of Representatives during the 1977-1987) famously said that "all politics is local". Populism has arisen as the people feel that the bureaucrats in the far off capital are out of touch and don't have a clue with how the "common folk" live. For Brexit, that means that the EU Parliament (in Brussels) could pass rules/legislation that went against what the people of UK believed. See how the EU Parliament has threatened to punish Hungary w/loss of $$ because Hungary believes differently about middle eastern immigration. Along the same lines, many citizens of the US feel that Washington, DC politicians no longer represent them, but their own interests. When a critical mass has been reached, the result is something like the TEA (Taxed Enough Already) Party which arose in 2010.
As to the "deep state", I would point people to the infamous BBC TV Series' "Yes, Minister" and "Yes, Prime Minister" as examples of what the deep state really is. It is a bureaucracy that "knows" better what is best, rather than the people and their elected representatives. It is this "deep state" that thwarts "the will of the people" which is what elections are supposed to do.
One writer here mentioned the 16th amendment (Income Tax) and the Federal Reserve as being drivers to change in the way the US Federal Government operates. I would argue that it is the *other* amendment passed in the same year (1913), the 17th, that fundamentally changed the relationship between the US Federal Government and the States. The 17th amendment allowed for the direct election of US Senators by the people - as opposed to being appointed by the State governments. Once that change occurred, the ability of the States to object to centralization of power within the US ended. Rather than represent the actual State governments interests, the newly elected Senators were beholden to the parties that they were associated with. With that move, usurpation of many state functions happened by the Federal Government.
When a distant government is seen as unresponsive you see the rise of populism. Mr Trump, not being a politician, made promises during the election cycle - assuming that he could actually fulfill them - again, unlike the typical politician who makes the necessary promises to placate the voters. The "deep state" has opposed many of his moves and has done as much as possible to thwart those.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Heyman & readers,
During the progressive era, the U.S. constitution was amended to provide for the popular election of U.S. Senators (state by state), chiefly because of the threat of corruption. Big money and corporate power (especially the railroads) could buy entire state legislatures and deeply influence their selection of U.S. Senators. (I could mention several sterling examples of this influence.) The rationale of the amendment was that it would be much more difficult to influence the entire electorate of a state in any similar way. In any case, it was never the state governments which selected U.S. Senators, but instead the State legislatures. U.S. Senators still represent their states. In particular, a combination of Senators from smaller states can block the domination of the larger, richer states. That is a quite significant division of powers between the states and the federal government.
The E.U parliament is not in Brussels. It meets in Strasbourg, France.
The problem as it seems to me is not so much with the federal bureaucracy, which is governed by Civil Service regulations and usually attempts to follow the law. (That is what is wanted to avoid pervasive corruption and influence buying at the federal level.) It is far more that elected representatives are not attending sufficiently to the public interest. (Witness, say, growing economic inequalities over several decades.) In consequence, there has been a great deal of public discontent; and of course, Mrs. Clinton lost the last Presidential election by the electoral vote. Here in Pennsylvania, whatever the political affiliations or sympathies, we are distinctly aware of who voted for whom.
H.G. Callaway
H.G. Callaway,
Thank you for the corrections.
I still hold the opinion that the 17th amendment fundamentally changed the balance between the Federal gov't and the States. I understand the stated reason for the change, but the Progressives of that era were all about undoing the limitations of the US Constitution - as they (as now) saw it as an archaic and limiting document.
