Following on from my question about differentiating intrinsic from Shannon information, I’d like to ask how this distinction affects theoretical models of intentionality and the emergence of semantic meaning in biological and cognitive systems.
In classical models, Shannon information quantifies uncertainty reduction but says nothing about meaning, function, or internal reference. By contrast, intrinsic information such as those discussed in frameworks like Dynamic Organicity Theory (Poznanski) or ODTBT, are defined by functional interactions, self-referential redundancy structures, and the restructuring of phase space across nested temporal scales.
In these models:
My question to the community: How have models of semantic grounding, intentionality, or consciousness formally integrated this notion of intrinsic (as opposed to extrinsic or Shannon) information?
Are there empirical paradigms or computational approaches that:
Any insights from information theory, theoretical biology, neuroscience, or semiotics are much appreciated.