Dear Bessat,

You raise a highly debated topic in the area of philosophy of science. To my understanding, the postmodern constructionist claim that all knowlede and value is socially constructed and hence relative (see, for see purpose, K. Gergen's work) is at odds with constructivist assumptioms that assume that individuals all contruct the same undertanding of knowledge and value as a result of their interactions with the physical and social words (see, for this respect, J. Piaget's theory of cognitive development or L. Kohlberg's theory of moral dvelopment).

As I see it, the idea that there is no truth leads to contradiction in epistemolological terms, to nihilism in terms of action and commitment, and to oportunism in terms of interpersonal relationships.

It leads to epistemological contradiction because when one says that there is no truth, one is saying that which was supposed could not to be said. In other words, to say that there is no truth amounts to expressing, say, and absolute, not relative, truth, that is, that is true that there is no truth.

It leads no nihilism in terms of action and commitment because if there is no truth, then it makes no sense to pursue the true in our empirical and theoretical endeavors. If there were no truth, then we could not say that, for example, heliocentic theory is a better and more valid theory than the geocentric theory. This, we know, is not the case.

It leads to oportunism in terms of interpersonal relationships because if all narratives were equally valid, then, we could reply, why teach some narratives to our children (e.g., those based, say, in cooperation and mutual respect) instead of others (e.g., those based on fear and unilateral respect)?

In a nutshell, to espouse a relativist stance is to fall prey to the disease we wanted to cure. In addition to this, a relativist stance easily leads to nihilism is terms of action and commitmnet, and to a opportunistic perspective in terms of social interactions.

Kind regards,

Orlando

The very statement true or truth suggests an absolute, as does to state this is false in that it has no elements of truth as truth has no elements of falsehood. When people use truth they mean 'of this time, at this point', contingent only at all times. Nevertheless, to say there is something called truth is to acknowledge the absolute but also admit that such a statement cannot be attached to any subject or object as it then ceases to be truth. Truth in a court can only be understood as pertaining to the law, court and environs and not beyond those environs. Thereby relative values persist whenever truth is actively applied.

is true in a number of its parts, according to conditional agreed/upon understandings of truth. If someone says this is true, it because conditionally in a specific situation truth or the nature of truth is agreed to by those present. It is an agreed absolute within specific conditions. Outside of those specific conditions it is not absolute, not agreed upon and no longer functioing as truth.

Dear Bessat & Stanley,

I understand that you, dear Bessat, are relativist to the bone. Fortunately we live in countries where people can choose their worldview, even though they have to be cognitively and ethically responsible for their choices.

I don't think that the opposite of relativism is absolutism but universalism. Is there any absolutism in saying that Earth revolves around the Sun, not the other way around? So, to a great extent, Stanley's idea that when people use truth they mean 'of this time, at this point', contingent only at all times should be seen with cautious. Is the Earth's move around the Sun contingent on this time and this point? There was a time at which people thought that Sun revolved around the Earth. They thought they were right, but they were wrong.

As I see it, both morality and science look for what is universal, not for what is particular and relative. Would it make sense to speak of a Portuguese morality or of an Italian science? I do not think so.The fact that both science and morality look for the universal, not for the particular, this does not mean that they do not think of themselves as something subject to revision and falsification.

I thinh of myself as a universalist, not a relativist. If this were not the case, for example, how could I condemm, for example, the Hollocaust or the killing of innocent people? if am not wrong, it seems to be that if one is a relativist s/he could not condenm such actions because they have to be seen, say, in context, that is, at certain time and and a given point.

Consider the case of the Golden Rule (i.e., "Do not do unto others what you would not like others to do unto you"). in factual terms, this rule is not followed by all people at all countries. So, this is not, say, a universal rule. However, from an ideal viewpoint, such a rule should be followed by all people all over the world, that is, the rule should be universalized. In other terms, what is not universal in factual terms does not mean that it should not be universalized from an ideal point of view.

I believe that you both should have have good reasons to adopt a relativist stance. I also think that I have good reasons to espouse a universalist perspective.

Kind regards,

Orlando

Dear Bessat,

Thanks for your reply. You say that your resentment of the Nazi's actions ought also to be "right" according to your (and your fellow relativists') "understanding" of "right". If I understood it well, your resentment of the Nazi's actions ought also to be "right" shows that you do not espouse the Nasi's concept of rightness. Are not you erecting here, say, some moral/ethical moral principle in name of which you condemn the Nazi's horrible actions?

The fact that you write "right", not right shows that for you such a concept has to be seen in context. You quote Kant's work, To my understanting, Kant's categorical imperative, act such that your action can be applied to all people, speaks in favor of an ethic universalism, not of an ethic relativism.

To my knowledge, I. Kant, L. Kohlberg, J. Rawls, J. Habermas, N. Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr. are in favor of an ethical universalism, not an ethical relativism, and they have good reasons to be so. As see it, there are actions, to kill innocent people, for example, that are immoral in themselves regardless of the time and place where they are committed. I do not espouse J. Bentham's and S. Mill's idea of social utility, that is, that moral actions are those that bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In this case who would define what is the greatest good?

So we agree that we can disagree and that we can do it in a decent and civilized maner without resorting to ad hominem arguments or personal attacks and insults. Because I argue for an ethical universalism, I can tolerate, for example, any form of slavery, child labor, domestic violence, or to maltreat children, the mentally ill and the elderly. Could I think so if I were an ethical relativist?

Kind regards,

Orlando

Dear Bessat,

Thank you for you reply. I can follow you when you say that imperative sentences do not have any truth value, and hence cannot declared to be true or false, but they have a moral value in the sense that they could be right or wrong. Like Piaget, I think that there is something similar between logic and morality. In his book, The moral jugment of the child, Piaget astutely remarked that logic is the morality of thought such as morality is the logic of action.

Kind regards,

Orlando

My comment is:

1) the “self referential” deep rooted in the idea of “’potential infinite--actual infinite’ confusion” in present science system inevitably leads to the unceasingly production of “paradox events” (different in forms but same in nature) from many fields in present science theory system and, the self-contradictory “self and non-self” (self referential) contents in present set theory (such as T={x|x📷x}) and mathematical analysis (such as micro-increment dx) is a typical example.

2) Studies to the history of infinite related science proved that people have constructed since antiquity the concepts of “potential infinite” and “actual infinite” and affirm the important roles these two concepts have plaid in present infinite theory system and there will be no present classical infinite theory system without the concepts of “potential infinite” and “actual infinite” --------the whole present infinite related science theory system is under the restriction of the concepts of “potential infinite” and “actual infinite”. But for thousands of years, people have never been offering scientific definitions to these two important basic concepts, never been understanding the different essences between them and what on earth the roles they play during the cognizing process of “infinite things”.

