In the modern philosophical culture the concept of duty plays a dominant role in the ethics of Kant. Hence duty becomes specifically not only a lawful action of reason, but also an act undertaken in view and in accordance with that law. Thus there is a clear distinction between action compliant with the law and moral action or duty, i.e. action taken by the law, that is, apart from the natural inclinations and often in opposition with them. The ability to act for duty becomes the witness and expression of human freedom as "autonomy" or obedience to the inner law of reason.
Kant defines, in fact, a moral duty as independent (since it does not come from external sources) and categorical (valid in itself and not to the achievement of other purposes): any motivation or utilitarian purpose corrupts the moral act in its purity. He understands duty as freedom of a rational being who questions and obliges himself, thereby linking closely duty to the essence of morality.
At the end of the nineteenth century the concept of duty was subjected to harsh criticism. First, as part of a utilitarian morality, from Bentham, it has replaced the concept of duty with that of interest, and as a result the duties towards themselves or others have become acts in the name of an individual or social interest.
But the main attack came from Nietzsche, in whose pages the criticism of the idea of duty coincides with the exaltation of the superman, who imposes its morality of an hero and does not accept a preconceived ethical and universal order. To the morality of duty, Nietzsche replaces that of the will (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1892): the superman denies traditional and universal values and asserts his own freedom and the will of power, thus re-establishing a new state of innocence which initiates a New era.
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant deals with duty and argues that morality must be based on something absolutely certain and firm: duty. Everyone perceives morality, safely and aware, as a duty. Man, endowed with reason, the one with reason, feels in front of certain situations of having to make a choice, to be followed by the moral behavior. Even the most wicked men, who still retain at least part of rationality, will feel having to pose the problem of moral choice, or how to behave. This is the moment that precedes any real moral action.
Morality is thus a matter of reason. Every rational being has morality, because he feels the duty and the need to choose. The duty has nothing to do with causality and determinism of the material world: it concerns only the sphere of morality.
But if morality is duty, then how will compulsion be reconciled with the absolute formal freedom of choice? The answer lies in the concept of autonomy. The morality of the rational being is such that he must obey a command (mandatory) that he has freely given (freedom), in accordance with his rational nature.
Man who performs a certain action according to the moral duty knows that, in so far as his decision can be explained naturally (also with psychological motivations), the real substance of his morality does not lie in this causal chain but in a free will that corresponds to the rational essence of his being.
Man, in short, is a 'being' belonging to two worlds: inasmuch is gifted with sensory capabilities, he belongs to the natural one, and therefore is subject to the phenomenal laws; as a rational creature, however, he belongs to what Kant calls the "intelligible" world or noumenon, that is, the world as it is in itself independently of our feelings or our cognitive ties, and therefore in it he is absolutely free (autonomous) , a freedom manifested in obedience to the moral law, to the '’categorical imperative".
The analytical philosopher Anscombe recognizes as empty and meaningless the various 'boxes' in which to enter her concepts of" obligation " " duty, " " right, " " wrong "(in a moral sense). According to her theory, in fact, the concepts of obligation and duty exist only as psychological survival, because they are based on a conception of ethics, grounded on the belief in a divine lawmaker, no longer existing. The concept of "moral duty" was intrinsically tied to a certain ethical conception that, by virtue of the beliefs and practices that characterized it, meant that it took on a special meaning, regulatory, and clearly intelligible.
The issue is that the "pseudo notion” of moral obligation, on the one hand, shares its characteristics with the correct concept which appears in legalistic conception of ethics, but at the same time does not qualify for the background, intended as a set of practices and thought, necessary for the intelligibility of a concept with these features. That of the concept of moral duty is a case where we transfer an expression from one context to another without affecting the use completely but at most some meaning, which is however insufficient to the intelligibility of the concept.
Duty and morality cannot be determined by reason and rationality but is determined by our capacity to be empathic to our fellow human beings. We have a biological and cultural built-in capacity to put ourself in the other's shoes and to sympathise and from there what need to be done is very naturally created by our imagination at the pre-conscious level. We are essentially social animal and we cannot be happy by being selfish.
Duty and morality only makes sense under the aspect of non-voluntariness. Which means that one has no real choice. No choice because one was either born or forced into a position that bounds pure being to a sphere of value. And no choice because the moment one does not want to share a certain morality or accept duties one leaves this sphere of value left outlawed and for thus cut off from nurturing processes. What one looses is a right to be seen as a 'rational being'. One looses the right to be part of a group.
In this sphere of value one not only finds an adjustment of relations and thus a re-arrangement of functions and capacities - like empathy and for that with what one might or might not sympathise with - but also a new order of what is 'good'. Those are principles. One does not have to think about the righteousness of those principles (because they are supposed to be good) because one has anyway no choice. It is a reason without any choice of reflection. And even if reflected it almost never leads to action against this sphere. Because that would mean being an outlaw.
