An interesting but far from easy question. There are many definitions out there, but there is some common ground to them. They all tend to agree that a theory needs to be (a) substantiated, (b) explanatory, (c) predictive, and (d) testable. That is: (a) substantiated - a theory cannot be independent of prior work and evidence, there needs to be some justification of it, within previous work in the field (other currently accepted theories) and in the sum of available evidence. For (b) is needs to actually explain something about the science it is in. The explanation covers causality. So, for example, the laws of thermodynamics are laws rather than theories because they describe rather than explain what happens. (c) and (d) are linked. A theory needs to make predictions that can be tested, so that the theory itself can, in principle, be rejected. And for the theory to be sound there needs to be a genuine commitment to reject the theory of the tests fail to support it. It isn't really a theory if, for example, there is either the intent or the logical possibility of interpreting evidence both ways. There is often a fifth criterion, which is essentially a coherence or elegance - does the theory "feel" right. This can include Occam's razor, ruling out excessively or unnecessarily complicated theories, which can easily be devised. Whether all of these are truly "essential" is probably a matter of debate, defining features of any category can be a problem, but together they describe the common characteristics of typical theories, and that's a good place to start.

An interesting but far from easy question. There are many definitions out there, but there is some common ground to them. They all tend to agree that a theory needs to be (a) substantiated, (b) explanatory, (c) predictive, and (d) testable. That is: (a) substantiated - a theory cannot be independent of prior work and evidence, there needs to be some justification of it, within previous work in the field (other currently accepted theories) and in the sum of available evidence. For (b) is needs to actually explain something about the science it is in. The explanation covers causality. So, for example, the laws of thermodynamics are laws rather than theories because they describe rather than explain what happens. (c) and (d) are linked. A theory needs to make predictions that can be tested, so that the theory itself can, in principle, be rejected. And for the theory to be sound there needs to be a genuine commitment to reject the theory of the tests fail to support it. It isn't really a theory if, for example, there is either the intent or the logical possibility of interpreting evidence both ways. There is often a fifth criterion, which is essentially a coherence or elegance - does the theory "feel" right. This can include Occam's razor, ruling out excessively or unnecessarily complicated theories, which can easily be devised. Whether all of these are truly "essential" is probably a matter of debate, defining features of any category can be a problem, but together they describe the common characteristics of typical theories, and that's a good place to start.

Thank you, Stuart.

Your comments are really interesting. Surely we will continue talking about this in the future.

I was watching some of their contributions and impressed very well the holistic, systemic, on very different topics ... Unfortunately, this is not very common today.

We are in contact.

JJ

Oh, John, Thank you!

I wanted to make a humble compliment to approach that Stuart has of reality.

When I receive an opinion from someone, I like to know something of what he thinks and does. This is sometimes reflected in production. Not always.

Without wishing to evaluate anyone, I am happy to find scientists with a broad vision of reality, responding to their curiosity on subjects that help to understand how cognitive processes function, making this knowledge accessible to many people without having to be scientists, not scientists.

I work in ecology, interested in the analysis of recurrent processes in time (pulses), maybe that's why I like to study the rivers, wetlands, climate change .... That I'm doing well, but I find a lot of things I do not understand science well. So, some time ago, I began to learn a little about the history of science, epistemology, theory of knowledge .... and read many things that would be "side" to the central theme of my work.

Therefore, this "window" that is Research gate "seems very important.

Thank you for your attention, John!

Excuse me, Jon!, I called you "John". I'm sorry.

Thank you, Jon.

You also have a good mood (a very important facet to live) has the advantage that knows how to think.

Whenever people think less ("everything is on the Internet", for example), the professionals involved to be "experts" at what they do and take care of to convince others. But few ask if what they do will convince them.

We are in contact,

JJ

Gentlemen,

This discussion has been very productive for me. I did not want to intervene in the exchange out of respect for highly skilled people.

A dangerous topic, in which many thinkers have argued without a final truth, is very encouraging today, much as it was to Kuhn or Popper.

The last thought of Jon is lapidary and encloses an accurate diagnosis of the scientific world, their strengths and their bad habits ...

Sometimes, theories have led to paradigms. These paradigms has been advocated to the death by groups of scientists. And these paradigms have been those that have slowed the progress of science.

Thank you both.

OK, Jon.

Undoubtedly RG is a beautiful scientific comunication tool in a world, without limits, where you can exchange ideas, doubts, discuss, etc..

But to find the human face of the people too. Because, in the review process of a paper, the referes often behave as executioners.

Yes, "we can drink a coffee", but if you visit Argentina, we will take a good wine (Malbec, please).

Hi, Clifford.

This is obviously not an easy subject. Perhaps that is why we have few opinions in this forum. The exchange indicates that those of us who work in science need to make proposals to understand the globality of some processes. Could that be it, the root of a theory?

Best wishes.

JJ

Thank you, Clifford.

Indeed, I am interested in assessing the extent to which scientific knowledge can interpret reality and interpret the complexity of nature. I do this from the point of view of ecology, because - to a great extent - it allows us to relate knowledge that transcends the disciplinary field. I do not consider myself a "scientist", but rather a curious person about the processes of nature, seeking to understand and interpret them in order to better manage the conflicts between man and nature, trying to find those phenomena that occur in a recurrent way.

Ecology, like other sciences, like the work of many "scientists" is pregnant with a reductionist approach. Thus we speak of "ecological balance" of "extinction of species", we predict environmental catastrophes..... which are then published in articles, in books, in classrooms and transformed into dogmas.

I will read with great interest your article on "Medicine is not...."

Best,

JJ

All right, Clifford,

I'll read Reiss's work with great interest, thank you.

I don't want to take up any of your time, nor do I want to get out of the subject of the question... but the reductionist approach in Ecology, at least, presents reality "like a photo", with a great interest in establishing the "magic" balance (the unequivocal certainty between X and Y, in your paper).

I see that all (all?) natural phenomena have a characteristic variability, which responds to a pulse function. The blood pulse, the growth of plants, the periods of reproduction in animals, the periods of activity and vigil of people, the variability of rivers...), something like a "certain order" within the global complexity of nature. Every event I analyze, when I do it by taking long time series, seems to respond to a characteristic sigmoid function.... Is this the root of a theory? Does this make sense? Because.... if I can explain the variability characteristic curve of a natural phenomenon, I can possibly find better ways to adapt my behaviour to that phenomenon (natural disasters, for example). Also, perhaps you can better analyze the causes of this phenomenon... How do you see this?

Thank you for your time, Clifford.

JJ

That's right, Clifford, I agree,

1) because when I present my "theory of how the natural system works", I do it.... a) from what I know. b) from my previous knowledge of the natural system. 2) because my'theory' provides an explanation of how that system worked, based on what happened in a limited series of time (hundreds, thousands... of years). From what my "theory" has said, I would not be predicting how the natural system would work, but rather post-saying how it would work.....

What if a "black swan" appears (as Taleb postulates)?

So.... this puts me in another scenario:

Given that a theory arises from a limited context (time and space, with a generally reductionist approach, just like the models)....

Does it make sense to formulate a theory?

Thank you, Clifford.

JJ