3) The promiscuous situation of “self referential” deep rooted in the idea of “’potential infinite--actual infinite’ confusion” in present science system not only triggers many insoluble problems and paradoxes in our science, but also produces some meditative and absurd phenomena: “Russell’s proof and its result by self-contradiction of T={x|x📷x}” produced Russell’s Paradox triggering the alarming Third Mathematical Crisis while the identical “Cantor’s proof and its result by self-contradiction of T={x|x📷x}” produced important fundamental laws for set theory and became the particularized and refulgent “Cantor’s Law of Uncountable Real Number Set” and “Cantor’s Power Set Theorem of 📷” (in potential infinite thinking, an infinite set should have a “self-contradiction subset” while in actual infinite thinking, an infinite set should not have a “self-contradiction subset”). So, in many situations of present classical set theory, people have been being always in a typical state of “not know what's what” when cognizing some infinite related mathematical things: you can take them either as “unknown ‘potential infinite’ things” or “unknown ‘actual infinite’ things”, even more, you can take them as mathematical things with both “potential infinite and actual infinite” characters and decide when they are “potential infinite” character and when they are “actual infinite” as you like. Let us see two typical members in Russell’s Paradox Family” (1) famous Hilbert's Paradox of the Grand Hotel-------- telling people with potential infinite thinking that the Grand Hotel is always full and there never have any vacancies then telling people with actual infinite thinking that the Grand Hotel always have vacancies and never being full; (2) famous Cantor’s proof of Uncountable Real Number Set-------- telling people with potential infinite thinking that all the elements in Real Number Set and Natural Number Set are all infinite “abstract mathematical things with same characteristic, same existence condition, same pattern of manifestation, same relationship, same quantitative meaning and prove they should be bijective during “one to one correspondence” then telling people with actual infinite thinking that all the elements in Real Number Set and Natural Number Set are with very clear characteristic differences, very clear existence condition differences, very clear pattern of manifestation differences, very clear relationship differences as well as very clear quantitative meaning differences and prove they are impossible bijective during “one to one correspondence” because infinite elements with characteristic of real number, existence condition of real number, pattern manifestation of real number, relationship of real number, quantitative meaning of real number are left. This artful and arbitrary “potential infinite--actual infinite” confusing working way produced a very woefully result: creating a huge and suspending “Infinite Paradox Family” (a 2500-year old huge black cloud of “Infinite Paradox Family” enveloping over the sky of human science). Because of lacking scientific foundation theoretically in present classical set theory and its quantitative cognizing tool of “one to one correspondence”, people have been unable to realize a harsh fact that all the efforts we have been striving to dislodge Russell’s Paradox and the Third Mathematical Crisis are in fact wholly refusing “Law of Uncountable Real Number Set” and “Power Set Theorem of 📷” in Cantor’s Cardinal number theory and continuum theory, because they are different version of Russell’s Paradox in the same paradox family.

A truth in front of us is:

The self-referential incoherence produces the whole paradox family with so many family members (non-truth truth, non-number number, non-infinite infinite, post card paradox, T={x|x📷x}, non-barber barber, Russell’s Paradox…) in different fields of our present science system at least from the time of Russell’s Paradox.

The self-referential incoherence phenomenon has very closed relationship with the definition of “set and elements in the set”.

For hundreds of years people have been trying so hard to solve this trouble from semantic way, linguistic way, formal language, formal logic… but nothing works and the family members become more and more!

Our studies have proved that it is impossible to solve the “self-referential incoherence paradox family” within present infinite relating science system basing on “potential infinite--actual infinite”.

Thank you dear Mr. Larry Carlson,

Questions are raised in human science and some ways should be tried to solve the problems stimulated by questions, but the trouble is whether those ways really work or not.

Thank you dear Mr. Larry Carlson for your idea,

It is true that both science and religion have very close relationship with our mental activities, but I think science is very different from religion in nature otherwise one term is enough.

So it is important not to be confused while working in the field of science.

Larry Carlson: You write: "A sentence does not even have the potential of being true or false if it does not refer to anything beyond itself, since its truth-ness, so to speak, is based on the degree (however measured) to which it matches, corresponds, reflects (etc.) some 'reality' outside itself." - If you hold on to this very statement you made, I think the original questions would still be: What makes this statement true? In other words: What observation would determine whether it is true that a sentence does not have the potential of being true or false if it does not refer to anything beyond itself?

Bessat Elmie: At the same time, I must admit that I don't understand the actual argument for self-refutation of the realist position, especially this passage: "The realist truth theory, therefore, is either "true" in virtue of its "correspondence to a fact" of the universe--and there are no such facts;for one thing, if there were, there would have arisen no rational debates about truth to begin with-- or in virtue of it standing in no relation to facts i.e. Reality! in which case the realist has already refuted himself by asserting a non-realistically true statement."

I would say that rational debates about truth are not necessarily contradicting the assumption that there are facts, i.e. that something actually is the case.

Yes, it would be a Russell-style contradiction. In my opinion, what can be known depends on the human understanding and its capacity for perception, with its own limitations.

In "definicion.de" it is said that according to relativism "the real has no permanent basis, but is based on the links that exist between the phenomena".

I believe that, apart from the division between objective and subjective truth, we must differentiate between those we know - or perceive - and what we understand (as has been said many times).

It is no longer about the links between phenomena themselves, but about the phenomena themselves. If we associate phenomena with the interpretation of perception, would that necessary limitation of interpretation influence the concept of truth in any way? The reference refers to the relationship between two things, whatever they are. If we understand by "self" "own or by itself", it is well understood that it is self-referential. The incoherence, supposes, following the Dictionary of the Spanish Language, "the lack of logical relation between things".

To try to answer your question somewhat more directly, I think that the term "argument", as demonstrative reasoning, might have - in terms of knowledge - a limit on its capacity for application. Because in part all the arguments, except the tautologies, seem to be somewhat partial, approximate. We would enter here in the field of contradiction and contingency. See: https://prezi.com/_tl2it1-kisu/tautologia-contradiccion-y-contingencia/

Whether such statements are incoherent obviously depends on what one's theory of truth is.

For example, according to the redundancy theory of truth (or the disquotational theory of truth), asserting that a statement is true is completely equivalent to asserting the statement itself. For example, asserting the sentence " 'Snow is white' is true" is equivalent to asserting the sentence "Snow is white".

Accordingly, I see no necessary incoherence or self-contradiction in asserting either "A statement is true iff it corresponds to the (epistemic) norms of a given community" or "A statement is true iff it corresponds to a fact". Such assertions may play any number of roles; for instance, they may simply be definitional, or give directions on how to use the concept of truth in the first place (e.g. "you shall call all assertions which correspond to the (epistemic) norms of a given community 'true'" or "you shall call statements which express facts 'true'").

Larry,

thanks for your reply!

