Axiology

Article The dynamics of the service delivery process: A value-based approach

Dear Tetyana,

I agree with Ivo and Harshvardhan on the Metaphysical roots to any question about 'What?' Yet, I think that the question of desire has a lot to do also with the question of taste. For the last reason, I think that whereas Metaphysics takes good care of the 'What-component' of your inquiry, Axiology (values) and Aesthetics (taste) are two other related fields in Philosophy that need to be considered in addressing any question about desire. This is because the question about 'What can be desired?' can as well be reframed to read in more details 'What can be desired by an individual?'

When your question is made to read in more details as I suggested above, it comes to clearer light that whatever can be desired by an individual (or whatever type of thing she/he constantly desires) is traceable to her/his 'preferences', 'values', and more deeply, 'taste'; and these are keywords in Axiology and Aesthetics.

Regards,

Anthony, thank you for the detailed answer. I had values in mind when I asked, the issue of taste has totally escaped my attention. Thank you for pointing this out. Indeed, within an individual mind taste and values are sometimes inseparable.

Stefan, thank you for correcting me about epistemology.

I disagree that " In order to desire something, you must believe for your self that the object of your desire is somehow 'good'". Desires are very often subconscious, so you do not have to believe in anything at all to have desires. It's also possible to desire something that you totally believe is bad (for example, out of fear, duty, curiosity or whatever you do not believe in).

Rather you come to Johannesburg, I seriously dislike driving

Book: The Philosophy of Desire in the Buddhist Pali Canon

By David Webster

@Ivo: thank you for the detailed overview. Indeed, desires can be viewed from different philosophical perspectives. I am not entirely sure yet, which perspective I will find the most useful. I was contemplating on human wellbeing (overall life satisfaction). That's where desires (or lack of) manifest themselves in subjective wellbeing evaluation (unsatisfied desires affect the perception of happiness).

@Louis: thank you for the link to Buddhism - most inevitably my question arose from the Buddhist worldview. And what I am looking for now is an ontology of desires.

Well, I agree with the caveats evoked to adopting a Kantian approach, but  it was Kant to put the question rather in the same form as yours. Sometimes speaking of what one can desire, more often in the version What can I hope. But always posing the problem of the legitimacy of a hope, a desire or the like (for how different anyway a hope and a desire can be).

This way of raising the question of legitimcay  is at the basis of the peculiar approach to Moral Philosophy that he adopted in the Critic of Practical Reason.

The whole projects of the three Critics: of Pure Reason, of Practical Reason, and of Judgement, is anyway linked to his rather peculiar epistemological approach called transcendentalism.

As such transcendentalism is an interrogation on the conditions of possibility of something. And as such was meant to be a complete departure from traditional metaphysics.

So: how can there be a causation in the world out there. Only (for Kant) if we admit absolute space and time, and so on.

In his moral philosophy, this becomes: how can a moral duty be really binding, etc.

Then, at the very end, there is a connection between his attempt to explain our knowledge of the world (epistemology) and the way he framed morality.

Since the modern Western departmentalization of morality, aesthetics and science as belonging to wholly different areas of human thought is to be traced back to this Kantian approach, I think it would be interesting to endeavor  a kind of genealogical study of how this departmentalization occurred to the Western mind, and how it was linked to a peculiar epistemology.

Besides, at the beginning German romanticism strongly contested a separation of knowledge from aesthetics, since a work of art possessed for these authors the status of a "gnoseologia major", something able to illuminate us on the reality, more than a pure reasoning.

And, also, the separation of Morality and Aesthetics certainly was in open contradiction with the theories of Hutchison, or even Adam Smith, who believed in the possibility of a theory of moral sentiments.

So I think that your reappraisal of the link between epistemology and the problem of legitimacy of desire could be of a rather great interest.

Stefan,

Most of our desire are not ''rational desires''.  Some are animalistic and the same as our primate cousins but the vast majority are determined by a moral framework which is socially enculturated into us through examplars of all sort in cultures and we do not rationnay have access to most of that but it determine the space of choices and desire that arise in our consciousness. 

 I myself would try to leave my feet on the ground and to find the answer to Tetyana's interesting questions among the territories of cognitive science, psychology and epistemology. Ethics does not come into the picture, as this is not a normative question in the form of "What should be desired?".

I totally agree with Hoercher but I must confess that in Ethic and in the Law there is a certain semantic opaqueness in handling these differences.