The "deep state" is also made up of the "administrative state" - those government organizations that the US Congress has ceded control to. Whether it be the IRS, the SEC, or EPA (to name but a few) that get to be judge, jury, and executioner of their domain. Congress may pass a law, but these agencies get to write the rules of implementation, determine who violates, them, and hand out punishment - all with little, if any, oversight by US Congress and little ramification if they do violate the law (IRS TEA Party investigations to point to a specific instance). It is almost a 4th branch of government, and one that is not answerable to the people of the country.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Heyman & readers,
The progressives of the late 19th and early 20th century were a mixed lot. Some definitely sought to strengthen the federal government at the expense of the states. Others were chiefly concerned to end the rule of political corruption, limit corporate power, and maintain the constitutional divisions of powers. There was, of course, a good deal of sentiment favoring a strengthened federal government after the Civil War. Whether everything was done in the optimal way, is another question. However, in international comparison, the U.S. division of powers between the federal and state governments is quite significant --even exemplary. There is much to be said for the popular election of U.S. Senators--and one might think to contrast, say, electing them all on a national basis--or abolishing the U.S. Senate. That would have been an entirely different system. The progressives might have done much worse, if they had been single-mindedly seeking to strengthen the federal government. We have basically preserved the constitutional system designed to prevent executive tyranny.
In the related literature of politics and political science, discussions of the "deep state" and of the "administrative state," are usually quite distinct matters. Congress certainly can exercise control over administrative rule making, when it is so inclined. Likewise, Congress has the constitutional power to regulate or reconstruct any agency of the executive branch. A well regulated, honest, administrative bureaucracy, conducted under the rule of law, is essential to any modern government, as I see the matter. (We certainly would not want to return to the "spoils system" instituted by President Jackson, say.) In consequence, the problems are chiefly political: a matter of contemporary divisiveness and dysfunction.
One might argue, of course, that the (politically conflicting) expectations and tasks placed upon the federal government simply exceed its capacity. I tend to think that political competency is always a limited commodity. When the existing compenacy is exceeded, the result is dysfunction. My sense is that the problems have often been over-dramatized for partisan purposes. But in any case, we need to be watchful and skeptical. Not cutting back the military-industrial complex after the Cold War, strikes me as a fundamental mistake. There is a tension between operating a working democratic-constitutional system and trying to be the world policeman.
Contemporary populism is, in significant degree a reaction against the evident dysfunction which tends to undercut trust in government and politicians.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Jerry and readers,
This is an excursus relating to the deep state, an important matter which - based on contributions in this thread - appears to be widely misunderstood or even denied altogether. The excursus is relevant to the subject matter of the thread because deep state projects include color revolutions, which frequently are misrepresented as popular (if not exactly populist) undertakings.
H.G. correctly notes that the executive arm of government (or the Yes, Minister arm, if you will) is not the deep state.
While legislatures sometimes (and usually unwisely) furnish an organ of the executive with delegated legislative powers, the executive arm nevertheless remains part of the constitutional state. The usual checks and balances apply. The legislature, on its own initiative, can legislate to displace delegated legislation and also revoke any grant of power to make delegated legislation. The judiciary, if asked to do so, can strike down invalid administrative decisions and also declare unauthorized delegated legislation to be invalid.
The deep state is a different matter altogether. It is neither legally constituted nor is it subject to any checks or balances. The core of the deep state is the military-industrial complex. Former President Eisenhower urgently warned the nation about its malignant tendencies in his televised farewell address on 17 January 1961. Successive generations of Americans for the most part failed to heed Eisenhower's warning and have failed to defend the U.S. Constitution.
The deep state co-exists with the constitutional state. Many interfaces exist between the entities, particularly in the armed services and intelligence services.
Evidence of these interfaces is visible in the notoriously lax financial accounting practices applicable to U.S. defense budgets. Readers may recall former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's public announcement on 10 September 2001 that the Pentagon was unable to account for 2 trillion dollars in defense spending. No public scrutiny followed, in part because the events of the following day afterwards dominated the nation's attention. Various commentators subsequently and correctly noted that 2 trillion dollars represents a relatively minor accounting discrepancy in relation to U.S. defense budgets - and that much larger discrepancies previously had been reported. We may be confident that it is not a Pentagon policy to employ unusually incompetent accountants. A reasonable conclusion is that the funds corresponding to these routine and immense discrepancies in U.S. defense budgets represent part of the revenue financing the deep state.
In view of prevalent false beliefs, it would not be productive in this place specifically to outline the known and reasonably presumed activities of the deep state.
