At one end of the spectrum regarding state society relationships is neoliberalism. Neoliberal institutions are currently dominating state / market relations (Ó Riain 2000). Arguments from the neoliberal perspective put forth that “the principal source of underdevelopment is government policies that distort economic incentives, inhibit market forces, and actually work against economic development” (Gilpin 2001:311). The state is seen as the problem rather than the solution, especially in less developed countries (LDCs) (312). Joseph Stiglitz (2003), an economist who worked at the World Bank, details this shift from Keynesian economics to neoliberal policies of conditionality and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that require reductions in state services and budgets in order for countries to receive loan funds. Stiglitz writes that conditionality “undermined national sovereignty,” a condition that he says was not even questioned until global protest began to call attention to these issues (9). Stiglitz notes that the global governance organizations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are increasingly dominated by the interests of what Sklair (1995) terms the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC); Stiglitz writes that these non-democratic global organizations are increasingly “pursuing the interests of the financial community” (206). McMichael draws attention to this problem when he writes, “the nationally oriented institutions of the developmentalist era are now being replaced by globally oriented institutions under the legitimizing cloak of efficiency and financial credibility (1996:25). McMichael (2008) is highly critical of this neoliberal era which he calls the “globalization project” (21). Under the neoliberal era there is an emphasis on export oriented growth (EOI) for LDCs, globally oriented free trade policies, and rhetoric supposedly promoting a decreased role of the state to minimal functions of facilitating market transactions; however as Ó Riain (2000) points out, some see strong states as necessary for facilitating market transactions (187) and neoliberals may ultimately be working against their own interests in weakening the state (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985:220).

This neoliberal approach is criticized on many fronts. In addition to Stiglitz’s criticism mentioned above that World Bank conditionality policies undermine state sovereignty, Babb (2005) looks at twenty years of SAPs and reviews how some studies have found they have contributed to less stringent labor and environmental protections, a decrease in state capacity to provide for the welfare of citizens, weakened leftist parties and a reduction in the quality of democracy at the same time as democracy has spread, and increased informal economies, urbanization, and unemployment. Other studies have detailed increasing global income inequality (see for e.g. Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997).

The era of the dominance of the development state came before the neoliberal era, and this theoretical perspective still exists as a challenge to neoliberalism (Gilpin 2001:316). Many note that it was the debt crisis of the 1980s that stimulated the shift from the support for developmentalist states to the new neoliberal agenda (see for e.g. Gilpin 2001; McMichael 2008). Just as the debt crisis marks the beginning of the neoliberal project, the development project began with the end of colonialism. This era was associated with the Bretton Woods system, out of which the World Bank and the IMF were born, and Keynesian economics. Keynes, a British economist who participated at Bretton Woods, believed lack of demand explained economic downturns, and thus it was the role of the state to stimulate demand using monetary and fiscal policies such as increasing government expenditures or cutting taxes (Stiglitz 2003:11). This era was characterized by nationally oriented policies and institutions (McMichael 1996) and was focused on promoting national economic growth of less developed countries by promoting polices such as taxation to finance public works and infrastructure, import substitution industrialization (ISI), and the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) by foreign firms (McMichael 2008:46-52).

As stated above, the debt crisis precipitated the shift to neoliberalism, signaling the failure of the developmentalist agenda to many (Gilpin 313). Much research from the dependency approach (not discussed here because it is discussed in question C.) also finds problematic elements of policies of the development state. For just one example, an entire research stream focuses on testing ideas of dependency using FDI data and details the problematic effects of policies to attract FDI as a means to development. While some find FDI is not as helpful as domestic investment but it is still helpful (e.g. Firebaugh 1992) others based on theoretical interpretations still find evidence of the negative effects of FDI penetration (Dixon and Boswell 1996). Kentor (2001) finds that foreign capital dependence leads to increased inequality, increased fertility, increased population growth and decreased economic development; in a more nuanced but similar light Kentor and Boswell (2003) also find long term negative effects on economic growth of foreign direct investment concentration from one country.

Rather than dividing the role of the state temporally and examining the shift from the developmental state to the neoliberal state in an era of globalization as the above authors do, Ó Riain (2000) analyzes the world-systems, world society, and political economy theoretical approaches to the role of the state; it will be useful to also discuss these three theoretical approaches here. (I discuss dependency theory in question C and therefore omit it as a category here although I do discuss work in this theoretical tradition in the section on the political economy approach.)

