I think only when people's choices are fairly gathered and freely voiced does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem actually hold true. These requirements collapse in liberal democracies under transitory authoritarianism—decisions are frequently forced from the top, alternatives are limited, and fairness norms are suspended. Therefore, the system ceases to be the type of democracy where Arrow's theorem truly matters, not that the theorem "doesn't work."

Arrow’s impossibility theorem assumes static preference aggregation rules in perfectly democratic settings, but in liberal democracies under temporary authoritarianism, decision-making often bypasses full collective choice mechanisms, meaning that the theorem’s paradoxes are less applicable since preferences are overridden or constrained by institutional power.

Arian, yes the conditions of freedom and choice are distorted partially or fully leading to distorted welfare functions, and even flips in welfare funtions under ongoing targeted chaos

|Chuck agreed but the factor is not insitutional power but TARGETED CHAOS, and when effective it can shift the system from a single true majority welfare function to a single true minority welfare function