SCIENTIFIC METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES
BEYOND HEIDEGGER
ENHANCING PHYSICS
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph. D., Dr. phil.
1. Introduction beyond Heidegger
I begin my cosmologically metaphysical critique of the foundations of Heidegger’s work, with a statement of concern. Anyone who attempts to read this work without first reading my arguments in the book, Physics without Metaphysics?, (1) without being in favour of a new science-compatible metaphysics and concept of To Be, and (2) without a critical attitude to Heidegger – is liable to misunderstand my arguments here as misinformed, denigrative, or even trivial. But I do this critique in search of very general means of constructing a metaphysics capable of realising constant guidance and enhancement to scientific practice.
Contemporary mathematics, physics, cosmology, biology, and the human sciences have a shape after undergoing so much growth that we cannot think philosophically without admitting the existence (termed “To Be”) of all that exist, the cosmos and its parts. The general concept of existence is always as “something-s” that are processually out there, however far-fetched our concepts of the various parts of or of the whole cosmos are. “The existence of the totality (Reality-in-total) as the whole something whatever” and “particular existence in the minimally acceptable state of being something/s whatever that is not the whole totality” are absolutely trans-subjective and thus objectual presuppositions behind all thought.
Today we do not have to theoretically moot any idea of non-existence of the cosmos and its parts as whatever they are. This is self-evident. That is, basing philosophical thinking – of the very nature of the existence-wise metaphysical presuppositions of all that are subjective and objective – upon the allegedly subjective origin of thought processes and concepts – should be universally unacceptable.
Therefore, I think we should get behind Heidegger’s seemingly metaphysical words – all based on the human stage on which Being is thought – by chipping his prohibitively poetical and mystifying language off its rhetorically Reality-adumbrating shades, in order to get at the senses and implications of his Fundamental Ontology as Being-historical Thinking. It suffices here to admit that the history of Being is not the general concept of the history of the thought of Being, and not the history of the thought of Being.
Moreover, it is not a necessity for philosophy that the Humean-Kantian stress on the subject-aspect of thought be carried forward to such an extent that whatever is thought has merely subjectively metaphysical Ideal presuppositions. All subjective presuppositions must somehow be taken to possess the merely subjective character.
There are, of course, presuppositions with some conceptual character. But to the extent some of them are absolute, they are to be taken as absolutely non-subjective. These presuppositions are applicable without exception to all that is, e.g. To Be and all Categories that may be attributed to all that exist. HENCE, SUBJECTIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS ARE NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONCEPTUAL PRESUPPOSITIONS.
This fact should be borne out while doing philosophy, without which no philosophy and science are possible. The weight of the subject-aspect continues to be true of thought insofar as we go to non-absolute details of metaphysical presuppositions and empirical details, and not when we think only of the metaphysical Ideals of all existents in themselves.
It is true that there is no complete chipping off of the merely subjective or anthropological aspect of the Heideggerian theory. Nor is there an analysis without already interpreting anything. The guiding differentiation here should be that between “the subjective” and the “conceptual”. The conceptual is not merely subjective, but also objective. It is objective due to the inheritance pattern behind it from the objectual.
Such a hermeneutic is basic to all understanding, speculation, feeling, and sensing. The linguistically and otherwise symbolic expression of concepts and their concatenations is to be termed as the denotative universals and their concatenations.
At the purely conceptual level we have connotation. These are purely conceptual universals and their concatenations. Since these are not merely a production of the mind but primarily that by the involvement of the generated data from the little selection of the phenomena from physical processes, which are from a highly selected group of levels of objectual processes, which belong to the things themselves.
At the level of the phenomena, levels of objectual processes, and the things themselves there are universals, which we shall term ontological universals and their conglomerations. These conglomerations are termed so because they have the objectual content at the highest level available within the processes of sensing, feeling, understanding, speculation, etc.
2. Conclusions on Heidegger Proper
The above should not necessarily mean (1) that we cannot base thought fully on the Metaphysical Ideals of “To Be” and “the state of existents as somethings”, and (2) that we cannot get sufficiently deep into the fundamental implications of his work by side-lining the purely subjective concepts of the fundamental metaphysical concepts. This claim is most true of the concept of To Be.
To Be is the simultaneously processual-verbal and nomic-nominal aspect of Reality-in-total, and not merely that of any specific being, phenomenon, or concept. For Heidegger, To Be (Being) is somehow a private property of Dasein, the Being-thinking being. To Be which is the most proper subject matter of Einaic Ontology (metaphysics based completely on the trans-thought fact of the Einai, “To Be” of Reality-in-total) is not the Being that Dasein thinks or the Being that is given in Dasein, because To Be belongs to Reality-in-total together and in all its parts.
Even in Heidegger’s later phase highlighted best by his Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, his concept of To Be as belonging to the Dasein which is the authentically Being-thinking human being has not changed substantially. Even here he continues to project positively the history of Being-thinking human being as the authentic Being-historical process and as the essence of the history of all that can be thought of.
Against the above metaphysical backdrop of essentially anthropocentric definitions, I write this critique based on cosmological-metaphysical necessities in philosophy, and indirectly evaluate what I consider as the major ontological imperfection in Heidegger’s thought from the viewpoint of the Categorial demands of the history of metaphysics, various provincial ontologies and scientific ontology, and of the way in which I conceive the jolts and peaks in such history.
Along with the purely meta-metaphysical To Be, (1) I present the metaphysical abstract notions of Extension (= compositeness: i.e., having parts) and Change (= impacts by composites: i.e., part-to-part projection of impact elements) as the irreducibly metaphysical Categories of all existents and (2) argue that Extension-Change existence in their non-abstract togetherness as existents is nothing but Universal Causation (= everything is Existence-Change-wise existent, i.e. if not universally causal, existence is vacuous).
These are metaphysical principles that Heidegger and most philosophers till today have not recognized the primordiality of. Most of them tend to fix to existence universal or partial or absolutely no causality. In short, Universal Causation, even in some allegedly non-causal aspects of cosmology, quantum physics, philosophy of mind, and human sciences, is to be the taken as a priorias and co-implied by existence (To Be), because anything existent is extended and changing...! No more should sciences or philosophy doubt Universal Causality. Herein consists the merit of Einaic Ontology as a universally acceptable metaphysics behind all sciences – not merely of human sciences.
To Be is the highest Transcendental Ideal; Reality-in-total is the highest Transcendent Ideal; and Reality-in-general is the highest Transcendental-Transcendent Ideal of generalized theoretical concatenation of ontological universals in consciousness. These are meta-metaphysical in shape. They are not at all classificational (categorizing) of anything in this world or in thought.
Although Heidegger has not given a Categorial scheme of all existents or Categorial Ideals for all metaphysics and thinking, he is one of the few twentieth century thinkers of ontological consequence, after Aristotle (in favour of an abstract concept of Being) and Kant (against treating the concept of Being as an attribute), to have dealt extensively with a very special concept of Being and our already interpretive ability to get at To Be.
I present here in gist the difference between the Dasein-Interpreted concept of Being and the ontologically most widely committed, Einaic Ontological, nomic-nominal, and processual-verbal concept of To Be, which should be metaphysically the highest out-there presupposition of all thought and existence. This is the relevance of metaphysics as a trans-science.
Bibliography
(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.
(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.
(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.
(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.
(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.