In a Nature article from 12 October 2015, named 'Price carbon — I will if you will', MacKay, Cramton, Ockenfels, and Soft argue that common commitments in a public goods game changes the Nash Equlibrium from free-riding, i.e. contributing nothing to the public good, to full contribution (cooperation).
They interpret this as a theoretical solution to climate change negotiations.
I wonder if there is an experimental investigation of this theoretical prediciton and would be happy if anyone could point me towards a paper that deals with this.
Thanks in advance.
Simulations of what, you mean? What be the advantage of running a simulation instead of creating a (game) theoretical model?
Hi Hendrik,
nicht genau das was in dem Paper beschrieben wird aber auf jeden Fall aehnlich:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40912732?seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents
https://www.econ.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-9758-127f-0000-000015425dd7/asimple.pdf
Insgesamt muss man sich natuerlich fragen wie realistisch eine "Loesung" ist die external enforment braucht um druchgesezt zu werden.
Viele Gruesse