World-system theory “emphasizes the ways in which states and markets shape one another at the level of the world-system” (Ó Riain 2000:189). Since I also discuss this theoretical perspective at length in another response, I will be brief here. Chase-Dunn (1998) notes that some charge the world-system perspective with being overly economist (e.g. Skocpol), however, he highlights the insights provided by the perspective to state society relationships (109-110). Wallerstein highlights the strong core state / weak peripheral state dichotomy and Chase-Dunn agrees that this “generalization holds” (111). World-system theory also draws attention to the rise and decline of one core state in hegemonic cycles; this state has much power and influence in determining state society relationships globally. In addition, world-system scholars might see what currently appears to be the decline of the state as simply the decline of a hegemonic cycle. Work from International Relations (IR) such as Modelski (1978), Thompson (1988), and Modelski and Thompson (1995) would likely support the perspective that the apparent decline of nation states is actually cyclical decline that may be followed by war and the ascension of a new hegemon; these scholars look at long term global cycles and trends of global politics and global war, and the IR field remains nation-state focused. The world-system perspective, however, also discusses system decline, and Wallerstein has suggested this is what we might actually be experiencing, hopefully in preparation for global social democracy (2000:355-454). The world-system perspective also suggests that states are integrated into the market and into the international division of labor in a state-based core, semi-periphery, and periphery hierarchy. The merit of this theoretical approach is that it draws our attention to the global level, which clearly influences individual nation-states and their interactions with each other. While much evidence has been found for these relationships in the past, which has justified the state centric approach (Chase-Dunn 1998), these are empirical questions that continue to be explored by various literatures, including non-state centric approaches or approaches that test the continued importance of states organized in the world-system such as the global commodity chains (GCC) literature (e.g. Gereffi, Bair) and the literature and studies on world cities (e.g. Sassen, Timberlake, Smith). One of the criticisms of world-systems is that it deals less well with questions regarding internal power and dynamics within nation-states (Chase-Dunn 1998:111).

The world society or world polity perspective offers another theoretical perspective on state society relationships. The merit of this perspective is that it explains “institutional isomorphism” or the similarity in structure of states across the world, despite the fact that individual states are quite different from each other and they face quite different situations (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997:144). This perspective, like world-systems, also focuses on exogenously driven forces that shape nation-states – nation-states are seen to be shaped by “worldwide cultural and associational processes” (144); however, this perspective also allows analysis of internal structural features too. World society perspectives focus on a convergence of institutions and culture, however, the perspective also points to evidence of decoupling between institutional aims and outcomes. Furthermore, the theory itself does not celebrate institutional and cultural isomorphism; it simply treats it as an object of study. The world society perspective does hold, however, that the state is of continuing importance in world society and states are seen as the primary actors (Ó Riain 2000:189), along with other actors including international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). Although some see the institutional focus of this perspective as a limitation, the empirical research coming out of this perspective has done much to illuminate the trend of institutional isomorphism and the growth of world society institutions such as INGOs.

Scholars working within the comparative political economy tradition (e.g. Evans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol, Stephens) emphasize the autonomous role of the state, separate from the market and also show how the state is necessary to the market (e.g. Evans 1995). Research from this perspective tends to focus on the various roles and actions of states and the different market and other outcomes. The merits of empirical work from this perspective is that the perspective encourages analysis that is not only focused on global level or economic forces to the detriment of local political agency, but the blending of these more macro theories has enhanced political economic approaches overall. An early weakness of this approach was that it often did not take into account global forces, however the perspective has evolved over time to include more consistent attention to states and their interactions with other states and how they are situated in the global system; this blending has led to what Evans and Stephens (1988) call the new comparative political economy. Evans’ work has long served as an example of the usefulness of combining the dependency tradition with the political economy approach that also sees an active role for the state. In Dependent Development (1979) Evans analyzes the internal structure of the Brazilian elite. Evans is known for his idea of the “triple alliance” between foreign capital, local capital, and the state in building an industrial economy (5). Although he analyzes the way this type of development works in detail and the change in terms of industrialization that it brings, he also emphasizes its limitations: this type of development is not able to help the masses, it creates a political divide between the elite with and without international capital and state owned enterprises in competition with private capital each of which cause problems, and finally and most importantly, this type of dependent development depends on a larger system of imperialism (287-290). In Brining the State Back In (1985) Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol see the state as a potentially autonomous actor, contra Neo-Marxists who see the state as an instrument of class rule that guarantees production relations and accumulation, or as an arena for class struggle. Skocpol et al. see the state as an actor, even as the state represents structure. The authors explore the modern state in different contexts such as state strategies for economic development and social redistribution in newly developed countries, states and transnational relations, and states and collective action. Particularly interesting chapters that reveal the strength of this method to provide depth and nuanced analysis include Amsden’s on the role of the active state in Taiwan’s development and Skocpol and Weir’s comparing Sweden, Britain, and the United States and their “state structures and policy legacies” (119) and how each state’s actions influence the others.