For instance, in the Law, we do not say: A contract must be composed of an offer and an acceptance, but we say Contract is an agreement. So the typical philosophical correct juxtaposition between a Sein and a Sollen, is bypassed by the "legal ontology": Contract is such and such, property is such and such, and goods are such and such.

In this way the normal question posed to a lawyer is in the form: Can I ... (e.g.) buy shares of my company using the company's assets? rather than what Should I .... etc

I think that all this must have a reason and that cannot simply be labeled as wrong. In a way there are ontologies which are disrupting the Sein/Sollen disctinction and refuse also modal logic as much as possible. No philosophical effort to introduce modal logic in the legal field ever succeeded.

I totally agree with Hoercher but I must confess that in Ethic and in the Law there is a certain semantic opaqueness in handling these differences.

For instance, in the Law, we do not say: A contract must be composed of an offer and an acceptance, but we say Contract is an agreement. So the typical philosophical correct juxtaposition between a Sein and a Sollen, is bypassed by the "legal ontology": Contract is such and such, property is such and such, and goods are such and such.

In this way the normal question posed to a lawyer is in the form: Can I ... (e.g.) buy shares of my company using the company's assets? rather than what Should I .... etc

I think that all this must have a reason and that cannot simply be labeled as wrong. In a way there are ontologies which are disrupting the Sein/Sollen disctinction and refuse also modal logic as much as possible. No philosophical effort to introduce modal logic in the legal field ever succeeded.

Dear Pier, thanks for this very nice reply. I have to accept it. However, I think that in philosophical anthropology the task is "describing" human nature while in law the task is to "formulate" norms. The reason for this apparent contradiction of a sein-form and a sollen-content is to make it the more demanding for the ordinary people and also to point back to natural law (where sein is already sollen).

The Philosophy of Buddha  propounded four noble truths. First is "There is Suffering" and second "There is cause of Suffering". According to the theory the second noble truth that there is cause of suffering determines that Desire is the fundamental cause  of sorrow. The desires are of three types, for sex, for life and for wealth. The hope seeking sensual satisfaction, satiation of passions,desire for future life or success in the present one is the fundamental cause.This was further explained in the theory of "dependent origination". That is a certain effect follows a certain cause.Thus we see desire is the cause.Buddha identified 12 links in the chain of cause and effect.

Maslow also reached very close to it. 

Dear Ferenc,

Cognitive science, psychology and (scientific) epistemology are based on a objectifying method which necessarily can only express MECHANISMS and so does reduce by methodology everything, including HUMANS to mechanisms and so Responsibility, Agency/Freedom cannot exist in the type of conceptual world such approach can constructed.  All the traditional moral frameworks are necessarily brush aside by such mechanistic framework.  All what is fundamental in humanistic and religious framework are illusionary into such framework.  I agree that looking for desire there is keeping your feet on the ground; 

To me philosophy reacts to our MIND & HEART & it speaks directly within us ,Which reflect a power -a light not only within us

but outside the focus areas thro our AURAS .Individual desires work force may pass thro various angles of our MIND-THINKING -

OUR NATURE -HABITS -TEMPERANMENT EGO,ATTACHMENT,JEASLOUSY ,& other related areas but for any individual any desire to be

supported by the tune of our mind to be covered under a FAITH & WILL POWER .This desires coming out from the latter

will be having a everlasting impression for our LIFELINE for our development & also for progressive out look .

Philosophy should be a way of our life & to work as a regular footing for day to day practice & if it gets support to our i

intuition which can pave the way to our power of prayer & Meditation & in this line our mind would remain as an observe for our

desire.

This is my personal opinion

Dear Tetyana ,

The book :  What is Ancient Philosophy?

by Pierre Hadot

I think could be of help.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/hadot/

All the schools (i.e. ancient schools of greek philosophies after Socrates) agreed that philosophy involves the individual’s love of and search for wisdom. All also agreed, although in different terms, that this wisdom involved “first and foremost . . . a state of perfect peace of mind,” as well as a comprehensive view of the nature of the whole and humanity’s place within it. They concurred that attaining to such Sophia, or wisdom, was the highest Good for human beings. All ancient philosophical schools agreed that, by contrast, most people live unwise lives most of the time. These lives are characterized by unnecessary forms of suffering and disorder, caused by their ignorance or unconsciousness concerning the true source of human happiness. In the view of all philosophical schools, Hadot claims that “mankind’s principal cause of suffering, disorder and unconsciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and exaggerated fears. People are prevented from truly living, it was taught, because they are dominated by the passions” (PWL 83). Political society in all but the best regimes, while natural to human beings, was agreed to be a further cause of individuals’ having deeply habituated, false beliefs concerning human nature and concerning what is good for them to pursue and to avoid. Ancient philosophers thus conceived of philosophy as involving a therapy of the soul, or “remedy for human worries, anguish, and misery brought about for the Cynics, by social constraints and conventions; for the Epicureans, by the quest for false pleasures; for the Stoics, by the pursuit of pleasure and egoistic self-interest; and for the skeptics, by false opinions” (WAP 102).

