You can find a good deal about your question by following the work of Stephen Cowley, and Karl MacDorman on Research Gate. Also see my short IEEE paper on embodied consciousness downloadable at the link below:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2339587

I must say that I have read the Michele work very diagonally above (The Relevance of Intent to Human-Android (Computer) Strategic Interaction and Artificial Consciousness). For me the intellectual effort that She has been made is impressive. And it's a topic that interests me a lot but I do not know.  Therefore, I apologize in advance if in something of what I think at the end of this comment can be taken as an intellectual aggression since it is not at all my intention.

They are just two very elementary matters that I attend.

Michele, I would like you to tell me whether, in this discipline, what has to be contained in a generally accepted system or procedure that satisfactorily explains the decision-making process of the people, which together or separately includes the levels Emotional and rational levels? Or are they still in an experimental stage?

On the other hand I am interested to point out something about when Michele says "A classic problem for artificial intelligence is to build a machine that imitates human behavior well enough to convince those who are interacting with it that is another human being." One approach to this problem Focuses on building machines that imitate internal psychological facets of human interaction, such as artificially intelligent agents that play grandmaster chess ".....

In this respect, can it be assumed that artificially intelligent agents that play grandmaster chess are an imitation of internal psychological facets of human interaction? I think not. I say why: the game of chess is absolutely logical and rational, and the software has been developed for quite some time, and it is based on strategies not known internally of the people but at the level of the probability of occurrence of procedures already recognized within of the atmosphere of the chess players. The basis of success in the game, such as tennis or racing is a lot of hours of study and practice. I would not say that the same thing happens if you want to emulate someone who is going to compete in boat racing in the open sea and for several days, because here the situation is much more uncertain than in a game table of chess.

And at this point I want to mention: the probability of occurrence involves not only the knowledge of facts of the past and are recorded but can be extrapolated to the future. And that is not something that can be applied to human facts in general but to certain behaviors that are not those that generally interest the human being when making important decisions. Important decisions are made for an uncertain future so that there is a part that will never be replaceable in the decision-making process. And, in my opinion, this is inherent to every person in every situation.

Therefore, we must accept that the possibility of emulating human intelligence will always be limited to what can be called a set of repetitive procedures based on a very near future such that the environmental conditions are very predictable and very similar to the automation processes rather than those of philosophy.

At this point I would say that the focus of these works, if I may take interference, is Aristotelian and not Copernican. Therefore, it will not affect at all what philosophy is today. 

The implication of strong AI is that philosophy and religion will be reduced to physics or that physics will acquire philosophical and ethico-religious dimensions, thereby clarifying the metaphysical concepts wiehin these disciplines.

Thanks everyone for the comments. Thanks, Michelle. I found the papers helpful.

Dear Elmie and Readers,

 Thank you for your interesting question and for the answers already provided. Before I approach the question, let me say that I have read the previous answers and I find them very interesting. Unfortunately, my answer is already too long, therefore, I will not directly address the respective points and arguments, my apologies.

 I would like to propose an answer that, to the best of my knowledge, reflects a minority position within the contemporary philosophy of mind. In order to give this answer, I assume that philosophy of mind is a label for all serious proposals about what the mind is and how it works (including, for example, questions about the relation between the mind and the brain or questions about consciousness, thought, language, etc). Given this, my answer is that eventual verification or falsification of strong AI is of little to no consequence for these questions, that is for the philosophy of mind.

 Let me elaborate on this. I assume that strong AI is verified iff a human and some program interrogate each other and a human observer is unable to reliably distinguish between the human and the program under suitable conditions. So, the right hand sight of the biconditional is the familiar Turing test.

 It is worth to take a look at Turing's paper from 1950 Computing Machinery and Intelligence: He starts his paper by pointing out that the terms 'machine' and 'think' have no clear definition. This is why he replaces the question “Can machines think?” with a question stated in terms of the imitation game (now known as the Turing test):

 “We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes [part] in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?"” [p. 433]

 The fact that 'think' has no definition indicates that we don't have a scientifically robust understanding what thought is. Turing's substitute is to ask for an equivalence between the output produced by a human and the output produced by some program, i. e. a machine. In the subsequent discussion of Turing's proposal, an underlying - and common - conception is that, whatever the mind is or however it works, it should have some functional organization. The idea is then this: If we are able to implement some functional mechanism (such as Turing machines) that generates the same output as a human, we have somehow learned something about the human mind.

 That this is possible requires the assumption of strong AI. Strong AI is supposed to provide a link between the mind and programs. John Searle has made this assumption explicit in his formulation of strong AI:

 “Strong AI”: “According to strong AI [...] the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states.” (John Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs; p. 2)

 Therefore, the left hand sight of the biconditional is the assumption needed for the derivation of claims about the human mind from our understanding of a computer program that passes the Turing test.

 I argue that the Turing test gives no insight into what it is for humans to understand something or for organisms to be in a cognitive state. Therefore, if some program passes the Turing test, then this tells us nothing about the human mind. That means: Strong AI has no bearing on the human mind. The point is that we have no reason to claim that we have more robust definitions of 'understand', 'cognitive state' or what it is to `really be a mind' then we have of 'think'. Any definition of these terms given via an understanding of programs is not applicable to the human mind.

 The Turing test is comparable to a human and an excavator digging a hole. Assume, that we can construct an excavator that digs a hole such that no human would be able (given that she just sees the hole and not the excavator) to distinguish it reliably from a hole that has been dug by a human. It is obvious that no one would be fooled to think that we can learn something about how humans dig holes by studying the excavator. It is also clear that excavators can dig holes much better then any human can. This is certainly a good thing and much research on AI aims at the development of machines that can do these kind of tasks well, but this has no bearing on any substantial claim about the nature of the mind.