Much of the work in the political economy perspective looks at the interaction between the state as semi-autonomous actor and the elite as separate entities, and sees problems when the state is too dominated by the elite, which tends to be associated with the situation in some LDCs. This is captured by Evans’ “ideal type” of the “predatory state” in Embedded Autonomy (1995:12). Along these lines, in Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992) Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, in exploring what promotes and prevents democracy (4), pose the question, what do we make of the fact that in the U.S. the state and the elite are increasingly not separate? Weber’s idea of elective affinity has often been applied to the relationship between capitalism and democracy; Rueschemeyer et al. write that both capitalists and Marxists agree that “democracy is the characteristic political form of capitalism” (1). Ultimately the authors come to the Polanyi-esque conclusion that it is the very contradictions of capitalism that promote democracy. Capitalist development changes the class structure, strengthening the working middle class, and this is the class that is consistently pro-democratic (7). “It was neither capitalists nor capitalism as such but rather the contradictions of capitalism that advanced the cause of political equality. Capitalism contributed to democracy primarily because it changed the balance of class power in favor of the subordinate interests” and they go on to say that while capitalism presupposes class inequality democracy is able to reshape capitalism (302). They might agree with Robinson (1996) who claims that what we are discussing is actually polyarchy, or modified democracy that doesn’t truly challenge the interests of the elites, however, Rueschemeyer et al. see even limited democracy as offering potential for deceasing inequality. This parallels Polanyi’s (1944) idea of the “double movement” that we must mention in any discussion of state society relations. Polanyi wrote, “modern society was governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions” (136). Polanyi saw the market as traditionally embedded in society, but he saw the efforts of those who promote market liberalism as an attempt to disembed the market from society and instead embed society in the economy; this was the “great transformation.” He believed that in the past when free market policies went too far people, and even the capitalists themselves, would call on the state to protect them from the unrestrained market, and in this way the rise of the market would actually also increase the strength of the state. Polanyi’s discussion of real and fictitious commodities (71) also draws attention to how capitalism exploits land, labor, and money, because these are not real commodities because they were not created for sale on the market, however, market liberalism and disembedding treats these as commodities which leads to their destruction. Polanyi writes “the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia” which ultimately would destroy the human and natural substance of society (3). Polanyi discusses (145) and Fred Block writes in the introduction that “laissez-faire was planned” (xxvii), which brings us back full circle to the current state of neoliberalism.

To sum up what I have covered so far: I have discussed the transition to a neoliberal dominated agenda that emphasizes the intentional weakening of states; prior to the neoliberal regime a developmental state regime emphasized the active role of the state, especially in promoting economic development; and I have discussed three theoretical perspectives, world-systems, which remains state centric, world society, which also does not support the idea that the role of the nation-state is in decline, and the political economy perspective, that also argues for bringing the state back in. Guillén (2001) cites Evans (1997) who “points out that globalization undermines the state because its associated neoliberal orthodoxy is against the state and not because globalization is inextricably against the state” (Guillén 2001:248). Sites (2000), emphasizes the transformed nature of the state and “positions the state as both facilitator and victim of globalization” (121). He sees states as “increasingly fragmented and yet remain[ing] highly significant actors” (122). Sites also discusses how Marx showed, via the concept of primitive accumulation, that capitalism was not self producing but was state orchestrated; Sites makes a parallel argument regarding globalization, emphasizing the state’s active role in the process. Thus, of the five perspectives covered, while some certainly make room for the changing role or transformation of the state, all see the state as maintaining and important role in society; neoliberalism is the only one that emphasizes the decline of the state or leads others such as McMichael to critique the current pressure for the decline of the state.