Only by swearing an oath one kind of voluntary enters a higher state of this sphere of value which extends a born in or forced position by giving one more ressources, boosting this nurturing process. And one might say with each state responsibility ascends as well as unfreedom. It is a resposibility without reflection. One only gains a higher portion of defending values and actions which are not one's own will but rather command (from above). Each action against those values must be defended likewise to avert demage from oneself to not fall back to a lower state with less or no nutrition.
The sphere of value is in most cases not the sphere of society. It is indeed the sphere of a ruler who bounds and cuts and limits forms of life through rules and makes it look like free will or at least a good idea and for that as if it was a sphere of society when society is indeed neither organized nor powerful enough.
Free will comes along with that taste of potential (social) death. As likewise real altruism and everything that is indeed natural always undergoes a risk to suffer under a changing climate.
Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols, specifically the section on "The Error of Free Will", in many ways simplifies this issue via a very pragmatic evaluation of the socio-historical function of the associated concept of "personal responsibility." In many ways, the whole binary-opposition of free will/determinism is undone in his later writings--which both-simplify and complicate the issue at the same time.
First, he delightfully points out that regardless of the inability to actually freely "will" one's actions--as one is in fact not essence or being, but rather an creative existence known-as-"becoming" (or perhaps "will to power" itself)--one is able to in a sense sociologically (and in free spirited fashion) become their own path, thus rejecting determinism as well. In Nietzsche, I do not interpret "will" as any sort of choice, moral, rational, emotional, etc. If we were to look at human social existence as something part of the actual universe, we would see it as something similar to a force--as in Physics rather than as in Politics.
See "free will" is tied to the concept of "personal responsibility." As a sociologist, I would have to-be absurdly naïve to not look at the social function of this tied concept. Nietzsche, though often overlooked in American sociology, is quite clear that the social function of "personal responsibility" is to allow for the re-placement of blame. It allows us to, in effect, avoid what we are (active force) and blame others, thus allowing us a feeling of moral purity when we avoid "personal responsibility" by denying that we are active force. We embrace reactivity, and claim free will. This all builds up to the alienation of the creative will to power, as we take an assumed "control" over it by claiming ownership of action and thus create the assumption of an Authority that is somehow valid not only over our own selves but thanks to blame, over others as well. Those of us who are "responsible" herd animals are then absolved of any responsibility when we negate the free action of others via Authority and punishment. Is this-Enlightened Morality or Duty? No, it denies life-as-action, negates any sort of liberty, and ultimately we sacrifice our duty in order to avoid it. It is even highly irrational.
I am action. I am duty. I am will. It is absurd to assume I am some God like being in control of my free will, for when I do this I am nothing more than a resentful, self-hating destructive force UNDER control of some non-existent Idealized Signified that I mysticize as "my" "free will." Now in this situation I would think that I'd attain personal-responsibility for my own demise as something with a life worth living.
If I am action, then it is insane to dream of being outside of myself (much less outside the whole to paraphrase Nietzsche again) and thus in control of my actions--this second delusion being even more absurd as it confuses control with freedom and lack of control as somehow lacking free will.
I am, ergo I am much more than rational thought, emotional drive, etc. I am all I am.
This can either be a Kantian & Nietzschean question or a general question as a positive answer on the ground of their theory of morals would be difficult to establish. The assumption that morality is duty would be questionable for me. It might be a duty in the sense that a pure mind find it necessary to follow morality - hence the duty - to fulfill its freedom. In the popular understanding of the terms , if the morality is duty, it is compulsive. if it is compulsive, it is not a result of free choice and hence, cannot be considered morality; for a decision to be moral, or good, a degree of free choice is assumed in general understanding. If a decision is not a result of free choice (easy or hard) it cannot be "moral". if I do not kill because I cannot, i do not make any moral decision even if the outcome is right.
In the first sense, it is a free decision to do or not to do something and "duty" is an acknowledgement of this fact. In the second sense, it is a duty but it is not moral.
I would say, to keep rather in line with personalism, that a decision to do or not to do something (in recognition of a duty [in the first sense]) is the first step. This is a beginning of a process that involves a number of human capabilities of thinking and acting. The real issue is not only the first decision but then the process of achieving the result. Efficiency in pursuit of such duty is the thing we put on the weight.
Does it make aany sense?
Hello Gergory,
"the social function of "personal responsibility" is to allow for the re-placement of blame. It allows us to, in effect, avoid what we are (active force) and blame others, thus allowing us a feeling of moral purity when we avoid "personal responsibility" by denying that we are active force. We embrace reactivity, and claim free will."
The social function is even much clearer taking a look at the german word "Verantwortung" as it still carries in it the greece offspring...
