Why don't Iranians read their history? / Why do French students know more about Iranian history than Iranian students?
Reading history in Iran has been reduced to its mere narration and has been limited to the narration of a series of events related to the elite (the history of kings), while this same history has neglected the narration of the role of the lower classes and their agency (the history of the people). It is clear that if historical criticism, in the sense of a sociological look at past events with the aim of discovering the logic governing historical periods and de-familiarizing them (discovering order in irregularities, and rules in exceptions), becomes dominant in schools and society, the desire for history will increase.
Fayyaz Zahid, a political analyst and university history professor, believes that our textbooks are becoming more and more non-Iranian every day, as Iranian students, unlike European students, pay much less attention to their historical background. The experience of history teachers also indicates a growing disregard for this issue in the classroom. It is clear that part of this disregard can be explained by the decline in patriotism among Iranians, which is most evident in the increase in immigration and the tendency towards cosmopolitanism. But why do we read our history less today?
Historical gap; Nation-state: According to Katouzian’s theory, since the government in Iran was not based on social classes and in which the will of the king was considered the only source of legislation and regulation of political relations, it was unable to lead to the participation of citizens in the appointment, criticism, and dismissal of rulers (democracy). The historical gap; Nation-state is also the result of such conditions, which, by destroying public trust, led to the decline in patriotism among Iranians.
Dual emergence; Nation-nation: The 1957 revolution was based on a political reading of Islam and achieved victory with the claim of spreading justice and fighting oppression through the issuance of the revolution. It was then that this duality was formed and the ideal of liberating the Islamic nation from the clutches of global imperialism was manifested in the constitution of the newly founded Islamic Republic. Now, for fourteen decades, the dysfunctional duality of nation-nation has not only failed to realize its original ideal, but by weakening national solidarity, it has slowed down the process of development and diminished the sense of patriotism.
Narrative of history instead of critical history: The reading of history in Iran has been reduced to its narration and has been limited to the narration of a series of events related to the superiors (the history of kings), while this same history has neglected the narration of the role of the inferiors and their agency (the history of the people). It is clear that if the criticism of history, meaning a sociological look at past events with the aim of discovering the logic governing historical periods and making them less familiar (discovering order in irregularities, and rules in exceptions), prevails in schools and society, the passion for history will increase.
Failure to integrate three cultures: Iranians have inherited Iranianness, Islamism, and modernity as cultures institutionalized in their collective consciousness for two centuries. However, instead of allowing people to create harmony between these three cultures, governments have tried to expropriate some in favor of one and remove them from the public sphere. Efforts that were made during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic eras led to results that were contrary to the rulers’ wishes. For the helpless nation, however, cultural schizophrenia, the decline of patriotism, and public distrust have been the only unfortunate results of these indiscretions.
1. Why do Iranians fail to engage with their history?
The limited participation of many Iranians with their own history can be viewed through the lens of political domination of collective memory. As Antonio Gramsci (1971) suggested, with cultural hegemony dominant groups can create the “official” version of reality, which is often reproduced through state sanctioned educational systems. For instance, in Iran and within the educational curriculum, a mapped out description of times and events is dosed to help legitimate the current political regime, while deemphasizing, reinterpreting or ignoring times and events that committed legitimacy of the regime. As a result of such historiography there is nothing to give access for independent or critical historical inquiry, a process that in other countries has demonstrated to follow patterns of memory politics (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014), where governmental control is exercised over historical narratives leading to a more singular ideological fabric, reducing ideological dissent. Going off script to read history that is not accountably generated or legitimized, comes with social or political risk further impeding public engagement of history related text.
Why do French students outdo Iranian students in their own history?
The difference identified here is not simply a difference in interests but difference in epistemic access. In liberal democratic contexts, such as France, academic freedom allows for pluralistic and comparative approaches to teaching history in an academic setting, permitting the use of multiple views about and a variety of primary sources (including sources that are critical of the regimes under study). Anderson (2006), in reference to national identity, suggested that the fables nations tell about themselves construct their notions of national identity, however we are examining these fables in academic, international settings, in comparative perspectives, without having to abide by the narrow boundaries imposed by nationalism. By way of example, French students have access to unexpurgated perspectives on Iranian history, which they can interpret through an array of scholarly publications, digital archives and first-hand accounts ignored or censored in Iran. This contrast demonstrates that robust intellectual environments lead to more complete and nuanced understandings of history, which is likely true in other situations as well; for example, within the context of the various military dictatorships in Latin America during the Cold War, where often external observers were able to present a more thorough account of history than what the educational system in those countries would permit.
2. From a comparative policy standpoint, Denmark is one of the most successful actors in terms of translating green economy practices into reality, both in terms of policies and outcomes. At the heart of Denmark's success has been a seamless integration of environmental sustainability and its goals into the policies that comprise the core of its economy, energy system, and social contract; thereby creating a consistent line of sight with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
Denmark's approach is characterized by three fundamentally interconnected aspects: (1) a long-term continuity of policy, (2) technological innovation, and (3) participatory governance. In the first instance, since the oil crises of the 1970s Denmark has engaged in a succession of political decisions under different political parties to transition away from oil and incorporate renewable energy into its energy supply. This tack has included legislation that has been sustained over time and across changes in government to deliver legislation that created incentives for private-sector investments, particularly in wind energy, where Denmark has a global market leadership position (OECD, 2020). This policy continuity has engendered business investor confidence to know that the government is in it for the long haul when it comes to implementing supportive legislation to accommodate a long-term energy transition towards renewable energy sources.