Other scholars however, do emphasize the decline of the state. Appadurai (1996), studying cultural dimensions of globalization writes, “Neither images or viewers fit into circuits or audiences that are easily bound within local, national, or regional spaces” (4) and he observes the “end of the era of the nation-state” (18). To Appadurai, the key elements of globalization are the media and migration, and these transcend the bounds of nation-states; one example of this is how migrants are increasingly able through the use of media and other technology to keep in contact with and maintain an identity related to countries even if they no longer reside there. Appadurai also argues for the continued importance but transformation of the local (11). Castells (1996) writing about the rise of the network society and the global information economy also sees the decline of the nation-state, and writes, “networks do not stop at the border of the nation-state” (xviii). Robertson, another scholar of culture doesn’t see decline but does see the nation-state as a cultural construct (112) that is being changed, and writes, “the contemporary market involves the increasing interpenetration of culture and economy” (100). Based on the work of these three scholars it appears those who study global culture and technology emphasize the decline or drastic transformation of the nation state more than those who take an economic or political approach. Many of these scholars of culture however also emphasize how the local, although it may not be contained by the nation-state, is increasingly salient as a counter to the parts of globalization that are homogenizing.

Taylor and Robinson are two additional scholars who see the decline of the nation-state system and the end of hegemonic cycles. Taylor (1996) posits that we are at world impasse largely because of environmental pressures; he writes, “There is no way forward for our world. The development of the modern world-system is coming to an end” (212) and Robinson (1996) writes, “globalizing pressures break down national autonomies and make it increasingly impossible to sustain distinct political systems in an integrated global economy” (40); he explains that as the nation-states just facilitate economic functioning the real power is transferred to suprastate organizations like the IMF (36). As mentioned above Sklair (1995) emphasizes the transnational capitalist practices (TCPs) driven by the transnational capitalist class (TCC) and transnational corporations (TNCs); he emphasizes state centric approaches that don’t take the increasing power of these organizations into account are myopic. Kentor (2005) provides an example of empirical work that is an illustration of Sklair’s point; his article analyzes the growth of transnational corporate networks.

There is much opportunity for future research on the continued, decreasing, or changing role of the state. World society theory offers potential for future theory testing and advancement; I am currently working on a project looking at the influence of the world society on environmental concern at the individual level that suggests the presence of a suprastate environmental regime and the impact of global forces on individual identity formation, that still works in conjunction with the structure of the nation-state and the state’s connection to the world polity. The idea of decoupling within this perspective also bears consideration regarding the complexities of the convergence/divergence argument despite the continued isomorphism of states. The global human rights regime offers an interesting topic of study as it serves as an example of a challenge to the Westphalia established sovereignty of states. Likewise, the 2011 actions of the United States and the global community in North Africa and the Middle East, including in Libya, also would be a potentially fruitful case study regarding the diminished rights of the sovereignty of states. Environmental issues are particularly pertinent as environmental problems do not adhere to nation-state boundaries. Global cooperation must be established to address system-threatening environmental issues. I have also used survival analysis to assess factors impacting variation in time until environmental treaty ratification by states. Stiglitz (2003) writes that we do not have global government but we do have global governance driven by very specific and self oriented interests; research should also focus on supranational political institutions and transnational networks for political action that challenge the dominant neoliberal regime and call for more global solutions. Research from the political economy perspective might look at how actions of states challenge the neoliberal regime or are diminished by it. If state capacity to protect the welfare of its citizens is increasingly diminished, who will protect these individuals and their health and wellbeing outcomes? Will we see evidence of the rise of INGOs for this purpose as the state outsources some of its responsibilities, or will we see a Polanyi-esque “double movement” of a rise in transnational activism calling for more state or possibly global government to protect individuals and the environment? Will financial flows, communication networks, global inequality, and migration continue to challenge the concepts of nation-states and borders? How will the rights of women be protected or degraded by the decline, increase, or transformation of state power? Furthermore, much comparative analysis uses nation-state level data; if the nation-state is truly in decline or being transformed, what other research methods can we utilize to understand social structures? Global cities research and global commodity chain research are well poised to not only test decoupling from the world-system of nation-states but also to advance non-state centric research. Research on transnational corporations and interlocking directorates and other methods of analysis are also important to consider moving forward.