Has there ever been any response to Husserl's rather articulate and profound declaration of a crisis within the western academy? There seem to be plenty of critiques of his earlier much larger body of work, but none of his dying words which are so provocative.
I Think that there is a criric of Husserl you are asking for in Jacob Klein's book "Greek mathematical thought and the Origin of Algebra".
I am actually working on articulating such a critique, though it doesn't focus on Husserl's declarations regarding the Western academy. Rather, my critique (which is sympathetic to Husserl's general point) focuses on his account of the 'Galilean' mathematization of nature and provides an alternate account to Husserl's, by approaching the birth of modern science from a Vichean (as in Giambattista Vico) mythopoetic perspective. Of course, on the basis of this alternate conception of modern science, I will also articulate an alternative solution to the crisis of modernity. I've presented the draft of these ideas at a conference and this is posted on my Researchgate page. The details of my argument are still being worked out in the form of a (very large) book manuscript. I'm not sure if this is what you are thinking about in terms of critique of Husserl's late work. But, in case you have an interest, I attach the file of my conference presentation to this response.
Conference Paper The Birth of Science Out of the Spirit of Myth: Husserl vs. ...
Mr. Stenlund, thank you very much for the suggestion! I have not yet read this work of klein's, and while it does seem rather interesting, I notice that it was originally published in the mid 30's before the publication of " The Crisis" or the "Vienna Lectures" on which the former's thesis is thought to have been based on. While it is certainly possible that Klein's K of Husserl is direct and poignant, I am skeptical if it clashes with the specific points made in the later works which were universally deemed radical in comparison to the earlier much larger body. I suppose I shall have to look for myself. Thanks again!
Cheers,
Ryan
Marina, as amazing and unlikely as this seems, i think we may be both engaging with the same obscure and profoundly important book in what appears to be very similar manners. My thesis is that Husserl's radical shift in " The Crisis" is due to a reorientation of his theory around esoteric concepts of history and subjectivity derived from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The Esoteric/Hermetic tradition and mytho-poetic thought are inextricable concepts... I will carefully read your work with great interest. My own paper is almost ready for submission and will be shared here relatively shortly as well. Thank you so much for taking the time to respond!
Cheers,
Ryan
Klein's critique of Husserl is elaborated in B.C. Hopkin's Book "The Origin of the Logic Symbolic Mathematics, Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein"
The place of Edmund Husserl's Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana Band VI, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1954). [The Crisis of the European Sciences and the Transzendental Phänomenology] within his intellectual development.
[See Strauss, D.F.M. 2009. Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines, pages 625-631.]
Husserl was born on April 8, in the same year when Darwin's “The origin of Species” appeared (1859) – Prossnitz, Moravia. He died on April 27, 1938 (Freiburg). He studied astronomy, mathematics and physics at Leipzig and Berlin. In 1887, he started his academic career as “private lecturer” in Halle. He was a professor in Göttingen from 1901 to 1916, and he taught in Freiburg (Breisgau) from 1916 to 1928.
The connection between phenomenology and intuitionism – one of the trends in modern mathematics – is obvious from the fact that Husserl received his first philosophical impulses from Leopold Kronecker (1823-1891), who is known as one of the leading figures in the intuitionistic mathematics of the late nineteenth century. As one of the leading mathematicians of his time, Kronecker particularly reacted against the idea of infinity as a completed totality, because he was influenced by C.F. Gauss (1777-1855), the ‘prince’ of mathematics. The latter wrote to Schumacher in 1831, that he “protests against the use of an infinite magnitude as something completed, which is never permissible in mathematics.” Early intuitionism understood infinity in the literal sense of succession without end (endlessness). On the basis of this assumption, Kronecker believed that it is possible to reduce mathematics to finite natural numbers.
The early development of Husserl
The central significance of these problems becomes understandable if we keep in mind that Husserl commenced his academic studies in 1876, and that he studied mathematics in Berlin between 1878 and 1881, with Karl Weierstrass (1815-1897), amongst others. The latter, however, alongside his younger contemporaries, Richard Dedekind (1831-1916) and Georg Cantor (1845-1918), provided a new foundation for mathematics, in which ample use is made of the idea of completed infinitude (we proposed to distinguish between the sucessive infinite and the at once infinite – traditionally known as the actual infinite, as opposed to the potential infinite – see page above). It is therefore clear that Husserl's initial philosophical interests challenged him with the problematic relation between the successive infinite and the at once infinite.
Husserl continued his initial mathematical studies in Berlin, and he finished his dissertation on the theme: Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung in 1883. During the same year, he worked as assistant for Weierstrass until the latter took ill, upon which Husserl moved to Vienna (1884-1886), where he studied philosophy mainly with Brentano (1838-1917).
With a view to his “Habilitationschrift” he moved to Halle in 1886, where Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) was located. Here he also met Georg Cantor, and they became very good friends. Cantor, who was working out his transfinite arithmetic on the basis of his ‘Mengenlehre’ (set theory) at this stage, whole-heartedly advocated the employment of the actual infinite (at once infinite) in mathematics. It is remarkable that Cantor's strong opponent was no one less than Kronecker. Cantor himself worked within the platonistic tradition of scholasticism and his Platonism exerted a significant influence on Husserl's thought.
Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic
In 1887, Husserl completed his habilitation with a psychological analysis of the concept of number. In 1891, he followed this with his first large work: Philosophie der Arithmetik (published in the Husserliana as Volume XII, 1970).