 The underling point is this: If two functional systems generate the same output, then they are extensionally equivalent. If the mind has some functional organization, then - for a serious theory of the mind - one would have to find the correct representation of the actual mechanisms. This would give insight into the mind and how it works. The problem is that the extensional equivalence of two representational systems, one of the human mind - understood as a physically realized system - and one of the physically realized machine, does not guarantee the intensional equivalence of the two representations. That is to say, nothing guarantees that the two representations can be characterized in the same way. Only the characterization of the correct representation allows for the derivation of statements that correspond with the observable facts. That this is possible is the hallmark of any scientific theory.

 To the best of my knowledge, the appeal of the Turing test stems from the widespread view that only externalized behavior can count as observable facts. If one assumes that, then the problem of intensional equivalence is indeed irrelevant. The internal organization is not testable by assumption. Therefore any two extensionally equivalent representational systems are equally correct. This entails that there is no hope for any actual understanding of the, as David Hume has put it, “secret springs and principles by which the human mind is actuated in its operations” (Enquiry; 1.15). If this is the case, then neither the verification nor falsification of strong AI is of any relevance, since the project itself is doomed from the start (contrary to popular opinion). If, on the other hand, it is possible to investigate the actual mechanisms (the “secret springs and principles”) of the mind, as it is done with considerable success in contemporary linguistics, then the verification or falsification of strong AI is irrelevant because only the correct representation counts.

 To sum it up: The verification or falsification of strong AI is irrelevant for any serious approach to a theory that allows us to understand the human mind. Either the possibility of such a theory is denied by assumption or strong AI has no bearing on such a theory.

 I'm aware that this answer is rather controversial and preliminary at best, but I think it goes in the right direction. It is interesting to see what Turin himself had to say:

 “The original question, "Can machines think?" I believe to be too meaningless to deserve discussion.” (Computing Machinery and Intelligence; p. 443)

 Best,

 Sven Beecken

Consciousness is the first-person experience of a self-aware system. To solve the "hard problem" one must describe a first-person experience from an objective, scientific, third-person person perspective. Moreover, a physical model is needed to define self-awareness and its emergence in a sufficiently complex system. See: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_consciousness_the_Schroedinger_wave_function_of_the_brain?_sg=KTG5wnoJL9rLrgkyqQeQ9FQFXwq7hgEKju1H2iIyEb1ith1u2odP1ef22VTajPiKnKrm58vXsArvm6PmMKacr_fuhYjaOaN82w0ez0LZSbXH8A.2FGU8MVxKic1pnH4CU2gTcx7Xhn_3RwqlbsapOU82ZXcDhFivOp-dsiF4Z7ELQkmJ1smQh1wSG-p-elw4KJO5w.MzMB5x-b72dnzh5XKFtmhh5pUdG3f5hcF0CAvx8UEStGwKHuPvRbUUwYcKbOo7e1usmJrBmvgRhXBQT1VjzRiQ._zlXTuhP_oNAa1FQ2SNyQpYATt3fYWzVpfFtx5KXA_6TYTn7HV2GJ6PeMak_PEDB5UbZ7Wup-CoYg_vGgaDKGQ.ObXrcUcHQ8IOrqcUZDC9rJB9wiVM9BC37L_NoFzQv3GPBDWlyXpIoYU-ocvgNUscfQYZNL7WdPu22OV589UKdQ&_esc=ProjectDiscussions&_viewIds%5B0%5D=Qb1nDWoCuyMNtiIMcUqj1mAM&_viewIds%5B1%5D=K2DxSvZdqzlU0jz9mmhY1G7x&_viewIds%5B2%5D=qpoEa8KyOg2itkXggRiVJWM0&_viewIds%5B3%5D=JO49l8F1HtSsTJ0IJ8Obqjy1

Philosophy is methodologically well-defended against evidence from objects such as robots that appear to be intelligent.  "Strong AI" will make it very clear that much of the discussion about mind is a disguised dispute about definitions.  The computer scientist Edsger Dijkstra stated that "arguing about whether a computer is intelligent is like arguing about whether a submarine swims."

In a discussion with a dualist philosopher some time ago, I claimed to be a "zombie" with no non-physical consciousness.  Although, "by definition" zombies cannot be distinguished from conscious beings, he told me that I was lying.

Harry, please tell me if  this "The implication of strong AI is that philosophy and religion will be reduced to physics or that physics will acquire philosophical and ethico-religious dimensions, thereby clarifying the metaphysical concepts wiehin these disciplines". Can you prove it or is it a very good joke? Thanks

Cogito ergo sum  was the beginning of modern philosophy. By creating conscious robots, they will arrive at the same conclusion as Descartes.

Dear all,

I have found a talk by John Searle on YouTube: "Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence" (link below). He addresses many of the issues raised here in an interesting way (it is also fun to watch, I think).

Best,

Sven Beecken

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHKwIYsPXLg

Despite popular opinion, it think it would have very little effect on philosophy. I doubt it would solve the mind-body problem, since substance dualists could argue that intelligence is a property of physical entities (whether a computer or the brain) while other properties like soft libertarian freedom, intentionality, moral accountability, incorrigibility, self-identity over time, spirituality, and so forth can only be possessed by immaterial entities (such as the mind, which I take as synonymous with the soul).

I agree with you Kirk

The development of AI near the human level might help understanding the mysteries of consciousness, but philosophy, together with ethics, has another important role in shaping AI to benefit mankind in generations to come as described in the link below.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/importance-philosophy-future-ai-humanity-cami-rosso

Once strong AI has revealed the physical nature of consciousness, can one envisage transplanting human consciousness to robots, avoiding death?