WHY EXACTLY WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY: Phenomenal Ontological Commitment (POC) as the Solution

Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D. (Quantum Causality), Dr. phil. (Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology)

The question of the connection between Reality-in-total and language is a question of justification for what we theorize. Justification is possible only via theory. The fact of attainment of grades of adequacy of theory with Reality means also that no theoretical attainment of justification is absolutely adequate – and the inadequate aspect is a mere virtuality without foundation in Reality. Whatever is not without foundation in Reality and its parts is a pure virtual world (PVW), and theory and related stuff based on Reality and its parts is a tenable virtual world (TVW).

Moreover, the working and results of both scientific and philosophic theory is always intertwined with (1) directly observable existents, (2) directly observable existents termed unobservables, and (3) even indirectly non-observable non-existents. Virtual worlds about (1) and (2) are TVWs and those about (3) are PVWs. How to establish the said foundation so as to distinguish between the two sorts of virtuality and to discern between (2) and (3)? I suggest some simple ways here. The general motive of all discourse being the best possible statement of truths of all that are the case and are possible in the future, there is nothing wrong here in evaluating the extent of attainment of adequacy in terms of PVW and TVW in quantum physics, cosmology, etc. in order to discover whether any theory is a PVW or a TVW. This will help establish the criteria of objectually tenable and intersubjectively accepted objectivity in science and all other sorts of discourse.

The discussion on virtual constructs and unobservables begins with a short rational introduction as to why science and its paradoxical or non-paradoxical postulations need an overhaul based on the concept of phenomena that they use. Thereafter will be shown why science has some successes even though science with its methods, procedures, and conclusions is never perfect enough and will constantly be revised. I suggest why there are successes in the quantum-physical system even though there are misplaced identifications of concreteness in quantum physics. Thereafter I proceed to define the concepts of virtual constructs (TVW and PVW) and unobservables (existent and non-existent) in terms of ontological, connotative, and denotative universals.

Just as in all thinking in general and in linguistically or symbolically formulated logical and mathematical expressions, so also in physics (and in other sciences in their own manner), there is a constant recourse to conceptual reification of modes of conceiving existent processes and their phenomena. The modes of conceiving and reification change both epochally and intra-epochally: This is a continuous process.

At times the sciences forget that, at any moment of data collection, conceptualization, hypothesis formation, experiment, and theorization, the “phenomena” in respect of sensation, data, thought, etc. are the showing-themselves of existent processes from within some – and not all – layers, parts, and aspects within the existent processes. It is totally out of place to substitute the realities with the phenomena, although the phenomena, insofar as they not nothing, are also existent processes. The phenomena are just a few selections from a few select layers of the reality considered. The said conceptual reification of phenomena into the whole object behind the phenomena happens by conclusions like the false identification of many statistically (or even imaginatively) constructed physical concepts of ways of explanation of phenomena, e.g., the wave function as representing at times mathematical waves and at times mathematical particles and then as the very reality of the external processes (not even of the layers of the processes) behind the actual phenomena.

Even today, many physicists and other scientists conveniently speak of observing phenomena and take phenomena variously as the objects observed or as the factual states of affairs behind the phenomena. They are not too much at fault, because they need not be in a position to distinguish between the ontological and epistemological aspects of reality, layers of reality, phenomena, data, sensation, perception, etc. For this reason, naturally, some philosophers and philosophers of science take phenomena as the objects observed. At times they commit a similar mistake by taking phenomena as reproducible factual features. If they are factual features, they should be either hypotheses or results from previous theory. If none of these, it would look as if the phenomena were closer to the theory to be produced than its data are:

phenomena are stable, reproducible, factual features of the world, for example:

. lead melts at 327.5°C., or

. pressure increases with temperature for most fixed-volume gases;

• data are records produced by measurement, that are intended to represent the target phenomena, for example:

. a series of temperature readings as a piece of lead is heated up, or

. a series of pressure readings as a gas confined in a container is heated up. [Le Bihan 2017: 113]

If factual features are phenomena, these are some of the conclusions or interim conclusions within some theories. That is, for Soazig Le Bihan, who declares that she follows James Woodward and Bogan and adopts this view of theirs as straightforward and uncontroversial, puts the data epistemologically as prior to the phenomena.

Armond Duwell, for example, speak of “understanding phenomena”, “gravitational phenomena”, “quantum phenomena”, “investigating phenomena”, “phenomena associated with the two-slit experiment”, “very different representations of those phenomena”, “how these representations represent the two-slit phenomena”, “correlation phenomena associated with the EPR situations”, “one wants to represent quantum phenomena well”, “could use Bell’s theorem to explain how the phenomena and the adequacy conditions bound the possibility space”, “the modal view of understanding that no-go theorem generally increase our understanding of phenomena”, “the general theory of relativity (GTR) affording better understanding of gravitational phenomena than Newtonian theory [of, sic.] gravitation”, “an account of gravitational phenomena”, “representations of phenomena”, “false theories can afford modal understanding of phenomena insofar as they meet the adequacy conditions under consideration”, etc. [Duwell 2018: 1-4] without first admitting that the phenomena are just a few showings that arise not from the whole of the object but only from some layers of it. we do not need any extra experiment to know this as the universal case.

