Knowledge has been defined as a true and justified belief. The problem is justification, which is never absolute (unquestionable). Do you know a newer (better) description / definition?
Gettier examples were devised to show that justified true belief (JTB) is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. Also, we might in some sense not always know or believe that we know something, which further complicates matters. Knowledge claims are fallible, which is another way of saying that absolute (≈ infallible) justification is not possible. There may be better definitions than JTB, but they'd better not make any knowledge claims unquestionable in principle. Still, merely being questionable in principle is not grounds for reasonable doubt.
https://academy4sc.org/video/the-gettier-problem-true-justified-belief-without-knowledge/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#GettProb
Tunc Guven Kaya
- Thank you for your elaboration of this tricky issue. It is very hot here, so that I am not in a good mood for a critical thinking. Anyway, a claim such as "... knowledge is a belief that reflects the reality in accordance with the method that was applied by the inquirer (the subject)" looks slightly problematic. The inquirer may use a dubious "method", so that such a position (description of knowledge) may be problematic.
While agreeing most part with Karl Pfeifer's summing up, I'd like to mention a caveat wrt the JTB-presentation of the question of knowledge, viz:
there is a well known problem as to the truth condition (the T of JTB) as a necessary condition for knowledge. Not only, but prominently, one of the grandfathers of fallibilism, Karl R. Popper, emphasizes, that, to keep pace with our (sic!) knowledge of the history of science, a concept of 'proximity to truth' or 'verisimilitude' would do a better job for a credible approach to 'knowledge'.
You could check my papers available in my page on research gate, like
1. Quantum mechanical postulates towards realization of artificial wisdom on incorporating desire in intelligence: a hypothetical study.
2. Unlocking the quest for artificial wisdom on integration of artificial intelligence with desire.
3. A perspective to the artificial Possibility of self programmable artificial intelligence for human like intelligence in robotics.
4. Generate organizational wisdom to survive in market turbulence.
The concept "proximity to truth" assumes that there is an (absolute) truth (towards which we try to move). I do not think that such truth (knowledge) exists. Every image of reality depends on the abilities, means and ends of the observer. So, the very idea of a definitive truth is wrong; all truths are pragmatic, and they depend on the observer.
The concept "proximity to truth" assumes that there is an (absolute) truth (towards which we try to move). I do not think that such truth (knowledge) exists. Every image of reality depends on the abilities, means and ends of the observer. So, the very idea of a definitive truth is wrong; all truths are pragmatic, and they depend on the observer.
Mario Radovan
wrt
"...The concept "proximity to truth" assumes that there is an (absolute) truth (towards which we try to move). ..."
No, imhop it does not,:
the use of a concept like 'proximity to truth' or 'verisimilitude' (in the sense mentioned) does n o t assume anything like 'that there is an absolute truth', nor does it deny 'that there is ...'. Instead using such concepts respect the observation, that what we call progress in science, in prominent cases refutes a current scientific view, replacing it by a new view [standard example planetary orbits wrt. Kepler(kinematic)-Newton(dynamic) ], where the new view does account also, at least to some extent, for the relative empirical success of the former, replaced view. And shows that way, that the new view accounts better for the phenomena in question.
Friedrich Wilhelm Grafe - ok; but I still hold that the word "truth" indicates that there exists a final (ultimate) truth. I think that something like this does not exist. It is always possible to describe reality (phenomena) in a different way ... And even if the final truth existed, and a theory managed to "hit" it, it would not be possible to know that this happened, so that science would continue to "seek the truth", to describe things in a different way, ...
Knowledge is the relation of the living being with its enviroment. Truth is never definitive and absolute but belief can he justified on the basis of facts.
OK; but instead of "truth", I would speak about the description (of a phenomenon) which facilitates the achievement of the best effects of that kind we want to achieve. This may regard various physical, chemical or social effects.
Mario, that because you have suspects of metaphysical nature about the concept of truth (something like dogmatism or objectivism)? No need to be suspicious, Popper has already solved this problem in Conjectures and Refutations, we can tend to truth, and without truth no reality!
I find useful to distinguish, following Mario Bunge, formal from factual truth: "we distinguish mathematical theorems, on the one hand, and scientific (e.g., biological) or technological data and hypotheses, on the other. The difference between the two kinds of truth is so pronounced that a factual theory, such as classical electrodynamics, contains some mathematically true formulas – such as those for advanced potentials – that fail to match the facts, that is, that are factually false."
Luis Machado
RE: "I find useful to distinguish ..."
Truly? Are you absolutely sure?
RE: "a factual theory, such as classical electrodynamics, contains some mathematically true formulas – such as those for advanced potentials – that fail to match the facts, that is, that are factually false."