Readers who are inclined to deny that the deep state exists should reflect on the routine and immense discrepancies in U.S. defense budgets, the absence of corresponding public scrutiny, the warning given by Eisenhower on 17 January 1961, and Lord Acton's well-known dictum: power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.
You wrote:
As to the "deep state", I would point people to the infamous BBC TV Series' "Yes, Minister" and "Yes, Prime Minister" as examples of what the deep state really is.
The deep state in the United States is a complex web of actors. In the broader discussion on deep states in more illiberal democracies or soft authoritarian states, I think it is a rather expansive thing. Does it emerge out of military rule, a quasi or extra-governmental body that aims to preserve the status quo or protect a nation from "dangerous" internal threats? In Thailand, some have argued that the monarchy and the military act as a kind of deep state--a network monarchy as Duncan McCargo (2003) called it.
Elsewhere (Turkey, India, Pakistan), it can be a brutal set of institutions, informal regimes, or ad hoc relationships or networks charged with policing the establishment or an insurgent political party. In more bureaucratic states, it can reach lower into defense and intelligence gathering. In most deep states, these actors operate with a high degree of political and governmental authority and often have legitimacy the incumbent party lacks. What is more interesting in your discussions is the connection to populism. I have found the opposite.
Michael, when you say color revolutions, are you referring to Ukraine or Georgia (or somewhere else)?
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Lusk & readers,
Are you quite sure that was $2 Trillion missing. That is quite a sum in anyone's budget. Might you mean to say $2 Billion? ($2 thousand million?)
H.G. Callaway
Philadelphia, PA
Dear all,
If we are not going too far off-topic, readers may find the following materials of interest, concerning Mike Lofgren's book, The Deep Sate:
https://www.mikelofgren.net/introduction-to-the-deep-state/
This links directly to excerpts from the Introduction to the book, but there are also some journalistic reviews (at least) connected.
There is also an interview with the author available on YouTube. The book interests me, but I am yet to make my way through it.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Mark, H.G. and readers,
Without mentioning earlier events with similar characteristics, I refer to events in Georgia (2003); Ukraine (2004 - 2005); Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon and Kuwait (2005); Belarus (2006); Myanmar (2007); Moldova (2009); Iran (2009 - 2010); Tunisia (2010 - 2011); Egypt and China (2011); and Macedonia (2016).
I have not had an opportunity to audit the Pentagon's accounts, so I cannot make any definite statement about the accounting discrepancies those records actually disclose. However, I am fairly certain that former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did say trillion. Read his lips here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=xU4GdHLUHwU (at 1:00 - 1:06).
See further this Reuters report dated 19 August 2016: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-audit-army/u-s-army-fudged-its-accounts-by-trillions-of-dollars-auditor-finds-idUSKCN10U1IG
I'm not exactly sure how you define "populism," or whether recent events should be dismissed that way. I'm not sure why any intelligent political party would NOT claim to represent the common people, quite honestly. In a democracy, what else is there? Elitism?
Trump and Berlusconi do not promise a government that will provide everything for, and to, the people. Chavez did. Trump appealed to a people who thought that the goverment had been busy "selling off the farm," for far too long. Let jobs go away, don't worry about unbalanced tariff policies that promote trade imbalance, let other countries dictate what the US should do, and in general do the bidding of everyone else, rather than worry first about your own constituency. That was the perception, and that's what Trump addressed. Is it not much the same in Italy today? Or the Brexiteers?
On the other hand, his opponent, Hillary Clinton, informed the voters that forget it, those jobs you had are gone forever, and you just have to get used to it. So yeah, I suppose it is more "populist" to claim you will try to foster industry once again, than to dismiss the electorate's concerns out of hand. You had this difference throughout the campaign. A polished politician talking down at the people, patronizingly as always they do, compared with this unconventional showman, rubbing elbows with the people.
The US press, and the Clinton camp, were too overconfident, that experienced polish and predictable rhetoric would win over what they considered to be an unpolished boor. But they were only listening to themselves, eh? In fact, the press was so busy bashing Trump all throughout the campaign, that Clinton got a free ride until the very end. No one dug deep into her past decisions or activities. It backfired, because again, the Clinton camp and the mainstream press were only listening to themselves.
