As regards learning, it makes sense to say that mimic has a prevailing significance: organisms develop different attitudes and behavior according to what they observe. Just think about the technique adopted by sparrows in order to open nuts (they fly high, then they drop the seed): you can consider this as an evolutionary adaptation, but indeed it regards a behavioral character not explicitly encoded in DNA. 

Then, think about insects or snakes: there are lot of examples for which different species try to mimic the appearance or behavior of particular other species (maybe poisonous or nasty): can you evaluate this just by convergent evolution? It is quite reductive, because a better enlightenment comes from epigenetics and sociobiology - which say that you must consider the interactions (on behavioral levels) between individuals form the same or different species... and this is actually what mimic is: take a cue form others to improve their own survival. Moreover, by this definition it is a short step to implement social behavior! 

Then, regarding humans, I think the concept of mimicry is highly suitable: most of a person's behaviors is based on knowledge acquired thoughout his or her experience; but memory is tricky, so the communication or the reproduction of the impressions linked to particular records may be misrepresented - for which it is better to say that the spread of a behavior is carried by imitation instead of duplication. 

In the end, I think mimic is quite a scientific concept, because it allows to systematically take over the typization of species though their evolutionaty path. 

Hoping to be helpfull, may I ask you to suggest some publication about evolutionary mimicry? I am quite interested... 

Dear Federico, thanks for your answer.

The end of your answer was the beginning of my question: “may I ask you to suggest some scientific publication about evolutionary mimicry?”

Your answer is “common sense”, and I do agree with you on the point that mimic behaviour might help in explaining human action. But …

Let me start with mainstream economics. This discipline assumes that human beings are rational and maximizing: so any human action can be explained by measuring the gains that an individual obtains from her/his decision, knowing any consequences and knowing that all other individual acts the same way. This is a theory. You can validate it through logic and/or experiment. You find in literature a large number of essays on that.

Marxism assumes that individuals do not have any personal preferences but act as the class they are part requires. This also is a theory. You can validate it through logic and/or experiment.

Institutionalism makes different assumptions … This also is a theory. You can validate it through logic and/or experiment.

Other economic theories exist that start from assumptions or from observation. In other words, the scholars use a scientific method. For all of them, you find in literature a large number of essays.

“Mimic” behaviour appears today as something in between 1. the result of some observation and 2. a basic assumption. In particular, your sentence: « … organisms develop different attitudes and behaviour according to what they observe … the spread of behaviour is carried by imitation instead of duplication» sounds as an assumption (exactly as it is for mainstream economics), unless one does not provide evidence!

In other words: today, mimicry is not consistent with social science! as far as I can understand.

In biology, expecially nowadays (it began to implement algorithms and logics, rather than fossilize further on mere observation), speaking about mimicry it make sense as regards defining new ways to treat biological information and population dynamics. Biology has itself evolved in a quantitative science: scientists notice some behavior in biotic systems, then rationalize it into a logic model. You can say that today, in biological sciences, "mimicry" resemble a model: a set of logical tools, suitably selected according to their model assumptions (in this case, everything regards mimic), gathered in order to describe and predict "common sense" observation. 

As regards social sciences, I think it could be usefull to consult the works of J.Huizinga and R.Caillois: expecially the last one discussed a lot about the category of mimicry in his book "Man, play and games". Huizinga described game-like aspects of society (surprisingly, a lot) and it is not difficult to reconduct the most to what can be called "principle of mimesis". A more scientific discussion (n.b.: for "scientific" I mean hard sciences) can be appreciated in E.R.Kandel's (neuroscientist) "The age of insight" even if it is treated in a more subliminal way: actually it reasons about the art - but soft sciences such social ones are undeniably linked to criterions of philosophical aesthetics, and so to art itself. 

I can suggest these as further readings, because they reveal (with examples and experiment) the consistency of mimicry in discussing social issues. Anyway, it is more appropriate to say mimic "paradigm" as regards the most of soft sciences, because of their undeniable arbitrariness (here the artistic influence) and "high level" setting: a hard science's theory is established upon the implicit directive of a set of behaviors, while soft science's theories spring up from behavior theirselves. For example, the assumptions of marxist paradigm are themselves its model of reference: is both an assumption and a directive. On the other and, in evolutionary biology, is just an assumption, while the implicit directive is . A theory is "hard" if exist proofs that directly advance the assumptions into a unique model of reference outside the set of assumptions; it is "soft" if the implication is not so clear. 

Maybe, today, we have found these evidences for some biological model, but we have not been able to do the same for social sciences... maybe because of redundant or erroneous asusmptions. 

Dear all,

May I introduce shortly the biological mimicry concept: Mimicry sytems have three protagonists which are the model, the mimic and the signal receiver which cannot or cannot fully discriminate between the original signal of the model and the signal copy of the mimic. Mimicry by this definition is based on fake signals.

Flollowing this definition the classical Bates mimicry or defensive mimicry, palatable animals mimic the warning colour of inpalatable animals as well as attractive mimicry, the mimic imitates a signal of a model in order to attract the signal receiver both are mimicry systems. Mullerian mimicry, two unrelated poisonous species use the same warning colour, is thus no mimicry. Mimesis, the imitation of inattractive objects like dead leaves or twigs, also is not mimicry.

Humans are also protagonists in mimicry systems, e.g. when a hunter uses the coat of an animal to approach animals for hunting or when you flee a hoverfly, because you think it is a wasp.

Best wishes

Klaus

Dear all,

In biology, 'mimicry' has long been considered to be a textbook example of adaptation through natural selection. While arguably there are human analogues to mimicry, I suggest that these can mostly be used interchangeably with imitation.

Imitation is conceptually different from, and more loosely defined than, 'functional mimicry'; that is, mimicry that evolves when a receiver perceives the similarity between a mimic and a model and as a result confers a selective benefit onto the mimic.

However, even within biology there are fundamental problems in how we use this concept, leaving the mimicry paradigm in urgent need of revision.

We address some of these problems in a recent Ecology Letters ‘Ideas and Perspective’ paper. Here we also provide a novel, more inclusive, functional framework for understanding mimicry in biology:

Article Mimicry for all modalities

ABSTRACT: Mimicry is a canonical example of adaptive signal design. In principle, what constitutes mimicry is independent of the taxonomic identity of the mimic, the ecological context in which it operates, and the sensory modality through which it is expressed. However, in practice the study of mimicry is inconsistent across research fields, with theoretical and empirical advances often failing to cross taxonomic and sensory divides. We propose a novel conceptual framework whereby mimicry evolves if a receiver perceives the similarity between a mimic and a model and as a result confers a selective benefit onto the mimic. Here, misidentification and/or deception are no longer formal requirements, and mimicry can evolve irrespective of the underlying proximate mechanisms. The centrality of receiver perception in this framework enables us to formally distinguish mimicry from perceptual exploitation and integrate mimicry and multicomponent signalling theory for the first time. In addition, it resolves inconsistencies in our understanding of the role of learning in mimicry evolution, and shows that imperfect mimicry is expected to be the norm. Mimicry remains a key model for understanding signal evolution and cognition, and we recommend the adoption of a unified approach to stimulate future interdisciplinary developments in this fascinating area of research.

All the best!

Justin