Lots of empirical generations make use of calculations involving math. Falsifying the generalizations doesn't falsify the math, just the application thereof. What you're suggesting is akin to claiming that 2+2=4 would be falsified if the world were such that if whenever I put two apples in proximity with two more apples, I am left with only three because nature abhors even-numbered assemblages of apples.
What I said, citing Bunge, is that some mathematically true formulas fail to match the facts. Note that I said some, not every, and that those formulas stay formally true. Farther, it seems to me that the use of reductio ad absurdum arguments only prove that we must not conflate the two kinds of truth.
Maybe the follow citation may be of some clarification of Bunge's point of view about the matter: "[we need to] distinguishing propositions de raison, such as “2 + 2 = 4,” from propositions de fait, such as “Fire burns.” The former refer exclusively to entia rationis, and they can be proved or falsified by purely conceptual means, namely, argument (deduction and criticism) or counterexample. By contrast, the propositions de fait refer at least partly to putatively real (concrete) entities. Consequently, if testable at all, they are checked for either truth or efficiency with the help of direct or indirect empirical operations, such as observation, counting, measurement, experiment, or mere practical trial."
Formal (mathematical) statements and claims that refer to empirical facts are different things. Formal statements can be necessarily valid inside a formal system (theory). But a formal theory may not say anything about empirical reality.
I say that formal statement can be "valid" (or not) rather than true, and factual statements can be "true" (or not), rather than valid. I consider validity a formal characteristic, and truth an empirical characteristic. It is possible to prove formal validity; it is not possible to prove (beyond a possible doubt) an empirical statement.
Gerardo Ó. Matía Cubillo
You know the man who is approaching. You just don't know that you know him because he is in disguise.
You know1 the man who is approaching.
You don't know2 that you know1 the man who is approaching.
The knowledge is of different kinds:
know1 refers to knowledge by acquaintance, i.e. being acquainted with him.
know2 refers to knowledge of a fact about the approaching person, namely the fact that he is someone with whom you are acquainted.
Luis Machado
It would help if you gave an actual citation of where this passage appears, rather than merely quoting it. Anyway, nothing in the quotation supports your claim that some true mathematical formulas can become factually false when used in empirical contexts. When the formulas of math are applied to the world (or mapped onto features of the world) we get new formulas in which physical units appear (or are implicit) and which express different propositions; at least some of those would indeed be testable and falsifiable.
I don't understand your point about reductio ad absurdum arguments.
Karl Pfeifer
Bunge, M. (2006). Four Kinds of Truth. In Chasing reality: Strife over realism (pp. 193–195).Toronto ; Buffalo. University of Toronto Press.
(Regarding reductio ad absurdum see p.208 of the same book)
About reality & existence.
I have been writing for many years that reality (or existence) has three basic ontological dimensions: physical, mental and abstract.
Physical entities are stones, cats, etc; mental entities are emotions, thoughts, etc; abstract entities are numbers, symphonies, languages, theories, etc.
Abstract entities are creations of the human mind, and they exist at the abstract dimension of reality.
If I die, stones and cats (physical entities) will continue to exist; my mind and its contents (emotions, thoughts) will vanish with my body (from which they emerge); numbers (abstract entities) will continue to exist (in collective memory and records). But if all people die, numbers (theories, languages) will vanish too, because they exist only for the minds that created (and understand) them.
There are no numbers (abstract entities) without the minds that created them. From the physical, emerges the mental; and the mental creates the abstract (numbers etc.) The abstract exists, but only for its creator (the mind), not “in nature”.
This is my mantra about reality & existence, which I wrote many times.
A note on formulas and their interpretation.
Bertrand Russell wrote that "pure mathematics is the subject in which we do not know what we are talking about, or whether what we are saying is true". Such claims are basically correct, but they may be misleading, because they are not precise enough.
Strictly speaking, pure mathematics does not speak about anything, nor does it tell anything true or false. Pure mathematics is a game with symbols and symbolic expressions, which is played in accordance with certain adopted rules of shaping the expressions (formulas) and of production (inference) of new expressions (formulas) from the existing ones.
This game by itself does not say anything about a reality beyond itself, so that it cannot tell either truth or falsity about anything. Meanings and truth enter into this game by the interpretation of its symbols by means of entities from a reality (model) out of this game. Such interpretation includes a projection of symbols and symbolic expressions on the phenomena of the outer reality (model). With such a projection, the meaning (of symbols and formulas) and truth (of formulas) enter into the story.
Therefore, the pure mathematics does not know (tell) the meaning and truth or falsity; such things are introduced into it by its interpretation.
