Very interesting for me too.

—g

A good question and I would love to get involved in trying to disentangle it. However, it all depends upon what you actually take phenomenology to be. You speak about a Heideggerian approach - and although that certainly is Phenomenology, I am still not quite clear about the question. Here is why:

If you take phenomenology as the experience-based investigation of the phenomena as they appear, than we seem to be limited to a phenomenological investigation which is - qua being phenomenology - limited to the one undergoing these experiences and recognising the a priori structures according to which these experiences constitute the apparent - and transcendent - perception. I cannot quite see how such a phenomenological approach would pan out in relation to secondary data.

if however you take phenomenology - as for example Chalmers (1996) does - as that experiential residuum that resists physicalist attempts to be reduced to causal cognitive/functional states, then I would say, it might be a worthwhile project. But you are then only tracing experiential dew as it manifests itself in the text - which is prone to be - at least partially - influenced by your own interpretative abilities. I have read protocols of court-proceedings regarding crimes against humanity. Some of the accused provide accounts full of disgust for themselves and what they allowed themselves to do - very moving. You can hardly avoid to be strangely touched by their horrible stories and the account they - rather bleak - provide about their own horrible participation - and in this respect, yes I take this to be possible, but probably not every text is appropriate?

So it is very much dependent upon what you actually want to do and how you define the parameters of your endeavour (wide or narrow reading of what phenomenology entails).

Thank You Tom. I think you have got the question clearly and your explanations definitely guides my thought process. I personally feel that If phenomenology is about the lived experience then it should be based on primary data.

Fascinating question, Govind! I agree with Tom that it all depends on what one considers 'phenomenology' to be.

Heidegger - in Being and Time, for example - combines different philosophical approaches where phenomenology (the analysis of the activity of hammering or equipmental breakdown, for example) is integrated with existentialism (the themes of anxiety, guilt, death, etc.), hermeneutics (the general inquiry about meaning, the 'hermeneutic circle'), ontology (the central concern with the 'meaning of being', the insistence on 'fundamental ontology'), etc. Thus, 'Heideggerian phenomenology' is a hybrid concept that is difficult to pin down.

What is more, because of its critical attitude towards the philosophy of the subject (Descartes' rationalism, for example, or Kantian transcendental idealism), a Heideggerian would be inclined to deconstruct the very concept of 'experience'. The distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' data would also be subjected to scepticism, I guess, because of the suspicion that a subject/object ontology is underpinning it.

Understood from the perspective of 'fundamental ontology', hermeneutics and existentialism of Being and Time, Heidegger's phenomenology would be an inquiry into the meaning of being as incorporated in everyday practices (e.g., enjoying the afternoon sun, doing repairs at home, finding one's way in the city, etc.). I have used this understanding of Heideggerian phenomenology (influenced by the interpretive work of Hubert Dreyfus) in my own research and it has not prevented me from making recourse to different types of 'data'. My guideline has been to look at the everyday (as reflected in what is done and said) in order to uncover the ontological.

My doctoral dissertation's methods were strongly influenced by French social phenomenological currents in sociology and drew on both secondary and primary data which it included in a larger phenomenological reduction. See: Gurdin, Joseph Barry. "Amitié/Friendship: The Socio-cultural Construction of Friendship in Contemporary Montreal." Ph.D. diss., Department of Sociology, Université de Montréal, 1978. I described these methods in terms more understandable terms to a wider audience in the book based on my dissertation. See: Gurdin, J. Barry. Amitié/Friendship: An Investigation into Cross-Cultural Styles in Canada and the United States (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), particularly "Appendix A: Methods of Research," pp. 462-478. However, in trying to make my methodological points to a wider audience in North America, I found it necessary to resort to the more commonly-employed concept of triangulation.

In reading the responses to this section, I would like to express a cautionary warning regarding what was recently summarized in an article in the major French newspaper, Le Monde, on January 28, 2014 (updated on January 29, 2014), by Emmanuel Faye, Philosopher and Professor at the University of Rouen. The title of his article is, "Heidegger: Sa vision du monde est clairement antisémite" which can be rendered in English as "Heidegger: His Vision of the World is Clearly Antisemitic." I agree with Professor Faye's assessment.

L'ethnographie,méthode fondatrice et sructive de l'anthropologie, apportera sans aucun doute des réponses à vos questions philosophiques quant à la phénoménologie des données de 1er ou 2ème ordre. Je vous invite à lire des monographies qui détaillent les expériences humaines et interspécifiques ici ou ailleurs.

What is meant by "secondary data" and are you asking if it can be used in phenomenological interpretation? Your question is not clear. I discuss three modes of phenomenological inquiry at:

http://www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/Seamon_reviewEAP.htm

These modes are:

1. first-person explication

2. third-person explication

3. hermeneutic explication

Prof David, By secondary data I mean data collected by other researchers or what is being seen in databases , may it be qualitative or quantitative. I hope that clarifies your doubt. Thank you for sharing the link.

Thank you Teodor , Gurdin and Florence for your contribution.