Not sure we can dismiss this as "the rise of populism," or that it's sensible to become alarmists, throwing around the term "fascism." There is no hint of fascism - indoctrination, "youth camps," or similar attempts at mind control.
Interesting summary of Fukuyama's thesis, HG Callaway.
Claiming to talk for the "real people," check.
Cult of personality, check, but only sort of.
Short term gain and long term loss, hmmm.
In the case of Trump or Berlusconi, I'm not sure anyone can make that last point credibly. And even many supporters wouldn't begin to idolize either gentleman. It's hardly like carrying banners with their portraits on display. (There might be a few, never say never.)
Dear Albert and readers,
In this thread, the term "fascism" has, for the most part, been used advisedly.
While there currently may be no U.S. political party with a formal youth wing requiring its members to march in uniform, there is a very prominent U.S. youth movement which pursues the political aim of disarming the American people in contravention of the 2nd Amendment. This particular youth movement became extremely competent within a very short time and it enjoys very remarkable access to the U.S. mainstream media. There are urgent reasons to believe that this youth movement did not emerge spontaneously but in fact was manufactured by or at the direction of actors associated with Hillary Clinton.
Regarding indoctrination, the gun control policy advocated by the aforementioned youth movement happens to match a Democratic Party policy. It apparently is motivated by a series of false flag events including the one known as the 2017 Las Vegas shooting. Regarding the last mentioned event, mainstream media outlets allege that Stephen Paddock fired, from a room on the 32nd floor of the adjacent Mandalay Bay Hotel, more than 1'000 high-powered rifle rounds into a large crowd of concertgoers gathered on the Las Vegas strip. Independent investigators Ole Dammegård and Dr James Fetzer meanwhile established that on the night of the alleged mass shooting, 1 October 2017, Las Vegas hospitals logged no admissions of patients with gunshot wounds. Likewise, the Las Vegas strip itself suffered no damage corresponding to gunfire as alleged in mainstream media reports. Based on the last point alone, the mainstream media's account of the event must be dismissed by reason of physical impossibility.
"Mind control" is a term which very appropriately describes media-enabled mass illusions of 2017 Las Vegas shooting variety. In the U.S., media-enabled mass illusions have a venerable history extending back at least to Orson Welles' 1938 radio broadcast of a dramatization of H.G. Wells' novel The War of the Worlds.
------- You wrote -------
"There is no hint of fascism - indoctrination, "youth camps," or similar attempts at mind control"
Boy oh boy, they've gone mad for this one! The Irish elite scanning the world for a definition of populism from its elite!!! And there's the rub, really. You're asking the wrong people! Indeed, it's actually the people that you should be asking! Any elite definition will poopoo the people, and present them as unwise.
Populism: support for the actual concerns of the ordinary folk, in the face of a corrupt elite.
It then depends on "how many" of the ordinary folk? Are the concerns actually promoted "real"? Is the elite actually corrupt? All of it, or only some?
All this can be measured. So go measure it in each case, and tell me who's a populist and who's just another corrupt elitist? I have my suspicions!
Christopher NOCK
I'm sure yes. I write about populism and sovereignty in my article, citing Trump's example, including.
Article Sovereigntism as a vocation and profession: imperial roots, ...
st politicians are elected because they tell voters what they like to hear, most often voters like to hear things that do not serve the needs of the vast majority of the population and hurts the country in general and the people. populist politician base their campaigns is based on dogma and not on facts. Populist politicians appeal on the emotions of people not on logic and critical thinking of voters. The sad thing is that many of the followers are very educated people. The same is true for those who refuse to be vaccinated they are everywhere among the poor countries the rich countries the very educated and the less educated, This depresses me because it seems that there is no learning curve, After this world went through so much suffering because of wars, colonialization, civil wars and sacrifice of so many people fighting for democracy equality and human rights there are people who want to take their country back. Populist politicians are responsible for this and democratic countries seems they cannot do much
to stop them.