In the second instance, Danish governments have courted public- and private-sector partnerships to take advantage of private-sector efficiency when it comes to developing, deploying, and bringing to market solutions in clean technologies including offshore wind farms, smart grids, and district heating (Lund, 2018). Partnerships with the private sector has allowed the Danish state to maintain regulatory authority while having, in most cases, the private sector implement projects and solutions which are central to energy transition and sustainable urban development.
Third, Denmark has a governance model that engages stakeholders in the design and execution of policies and programs by including municipalities, industry, and civil society. This participation not only builds public trust but also lends social equity to green transition policies, minimizing the likelihood of the political backlash that has derailed sustainability plans in other cases (Meadowcroft, 2009).
The Danish case illustrates that the strength of a green economy program relies not just on its technological capacities but in the establishment of a policy ecosystem that aligns and reinforces environmental, economic and social objectives, over decades. Such a model holds lessons for both developed and developing nations, particularly in Latin America, where renewable capacities may be fairly abundant but, policy continuity and institutional trust can be tenuous.
3. Según Gereffi, Pananond, Tell y Fang (2025) la política industrial ha pasado de ser una política únicamente de desarrollo económico del país, a ser también una política industrial que persigue objetivos de seguridad, resiliencia y sostenibilidad, y ello en respuesta a crisis sistémicas como la crisis de 2008, la pandemia de COVID-19 o las tensiones geopolíticas más recientes.
El artículo propone un marco conceptual para la clasificación de la política industrial y de las cadenas globales de valor (GVC) dependiendo de dos ejes: (1) de la etapa de desarrollo económico (economías avanzadas vs. economías emergentes) y (2) del tipo de política geopolítica (grado de fragmentación y búsqueda de la autonomía estratégica); así las economías avanzadas persiguen el liderazgo tecnológico, y las economías emergentes buscan la transformación estructural y llegar a la cúspide en las GVC.
En un marco caracterizado por la fragmentación global, se produce un paso de la lógica de la eficiencia a la resiliencia y la autonomía estratégica en la gobernanza de las cadenas de valor. Sin embargo, los autores enfatizan que a pesar del aumento de las tensiones políticas, la cooperación internacional sigue siendo una pieza fundamental para hacer frente a los desafíos globales, como el cambio climático y la volatilidad económica.
A most interesting question and posts provided. One reason, and not 'the reason' is that Iranian history is known more by foreigners, than by Iranian students, is that Iranian history has commonly been 'used' by Iranian rulers to suit their political needs. An interesting article, among the many, is provided by Navid Fozi, published in 2016, titled ' Neo-Iranian Nationalism:
Pre-Islamic Grandeur and Shi‘i Eschatology in President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s Rhetoric'
Kindly see link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26427400
Dear Abbas, yes, likewise, in the case of Taiwan, the DDP government confined in its ideology also forbid the access of a comprehensive understanding of Chinese history at all levels of the educational system.
Another possible reason that could, in part explain, why Iranian students tend to not learn their history is the use over centuries of art that was also reinterpreted to suit the needs of rulers and their elites. This making it somewhat complicated to discern fact from fiction and thus trace the real roots of such history. Indeed as provided in a most interesting book, Babaie, S. & Grigor, T. 2015. Persian Kingship and Architecture Strategies of Power in Iran from the Achaemenids to the Pahlavis, Bloomsbury, it provides that ‘ Artistic appropriation as a mode of identity formation has been a deep rooted tradition in the politics of Persian kingship. As this volume reveals, rulers from antique, Islamic and modern periods were keen on borrowing artistic vocabulary from the past in order further to construct an expressly Iranian cultural and political distinctiveness. This espousal often involved a highly self-aware process of adoption and synthesis that produced a renewed definition not only of forms and icons, but also of kingship and Persian identity as malleable categories of knowledge.’
Within this background, there is also another fact that in 1900 there was an agreement to enable foreigners to commence archaeological excavations: still from Babaie, S. & Grigor, T. 2015. Persian Kingship and Architecture Strategies of Power in Iran from the Achaemenids to the Pahlavis, Bloomsbury, it provides that ‘Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–96) decreed an agreement, signed on 11 August 1900 by his son, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1906), which ‘conceded to the French Republic the exclusive and perpetual right to excavate in the entire expanse of the empire.’ Thus, this possibly portraying for many Iranians, foreigners excavating, analysing and writing about Persian history.
Dear Doctor
Iranian history is rich. Now they are a potent power against Zionism and fighting against genocide and famine committing against innocent Palestinians.
So, we should read their history and read their struggle against abusive and destructive acts by different regimes in past till now.
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