As far as I can see, the difference you'd like to preserve can be perfectly captured by the differences between "the sky is (now) blue" and "the sky is always blue" or "murder is (ceteris paribus) wrong" and "murder is always wrong". The point about the redundancy theory of truth is that the predication "is true" adds nothing to the mere assertion of any sentence so predicated; I do not see how this point touches, let alone settles, the distinction between specific and general statements.

You also mention problems regarding ceteris-paribus-claims (claims which are only true given further restrictions) and differences between moral and non-moral facts. These are certainly interesting philosophical problems in their own right, but I do not see how they have anything to do with the view whether the predication "is true" is redundant or not.

What, Larry, about truth of perception and experience/although I feel your descriptions in some measure attempt to deal with both? If I say I am against something/an ideology for example or some way of perceiving/and provide reasons that I can prove through identification of an action or text, is my statement necessarily true if those who hold the ideology or perception prove their understanding is true in a similar fashion? Surely we are then dealing with concepts of truth and the nature of proof rather than with those things each holds to be true?

Larry,

of course, you're right that not all truths are equally easy or hard to prove or disprove. However, I am still not sure why you felt the need to point this out in direct response to my comment - what bearing do you think your issue has on my point?

Larry,

again, I believe you bring up several, potentially separable, interesting points. To just comment on a few:

You do not need to claim that "a statement that does not symbolically refer to something in the world is meaningless" in order to hold that "there is no truth" is self-contradictory. In fact, I believe you should not, as this claim is highly vulnerable to counter-examples such as "unicorns have horns", which is not only not nonsensical, but very likely also true.

Rather, the self-contradiction already follows from interpreting "there is no truth" as the claim "'there is no truth' is true". However, my point was that you simply do not have to interpret it this way. For instance, you might take "there is no truth" to simply mean the instruction "do not treat any sentence as true", which is obviously not self-contradictory.

I agree that "there is no truth" is often justified by pointing out that, for some reason or other, we can only approximate empirical truths. However, truth is a general property of sentences, not merely of empirical ones. For instance '1 + 1 = 2' is not merely approximately, or partially, true. It is quite simply true.

There is an interesting related point to be made about empirical generalizations: As Nancy Cartwright classically noted, "the fundamental laws of physics do not describe true facts about reality. Rendered as descriptions of facts, they are false; amended to be true, they lose their fundamental, explanatory force". This not only chimes with your idea of usefulness not requiring truth; rather, it says that, as a matter of principle, scientific laws are only ever useful if they are not true.

Article DO THE LAWS OF PHYSICS STATE THE FACTS?

However, perhaps the most striking - or even devastating - point about this justification of "there is no truth" by reference to the impossibility of stating empirical truths is that, if "there is no truth" is true, this truth is itself not an empirical truth. Hence, we should interpret "there is no truth" as "'there is no empirical truth' is non-empirically true", and so, once again, the self-contradiction evaporates.

Larry,

thank you for elaborating. There are, of course, different valid ways of dealing with the (potential) truth of statements about fictitious objects. And I agree that fictitious objects such as unicorns are learned about empirically, .i.e. from existing objects. Still, all of this is no reason to give up the truth of a simple, straightforward assertion such as "unicorns do not exist". Rather, we may say that e.g. stories or thoughts about unicorns exist. The statement "unicorns exist" (without further qualification) is justifiably taken to be false, whereas the statement "unicorns exist in books" is true.

Crucially, from the fact that symbolic meaning is gained empirically (by connecting symbols with empirical contexts) - on which we agree -, it certainly does not follow that all symbolic entities denote empirical entities (or, consequently, that their denoting empirical entities is somehow required for their being meaningful). For instance, the fact that we learn about unicorns empirically does not mean that 'unicorn' denotes some empirical object.

Apart from that, even if ideologies cannot (or never) be said to "be (fully) true" (whatever that may mean), ideologies typically still prescribe some absolute truths. That is, given some ideological framework, you can state some sentence with absolute truth.

Further, I respect your principle that sentences should not be self-referential in order to be meaningful and hence truth-evaluable (I also vaguely remember from my studies that this point has a respectable history in philosophy), although I cannot say I have fully made up my mind about that. For example, the sentence "This sentence has five words" seems to be true enough to me, and its truth seems to be empirically verifiable.

In any case, the bottom line for me is simply that, for the reasons I gave previously, I do not think that "there is no truth" is inherently self-contradictory, and perhaps we can agree on that?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Elmie & readers,

"Truth" is, of course, a difficult concept to elucidate, and people typically fall into a variety of false paths in talking about truth. But, as has been pointed out above, the use of truth" and "true" are fairly unproblematic in many instances.

What has always struct me as central is the use of the truth predicate in relation to logic, where the usage is systematic and comparatively unproblematic --as contrasted with traditional theories of "coherence" and "correspondence," etc. Focus on this usage likely moves in the direction of Tarski's semantic theory. This is to regard "true" and "truth" as belonging to a family of specifically semantic concepts capable of systematic development in semantic theory.

My suggestion is to first illustrate the usage, as in say (roughly),

If p is true and q is true, then so is the compound statement p&q.

If p is false (not true) and q is true, then the compound, if p then q is true.

If p is true or q is true, then the compound, p or q is true,

For any statement p, that statement is true, just in case p.

A predication "Fa" is true, just in case the object named by "a" is a member of the set denoted by "F".

Here we see some of the inter-relation between "true" and other semantic vocabulary such as "is named by..." and "...denotes... ."

In general I am inclined to say that realism about truth is best justified by the systematic usage of the truth predicate in semantic theory--especially that semantic theory which elucidates logical relationships. Note that there are many semantic facts, e.g., "Venus" names the planet Venus, and "the set of all sets not members of themselves" doesn't denote a set; and, of course, one can go on with countless examples --which are nonetheless open to systematic summary in relation to any particular formulation of logical relations over a set of statements.

The facts involved are sometimes trivial sometime not, but in any case, they can be conceived as facts--many many semantic facts.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

But what chuck of the perceivable space-time does, in fact, testify to the objective truth of this statement?Alternatively, what abstract entities e.g. geometric shapes, numbers, sets, substances etc. might be said to be the truth-makers of the statement in question? The realist truth theory, therefore, is either "true" in virtue of its "correspondence to a fact" of the universe--and there are no such facts;for one thing, if there were, there would have arisen no rational debates about truth to begin with ...

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

By way of a brief reply, I would say that the introduction of a contrasting notion of "absolute" truth is at best misleading. Its often a distant reflection of 19th-century, idealist thought. One can rejected it and still defend a (fallibilist) concept of truth. In consequence, you would seem to have the relativists disputing a straw man (which in fact they often do).