Dear Louis,

I myself do not feel so pessimistic about the possibilities of the "objective" natural sciences. But I am happy to add philosophical anthropology to open up the field for philosophy. However, morality or ethics is not available if our question is simply What can be desired?

Dear Ferenc,

'' However, morality or ethics is not available if our question is simply What can be desired?''

Could you  elaborate?

Dear Louis,

 I talk a bout the grammatic form of the question.This implies not a normative problem - i.e. something that you chose -, but something that is already given, independently from your own will.

Ferenc, yes, you are right. Desires exist independently of our morals and ethics. But having said this, morals and ethics affect our desires to a certain degree. Desire to adhere to moral and ethical rules is also a desire

Louis, thank you for pointing me to Hadot. I think the ancient philosophical traditions are finding their way back into academia and daily life now. It is interesting, that this my question was born out of the vexing discussion, in which I find myself often. This discussion is with one of my friends who assumes that the main desire of any human being is financial gain, and subsequently he evaluates any action or thought from the possibility of achieving a financial gain. So I was trying to find some grounding to my opinion that people can actually desire something else, or even try to desire nothing.

Dear colleague, I would start with reading Levinas

Ferenc,

I do not beleive that ''desire'' are given.  If they are given , they are mostly given to us socially (enculturation) and it is in our power to do something about it.  Just take the simple example of desire to eat.  Suppose you had no lunch and is a bit hungry.  If you are absorbed in you work, you will probably not even feel it.  But if you think about good food, visualize a good meal, then you will feel it very much.  ''Thinking'' has a huge effect on our desires and our beliefs, true of false, have huge effects. 

Tetyana,

Modernity and the rise of capitalism are our economical system is gradually displacing traditional value systems by an universal economic value system: money.  On that three important books:   

- Philosophy of Money, Georg Simmel

-The great transformation, Karl Polanyi

-Theology of Money, Philip Goodchild

We are in early age trained to value external rewards (attention,marks,gifts) at the expense of internal self-attribute rewards that come from learning, satisfaction of the work well done, etc.  As soon as the kid learn to count then it is submit to the quantitative external reward systems: markings, money, etc, etc,  Learning is rewards by high marks and then the enjoyment of learning is temperated and gradually replaced by the enjoyment of marks, attention, the job, competition. etc. A gradual replacement of the importance of ''who you are'' to ''what you have''. 

Regards

The real question here is why we should spend time on what can be desired--Buddhist philosophy deconstructs the entire mechanism of desire/tanha as a cognitive delusion.

Dear Tetyana,

indeed there are as philosophers would call it, second order desires. So indeed you can answer to your question: What can be desired? That desires themselves (or theirdenial) can also be desired. But this is a different issue from saying that certain desires should be desired to be denied.

Dear Louis and Sandra,

indeed we can push back desires by certain technics. Pierre Hadot's spiritual exercises are quite important in this respect. And yet I have the impressions that desires (or as Hume would have called them passions) are rather strong. And he famously said "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions." See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD8Hume.html#ReaOugOnlSlaPas

Have I not warned you that I am in the process of writing about Hume? :)

Best,

F

I recommend Bertrand Russell's article, 'Politically Important Desires"  This will help put the matter of 'Desires' in proper perspective.

Ferenc, there's also a hypothesis that the global consciousness is above reason and passions ;) In fact, the techniques that are used to quieten the desires AND reason, are used to connect to the global consciousness

Dear Tetyana, let's hope for that global consciousness. :)

Indeed, Stefan has a point. The German school of philosophical anthropology (Scheler, Gehlen, Plessner, etc.) was much interested in the traditional distinction of reason and the passions. See Scheler's

- Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 1973, Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (trs.), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

- Man's Place in Nature, 1961, Hans Meyerhoff (tr.), NY: Noonday.

Plato, Aristotle and the ancients have much to say on this subject, as do Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and David Velleman to name three more recent thinkers who come immediately to mind.

