In ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’, Karl Popper writes:
11. METHODOLOGICAL RULES AS CONVENTIONS.
"Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic […]."
"[…] methodological rules […] are very different from the rules usually called ‘logical’."
"Profound truths are not to be expected of methodology."
Some authors state that the materialism of science is merely a methodological constraint (methodological materialism) related to scientific specifications, not a philosophical choice (philosophical materialism).
However, if methodological rules are conventions, then it might be stated that the materialism of science is merely a convention, not a methodological contraint, and thus a philosophical choice.
Moreover, is it possible to consider that a methodological materialism be different from the philosophical materialism? Are not the two inseparable, closely imbricated notions?
Finally, if profound truths are not to be expected of methodology, could it be stated that a methodological materialism is not a "profound truth", and thus only a relative notion?
hello Mr Espesset,
I just know in science( empirical ), we work with rules in a methodological approach that nobody is not concerned the logic basic of them. in the other word we just focus on methodology and consequence in a mathematical manner..
It might be useful to distinguish between physicalism and materialism, since many physical entities, states, and processes don't seem straightforwardly material. That said, what could be an alternative to physicalism in the natural sciences? A methodology or metaphysical position that includes the supernatural?
Reasons for a choosing a methodology or convention could be merely practical rather than philosophical. Many behaviorists in psychology did not deny that internal mental states exist, but they implemented a methodology that ignored such states and focused on behavior because behavior was publicly accessible to researchers and claims about behavior could be verified.
The dominant materialism and economism of science is a methodological constraint and philosophical choice; it is the emprical outcome of a total monetary economy. The methodological rules of the scientific game are a cognitive reflection of dominant human value preferences, which use the spearheads (assembly lines) of science and technology for the fight for markets and political supremacy.
First of all, it is important to distinguish between methodology and method. On the one hand, methodology refers to the fundamental assumption of the nature of reality under investigation. Empirical sciences methodologically assume that their objects of study are empirical facts. Social sciences methodologically assume that the objects of their study are primarily social facts (though they may be secondarily empirical facts). For example, money is primarily a social (institutional) fact though money may also be an (empirical) paper or metal (coin). On the other hand, method refers to the tools/instruments (the choice of which is directly dictated by methodology) employed to measure, understand, or interpret certain empirical and social phenomena. Methodology determines the method; method depends upon methodology.
Empirical sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) assume an empirical methodology. This assumption of the empirical sciences, namely that reality is objective and material, is fundamentally a methodological constraint rather than a philosophical choice. By their very assumption of reality as empirical and objective, empirical sciences are, by default, caught in this methodological constraint. The empirical sciences cannot and do not have the philosophical choice of another methodology, otherwise they cease to be empirical (physical and natural) sciences.