Regarding "post modern" relativism, readers of this thread may find a paper of mine of some interest: "What's Wrong with Relativism." This was included in my 2017 book of essays, Pluralism, Pragmatism and American Democracy, and a slightly earlier version can be found at the following address:

Research What's Wrong with Relativism, anyway?

BTW: this paper developed out of an earlier RG question and thread.

See also:

https://www.cambridgescholars.com/pluralism-pragmatism-and-american-democracy

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

On the other hand, the claim that there is no truth seems plausible when evaluated in terms of what real life (e.g., postmodern) relativists in the real world intend to mean, which is something along the lines that all ideological claims are created by humans and therefore are not absolute in terms such as being unquestionable, open to only one interpretation, applicable to all cases, eternally true, or 100% accurate (in terms of degrees of empirical or pragmatic correspondence) in what they describe.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

I don't think that anyone genuinely doubts, as a matter of fact, that standards of moral and epistemic judgement differ from time to time and from place to place. The question of importance is whether we can cogently judge of the better and worse, at particular times and places or must, in contrast, lump everything together as "humanly constructed" and arbitrary in relation to cognitive value and justifications.

Values exist in social traditions; and anyone actually alive already has some values or other. As I say, whether or not people count their actual values as "absolute" is chiefly a distraction --which you have introduced. (It puts the standards of justification so high as to make them unattainable.) The question of importance--given that we (or some other group) have some particular values--concerns how we can decide about deviations or questions of innovation or reform. Such questions make little sense apart from their relation to some particular social tradition, but it does not follow that answers given can only be arbitrary or cognitively defective in some other fashion.

I suspect that a chief point which you fail to see is that doctrinaire relativism (e.g., of the "post-modern") is itself an ideological position of the sort, concerning which, you are generally content to heap doubts. Its an ideology which erodes authority of established mores, customs and standards of judgment, but basically offers no substitute, improvement or reform of existing values and standards. Its very value neutrality, in consequence, implicitly favors power untamed by overall social or moral stricture. In Bertrand Russell's terms, its a "power philosophy."

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Knutson & readers,

Regularities and law-like phenomena are certainly very important in support of sound and convincing judgments. They are strongly indicative of truth, but they do, in spite of that, sometimes lead us astray.

You are arguing, it seems, in favor of a science-inspired "coherence" theory of truth? But strongly coherent accounts of give subject-matter may still sometimes be false. (That is why we keep questioning even the most convincing approach or theory.) We do normally assume that coherence is a necessary, but not a fully sufficient condition of acceptability. Successful prediction, particularly of new phenomena, is again, strongly indicative of truth --but does not strictly define truth.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Truth in of itself is the essence of continued data.. things that act predictably are entirely because of truth or thing acting in accordance with law etcetera...

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

Basically, my view is that the notion of "relativism" rests on very serious confusions. One of these confusions is the notion of "absolute" values. Another is the idea that the values of one group or person are "just as good" as that of another. The fact that values differ from time to time and from place to place shows us nothing of interest regarding the values of a particular time and place--as appropriate or valid to that time and place. Its basically an absurdity to argue that since values differ from time to time and from place to place that it is just as well to substitute one set of values for another. This ignores, even denigrates, the roles and function of the specific values of a specific group in their own organized life.

If you come to see relativism as an ideology (especially as an academic ideology), as I argue in my paper, i.e., as a variety of "power philosophy," then I think you will not go looking for crimes of relativists of the more outlandish sort. It is instead a matter of suppressing the reigning values of a particular society in favor of a value neutrality --which facilitates morally and socially unconstrained power. The objective which arises is to ride the roller-coaster of power politics. The relativists' barbs are reserved for those who resist power on the basis of the (domestic) reigning moral convictions. You wouldn't expect campaigns of random murder, say. Relativism functions in adaptations to the powers-that-be, whoever they may be, and especially if they are more aggressive and self-aggrandizing. Relativism has some genuine effects, not because of some grand conspiracy, it instead draws upon mutual tolerance and exaggerates it. Its more a matter of a confluence of interests.

I take it that we agree about the separation of state and church, in the spirit of the first amendment. I see no reason for extended discussion of related issues, though it is perhaps worth noticing that aggressive secularism typically arises in societies which are religious monocultures. It has proved less appealing in societies which have a great variety of denominations. Part of the point is that American religion is denominational, and you can pretty much trust the denominations themselves to oppose the domination of any one of them.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

In terms of logic, if we are, for example to agree that values are (hu)man made, and agree that, even in terms of logic, one human's value judgments are equal to another's, it follows that we have no external standard on which to claim that one value judgment is any better than another, as if that gives one carte blanche to do anything one likes, just as the absolutist has carte blanche to justify anything he wants because divine decree or natural law supports his moral belief system.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

I'd say the quotation below sounds somewhat like a secularized "absolutism." (Or universal standard.) But it is well known that many people, even many societies reject utilitarian standards.

I recall, for example, philosopher William James' rejection of that "bitch goddess success" --though success often brings happiness.

Are we getting a "utilitarian" argument for relativism here? As I see the topic, relativism is a strategy, insofar as it is articulated --especially an institutional strategy.

The posture is, I think, quite familiar: "Whishy-washy groveling before the powers-that-be while steadfastly treading on the complaints of folks below.

H.G. Callaway

---Carlson wrote---

Similarly, sociologists do not typically claim that all cultural norms are of equal value, but rather that some society's achieve success (e.g., the utilitarian one of the achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people) better than (relative to) others.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

It seems you miss the contrast between "relativism" and "pluralism."

Pluralism emphasizes and--generally--accepts that people in a given society or sub-group have specific values that differ from those of people at other times and places. The specific values held in a given society or group are not generally discounted or denigrated just because they are of the values of that distinctive society or group. It is reasonable that in judging of departures from or innovations of the accepted values of a particular society or group, the people who hold those values are going to make their decisions--whatever else is involved--on the basis of the values they hold. (One might think of it as a matter of them doing the "editing.") To deny them that right is akin to denigration of their values--and by what standard? Utilitarianism?

Unless you might prefer to see external values imposed on others, then I think you'll have to allow that people holding specific values as a matter of their own social tradition have basically no other way of judging of departures or evaluating innovations except by reference to (some subset) of the values they already hold. They are not going to start with a moral "blank slate," or begin from Cartesian doubt, e.g., since anyone alive already has values, they are going to employ them. In a sense, it is a matter of their own self-development. As I say, the genuine and deeper question is whether it is possible to judge of "better and worse," from within an on-going social and moral tradition--and whether this is best tolerated and accepted --within the bounds of the law.