G--

Good phenomenological research always requires that the researcher immerse himself/herself in some evidence of the phenomenon. In that sense, there can be no use of secondary data as you describe it. Please study the article I gave a link to in my earlier response. You need to clarify your understanding of phenomenology.

Prof Florence... would you like to provide any links about the literature you are suggesting? I will be highly obliged. Thanks

Govind,

have a look at the question: "What are the problems of phenomenology" here at the research-gate. David, many others and I have provided a rather long list of possible literature. However, based on David's assessment regarding a need for further clarification I would probably recommend Dermont Moran's Introduction to Phenomenology (by Routledge - have a look at ABE books for a used copy). That is quite a far-reaching but easy to digest overview on what phenomenology (in philosophical terms) entails and it can be read and understood by non-philosophers.

Nevertheless, you need to be clear about the fact that (continental/philosophical) 'phenomenology' has come to stand for something different in the (analytic) philosophy of the mind and in social-science research.

So when you hear a resounding No to your question that might be because of the sometimes equivocal use of 'phenomenology', meaning different things for different disciplines. Social scientists normally use the concept of phenomenology rather light hearted and do not give much regard to its original meaning.

But if you talk about phenomenology in the sense of continental philosophy taking human experience as its starting point, then I certainly agree with David's negative answer.

Best

Thomas

I very much agree with Thomas's response and his suggestion that Moran's fine volume be studied. There have been a wide range of efforts to generate "real-world" phenomenological research, and one of the best set of examples is the DUQUESNE STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY, published between 1971 and 1983 (4 volumes and a wide range of phenomenological methods, from first-person through third-person to interpretive/hermeneutic).

Another effort is psychologist Jonathan Smith's INTERPRETIVE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, which is controversial and considered by some phenomenologists NOT to be phenomenological. But Smith's work is useful in that it offers one way to provide a more "empirical" mode of phenomenological investigation.

And as Thomas suggested, take a look at responses to the question posed earlier about phenomenology on this site.

I just completed a draft of a chapter on "qualitative methods" that might be useful. it's available at academia dot edu at the following link:

https://www.academia.edu/4967168/Qualitative_Approaches_to_Environment-Behavior_Research_Understanding_Environmental_and_Place_Experiences_Meanings_and_Actions_2014_forthcoming_

David Seamon

Books from Philippe Descola, Tim Ingold, Romain Simenel, Florence.Brunois, M.Houseman but most are in french, I'm sorry... In anthropology we face two types of data: those that we one observe and those who are restored to us by the speech of the observed. Those second possibilities could be assimilated to your "second data" even we are also in this last case observant of this restitution. As our frame was until now society, the tribe, the community, we were confronted with the question to know and to conclude if these second data are a matter of the anecdote (and which place to give to it) or are generalized. The anthropologist decide that the phenomenological narratives of life and their expression become some raw material. Today (following Descola, Latour and Brunois), our frame is vaster and so complex because it is a question of widening it in the non humans beings and of more precise hearth in the interactions between either " the society" but the individuals and the non human beings. The second-class data are not any more a matter of the anecdote but are become of the first order.We consider them as constitutiv of "un savoir" (knowledge) but In this new context, anthropologist have to be very carrefull in their description of the phenomenology of the interaction because the other discutant or actor could be an animal, a plant, a spirit...

Hi Florence,

sorry to deviate from Govind's question here, but that sounds very much like Bruno Latour's and Michael Callon's Actor-Netowrk Theory the way you describe interaction with other human beings or objects. If I am right Callon calls these objects of interaction actant?

Absolutly

but we have to be carefull as anthropologist : our methology is changing, in progress. We have to crate new tools and skill. But in the same time, it's a beautifull adventure as science one

from those process, three perspectives grow up: one, more structuralist (Descola), the second more relativist (Latour) and the third one, more phenomenologic but also less structif (Ingold) .... So we have to wait for the new generation of researcher and ethnographies to see...

Very interesting question. Obviously if you use secondary data, you cannot collect data in the manner recommended by whose ever method of Phenomenology you want to use. Since the way interviews are conducted using Phenomenology is crucial, that first crucial step is missing. Also since date collection and analysis occur concurrently and lead to other important component of the phenomena, that too is missing. The only part of Phenomenology what could be used with secondary data would be the data analysis component. While I wouldn't call it Phenomenological research with all these component pieces of the research process missing, the analysis of experiences could be done using Phenomenological analysis methods, I believe.

In my case, for example, I have access to a database that has many descriptions writen by near-death experiencers. As frustrating as it might be to not be able to ask them probing questions, the cases can still be analyzed but I don't describe doing that as doing Phenomenological research.

Thank you all for your valuable contribution in my query. I am going through the references suggested and will update soon about what could collect. Thanks again for a big help.

I forgot to mention: One of the best introductions to phenomenological method is Linda Finlay's PHENOMENOLOGY FOR THERAPISTS: DESCRIBING THE LIFEWORLD (2012). Her presentation is broader than the title applies, and she does a good job of delineating the various "modes" and "methods" of phenomenology.