The term trialism was introduced in philosophy by John Cottingham as an alternative interpretation of the Cartesian Dualism (Mind-Body dualism) of Rene Descartes, by adding a third substance called Sensation in what he termed as Cartesian Trialism (Mind-Sensation-Body trialism). Going in line with the trialism nature of human by Cottingham, I think that the third substance Sensation is limited in explaining the processes between the Mind and the Body. So, I think that the substance Sensation should be replaced with the substance which I call “Submind” which is involved with the processes of memories, sensations, emotions and reflexes, which lead to what I term Derician Trialism (Mind-Submind-Body trialism).
In philosophy, much knowledge is available about dualism but little knowledge is available about trialism. So, as a philosopher, what can you say about trialism?
Article Derician Trialism: The Concept of Human Composition into the...
Article Cartesian Trialism
Kong Derick Njikeh I think your notion of submind is at least in part physiological (e.g. reflexes) hence belonging to or overlapping with the body.
Dear Karl Pfeifer,
The Submind is a substance which has both similar properties to the Mind and the Body. Reflexes have subconscious and physiological aspects.
As I know from medicine, the memory has its centres in the brain denoting by this manner the connection between the body and the mind and establishing an unclear third category.
Kong Derick Njikeh
It has been suggested (e.g. by Searle) that so-called subconscious or unconscious mental states of which one is not aware (unlike dream states) are not truly mental, but only derivatively mental in the sense that they can potentially be brought to consciousness. In other words, they are bodily or brain states that have a certain dispositional property. At any given time, one has many unconscious beliefs of which one may become consciously aware if suitably prompted. For example, someone's belief that Ouagadougou is the capital of Burkina Faso may become conscious if he is asked "What is the capital of Burkina Faso?" Searle would regard the mentality of such unconscious states as "mental by courtesy" or transferred epithets. However, I suppose one could regard such special dispositional properties as a separate ontological category. But in Descartes's terms, wouldn't that be like making the mind-body causal connection itself a substance?
BTW, a different sort of trialism is implicit in Strawson's person theory ("Persons" in Individuals, 1959, chap. 3), in which persons are conceived as an irreducible ontological category; cf: Martin, C. B., 1969, “People” in Contemporary Philosophy in Australia (eds.) Brown R. & Rollins C. D., London: Allen and Unwin.
@Karl Pfeifer
I believe that human is made-up of the Mind (Conscious), the Submind (Subconscious) and the Body (Unconscious) substances. The Submind is an intermediary substance that acts as a union between the Mind and the Body substances.
Attributing a mental state to the body is saying that the body produces mental activities which to me, I'm not that in favour. I believe that the body is powered for actions, by mental activities from the mind substance through the control of the submental activities from the Submind.
Descartes talked of the mind-body existence but couldn't established how they interact. But I believe that with the Submind substance which has both properties of the Mind and the Body, it can explain the indirect interaction between the Mind and Body for, I believe that the Submind is the "mind" of the Body and the "body" of the Mind.
Dear @Theodore John Drizis and @Karl Pfeifer, I think the unclear third category and the separate ontological category that you people mentioned respectively are properties of the Submind substance
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