When we take a look at the syllables it consists of we can devide it into four parts:
Ver
ant
wort
ung
"Ver" points torwards a change in state. "ant" is the short form of "anti", which means here "against". "wort" is word and obviously spoken. "ung" just turns it into an object.
Originally talking about it it means that you stand in court and you got to defend yourself. So it means a speech act and for sure some rhetorical skill that leads to a change of state in the offender. But clearly its function was one of defence of freedom and/or live. Later on Cicero softened the skill factor a little bit by talking about evidence.
The romance got another idea: You can transfer your own acting to another person and let this person act for you. If asked the person "responds". This is more the command aspect of "responsibility".
So here we got two functions: The one of defends and the one of responding.
Later on some smartasses got the idea: "Hey, why not combine both functions! We give some rights to act to someone in our name and in case he does it bad or it goes wrong let's cut off some heads! Which prevents us from being the center of attraction!". And everyone was cheering thinking it was a great idea.
Today's function is that you are giving away your rights in order to act in the sense of a counterpart and it's definitions about what is 'good' (principles). Your counterpart gets on top of your given away rights (f.e. to reflect about good and bad) the right to question your actions. Each respond function is in that case to defend actions which go against those principles (to avert a damage from yourself).
You said that responsibility is " re-placement of blame". This is only so talking about the function that a person is able to anticipate what is expected. But if you think again about it there turns out to be a deeper feeling one wants to replace:
Responsibility results from a feeling of fear of demage to oneself.
And there is a bunch of functions linked to it which are not only and always social. Like the function to take away your freedom of choice. Or the function to take away from you your ability to think about what is good and bad.
So obviously someone is thinking you are too stupid to understand what is "good" and what is "bad" and most people are not smart enough to take care of social structures. Not even in the back of beyond. And talking about Nietzsche obviously someone is thinking it would be a better thing to take away any tools from you that enable you to develope powerfull thoughts. I think it was in "Der Antichrist" when Nietzsche was talking about Buddhism and its favours torwards other religions making this mistake not to anticipate that a regime without any religion can indeed pervert this idea likewise in order to bound people to a sphere of values they do not even be part of. Tibet is a perfect example here.
Nietzsche is a good start. But he is not sufficient anymore when it comes to insights or ethics. Chronos already ate this son. Beside the fact that even Nietzsche had his flaws and was from time to time misleaded by some personal emotions emoting over something when it would have been better to think twice. Nietzsche will not help anyone to develope own opinions. And that is why we cannot take Nietzsche talking about real functions of "resposibility".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZk5Uz96hwg&feature=youtu.be&t=2m2s
Hello Gergory,
"the social function of "personal responsibility" is to allow for the re-placement of blame. It allows us to, in effect, avoid what we are (active force) and blame others, thus allowing us a feeling of moral purity when we avoid "personal responsibility" by denying that we are active force. We embrace reactivity, and claim free will."
The social function is even much clearer taking a look at the german word "Verantwortung" as it still carries in it the greece offspring...
When we take a look at the syllables it consists of we can devide it into four parts:
Ver
ant
wort
ung
"Ver" points torwards a change in state. "ant" is the short form of "anti", which means here "against". "wort" is word and obviously spoken. "ung" just turns it into an object.
Originally talking about it it means that you stand in court and you got to defend yourself. So it means a speech act and for sure some rhetorical skill that leads to a change of state in the offender. But clearly its function was one of defence of freedom and/or live. Later on Cicero softened the skill factor a little bit by talking about evidence.
The romance got another idea: You can transfer your own acting to another person and let this person act for you. If asked the person "responds". This is more the command aspect of "responsibility".
So here we got two functions: The one of defend and the one of command (and control).
Later on some smartasses got the idea: "Hey, why not combine both functions! We give some rights to act to someone in our name and in case he does it bad or it goes wrong let's cut off some heads! Which prevents us from being the center of attention!". And everyone was cheering thinking it was a great idea.
Today's function is that you are giving away your rights in order to act in the sense of a counterpart and it's definitions about what is 'good' (principles). Your counterpart gets on top of your given away rights (f.e. to reflect about good and bad) the right to question your actions. Each respond's function is in that case to defend actions which go against those principles (to avert a damage from yourself).
You said that responsibility is " re-placement of blame". This is only so talking about the function that a person is able to anticipate what is expected. But if you think again about it there turns out to be a deeper feeling one wants to replace:
Responsibility results from a feeling of fear of demage to oneself.
And there is a bunch of functions linked to it which are not only and always social. Like the function to take away your freedom of choice. Or the function to take away from you your ability to think about what is good and bad.