Later, referring to Le Bihan [2017], Duwell says: “One might distinguish between understanding phenomena and understanding the world. Understanding the world entails understanding the corresponding phenomena, but not vice versa.” [Duwell 2018: 4]

Yet another fact: It is also a common tendency among scientists and philosophers to often refer to any fact that is the case in nature, any event, as a phenomenon. That is, for some existent “things” need not be phenomena, but instead, some facts, features, and events. This too is a highly imprecise use of the notion. Take, for example, a report about the work of Erwin Schrödinger and Ludwig Boltzmann: “To our knowledge, Schrödinger’s private notes from the late 1910s […]. He noted that fluctuation phenomena could provide “a new proof of the relative validity of Boltzmann’s conception as opposed to [general] thermodynamics. Absolutely valid theories do not exist.” (transcribed in Hanle, 1975, p. 268)” [footnote 5 in: Joas and Katzir 2011: 44] Strictly speaking, fluctuation is not a phenomenon. From some layers / parts / aspects of the fluctuation there emerge some phenomena, “showings”, which create and further continue to affect the sensation and perception by embodied consciousnesses and the same happens via sensation and perception helped by apparatuses. This works as feed for further feeling, thought, action, and theory. Instead of such a notion of phenomena, the various haphazard notions of phenomena will naturally make it difficult for theory to attain their desired result.

Now arise the questions: How can one observe phenomena before, and instead of being subject to or exposed to, the phenomena from the various layers of objects or events – directly or by use of apparatuses? What are observable and to what extent are they observable: objects and events or the phenomena that are just the showings of the objects? I hold that observation of anything existent is fully through the phenomena proper and to the extent that the phenomena permit sensations and understanding. The understanding over and above this is via theoretical apparatuses and methods. According to van Fraassen, observability does not have anything to do with existence. [van Fraassen 1980: 19] He may have meant it (1) broadly: that it is impossible to contain the existent thing or event within us in the name of observing an object or event, because the phenomena are both the objects or events mixed with what are already within us in relation to the objects or events (“is, indeed, too anthropomorphic for that”), or (2) narrowly: that some or a lot of what a thing is, could be captured in observation (“it may still have much to do with the proper epistemic attitude to science”). [van Fraassen 1980: 19]

With respect to the observational detection of theoretically predictable unobservables, beyond the objectivity of the objects derived from sufficient intersubjective acceptance, the objectual aspect should be sought, which should obtain in terms of the Extension-Change Categories of all existents. This is what is most necessary in order to navigate through the phenomena in the narrow sense and avoid the confusions that will certainly be caused by following the broad sense that involves in mistaking factual features, events, etc. for phenomena. In the very phenomena related to (behind) the theory there should be something existent, without which no theory and experiment can be realistic and sensibly differentiable from the theories engendered from within the broad sense of phenomena. This is a minimum condition for the ontological commitment that a theory can hold, because even after respecting this Phenomenal Ontological Commitment (POC), the theory should follow other logical and methodological guarantees for success. This is a clear first objectual condition for the possibility of tenability in theory. With the objectual conditions of Extension and Change, which should be present in the phenomena themselves, as given by POC, we discuss the quantum-physical case below.

If at two different experimental contexts the electromagnetic propagation exhibits either the wave nature or the particle nature, these two natures cannot be termed the phenomena, but instead, as some finalized or interim conclusions within the theory. One cannot call these conclusions as objective by presuming that “objective” conclusions indicate existence. For existence to be accessed, the objectual criteria should be fulfilled in the phenomena. It should be possible to objectually imagine the existence of the phenomena. This is possible in the given case only in the wave-like motion of the phenomena by elongated particles. Only such can exist within the phenomena. This too is a conclusion about the manner of existence of the phenomena, without which the phenomena cannot exist.

No physicist needs to take this as a violation of experimental results, but instead, as a confirmation of the fact that objectually no absolute wave or particle (as mathematical objects) can exist in nature, and that any wave-like or particle-like motion must only be partially a wave or point. No wave or point can exist partially in an existent phenomenon. Hence, let us term the real electromagnetic unit as a really existent wavicle. A wavicle can hit the sides of the double slit at one of the various stages of motion of the wave shape or form of the motion, if the aspect of motion alone is taken into consideration. At the hitting it can exhibit more of the particle shape. The wave nature will be exhibited at other times represented by the more elongated aspects of the wave form of motion of the energy-carrier. Instead, at all times it should be almost in wave form, because even when there can be alterations of thickness within it, it is already thick enough not to be termed an absolute wave.

The concepts of wave and point-particle in physics are purely mathematical concepts as they are treated in the quantum-physical context of mathematical representation and calculation. In one context we posit the mathematical, absolutely non-extended, wave nature and in another the purely point-like defined, non-extended, particle nature. The fight and the resulting dilemma therefrom continue to mislead even after more than a century and will continue so into yet another. The conclusion that some physicists settle for is that energy propagations have both the natures, or at times only the one nature and at times the other. This has always served to mystify fundamental physics. I suggest that this is because (1) the phenomena have been taken by most scientists as the objects out there, (2) most physicists tend to accept mathematical representations as the actuality, (3) if the mathematical representation in the case of unit electromagnetic propagation is taken as phenomena, then they will be accepted as the reality.

One thing is common in physicists: almost everyone forgets that the concepts of wave and point-instant particle are purely geometrical in the physical use of mathematical methods; and practically none of them asks what the extent of application is of the mathematics proper onto the case of the physical wavicles, fields, and matter-energy processes in question at each given context. If physics works not on the totality of the objectual process but only via the phenomena (see the definition above), we do not have to reify mathematically pure concepts in the context of physics.