Its a curiosity to me that such general points of moral philosophy should be so widely denied or overlooked. Relativism, in its denigration of the existing values of particular groups or societies, is akin to aggressive colonialism. An economic motive is not at all difficult to imagine. I don't see that you have quite grasped the overall criticism.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote--

In a nutshell it seems that you acknowledge that looking for (moral) absolutes is setting an unrealistic standard, yet suggest that those (relativists) who realize that, without absolutes such as divine commandments, we have no way of determining whether the morals of one society are preferable to those of another. I fail to see how it accomplishes anything to replace the statement that there are no absolute moral truths, such as divine commandments, with the statement there are moral truths whose truth is "quite strong enough," (for some unstated reasons) as you apparently do at the end of your paper , "What's wrong with relativism."

Larry,

thank you very much for your insightful replies to my previous comment, and apologies for my late reply. I have just one additional point to make:

I believe the notion of "meaning" is not complex enough to deal with the issue at hand. For, even if I agree with you that there is something wrong with sentences whose words have no empirical equivalent, they are not outright "meaningless". Rather, we should say that they have no referent, whereas they still have content. The term "meaning" glosses over this difference. In your second comment replying to my previous one, you write that a "sentence such as 'The present king of France is bald' (...) has all the right syntactical ingredients", but that is not quite enough; what you should acknowledge, in my opinion, is that such sentences also have content. Hence, these are not entirely meaningless, only "referent-less".

Obviously, this property of sentences is crucial for our capacity to understand both sentences about non-existing entities as well as sentences whose truth or reference we cannot ascertain. In other words, we need not check whether the things we talk about actually exist before we understand their meaning - and in this sense, at least, they cannot be meaningless.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

In general terms, it strikes me that your recent notes are all over the map, but I see little indication that you have yet understood the character of my criticism of relativism. Instead of replying to the specific points I have brought up, you seem to regularly take off on a new direction? I sense a problem here of "many questions." Your replies are not well focused.

Perhaps the best thing for you to do would be to simply tell us what it is you mean by "relativism" ? I would suggest that you are continually distracted from the present question --and more relevant replies--by your inclination to mix a discussion of relativism with a critique of religion and dogmatism. These strike me as two quite distinct kinds of questions. The anti-relativist need not be religious, and not all religion is absolutist and dogmatic--or even doctrinal. Your attempted turn about on my argument linking relativism and colonialism is lame, just because it assimilated anti-relativism to dogmatism.

I think the chief point I have been making is that the customs, mores and ways of life of particular groups deserve a prima facie moral legitimacy (not, mind you, uncritical acceptance or endorsement). Relativism, as I understand it denies this, on the grounds that such customs, mores and ways of life are not absolute or universally accepted. But given the factual, existing differences, this point is trivial and counts against nothing.

So far as we know, the customs, mores and ways of life of some existing group (or other) might become universally accepted. This is perhaps implausible, but not ruled out merely on the grounds of present, existing differences. On the other hand, the factual differences between groups do not rule out the possibility of convergence. These may take place in the course of group interaction and expanded contacts. As I say, the central and deeper question concerns the possibility of valid judgments of "better and worse" from within any given society and moral configuration.

Notice, by the way, that, say,

"Stealing is wrong" is true, just in case stealing is wrong.

The approach to truth sketched above is applicable to statements of normative discourse.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Lipski & readers,

I think you have the distinction between meaning and reference about right in the passage quoted below. The interest of Russell's example of "The present king of France is bald," arises precisely because it is a meaningful statement, though, the subject term "the present king of France" has no reference, i.e. there is no present king of France.

The more general point is usually made by drawing on Frege's example, of "the morning star = the evening star." Though the reference of the two expressions are the same, as a matter of empirical discovery, still the meanings of the two terms are distinct. Otherwise, empirical evidence would not have been needed.

This is the start of any coherent account of the relationship between cognitive meaning and reference of expressions.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote in reply to Carlson---

In your second comment replying to my previous one, you write that a "sentence such as 'The present king of France is bald' (...) has all the right syntactical ingredients", but that is not quite enough; what you should acknowledge, in my opinion, is that such sentences also have content. Hence, these are not entirely meaningless, only "referent-less".

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

Well, maybe we are starting to get down to some specific issues?

Regarding the quoted passage below, I think it is a matter of relevancy to our question:

Is self-referential incoherence the most devastating argument against relativism about truth?

On the face of things this is a question about relativism. You may recall that I objected to your bringing in the concept of "absolute" values, since this sets the standard of judgment impossibly high when it comes to any justification of values or claims about values--which may seem to leave "relativism" as the only alternative. We do well to focus on the topic at hand and not prejudice the discussion by introducing, contentious extraneous matters. Anti-absolutism is much broader than doctrinaire relativism, and you seem to want to blend the two concepts--without answer to the objections.

My sense of the matter is that your various positions are in some sort of retreat--in the direction of distancing from the usual relativist disdain for the specific mores, customs and morality of specific groups--based on the idea that none of them are "absolute" or universally accepted. But you refuse, so far to answer my question about the viability of judgments of "better and worse" from within particular systems of values which may in fact result in convergences of values between groups otherwise contrasted.

BTW: accepting the prima facie legitimacy of the morality within some particular group of interest, does not imply accepting it without possibility of criticism of any particularity that may be involved. The point is that if people are going to change their values, say concerning female circumcision, then appeal must be made to other of their values --by anyone concerned with the problem.

I am, of course, not defending dogmatic approaches to values and conflicts of values. Nor do I accept a position which plays off the claim that so-and-so is not "absolute" or universally accepted and may therefore be discounted. I doubt that you understand the origin of such dichotomies in 19th-century idealism and related "totalizing" philosophies.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Also, I have pointed out that it seems unbalanced to me that you do not criticized absolutists for perhaps giving (historically speaking) even less prima facie moral legitimacy to the customs (etc.) of other societies that they deserve.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

Well, very good. We now have "culturally sensitive" relativists --who only disdain values arising from religion, apparently? The defense of "relativism" on your new, improved reading of it, turns into the critique of religion. As I say, it is an obvious retreat into the positions of the critics.

"Relativism" is standardly understood in contrast to "absolutism" --which is part of what is wrong with it. Since the "absolute sleeps forever," we are then left with various specific moral systems, none of which are "absolutely" adequate. This is the basis of the "relativists'" criticism or rejection, as the occasion presents a need, of any specific moral stricture which gets in their way. (It is very popular in "power-politics" circles.) In this way it circumvents attention to moral strictures which prove inconvenient, however prevalent they may be in the population of interest, but holds out an olive branch to those more congenial. Being wishy-washy to the powers-that-be is extended to unconventional or outside recruits--not representative of the population and values discounted.

The concept of "relativism" simply goes down with the concept of the "absolute." (Understood as what is factually or "obviously" destined to be universally accepted.) One can have no greater validity than the other.