So obviously someone is thinking you are too stupid to understand what is "good" and what is "bad" and most people are not smart enough to take care of social structures. Not even in the back of beyond. And talking about Nietzsche obviously someone is thinking it would be a better thing to take away any tools from you that enable you to develope powerfull thoughts. I think it was in "Der Antichrist" when Nietzsche was talking about Buddhism and its favours torwards other religions making this mistake not to anticipate that a regime without any religion can indeed pervert this idea likewise in order to bound people to a sphere of values they do not even want be part of. Tibet is a perfect example here.
Nietzsche is a good start. But he is not sufficient anymore when it comes to insights or ethics. Chronos already ate this son. Beside the fact that even Nietzsche had his flaws and was from time to time misleaded by some personal emotions emoting over something when it would have been better to think twice. Nietzsche will not help anyone to develope own opinions. And that is why we cannot take Nietzsche talking about real functions of "resposibility".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZk5Uz96hwg&feature=youtu.be&t=2m2s
"In good times you have the freedom of choice doing the good thing or the bad thing."
We have been talking here a few times about will. And I think it would be a good thing to discuss Hobbes now. Taking a look at Hobbes he would say that a "good time" would be when a human being feels no lack and for that no need or at least feels hope to fullfill intentions. And so man has no need for a will to fight. From that point of view 'good' behaviour would be to stay friendly and 'bad' behaviour when you are still even without any lack or a chance to fullfill intentions feeling a need for a will to fight. So in a nurturing society most people should be satisfied and do not have to make a choice. They are simply good. This choice only arises when you have kind of a problem to regulate your needs and/or a problem with making proper plans to fullfill your needs in a friendly way.
"When times become hard, critical for your own basic existence, your basic instinct will make sure you are not opting within the freedom frame. Rather, you do the survival move."
Let's build a hypothesis here: The more the nurturing factor of a state shrinks the more people will feel a will to fight. The nurtiring factors are that you are able to regulate your needs and you have a fair chance to fullfill those needs without fighting.
"In this respect you are probably excused when you chose for your own life, rather than for the life of your opponent of enemy."
Well... no. Hobbes is talking about an equality that even the weakest is able to kill the strongest using guile or banding together with other weak men. In this respect you are not excused as long as you got skills to avoid such situations using for example your creativity to invent new methods to fullfill at least your basic needs without the nurturing function of the state before you go against others.
Think about what was said about the basic functions of responsibility: Defend and command. You just fight when you get attacked. And you use your skills to command. You only command those who follow. It is their choice to follow or not. And even if you are running out of ressources it would be better to search for allies first who want to share before running right into a battle.
"that the strong man takes what he wants"
Who survives? The strongest? Or the fittest?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEVwun0ikRo
I wish to add the following considerations.
Absolutism is that perspective for which all the statements in that domain are either absolutely true or absolutely false: nothing is true only for some cultures or false for others. The binding with the concept of truth is very tight. The term truth indicates the sense of agreement or consistency with a given or objective reality, or property that exists in an absolute sense and can not be false.
The main topics of discussion concern both the definition and identification of truth, that is, according to an ontological perspective, as the criteria to achieve that truth, rather related to epistemological standpoint. This can also involve the ethical aspect, being connected with the need for intellectual honesty, good faith and sincerity.
Matteo Perlini, an informatic enthusiast of philosophy, writes: "There is a way, perhaps, to make sensible the position of moral absolutism. Many religious views, in fact, seem to treat the moral values just as discussed above: the moral values really exist, are out there, in fact, God created the universe and its physical laws, but not only, He also created moral laws, requirements to which every individual is subject everywhere and in each time.
According to a position laws are concrete and are part of creation along with the other usual items. However, although this scenario seems at first glance making sense, it holds out the side to a deep and difficult problem: the Euthyphro dilemma. Socrates asked Euthyphro if it is loved by the one who is holy, or holy is the one who is loved by the gods. In other words: it is morality that determines the divine commandments, or is God's will to determine the moral?
It seems, from the analysis, that moral absolutism is not a sustainable position. Precisely for this reason, many hold the forms of moral relativism.
Relativism and moral absolutism, however, are not the only possible options . What I would propose is a position that maintains a certain objectivism in moral evaluations - in the sense that there are ethical standards that allow us to understand what is best. I would argue, therefore, that it is not true that everything is arbitrary, without falling into the error of the state Platonic existence of moral values
Anna Bosetti describes moral absolutism by arguing that it is not free from distortion of moral ethnocentrism, which contains within it the seeds of 'imperialismo morale'. It assumes, in fact, the absolutizing of a certain point of view, albeit the dominant one in a certain historical period in a given culture. Then flows into the ethnocentric definition of a supposed natural law which, as such and as a manifestation of a "natural revelation", is compulsory for all human beings, regardless of their cultural system of beliefs, values and practices. Comes in an attitude of universal presumption that can lead to forms of fanaticism and dogmatism of ethics, as well as the forced conversion of people from other cultures to their moral beliefs
Neither philosophy nor religion nor science are able to define a moral system immutable and valid for all mankind. Above all religions with a strong dogmatics they contain the foundations of moral fundamentalism, as they are prone to proclaim their superiority and uniqueness and are active in the action of proselytism and conversion of others.
