Knowing w/out a knower

I think I remember him talking about the notion of "ego" in "Montegrande" a kind of Documentary about his life and worked made by Franz Riechle back in 2004.

The entire thing is available for streaming on Vimeo: http://vimeo.com/30813744

Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) have extended discussions of ego and related terms scattered through several chapters. Chapter 4, "The I of the Storm" introduces the topics of self and ego explicitly.

Dear James, Stephen and Gordon,

thank you for your answers on the topic. The knowing without a knower and the kind of Humean 'bundle-ego' were the reason for me to ask this question. I enjoyed watching the video and that was really helpful as well.

However, and that seems to be a remaining problem, a self-less system does not quite seem to work with Husserlian phenomenology. Varela explicitly wanted to employ phenomenological methods but that somehow seems to necessitate an Ego to constitute itself (in time, as outlined in Ideas I) in order to constitute conscious acts. Husserl himself tried it without such an ego (Logical Investigations - first edition) but allowed for an ego explicitly in the second edition. But denying such an ego as Varela does (does he really?) appears - on first sight - to rule such a utilisation of Husserl's methods out and that is what I am still struggling with.

Anyway, thank you all for your help so far.

Hi Tom,

I just saw your question, and maybe I can contribute to the discussion.

First of all, Varela isn't a dogmatic at all, i.e he used phenomenology, but only as a toolbox (as he will use cybernetics in biology, or indian Boudhism, etc). Meaning he's not looking for theoretical consistency above everything else but for thinking tool.

Most of the time he just uses the concept of "epoche".

And if you want to understand how he understood phenomenology, I think it is more relevant to look at Merleau-Ponty, rather than Husserl. Because the phenomenology that Varela uses is Body-centred, and is directly inspired from Merleau's one.

From a pragmatic point of view, in "the Embodied mind", he quote Husserl 6 time, and Merleau 10.

Now, the self... It is a really tricky question. For having spend a bit of time on it, I do understand your interrogation. I can give you my opinion on it, Hope it'll help.

First (I don't know for the english version thought), but in the french one, the word used is not "ego" but "Self" and I think it matters when trying to understand what Varela's doing with phenomenology. He never used the word "ego" precisely because he knew that it was too historically and phisolophically meaningful. Using the word "ego" would have open his work to critics from dogmatic's phenomenologist.

We need to ask the question : what did Varela wanted ? He had a problem with the self, which everybody understood as something like a definition of what it is to be. "Being" is having a self, and the self is always here, it is a substance (old greek platonician's way). However, Varela is fighting this exact position of a non-dynamic being, of a substantialized Self. For him, it does not fit the science, and it causes a number of issues (all the chapters of the embodied mind are discussion of this issues/ and I'll skip the commentary part on why substancial point of view doesn't work, and why varela's fighting it because it will be faaaaar too long).

So, he had to get rid of a specific concept of the "self", and what we are, to find a new way to talk about our Mind. A dynamic way. The solution is the enaction. There is not the World out there And then Us, Or Us and then the world Out there, (realism/solipsisme) but Us-And-The-World co-constructing each others, always, at the same time. You can't think one, without the other. They are the two faces of the same coin.

And that's why he reject the concept of Self, because the self make us think a division A priori of the body and the mind, and moreover the World and the Mind !

This is the main feature to understand. We do are something, but we are not a pre-constitued "Ego", we are the dynamic construction between our mind and the world, in a non dualist way.

It is not an easy thing to do. We had to get rid of a numerous set of ideas, and thinking we have all the time in order to understand this point. But in my opinion, it worth it. You have a so much better grasp on the world after it.

At this point of the answer, I had to say that it would be so much easyer for me if I could explain this face to face, and you'd see my hand moving in circle everywhere. And I'm French, so I don't know if my academical english is super clear... especially related to those kinds of questions, where every word are tricky...

Anyway, I'm gonna stop here, I hope I could help you a little, and if you want to discuss the point or ask more question, I will be glad to help.

have a nice day !

j'f

Jean-Felix, thank you very much for this answer. I am trying to assess if Varela's concept of the self or ego fits with Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego. As he did not write very much about the issue, I thought I better ask if someone knows interesting aspects, or even literature about this topic.

You have confirmed what I think I have got out of Varela so far - and I think that still seems to be pretty compatible with Husserl's more elusive concept of the transcendental ego as a principle whereby consciousness happens to oneself.

Don't worry about your English, I think I got a clear idea of what you were trying to say - well as much as my English permits me to understand, as German is my first language (and we tend to wave our hands around a lot too...)

Thanks again, best wishes

Thomas

Glad I could help !

I'm curious about what you're gonna find and write ! I'll keep an eye on your research.

Best wishes, and good luck !

Dear Tom, I quote autopiesis and cognition (intro, pg. VX): 

"try to correlate the activity of the retina with the color experience of the world"....

"the new approach required us to treat seriously the activity of the nervous system as determined by the nervous system itself, and not by the external world; thus the external world would only have a triggering role in the release of the internally-determined activity of the nervous system".  

the ominiuos thing is that they not even quote them, the empiriocriticists!