What we are then left with is the social facts on the ground. People disagree in values and value judgments. What to do about it? Well, the first thing to do is to stop denigrating values of others as merely "relative." The concept involves a confusion which is closely related to the advent of the logic of relations. It used to be that binary and higher predicates had a sort of second-class citizenship and that statements arising from comparisons were regarded somehow merely mental or imaginary in character. The concept of "relativism" fuses the attributed irreality of values actually held in a give group or society with the very fact of their being specific to a particular group or society. Notice that particular values may be crucial in a given society "Thou shall not steal," say, whether or not anyone thinks of it as "absolute" or a matter of religious dogma.

People, as the saying goes, are often "better than their theology."

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Of course, without appeal to natural and divine truths or moral truths, it is difficult to claim that any value is absolute, in the sense of being eternal, or unquestionable, or always accurate, etc. But the term "relative," in general use, derives its meaning from its contrast with the term, "Absolute."

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson, Lipski & readers,

It seems that the passage quoted below involves some sort of "empiricist" concept of meaning, such that the statement "The present king of France is bald," is literally meaningless because lacking in appropriate "empirical content." The statement is not meaningful "today," though it once was --when France had a king.

This position strikes me as doubtful, though I find the consideration of contextual factors congenial. It strike mes that there are any number of statements and terms which are meaningful though lacking by way of their purported or proposed reference. Meaning is less like reference than it is like purported (or even pretended) reference. While reference to be successful requires something or other that is referenced, purported reference (like meaning) does not.

Carlson seems to confuse meaningfulness with successful reference. But take an historical example, say,

"A planet Vulcan, inside the orbit of mercury, explains the irregularities of Mercury's orbit."

As it turned out, there was no such planet, not when the hypothesis was proposed and not at present. But the statement was certainly meaningful, then as now, nonetheless.

Right?

H.G. Callaway

---Carlson wrote---

That’s why I noted that the sentence “The King of France is Bald” may be meaningful within the context of being stated during the reign of King Louis XIV, but not today. Today, one might as well say that “The sxbesrcrvd of jrljosei is bald." Of course, there is a kind of vague “empirical” content in the sentence, in the sense that readers know that the word “king” refers to someone who rules over a kingdom. Similarly, readers know that France refers to a country. Nevertheless, the sentence does not convey information.

My view is that the argument you give works better against epistemic relativism than it does realism, but it also points at a feature of realism too. That is to say, realism (that there are facts and references independent of epistemic values) does follow from the incoherence of relativism, but realism can lead to an infinite hierarchy of truths (a fact is true, realism about facts is true, realism about realism about fact is true, etc.). It is possible to collapse the hierarchy by adopting a disquotational theory of truth, that is that "is true" is a harmless predicate that can be ignored; but I think we may have to live with a hierarchy of truths, primarily because establishing whether a judgement is true or not is often hard won. However, I am not convinced that most judgements are independent of the language that they are expressed in, in the sense that the references of the words and predicates will in general vary with choice of natural language. Where there is independence though, I think that realism is a reasonable point of view, although realism needs to take into account the conventions that humans use, which leads to a structural realism position.

1/ I would like to answer the question posed at the beginning as follows: The rules of logic state that a factual statement must not be associated with self-referentiality, otherwise a paradox arises, for instance a sign that we see on the street with the request: Please do not read.

2/ The discussion between H.G. Callaway and L. Carlson was stimulating. In the end, I found the solution to the - old - problem, "Absolute or relative claim to truth?" that Larry proposed, very acceptable by asking certain questions to ourselves if they want to solve. I think here that Immanuel Kant's first sentences from the "Preface A" of the "Critique of Pure Reason" (1781) name the basis of the problem, that we are occupied with questions that transcend the limits of knowledge at certain points, that is, we are trapped in ourselves if we want to answer them.

3/ I would always answer the question whether truth is relative or absolute with a "non solum - sed etiam" and not with a "neque - neque". If we want to preserve humanity, then we must, in my opinion, set absolute standards in some points, such as those laid down in human rights and in the postulate of human dignity. Although I generally consider the pragmatic concept of truth to be problematic (because it is completely relativizing and only sets it against success criteria with regard to consequences), we cannot do without it in the solution of practical, i.e. moral problems - although this looks like a paradox. We have too much violence and inhumanity in the world, which we cannot get under control other than by pragmatic setting, without associating a certain instrumental or corrupting interest with this setting. This is how I understand the need to hold on to values of the integrity of human life. Everywhere we quickly reach the limits of what we want to define: What about the need for implants? Does man as an individual have a right to the integrity of his body after death? Or is the life-supporting right of the mass of patients to a kidney or another human organ that is in short supply on the organ trade market? (so that the state get the right to have the body of every deceased citizen disemboweled by doctors when the body is still warm, to ensure the usable organs? ) I would therefore like to hold on to the claim to some norm-setting claims to absoluteness that mark boundaries and release everything to relativism.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Retter & readers,

I wonder if you might care to say just exactly what "absolute" means in your phrase, "absolute standards."

I have been arguing, that "relative" and "absolute" go down together. The natural meaning of "absolute" is perhaps, "unconditional."

The following definition comes from the internet:

ab·so·lute/ˈabsəˌlo͞ot,ˌabsəˈlo͞ot/adjective

noun: PHILOSOPHY

---End quotation

I venture to say that there is no value which may be "viewed without relation to other things," because there is nothing at all which is without relation to other things. That is just the mistake involved in the traditional philosophical concept of the absolute.

Get rid of that concept, and the "relative" goes with it, to be replaced by talk of relations and the logic of relations.

Notice, in particular, that it is plausible to be very conservative at the prospect of revising, say, "Thou shalt not steal," without holding that there could never be circumstances in which it might plausibly be questioned or rejected. This is quite different from saying that it is plausibly rejected. We are justly conservative on basic values and "habits of the heart." But this fact should not be erected into unquestionable dogmas. Depending on exactly what is meant by "human rights," they have, in fact, been questioned or rejected.

NB: I defend no "pragmatic" conception of truth.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

If we want to preserve humanity, then we must, in my opinion, set absolute standards in some points, such as those laid down in human rights and in the postulate of human dignity.

H.G. Callaway

1/ You said: "there is nothing at all which is without relation to other things. That is just the mistake involved in the traditional philosophical concept of the absolute."

Comment: I am trying to keep myself out of discussions in which the opponents draw each other's attention to the fact that the other side has not understood something correctly or is producing mistakes and dogmas. Also tendencies to want to teach others (or to try to do so reciprocally) are far from my intention, but perhaps one gets into such a situation in the eagerness of the battle.

2/ You expects a definition of the "absolute". You know the concept has more than one or two connotations, therefore we have free choice if the understand the term "absolute"; I try to orient myself by the everyday language when I focus on the term: total, without exception and independent of restrictive conditions.