It is likely that moral absolutism leads to forms of intolerance, fueled by an attitude of superiority to the adoption of moral principles held so presumptuous most noble and righteous. As a result, moral absolutism often favors the production of negative ethnic stereotypes and prejudices against cultures that do not share the same moral code.
.
Two days ago after I finished my posting here I went to another board and had the opportunity to see there a piece of arising "superiority". A young man from russia (let's call him Leeroy) calling himself a philosopher and his philosophy "Nietzschean" claimed that he has already rotten 400 men around himself in St. Petersburg who are "ready to fight". Now Leeroy was asking for german suppirt. Leeroy was also claiming that "attack" and "take" (you maybe remember that I was talking about defense and share) would be a great idea. So here we have obviously a exquisit group of 400 men ready to attack and take from the weak who they believe to be below them (and hostile) which are (guess what!) of course mainly those who are not part of the "european race".
Meanwhile in russia tons of 'illegal' food was thrown away. An order based on laws.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLyOj_QD4a4
And the moral of this story: Tanks are really in all possible worlds idiots.
Two days ago after I finished my posting here I went to another board and had the opportunity to see there a piece of arising "superiority". A young man from russia (let's call him Leeroy) calling himself a philosopher and his philosophy "Nietzschean" claimed that he has already rotten 400 men around himself in St. Petersburg who are "ready to fight". Now Leeroy was asking for german suppirt. Leeroy was also claiming that "attack" and "take" (you maybe remember that I was talking about defense and share) would be a great idea. So here we have obviously a exquisit group of 400 men ready to attack and take from the weak who they believe to be below them (and hostile) which are (guess what!) of course mainly those who are not part of the "european race".
Meanwhile in russia tons of 'illegal' food was thrown away. An order based on laws.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLyOj_QD4a4
And the moral of this story: Tanks are really in all possible worlds idiots.
Two days ago after I finished my posting here I went to another board and had the opportunity to see there a piece of arising "superiority". A young man from russia (let's call him Leeroy) calling himself a philosopher and his philosophy "Nietzschean" claimed that he has already rotten 400 men around himself in St. Petersburg who are "ready to fight". Now Leeroy was asking for german support. Leeroy was also claiming that "attack" and "take" (you maybe remember that I was talking about defense and share) would be a great idea. So here we have obviously an exquisit group of 400 men ready to attack and take from the weak who they believe to be below them (and hostile) which are (guess what!) of course mainly those who are not part of the "european race" (maybe NPCs, or what?).
Meanwhile in russia tons of 'illegal' food was thrown away. An order based on laws.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLyOj_QD4a4
And the moral of this story: Tanks are really in all possible worlds idiots.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=baMM19MhgqE
Dear Carmen,
you must be really upset, probably furious as I am.
Once, an Italian professor wrote the “Five laws of Human Stupidity. You may know them, but someone else may profit. The laws are the following:
1. Always and inevitably everyone underestimates the number of stupid individuals in circulation.
2. The probability that a certain person be stupid is independent of any other characteristic of that person.
3. A stupid person is a person who causes losses to another person or to a group of persons while himself deriving no gain and even possibly incurring losses.
4. Non-stupid people always underestimate the damaging power of stupid individuals. In particular non-stupid people constantly forget that at all times and places and under any circumstances to deal and/or associate with stupid people infallibly turns out to be a costly mistake.
5. A stupid person is the most dangerous type of person.
The first basic law prevents me from attributing a specific numerical value to the fraction of stupid people within the total population: any numerical estimate would turn out to be an underestimate.
Cheer up, Gianrocco
I am not upset. I am concentrated. From time to time I get frustrated. Especially whenever I feel disillusioned.
"The first basic law prevents me from attributing a specific numerical value to the fraction of stupid people within the total population"
Did you watch the 'Leeroy Jenkins'-video? That is how it really works. I had an intention when I linked it here. You need to watch it carefully to see what is happening there. Because that is how people are: They group up and they follow. No matter how stupid it gets... So what we think of when thinking about leadership is that we assume people are always following a leader. But there is another aspect why people follow: In order to help and (like incidentally) reach a certain interest. If those guys in that video did not share the same interest: Why should they help their Leeroy?
This is called 'smart-pull'. A leader would push his people. But if you want to make it the smart way you are creating a need and you 'pull' people to search for information how to overcome this need. And that makes them 'intelligent' (or whatever they think is intelligent; at least they are 'informed'). Now this person has some knowledge he wants to share and implement. And there is all in all nothing bad about that IF the information he found was not directed only to lead him to a certain view that leads on to a certain behavior.