Thank you, Stefan for pointing me to philosophical anthropology. I tried searching "philosophical anthropology" and "consciousness" and it returns some very interesting results :)

Navigating through Goole at the internet, you may find relevant studies on ‘desire’ at “Philosophy of Desire”, in English or in other languages. Hope you can find proper explanations to your investigation.

I am not a student of philosophy , just interested in  it.

Is there a limit to what can de desired ? Should all desires be pushed back? Nature gave us such small eyes. But with those eyes we have the capability to see the entire world. Is there a need to restrict what one can desire? My understanding is:

Desires are the moving force of life. The sum total of ones' desires and its consequences defines a person's life.The happiness of achieving a desire and the misery of not materialising it is the core of our life experience. It is the freewill of the human mind to desire anything. But, the nature of the desire will determine its consequences and how it affects one's life. It can be the most powerful motivation or the cause for absolute destruction.

One is able to conquer the entire universe, but seldom to kill the desires in his heart. But is it not that ,the agony of a shattered desire is also the birthplace of knowledge ?To innovate new ways of doing things, to cut out a new path, to discover hidden opportunities or simply to develop the grace to understand that the nature of desire is such that at times, it simply cannot be materialised.

Should desire be the central PURPOSE of living ? Uncertainity and change are characteristics of desires. Is life simply a log of fulfilled and unfulfilled desires? 

We cannot control or create the way in which  future descend on our life, but can simply imagine it.  We spend life thinking of the past or making plans and desires for future; but in between these two, life slips away.

Life is the name given to the experience of THIS MOMENT .It is sum total of everything in our consciousness that leads to action or inaction at each particular moment. This experience is moulded more than by just desires.

(Source :Bhagavad Gita)

Swapna - that is a good analysis, indeed. Which chapter in Bhagavad Gita has it? Thank you

Dear Tetyana,

Thanks for the appreciative comments. The Bhagavad Gita is the eternal message of spiritual wisdom from ancient India.Historically many  extraordinary people such as Albert Einsten, Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, Herman Hesse, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Aldous Huxley, Rudolph Steiner and Nikola Tesla to name but a few have read  Bhagavad-Gita and were inspired by its timeless wisdom.Accurate, fundamental knowledge about God, the ultimate truth, creation, birth and death, the results of actions, the eternal soul, liberation and the purpose as well as the goal of human existence are discussed in BG. Please see link http://www.bhagavad-gita.org/Gita/chapter-03.html for a summerised overview.

I cannot specify a particular chapter that deals with desires specifically, as the discourses of reality in BG are closely interwoven and multi dimensional , so that desire is not stand alone, but a part of different wider concepts. I would recommend reading BG as it will provide a new dimension to our understanding of reality.

Thank you, Swapna - the link you given answers my questions :)

I am glad it did Tetyana. I was sure it will :)

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Loskutova & contributors,

I have just read through the contributed answers to this question and puzzled about it a bit.

You ask Is there a branch of philosophy that deals with "what can be desired"? 

I would suggest that the answer may be "moral psychology." That is a traditional affiliate field to ethics in philosophical discussions and discourse. Still, I think the question comes at the field in a somewhat odd way or from an odd direction.

What strikes me as relevant is the point that there is an important relationship between what we can do, generally, and what we want to do. Not wanting to do something in particular, not desiring it, in the language of your question, may render us less able to become able to do it or obtain it. Two warring nations might wish (abstractly) to get on with their neighbors, but they don't want to be bothered, say, with knowing enough about the others to be able to deal with them. Desires or wants tend to be connected in chains, we want x because it leads to y, and we want y. Otherwise, x might have had no interest. But understanding that x leads to y, and wanting y, we learn about or study x in order to find out how to get hold of it and then get to y.

Particular desires may be things that we want and do not really have. Such meta-desires were commented on above. To take a pedestrian example, imagine a student who envies the study habits of a friends or classmate, but doesn't have the same discipline or desire to apply himself. Is it possible for him to obtain this desire? What can he desire? Here we come clearly into the traditional domain of moral psychology and the "training of the will." That seems to be the proper domain of your question about what it is possible to desire. There is much is Aristotle's Ethics about the training of the will and the acquisition of virtues, conceived as habits of action connected with noble (more desirable) aims.

H.G. Callaway

H.G. Callaway, thank you for your answer. Indeed, there are so many ways that one can approach desires. And also classifications of the levels of desires, as you mention "meta-desires". As I asked the question, I wanted to know the elaboration of the classification or ontology of desires. And that was already discussed above.