Of course, there is the possibility of taking this understanding to absurdity (if you absolutely want to be right) by means of certain examples, but in those circles of international communication that I deal with, I get along with it, there are until now problems of unnderstanding and also in everyday language I can cope with these descriptive terms of the absolute. -

2a/ If I take the term "absolute" philosophically, however, I see the absolute as regulative (regulatives Prinzip) in the sense of Immanuel Kant's transcendental analytics (others may have other philosophers with other contexts in mind, such as Spinoza).

To H.G. Callaway

(sequel)

3/ You said: "Depending on exactly what is meant by 'human rights', have been questioned or rejected."

I disagree: (a) Human rights, as those basic principles of a humane life, which are based on human dignity and which applies to all human beings in the same way, have not existed for very long, as is well known, and there were attempts to do so in the 18th century.

See the situation inthe Middle Age:

Creation was seen as the staging of the world, strictliy vertically defined: The ruling people above, the mass of others - as medieval law shows - below, i.e. equipped with lesser rights. The social world was understood vertically.

The Virginia Right Bill (1776) and the US-Federalist Papers (1787/88), formulated within in a territory full of slaveholders, denied such rights to the indigenous inhabitants (Indians) and the slaves; this was so absolute that they don't mentioned in special paragraph. Here it was not a question of definition problems, but it was crystal clear that slaves were property.

Yes, your statement would fit (but with bitter irony): There are no human rights, everyone sees them differently. - I say, on the other hand, that a comparative examination of the constitutions and fundamental laws of the countries of the EU has established such fundamental rights in fairly consistent terms.

Individual ideas have at least two checks. One is reality itself, and another is society. The normal person

sort of glides between these checks, searching for some self fullfilment. Psychotics will not recognize reality and sociopaths

will ignore society. If reality becomes too heavy, be may well crack.

One of the skills of a good researcher is to deal with areas of uncertainty, looking for windows of opertunity. To realize what is known and unknown is valuable skill.

Then there are rare geniuses who simply transform reality, not exactly the normal type.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

I make distinctions between "relativism" and "multiculturalism" and "pluralism." I'm afraid you are on the wrong track.

More later.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

it is all very well to say that you are more congenial to cultural relativism than to doctrinaire relativism,

Relativism has to do with sometimes no right or wrong, but relative. The right or wrong has to do with culture, not the same in each culture and each person is different; so it has to do.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Perhaps a definition of "moral relativism" will help things along. The following comes from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Most often [moral relativism] is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a meta-ethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons.

---End quotation

See:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

Further along in the article, there is some attempt to clarify what the relativist mean by "absolute."

With respect to truth-value, this means that a moral judgment such as ‘Polygamy is morally wrong’ may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another. It is not true, or false, simply speaking.

---End quotation

My position is that this notion of "true relative to one society, but false relative to another," needs to be rejected --to facilitate more productive moral discourse. Basically, there is no such thing as "true for me," and "false for you." There is only true and false.

That is why I reject relativism in all its version. Pluralism, in contrast, while recognizing the factual diversity of mores and standards, make no use of similar doubtful concepts. As I say, "absolute justification" goes the way or "relative justifications." There are only justifications, better or worse, truths and falsehoods.

H.G. Callaway

I only took part in the interesting discussion between L. Carlson and H.G. Callaway through a longer remark earlier; but the discussion is a little outside my field of work, so I only allow myself a few more remarks.

1/ In my opinion, H.G. Callaway seems to represent a point of view that is more oriented towards the need to see the absolute completely free of relativity. In principle (this term is close to the Absolute) I find it necessary to set an Absolute in this sense. I support such a need.

2/ The reason for this is that we live in a world of fictions, fakes and corruptions of truth, and must not give up the (absolute) truth value of facts (dates, events, sequences of events). However, this does not mean that we may derive normative settings for our own behavior from facts (and their time-bound interpretations) of a time or historical period; that would be a naturalistic fallacy. So we are not forced to accept widow burns in India or polygamy just because they occur or have occurred as facts morally justified. No, we must discuss this openly and commit ourselves to certain values.

3/ In fact, we have to discuss again and again the basic principles (the absolute) of just human life. Instead of referring to any encyclopedias as authority (the author does not know any more than we do here), I think it would be better to discuss on the basis of known theories or authors of theories. I myself lean towards Jürgen Habermas' discourse theory in a discussion about truth and morality in the context of absolute/relative.

(sequel)

4/ We must consider that understanding the modern world is only possible if we address the dilemmas, balances, contradictions, aporia in which we live today in the process of self-experience. I find this point of view in Larry Carlson and support him.

5/ Conclusion: As you know, the deeper you drill, the quicker you reach a limit in questions of knowledge and morality. One finds oneself again in the "infinite regress": the argumentation turns in a circle. This discussion is close to it.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

It strikes me that what Retter means by "absolute" values is more an aspiration for universal acceptance of particular values than it is a justification of them acceptable to all. But, of course, that someone or other disagrees, say about human rights, or about "Thou shalt not steal," proves nothing one way or the other. It does not show that the aspiration is illegitimate. On the other hand, the aspiration might still conflict with the aspirations of others. Though philosophy aims to be universal, in fact, it is often an expression of human cultural particularities. (Recall the traditional terms of classification, "English empiricism," American pragmatism, "German idealism," etc.)

We still have the facts on the ground of moral differences from time to time and from place to place. Moreover, these differences, however rooted in our particularities of culture and outlook, are also evident in political differences and conflicts. They are not about to go away any time soon. That means that pluralistic "live and let live," is much needed.

Readers of the present thread, may find the following paper of interests:

Article Semantic Contextualism and Scientific Pluralism

Rejecting the relativistic conception of truth, along with the contrast between truth and "absolute truth," that the relativists have on offer, we face the facts of moral and cultural difference more clearly. This is very far from saying that we then have means for effectively settling all the various conflicts which may arise in human affairs, but recognizing them for what they are is an important first step. This is part of what recommends pluralism over relativism.

H.G. Callaway

My dear Larry, I should like say a comment to your last sentences. You wrote:

As an aside, the U.S. bill of rights is ultimately based on what the majority of people think that they would never like to lose if they were ever placed in a situation where they were in the minority, and therefore is, arguably, consonant with the principles of democracy.

You will not seriously claim that you have thus justified the just core of democracy as a form of government as the wisest form of social order?? I say: You have pointed out one of the worst dilemmas of democracy, namely that a mere majority of votes (of the powerful or the taxpayers) leads to decisions, treats unfairly, exploits those who have none; the latter have no right to be heard - they were not even regarded as human beings. In the 19th century, liberals in Europe fought with their hands and feet against universal suffrage and stuck to the three-class system: the one who pays the most taxes should have the most to say.

(Of course a rational argument is effective here, but this rationality does not consider the consequences. Today, the right to vote has the rank of a human right, not just a civil right, which permits second-class citizenship for the mass of poor people.)