So obviously our Leeroy found some information that fits his need. And there are other people with the same need in the same group like our Leeroy sharing knowledge. And that is what this group consists of: Of people who got the same information and the same need.
Now let's assume there is our group of Leeroys and other people with the same need but different or no information and a third group. Let's call them 'the outlanders'. They do have needs too. But their needs are not seen and of no interest. Indeed they are comparable with NPC-Players. Not humans. More annoying insects.
Let's furthermore assume the Leeroys are attacking the outlanders. And now ask yourself how many of those who share the same need and but not the same information will follow.
This could easily lead to a civil war with genozide. And this time it won't be like in WW II were it was somehow clear who were the bad guys. No. This time noone will be responsible. It will look like some stupid people fought for ressources.
"Command in the Information Age is ultimately not the sole responsibility of any single individual. It is a shared and distributed responsibility. Does this mean that no one is in charge? This question is at the heart of the matter. The simple
truth is that there are in fact many instances where no one is in charge of an enterprise or endeavor today. Who, for example, is in charge of the U.N. Security Council? Who is in charge of a coalition of the willing? Is the leader of the government of a nation in charge of that nation? What, in fact, does in charge
mean?... Some would say that being in charge pertains to the degree of
influence that one has. That is, if you are in control, then you are in charge... In a coalition environment, the maintenance ofthe coalition (shared intent)
is a very important element of command." (Alberts & Hayes, Power to the Edge)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/herder/
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Johann Gottfried von Herder
''Herder's second sharp turn concerns ethics. Here he is again indebted to the precritical Kant, but he also goes somewhat further beyond him. Herder's basic claims are these: (1) Morality is fundamentally more a matter of sentiments than of cognitions. (Herder's sentimentalism is not crude, however; in subsequent works such as the Critical Forests he emphasizes that cognition plays an important role in morality as well.) (2) Cognitivist theories of morality — of the sort espoused in this period by Rationalists such as Wolff, but also by many other philosophers before and since (e.g. Plato and the critical Kant) — are therefore based on a mistake, and so useless as means of moral enlightenment or improvement. (3) But (and here Herder's theory moves beyond Kant's), worse than that, they are actually harmful to morality, because they weaken the moral sentiments on which morality really rests. In This Too and On the Cognition Herder suggests several reasons why: (a) Abstract theorizing weakens sentiments generally, and hence moral sentiments in particular (this is perhaps Herder's least interesting reason). (b) The cognitivists' theories turn out to be so strikingly implausible that they bring morality itself into disrepute, people reacting to them roughly along the lines: If this is the best that even the experts can say in explanation and justification of morality, then morality must certainly be a sham, and I may as well ignore it and do as I please. (c) Such theories distract people from recognizing, and working to reinforce, the real foundations of morality: not an imaginary theoretical insight of some sort, but a set of causal mechanisms for inculcating and sustaining the moral sentiments. (4) More positively, Herder accordingly turns instead to discovering theoretically and promoting in practice just such a set of causal mechanisms. In How Philosophy he mainly emphasizes forms of education and an emotive type of preaching in this connection. But elsewhere he identifies and promotes a much broader set of mechanisms as well, including: the influence of morally exemplary individuals; morally relevant laws; and literature (along with other art forms). Literature is a special focus of Herder's theory and practice here. He sees literature as exerting a moral influence in several ways — e.g. not only through fairly direct moral instruction, but also through the literary perpetuation (or creation) of morally exemplary individuals (e.g. Jesus in the New Testament), and the exposure of readers to other people's inner lives and a consequent enhancement of their sympathies for them (a motive which lies behind Herder's epoch-making publication of the Volkslieder (1774), a collection of translations of popular songs from peoples around the world). Herder's development of this theory and practice of moral pedagogy was lifelong and tireless. ''
Well... the thing is this:
Moral sentimentalism is dealing more with questions about aims. And this topic seems to be pretty related to interdependence. When we take this glas and we take a look through it on morality... what and how do we see morality? Of course through this glas morality turns out to be some kind of interest, fluctuating, pretty unstable, situational. How come? Good question... Because morality really deserves a better definition than this in order to be able to touch duty. And let me tell you this: Taking a look at unstable interests you will never be able to even grab it.
Let's say we got two fractions: Those who are moral and those who are not. We devide them into two classes. Now we give power to those who we assume to act morally. They are now able to exercise power over those who are not moral and those who are moral but without power. Moreover we give them a monopoly on legitimate use of force which only allows the morally to apply pressure in order to force others to reach defined aims. It is a prerogative of the morally to decide in regard to situations how and by what means those aims are effectuated. The decission to act morally can be cancelled.
