Presentism, contextualism, and positivism

Initial note In the first place - I always do - I have to declare that what follows is derived from ideas of its own; In other words, this is not an academic or scholarly work. My writing arises from the lack of subjection to general norms of many aspects of abstract thinking.

Before entering into a comparative or relational topic, I think it is best to have well defined concepts that are going to be treated. For this you can consult various sources (dictionaries, encyclopedias, and it both on paper and on the Internet).

1. First of all, are these three concepts that can really be related, are they essentially separate concepts or are they interrelated?

2. We could say that presentism affirms that only the present exists. Thinking only with our means (without going before external references) can we say that the past and the future do not exist? The past, regardless of objective manifestations (eg works of art in stone, monuments ...) exists in our conscience, whatever that may be. The future really is only a possibility. It is a hypothesis, in each second the future begins, but in case it starts we do not know how long it will last.

Positivism starts from the basis that only the verifiable is worthy of being appreciated. It seems that the abstract deductions in regard to knowledge are over. But how to know what is good, and even more, to what extent is a person "good"? Without a doubt, it will be said, the concrete references are missing. We move within the approach at this point.

We should consider the positivism of Comte, of the nineteenth century, and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.

Contextualism is a subject that I would say rather psychological, field of which I barely know anything. Maybe you have to consult Steven Hayes here. And consider contextualism in the language the meaning, the verification ... (vide: The Oxford Companion to Phlisophy)

3. A relationship between the three concepts stated is that all are part of the philosophical-psychological field, and that they intend to access some type of certainty or optimal behavior. It could be said that according to positivism only those affirmations demonstrated should be considered. But, and the possible future? And intuition? And the proportions that can be true but of which its certainty or falsehood can not be affirmed? If we refer here to Gödel, in terms of time, perhaps we should think about Einstein and the field of Physics.

And every human being is limited to the end by his intelligence, his capacity for knowledge and his intuition. That is, subjectively speaking, the world of each one, which must be considered together with objective truth.

thanks so much Miquel, you've given me much to ponder! I think I follow what appears to be your hesitation to accept my initial premise that these three epistemological concepts can or should be framed as reasonable subjects of a single inquiry (to put them in some relationship with each other). Am I reading you correctly? The only basis for my doing so is that the critic to which I seek to offer a rejoinder to his dismissive criticism of a sociological work that posits a hegemonic culture that functions to socialize all inhabitants of that cultural space in such a way that they unavoidably internalize core elements of the hegemonic culture in a way that we are often quite ignorant of. We do not realize the extent to which culture, transmitted historically via selective renderings of our past in educational settings, through families, - the usual agents of socialization. Such a project draws on a wide range of theoretical work, but heavily relies of critical discourse analysis.

The critic, uncharitable to say the least, argues (in at least four separate reviews) that the failure to adopt Popper's hypothetico-deductive method, and specifically quantitative methods, renders sociologist's work no better than Freud's methodology for arriving at his Oedipal theory -- which was his his interpretation of the dreams of but one subject - himself! As I say, uncharitable to say the least.

So in my effort to better understand the critic's epistemological standpoint, I've read several or his works. And though most do adhere to Popper's model, the most revealing work, to me, is his argument that removing a statue of Gen. Robert E Lee is misguided because he was a good and honorable man. That we don't appreciate this fact, and thus the error of our ways in removing said statue, is the result of the presentism employed by those who approve of its removal, on the grounds that Lee, as the man who led the armed forces fighting to preserve the institution of slavery, is not a proper object of public celebration. He states that being guilty of presentism (judging historical figures based on contemporary moral standards), we have therefore failed to adequately contextualize Lee in his temporal and cultural setting. Were we to do so, he argues, we would arrive at the conclusion that he was indeed a good and honorable man worthy of our celebration. Only through an epistemic contextualism can we reveal the true meaning and measure of the man.

So I put these concepts together because the critic has done so himself. And my query begins with him having done so. A sociologist's work that employs a contextual epistemology is dismissed for failing to adhere to Popper's methodological monist demand for the hypothetico-deductive method and additionally, for not using statistical methods, while his criticism of the removal of Lee's statue seems to me a stark departure from the positivism he invokes to dismiss sociological work on the cultural/contextual determinants of racism, demanding, as he does, that we reject all elements of presentism and further demands we utilize contextualism to truly grasp the meaning of Lee and his statue.

I really am trying to not repeat the uncharitable approach this critic adopts toward the sociologist's work, but it does seem to me that the critic reveals a curious epistemological flexibility that just happens to sustain, on the one hand, a dismissive reading of work critical of contemporary racism, while defending, on the other, the man who led the cause of defending slavery.

Angelo, Thanks to you as well for showing an interest in my question. But I'm afraid you're right that you were just beginning to offer your assessment when your phone posted. Can I trouble you to repost or edit your answer so that I might get a sense of what you were about to say? Thanks again for taking an interest!

b