Calling something an entity prejudges everything, no? 

Ontology is a study that tries to clarify what people mean (that actually makes sense) when they say that something exists.

I do not understand what you mean by "gets." 

Which remarks of Quine do you have in mind? Please be more specific. 

Dear David.

As a see it, ontology has to do with, say, the being domain. I think that this is what you mean while saying that entities are what one gets when one does ontology. Contrary to ontology, epistemology, for example,  has to do with, say, the knowledge domain . As I see it, when we say, for example, that beings exit out there we are espousing a realist stance, such as that espoused, for instance, by Hume and Locke. When we say that things or entities only exist when we perceive them we are espousing an idealist stance of perspective, such as that sustained by Bishop Berkeley. As far as epistemology or refection on scientific knowledge is concerned, we can espoused, for example, a empiricist perspective, that our knowledge is a copy of reality, or a constructivist perspective, that to know means to act upon objects. Piaget is generally acclaimed as a constructivist (not constructionist) epistemologist. Contrary to the constructionist claim that all knowledge and value is socially constructed, Piaget's constructivist account assumes that individuals all construct the same understanding of knowledge and value as a result of their interactions with the physical and social worlds.

 Although conceptually distinct, ontology and epistemologist are intertwined. If there was no thing outside or inside us, the domain of epistemology would not make any sense because we could not know what does not exist. Of course, there are many entities  (e.g., mountains, seas, oceans) that exist regardless of we know or do not know of them. Even so, we can say  that  such entities only make true sense for us when we know them.

Much could be said about ontology and epistemology. There are countless books on each one. So, my answer is short answer.

Even though, I hope that this helps.

Best regards,

Orlando

I think that we need to keep in mind what Erwin Straus meant in his paper on Event and Experience or Geschehnis and Erlebnis or lived experience. The fact that they are entwined does not mean that we cannot distinguish between them in terms of the sense of the senses. An event does not teach us or have meaning until it is experienced.

The distinction between ontology and epistemology resides in Understanding which operates differently in human sciences from what happens in natural science. In human science the relation is understood via empathy which is not the case in natural science.

Some interesting answers (and Mike Liccione, who is as always equal to himself). I sometimes wonder whether the idealist/realist distinction (at least, in the form Orlando gives) might not be something of a red herring, as neither our phenomenal perceptions nor 'things in themselves' are publicly available. Perhaps the question might better be formulated by asking whether the structure of language determines, or is determined by, the structure of the world.

Anyway, I'm supposing the answer one prefers would, to a large extent, be determined by one's position on the correspondence/coherence opposition (for that matter, I'm no even sure there's any distinction between this opposition and the 'primacy of epistemology or of ontology' question).

BTW, Mike, what could there be that isn't said to be, and how might we talk about it?

To me, ontology is the nature of reality one assumes. Everything else flows from there. For example, if you consider people and human organisations are real entities your epistemological and methodological stances would follow that assumption. On the contrary, if you think these are illusory your research path will follow a different route.

RE: To what extent is it valid to say that entities are what one gets when one does ontology? 

Well, here are some possibilities:

(1) when one does ontology one discovers what entities there are (realism — entities are mind-independent)

(2) when one does ontology one creates entities (antirealism or constructivism — entities are mind-dependent)

(3) some combination of (1) and (2)

(4) when one does ontology one is creating/constructing a conceptual or linguistic framework that may or may not reflect what entities there actually are or what entities one believes there are. The “logical domain of discourse” that Michael Liccioni refers to would be an example of a (formal) conceptual framework; however, while it may be convenient to put certain things in a domain of discourse so one can quantify over them, that (pace Quine) doesn’t have to commit one to regarding those things as actually existing. One can regard talk of the entities in the domain as merely a useful façon de parler.

(5) when one does ontology one may start out with a certain preconception of what entities there are and after investigation come to believe — perhaps because of (1), (2), (3), or (4) — that there are more or fewer kinds of entity than one was initially disposed to think. And if there are fewer kinds, some entities are what one does not get.  :-D

Dr. Pfeifer's comment sums up the controversy very well. "One can regard talk of the entities as merely a useful facon de parler. I presume he means by "facon de parler" a manner of speaking or to facilitate dialogue so to speak. This problem needs not be restricted to formal logic, as Michael Liccioni suggested. It can also benefit by  a facon de parler discourse such as this dialogue between us.

If I may give another example for the entwinement between ontology and epistemology I would cite the work of Paul Ricoeur in "difficult forgiveness". Why is it difficult to forgive? Logically we cannot separate between agent and action and at the same time blame or forgive the agent. Ricoeur says that it is difficult to forgive someone for faults committed causing harm to someone else because of this dilemma. If we say that we forgive the person but not his act we are separating between the person and his act, ie  giving forgiveness and at the same time denying his selfhood. Without self as responsible there can be no forgiveness, because one's agency as "selfhood" is done away with. Thus it is difficult to bridge the gap between ontology and epistemology in dealing with the issue of forgiveness. There are those who say: We shall not forgive, and there are those, like Ricoeur, who say we cannot forgive unless the person who committed wrong asks to be forgiven, and even there it is difficult to bridge the gap between agency and fault..

I don't understand your question. Phislosophically, ontology is related to an essentialist leneage. Perhaps you should see «ontic»

Clara what do you mean by "essentialist lineage". Do you mean what Aristotle called ousia, the "thinghood" of a thing, that is to say that what makes a thing to be what it is? For Aristotle this was a certain activity, he called form.

yes, the lineage that comes form Parmenides and aristoteles too; ousia is a good example

Aristotle thought of essence in terms of substratum, or "ousia". Husserl went a step further by searching for the origin or "eidos". This is an open ended search which can only be approximated by narrative or a dialogue.  This is where it is difficult to sort out what consciousness does in terms of constituted an object, and at the same time being consitituted by the object. Husserl was addressing a different search for meaning from that of Aristotle, but one cannot think of one without the other. 

some lineage but a long and not straight road

You are quite right in saying that the search is never straight or univocal. Science tries to take a straight line, but it ends up in probabilities rather than essence. A straight line  is necessary, but the relation between ontology and being cannot be understood in a straight line, and dialogue becomes an alternative.