What is morality then? A sentiment? Sentiments might be the offspring of the idea of morality. But they are not morality themself. Morality itself is more an agreement to keep certain traits stable no matter how you feel about a situation. It reflects the knowledge that situations come and go and emotions do not last forever. Only by morality one overcomes the state of being trapped in fluctuating situations. By saying which feelings and thoughts and actions are moral and for that 'good' for society. So what is the duty then? Simply to keep certain aspects stable. It would be a pretty sad thing if we assume that only a person who really feels certain feelings can be a moral and for that 'good' person. In that sense any ideas about regulation and shifting personalities would not make much sense. Because here a good person is good and a bad person is bad. And there is no real choice because one is really trapped in dependence and those who are moral are like addicts who simply prefer certain feelings. No way to change or even regulate it.
And that is the trouble with moral sentimentalism and theories based on rather fluctuating traits. Here of course it looks like an illusion and "sham", because it comes up with the idea morality is made to replace sentiments and one does not need to feel anything anymore. Danger is indeed at hand were one simply follows those who are assumed to be more moral and when one does not expect that morality was cancelled. Danger is at hand too when we do not understand that nothing should be set in tablets of stone but we always got the choice to modify and rethink agreements with regard to knowledge we gain. Because knowledge and information has the power to have an effect on our sentiments. And by doing so it is highly justified to assume that there is something like a true morality that has nothing to do with sentimentalism.
Dear Carmen,
as usual, your interventions are intellectually ‘intense’ and as it is my habit I try to answer, maybe indirectly.
I consider reason and feeling, intellect and moral sense not antithetical and incompatible, but located along a line of continuity that sees reason active in the preparatory phase and the sentiment common to all men, working in the final stage of the selection and determination of the content of morality.
As known, Kant assumes feelings to be a fact mainly pathological, except in the case of moral sentiment, and then of the aesthetic feeling which is, in its highest expression: transcendence, liberation, moral catharsis. Then, he holds that sentiment is in the intermediate position between the theoretical and the practical activities. The first aim is knowledge; the second moral action. Sentiment should join both activities.
Moreover, Hume says that we must attribute the sentiment of approval for all the virtues useful to society or to the person who owns them. This fact constitutes the most significant part of morality. (Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part III, Sec. I-III)
Morality pervades today more than in the past every aspect of life, and perhaps it will do it even more in a visible manner as humanity will face - in everyday life - themes immense such as cloning, genetically modified organisms, hunger, save the planet, the differences between rich and poor in the world, intelligent machines.
We do not know how to explain, in terms of neuroscience, why we have a moral instinct, but every gesture, every decision, every behavior is dictated by a choice between right and wrong, appropriate or inconvenient and so on. This is because man is not perfectly rational but also the result of emotions, culture, experience, and has a limited capacity to make practical choices. The proof? There is no way to teach a human being not to make moral choices.
Alas, we have contracted a serious illness, amorality, the total indifference to everything and everyone, topped by massive doses of superficiality and banality that tinges everything gray, enveloping us in a thick fog and blurring the ability to distinguish between white and black, good and evil, right and wrong, true and false. All without any sense of guilt or shame.
As you see, I’m going my way following the inspiration of the moment. Someone says that sentiment, being something impulsive, weak, inconsistent, can not be the basis of morality. I am not of the same opinion.
My best regards, Gianrocco
We have a moral instinct because we are the most social of all animals. We are the most social because we become human through social inculturation and caring. Caring for each other is what makes us human and it starts with the mother baby relationship. We cannot be conscious of the billion of things we know and have learned but our feeling guide us. Like animals are guided by their feelings, we are guided by ours. Even in our most intelectual and abstract work, feelings are our guides. Only when the problems are very easy like additions that we do not need feelings. Sometime It may take decade before the reason find out why the feelings indicated is true. If the feeling persist, in general, the reason will be found. Most of my ideas where first revealed by a feeling or an sudden image but then a lot of work is then required to discover a rational path and from there begin the communication with other.
Dear Louis,
your ‘dense’ intervention made me have instinctive reactions which I hope to share with you and our fellow researchers.
The link with other people becomes an existential and ontological fact, fully independent of the relationship experienced with another ‘being’: others become part of human existence that is present even when it does not translate into actual experience of a relationship.
Inter-subjectivity is there with us, develops and produces some of the most important values of a civilization, in the reciprocal relations experienced among persons inhabiting the world.
We must not pretend to understand it only through intelligence. We happen to know it, to the same extent, through sentiment. So the judgment of intelligence is, at best, only half the truth. This is a passage from the essay ‘Psychological Types’ by Carl G. Jung. His reflection deserves attention because we are often tempted to consider as true only what follows the canons of rational demonstrations. Of course, intelligence is a great knowing tool that one should never give up. But man has other channels of knowledge and one of them is feeling, in the highest sense of the word: just think of love that makes us discover unknown horizons to reason. Even beauty is not fully comprehended unless through an intuition which includes reason, passion, contemplation.
