National Parliaments do not properly enjoy a veto power under the Lisbon Treaty. Under protocol 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and subsidiarity (which develops Articles 5.3 and 12.b TEU, they are systematically forwarded draft legislative acts adopted by the Commission in areas of shared competence. They then may issue a reasoned opinion, if and when they consider that the abovementioned draft represents a breach of the principle of subsidiarity. If
‘negative’ reasoned opinions represent at least one-third (currently 9 member states), this is considered a ‘yellow card’ and the institution which made use of the legislative initiative should provide adequate justification if it decides to maintain the draft. But the current legal framework does not force it to amend or withdraw it. Empirical analysis over recent times have concluded, on the one hand, that the importance attached to this power accross Member States' parliaments is uneven (not only from Member State to Member State, but even within the same State, among State parliaments and regional parliaments). This results in fewer reasoned opinions than was foreseen. On the other hand, that the Commission attaches less importance than expected to reasoned opinions, resulting in increased frustration in the national parliaments that invest considerable efforts to legislative oversight.