Tononi and associates (2016) believe that different neurons control consciousness over unconsciousness, subjecting the brain to a dualism that can be traced back to René Descartes of the 17 Century. This idea conflicts with the observations of Oliver Sacks, who found that bilateral damage of the dopaminergic fibres that innervate the neocortex disrupts both the flow of movements (which can be done consciously as well as unconsciously) and the flow of thinking (a very conscious process):

Parkinson’s patients while immobile and comatose are unable to schedule their movements and thoughts. As described by Parkinson’s patient, Miss D: “…my essential symptom is that I cannot start and I cannot stop. Either I am held still or I am forced to accelerate. ” [Sacks 2012, pp. 40] As well, perceptions, words, phrases, or thoughts can be locked, either brought to a standstill or continuously repeated [Sacks 2012, pp. 15-16]. All volitional, introspective, and automatic states are interrupted in Parkinson’s patients, suggesting that dopamine must mediate the smooth transition of events for these states and in the absence of dopamine subjects are put into a perpetual ‘sleep’ as evidenced by their EEG, delta activity which is prevalent during slow-wave sleep.

Furthermore, when considering the preparatory activity preceding a movement (which can be thought of as ‘thinking to move’, James 1890), the preparatory activity has the same predictive power for a future movement irrespective of whether there is a movement or not (Darlington and Lisberger 2020; also see Nasibullina, Lebedev et al. 2023), and the preparatory activity is present throughout neocortex as well as subcortex including the thalamus, the pons, and the cerebellar cortex and nuclei, for instance (Darlington and Lisberger 2020; Hasanbegović 2024). Accordingly, the same neurons in neocortex mediate both consciousness and unconsciousness with the difference being in the nature of the pathways utilized to accomplish each: e.g., visual consciousness (which is for visual learning, Hebb 1949, 1961, 1968) would depend on both posterior and anterior neocortical sites, whereas visual unconsciousness would depend mainly on posterior neocortical sites since the learning of new routines has been finalized via the frontal lobes (Chen and Wise 1995ab; Schiller and Tehovnik 2001, 2005, 2015; Tehovnik 2024; Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, Chen 2024).

When mammals including humans are involved in volitional behaviors such as walking, running, or swimming, the neocortex assumes a low-voltage fast EEG activity, which characterizes the waking state of the brain (Vanderwolf 1969). When one swims lengths in a pool, one is very aware of two states of consciousness: a first state that is anchored to current sensations, especially when approaching the end of a pool length, which requires a flip turn initiated by vision, touch, sound, proprioception, and a change in vestibular head-orientation. To enhance one’s linkage to current sensations while swimming, one must swim with determination to reach the end of the pool as fast as possible, as would be the case by someone engaged in a swimming competition.

A second state of consciousness assumed during swimming is to be disconnected from one’s sensations, and instead be thinking about events of the day which depends both on information stored in the neocortex (e.g., in the parietal, temporal, and orbital cortices) and on the unconscious rhythmicity of swimming via subcortical circuits (e.g., as mediated by the cerebellum, Hasanbegović 2024). The unconscious rhythmicity is triggered by a visual impression at the end of a pool length to induce a flip turn; this is transmitted via the neocortex to subcortical channels (Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, Chen 2024). Once a flip turn is completed and swimming resumed, one can continue to contemplate the events of the day, consciously.

It is noteworthy that when the dopaminergic system of Parkinson’s patients whose dopamine levels have been reduced by 99% (Sacks 2012, pp. 335) is recovered using amantadine (a dopaminergic agonist), their neocortical EEG resembles low-voltage fast activity [Fig. 2 and 3 of Sacks 2012, pp. 329, 331], which is evidenced during waking state and volitional and automatic movements, as well as during introspective thinking (Sacks 2012). And recall that having one’s movements and thinking locked-in due to dopamine depletion is accompanied by neocortical slow-wave activity, which also occurs during sleep. It is for this reason that Parkinsonism has often been referred to as a sleeping sickness (Sacks 1976).

So, using EEG monitoring of athletes during swimming is a fast way to pilot if neocortical low-voltage fast activity undergoes a change depending on whether one is swimming volitionally as during a competition (which means all consciousness is dedicated to current sensations and the motor act) or whether one is swimming contemplatively (thinking about events of the day while executing an automated act). According to Tonini et al. (2016) these two states should generate different forms of activity over the neocortex if different neurons are engaged in the performance of each. According to our scheme (detailed in Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, Chen 2024), the activity of posterior neocortex should remain unchanged for both conditions, while the frontal lobes will only be engaged when new routines are being learned (or contemplated), which requires consciousness (or thinking, Hebb 1949, 1961, 1968).

** I would suggest that the bet between Christof Koch and David Chalmers [In: A 25-year-old bet about Consciousness has finally been settled, 2023] be extended for one or two years so that Christof can finally collect his reward for being correct about consciousness. But not to be too hasty, maybe we should wait for the empirical results to roll in based on our new conceptualization of consciousness being a neurophysiological/behavioral (rather than a philosophical/computational, Tononi et al. 2016) problem. The latter is the same error made by supporters of the Blue Brain Project, as spearheaded by Henry Markram which cost Europe over a billion dollars. **

More Edward J Tehovnik's questions See All
Similar questions and discussions