I have noticed that you have preferred to use - instead of the concept of ‘acculturation’ - the term ‘inculturation’ because I believe it defends better comparison and differences, avoiding the risk of syncretism, the extinction of cultural differences and of fundamentalism, that is the denial of comparison.
All the best, Gianrocco
Dear professor Gianrocco Tucci,
This capacity to feel our way into things, artwork, natural process, other peoples , the past is what the german romantic called Einfühlung is very real although we do not yet have much Einfühlung in Einfühlung.
My mastery of the English language is limited. I should have used ''enculturation'' , a process of being grown into a cultural matrix. We live into an age of a vast cultural extinction but I think that we will soon learn to live together without extinguishing each other.
Regards,
Louis
Dear Louis, I found both terms looking up in a dictionary. However, what is really important to me is that we share the same thoughts.
Best wishes,
Gianrocco
That's so heart warming when two people are using emotions in order to group up. The concept of common intention...
"I have feelings."
"I have feelings too!"
"I love what I do and I truely feel motivated"
"Me too!"
We all feel pretty motivated from time to time. And we all love what we do. It's really easy for all of us to feel motivated when everything is easy and feels quite good. Like right now... Maybe you are still feeling good right now. Think of a happy place where everything is peaceful and moral. A place where we care for each other guided by the very best intentions for each other. And reason is a tame unicorn you can ride.
But nothing lasts forever and this is going to come to an end soon. Let's count backwards now...
...three ... two ... one *snipping*
Now what about duty and times when you cannot connect through feelings? And whenever common intent is missing? It's pretty easy to be highly moral if you do not have to come clean. Studies suggest that humans are in the end not that moral as we might expect. Even Hume realized that rationality can be used to rationalize anti-social behavior and be a "slave" to affects (with the poor restricted tools he had). And your unicorn could easily turn out to be an apocalyptic horse. And guess what: You are an apocalyptic rider.
So you are using feelings for your work. Feelings cannot be right nor wrong. It normally doesn't hurt anyone if a scientific hypothesis turns out to be wrong. Maybe it's a pain because one wasted time. But when it comes to morality and moral decissions you make that can destroy life... I would like to see how you are still flowing that careless in lala-land telling everyone you are inspired by your emotions.
Even Leeroy was inspired by emotions. I bet he was...
Dear Carmen,
I apologize for my form of intervention at a point where both of us are dealing with emotions and feelings. I am going to explain. From a book (I wrote in Italian) by the title (rather surprising): The reduction of envy in Economics – equity, cultural evolution and group selection” following Boyd, Richerson, Sober, Wilson and ….. I have chosen a passage which might have a relation to the core of your contribution:
“……Some recent readings from their works concerned the phase of the final choices or definite decision when it would be advisable to have the mind clear, without the burden of emotions. However, I understand that it is hard to reach such an ideal mental condition as it is in the nature of human beings to resort to the sphere of feelings, emotions, one of the components of their personality which cannot be ignored .
In particular, I want to focus and analyze that particular emotion that derives from an interpersonal comparison: malicious envy. As a first observation, it is worth noting that it does not occur under all conditions of inequality, such as - for example - income inequalities within the member of a group of a society. Envy is revealed only when the questions at hand induce people of the same class to compare themselves. And we realize that we are in the presence of envious people only when they turn their feelings into action. I have already had occasion to discuss the consequences of negative feelings on the development of various communities, especially of the most deleterious, anti-social feeling: malevolent envy……”
It is a research program where I, together with four researchers, intend to pursue the road of second-order cybernetics not as a kind of intellectual fashion, but because we believe that Gregory Bateson was wright when he said: “I think that cybernetics is the biggest bite out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years” (Gregory Bateson. “From Versailles to Cybernetics”, 1966. In Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. University of Chicago Press, 1972.
I apologize for having talked of myself. The reason was that I felt consonance with your thoughts.
All the best. Gianrocco.
Hello and sorry,
I was knocked out for a while due to a cold.
I agree that one can be 'inspired' by envy too. But think about Milgram and his experiments. Those people were not inspired by any ideas (at least not in a way that it lead to action) and I guess there was nothing you could call envy. They were mostly 'motivated' by obedience. And I guess obedience is something we might find more often in society than inspiration or envy. I understand that both topics - inspiration and envy - are important topics and documented in many studies. But that is what one can see as it scratches the surface.
I guess obedience is really a rare topic. And it could be an important one. Because it points torwards what we cannot see, what can be hidden and what does not happen but still is inherent. And it seems to be more than anything else linked with duty.
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