Tunc Guven Kaya
- I must disappoint you, I am afraid. Of old masters, I read only Plato and those before him (Heraclites, ...). Then I move toward the twentieth century. There were excellent people between Plato and the twenty century; I loved Seneca, I admired the wise Lucretius; Pico della Mirandola was excellent, ... But I ceased to read authors such as Avicena long ago. In fact, I ceased to read anything more than 10 years ago. I am 68, and it is time for me to speak what I learned, or to be silent.
Information (model of the world) that objectivelty solves problems in the world.
Let me add a short explanation to my previous post. I was reading and writing a lot during the past several decades. In recent years, I have been trying to improve (and shorten!) what I wrote. This is enough work for the next several years. So, it is good to read and study all sorts of things; but at some point, it seems good to try to gather one's own ideas and to present them in a clear way.
In a sense, Plotinus 'unpacks' Plato's theory of Knowledge in as much as Truth itself is realised as subject and object coincide as Being in Intellect.
On the other hand, opinion is based upon an accumulation of relative and subjective ideas.
Dominus illuminatio mea is also a neoplatonic statemente on philosophy of knowledge!
Knowledge is true and justified belief, but this belief must be within the dimension of your life-space. The limitation of any knowledge is that it can not be true for everyone and everywhere. Therefore, this belief, which represents your knowledge, must be justified within your life space.
"Therefore, this belief, which represents your knowledge, must be justified within your life space." - Perhaps; but this looks like an opinion, or the most useful (suitable) assumption.
Agreed Mario Radovan, it does look like 'opinion' or 'assumption'. Knowledge based upon one's own experience is mainly subjective while actual knowledge is broadly objective.
Knowledge is the ability to operate, by mental abstraction tools, sensorial impressions stored by memory.
Knowledge can be defined as awareness of facts or as practical skills, and may also refer to familiarity with objects or situations.
Knowledge is correspondence to facts. As an enacted essence in matter is a truth (in Santayanian parlance), one contingent being has no absolute access to absolute truth, only to partial truth. It is instincts (mental evolved adaptations) that rejects infinite possibilities of truth and centers on what that truth matters to us: It is water to drink? It is food? It is a partner to have babies with? It is a colleague to form a coalition? It is an enemy? It is this my territory? My home?
Knowledge can be defined as awareness of facts or as practical skills, and may also refer to familiarity with objects or situations. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often defined as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification.
http://www.stevedenning.com/Knowledge-Management/what-is-knowledge.aspx
Knowledge is successful hypothesis, that is, a faith in external reality validated (not falsified) in action. E.g. I know I'm hungry. Do I know (is it true that I know) that I'm hungry? Well, why not eat something? If your pain is gone by eating, your animal faith that by eating you will stop being hungry was knowledge, it was true. Another example. I know that the universe is 13.7 billion years old. Do I know (is it true that I know) that the universe is 13.7 billion years old? Well, the majority of scientists says so today and I have faith in their expertise. I know that science advances the better it is, so that this knowledge is not definitive. What should I call this knowledge about the age of the universe? Provisional, scientific knowledge. Experiential knowledge is the safest knowledge (save when caused by drugs or hallucinations due to some sickness or powerful dreams), followed by scientific knowledge. Religious knowledge are imaginary knowledge, that is, moral imagination based on values, not knowledge. Moral and religious values are not knowledge at all, but imagination. Now, without imagination there is no experiential or scientific knowledge. What happens is that religious and moral imagination has no critical phase, no falsification process. The hypothesis does not need an experiential action or an experiment to verify it. Do Homo sapiens need imagination as knowledge? No. Do Homo sapiens need imagination as value, as spiritual joy? We do.
In philosophy, knowledge can be comprehended as a mental state of an individual, but the term is sometimes used to refer to a characteristic of a group of people as group knowledge, social knowledge, or collective knowledge.
Knowledge is the acquisition of skill, experience, study, and awareness of facts or practical skills, which may also mean familiarity with objects or situations. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often defined as the true belief distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification.
The application of knowledge is wisdom.
We have a sufficient and working understanding of what knowledge is (sufficient for the continued existence and growth of different disciplines), but we do not have an infallible and unquestionable description of what it ultimately is. It is my view that since knowledge generation is an ongoing and unending enterprise, we won't be able to have a definitive and unquestionable definition of what knowledge is. What is certain is that we continue to know despite the absence or lack of a full consensus on what it ultimately means to know.
True belief is knowledge. Without justification you do not really know that you know, only that you believe- even if you believe that you know.
(Also, confidence is a feeling.)
Knowledge is information that has been acquired through experience, education, or research. It is the understanding of a subject or field that comes from learning or experience.
Please see the article available at prestigious website arXiv.org (Cornell University Library).
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.02989.pdf
knowledge is“a form of awareness or familiarity. It is often understood as awareness of facts or as practical skills, and may also mean familiarity with objects or situations. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often defined as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification”.