You will hopefully not justify the judgements of the Supreme Court (as highes institution of the democratic state), regarding "negroes", that in the 19th century initially denied the right to vote altogether, and later justified justified the Black Codes, in 1896 elevated the judgment "separate but equal" to the doctrine of the social second-class status of African Americans, up to the poll-taxes, which were not abolished until 1964.

Either I misunderstood you or there is some misunderstanding on your part. Maybe you can clarify the jumping one better than I can.

Hein

to Larry Carlson post scriptum:

you added a general statement later:

What to make, then, of the rather ironic situation in which the United States tries to impose democracy on a country (as if for the other country's own good) in which the majority of its citizens choose not to have a democratic form of government, but rather prefer to keep the religious or secular dictatorship that they already have.

That is a very ironic sentence, the admission of the failure of democracy in one's own country. But that would be far too little, because it is also a waiver of active participation in improving the situation, which is at the expense of others, because academics still get through life better and - in my opinion - have the moral duty not to surrender in resigned irony, but to call injustice by its name and help to reduce it.

Hein

to Larry Carlson in addition

By the way: If you said that democracy is based on moral pluralism, then I can agree with you on one point: The values and ultimately the interpretation of moral principles are party-politically different. Because the parties are in competition with each other, moral pluralism - in this respect - is self-evident. But pluralism is nevertheless oriented towards a basic (in its core: absolute) moral consensus, because extreme parties are forbidden, at least by us. This should not be overlooked. And even the impact assessments for moral decisions in dilemma situations can basically only be made if the idea of the common good is taken seriously. I have always advocated pluralism in science, because those who believe they are leading the discipline in a certain political left or right doctrine have a tendency to suppress other views. But if everything is set relatively without limits, if liberal individualism is set no limits by a duty to serve the community, then society becomes anomalous and is a self-service shop for those who possess power and money.

Hein

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Retter & readers.

The passage I quote below from one of your prior notes strikes me as rather puritanical. (I use this term in contrast with "moralistic," favoring moralism but skeptical of the traditional puritanisms, especially those in American society.)

I would certainly not argue for or support self-immolation of widows or polygamy, e.g., but I do not see it as my task to see to it that it does not happen. I'm not so ambitious, and equally, I do not believe that any country should go around the world imposing democracy or anything else by force of arms. I think we each have to respect our own limitations and work for what we see as better through our more immediate connections and relations. It belongs to the "live and let live" of pluralism that we not "borrow trouble." If someone wanted to practice self-immolation here in the city, then I think the law should step in to prevent it; but I would not attempt to impose our local laws elsewhere. Things can change for the better but no moral utopia is going to be produced any time soon.

There are situations where our moral choices are forced, when we are immediately involved or concerned with what is happening; and there are other situations more distant and difficult to effect in any reasonable fashion. Moral convictions of different people and peoples don't tend to converge until and unless they come into more immediate contact and interaction. Without more immediate contact and interaction, people will tend to remain indifferent to what outsiders think, and no abstract arguments will likely have much effect in engaging popular sentiments. Convictions, we might say, are held more rigidly within comparatively closed and more uniform groups. But that does not imply that we are entitled to force openings. Neither are we obligated generally to support or subsidize difference and distinctness.

I am wary of "universalist aspirations" when imposed, though I would encourage wider contacts as the opportunity presents itself. Turning moralism into politics is not the way to go--it tends to suppression.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

2/ The reason for this is that we live in a world of fictions, fakes and corruptions of truth, and must not give up the (absolute) truth value of facts (dates, events, sequences of events). However, this does not mean that we may derive normative settings for our own behavior from facts (and their time-bound interpretations) of a time or historical period; that would be a naturalistic fallacy. So we are not forced to accept widow burns in India or polygamy just because they occur or have occurred as facts morally justified. No, we must discuss this openly and commit ourselves to certain values.

Thank you, H.G. Callaway and Larry Carlson, for your detailed comments as answer to my contributions. I can live with them. I think it is good when such fundamental discussions take place, but I do not have an overview of everything. You are welcome to continue.

Hein

Historically the US has oscilated between intervention and non intervention. Now they are trying nonintervention.

Intervention has usually been preceeded by psychological campains, that the devil himself lives in Iran, or Iraq,

or venezuela or north korea or whatever. It is bad to be manipulated by such things, usually they are not that dramatic.

I suppose if a real disaster happens elswhere, the locals will eventually figure it out.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

Many thanks for the good words.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carlson & readers,

Consider the statement,

(1) This sentence is false.

Suppose (1) is either true or false --by the law of excluded middle, (P or not-P).

if (1) is true, then, since it tells us it is false, (1) must be false. So, on the assumption that (1) is true, it turns out false.

So, suppose on the contrary, that (1) is false, then, since it states that it is false, if it is false, then it must be true.

In consequence, the sentence seems to be both true and false, which contradicts our original assumption --the law of excluded middle.

But whether we hold onto the law of excluded middle or not, it seems we are not going to be able to do much with (1). You are right to want to discard it --though it appears syntactically well formed. The standard analysis is that it is defective semantically, and the conclusion drawn is that we need to forbid the truth predicate in the first-level object language. The truth predicate is then taken to have its proper place in a second language of use in talking about the object language. Removing "false" (=not true) from the object language, we get only "This sentence." is false --which fails of self-reference.

Now consider the following statement:

(2) There are no moral truths.

Removing the equivocation introduced by talk of "absolute" moral truths, what ever that may be supposed to mean, this is implied by moral relativism.

Now (2) is either a moral (ethical) statement or it is not. (By the law of excluded middle).

Assume that it is a moral statement and true, then we get a kind of self-refutation, since there is at least this one true moral statement.

If on the other hand, if we assume that it is not a moral statement, and true, then it amounts to a rejection of all morality--which is absurd. (Whether or not someone who holds (2) true actually acts --or consistently acts--in accordance with the rejection.) It tells us that no matter what moral claim you may consider, it is not true. This is subject to counter-example. If, e.g., 'It is wrong to steal" is true, then (2) is false. If "Senseless violence is wrong" is true, then (2) is false, etc.

Notice, too, that

(3) There are no absolute moral truths.

(if otherwise unobjectionable) follows logically from (2)--assuming the use of "absolute truth" in contrast with "truth." But, (2) does not follow logically from (3) alone. So it appears that endorsing (3), the relativist doesn't get (2) after all. But isn't relativism --as a variety of non-cognitivism--committed to (2)? Doesn't use of "absolute" merely disguise this point?

On this analysis, moral relativism is refuted by the observation that, e.g., "Senseless violence is wrong."

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

As for applying to itself, all of the essential terms and phrases in the statement, "This sentence if false," are valid, but its truth value can neither be verified nor falsified, (even in theory) and therefore has no shareable meaning and must be discarded.... With the result that we can't say that relativist are being hypocritical when they claim that truth is relative.