During this period, Husserl particularly struggled with the problem of the infinite. On the one hand, he related the infinite to the psychical (‘psychological’) nature of a collective synthesis in a psychologistic sense (Husserl, 1970: 64 ff.), which coheres with the principle of succession (Husserl, 1970:220). On the other hand, he focused on the question regarding the existence of the actual infinite in view of the finitude of human nature (Husserl, 1970:191). At this stage of his development – and in line with Kronecker – he envisaged the ideal of developing a finite arithmetic, and even contemplated a second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetik.
In the Foreword to this volume, L. Eley concludes from the fact that this second volume never appeared in print, that the ideal of a finite arithmetic failed. From the unpublished manuscripts of this second volume, it is clear that Husserl did not succeed in providing a foundation for arithmetic without the assumption of the actual infinite.
The effect of this failure was that, during the nineties, Husserl developed a closer affinity for Platonism in its linkage to the acceptance of the actual infinite. According to this Platonism, the entities and relations with which the mathematician operates exist in a Platonic realm of ideal forms.
Platonism in Husserl's thought
The influence of this mathematical Platonism clearly manifests itself in Husserl's next large (two-volume) work: Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchingen – LU ) (1900-1901; Husserliana, Volume XVIII, 1975). In this work, he accepts a world-in-itself, with “ideal objects,” independent of human consciousness. Whereas he often uses the word ‘Idea’ in LU, he later prefers the terms Form (Eidos) and Essence (Wesen). In LU, the universally valid essences are independent of the flowing psychical acts that acquire a direct grip on them through an inner evidence (LU, I:190). For Husserl, evidence here constitutes the experience of truth (LU, I:230). Truth in itself is the correlate of being in itself (LU, I:229).
The effect of Platonism in his LU causes an ambiguous methodology: on the one hand, a phenomenological descriptive analysis of essences, and on the other a natural scientific explanation. At this stage of his development, Husserl still views material things as independent from the human consciousness. Only interpreted objects have a mode of being dependent upon the intentional consciousness. In general, one can therefore say that the all-pervasive presupposition of LU lies in the acceptance of a world-in-itself, with “ideal objects” that are independent from human consciousness. In his authoritative work on the development of Husserl, we find that De Boer characterizes this position as realistic (De Boer, 1966:315). Picker relates this directly to Husserl's mathematical studies (Picker, 1961:289).
The genesis of Husserl's transcendental idealism
With the exception of his Five Lectures on Phenomenology, Husserl did not publish anything for the next decade. For the first time, he now engaged himself in a penetrating study of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The outcome of the crisis through which Husserl struggled during this period appeared in his first article in the newly established philosophical journal, Logos (1910), under the title: Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (Philosophy as an exact Science). Although Husserl did not support the classical modern ideal of a mathesis universalis (i.e. a mathematical science ideal), he did remark later (at his 70th birthday celebration) that he wanted to do for philosophy what Weierstrass achieved for mathematics.
He now realized that, although he succeeded in conquering logical psychologism, he failed to liberate himself from epistemological psychologism. As an alternative, he presented his so-called transcendental idealism.
The intuitionistic core of Husserl's transcendental idealism
In his 1913 work – Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie – the intuition of essences is also designated as eidetic reduction. In the natural attitude, material things are simply at hand (Husserl, 1913-I:62-63). The basic thesis of this attitude is: “I and my Umwelt” (“Ich und meine Umwelt”). This attitude views reality as absolutely at hand – with consciousness as a layer of reality itself. In order to alter this attitude, Husserl introduces the philosophical (transcendental, phenomenological) reduction (epochè: epoch;) in addition to his eidetic reduction (Husserl, 1954:153).
Without losing or changing anything, our natural conviction is bracketed (suspended) through the transcendental reduction – which is a matter of “complete freedom” (Husserl, 1913-I:65). The philosophical epochè is also constituted by the maxim that we withhold ourselves from all judgments regarding the contents of all given philosophies (Husserl, 1913-I:40-41).
Through this transcendental reduction, I no longer accept the world as presented by the natural attitude and the positive sciences, namely as a universal existential basis for knowledge and as a world existing prior to all knowledge of it: “In the change of the epochè nothing is lost” (Husserl, 1954:179). What this in fact means is that the transcendental reduction does not eliminate the existing world, but simply sets aside a specific natural interpretation of it.
In opposition to LU – which still accepts the world in a platonistic sense as presupposition – the transcendental reduction reveals that consciousness itself is the sole true ground of the world: the reality of the entire world exists only as the correlate of the intentional consciousness. In other words, matter does not serve as the foundation for consciousness, because the reverse is the case: “Reality, both the reality of things taken separately and the reality of the universe essentially lack independence. It is not something absolute which in a secondary sense is connected to something else, for in an absolute sense it is precisely nothing, it does not have an absolute essence. It displays the nature of something that in principle merely (emphasis from Husserl!) exists intentionally, merely conscious, that is to say, it can only be represented and realized in possible appearances” (Husserl, 1913-I:118).
In all this, Husserl closely approximates the transcendental constituting motive of Kant, holding that understanding prescribes its laws (a priori) to nature (Kant, 1783:§36). Kant elevated human understanding to become the formal (a priori) law-giver of nature (see page above).
Husserl accounts for the transcendental motive as follows: “It is the motive of investigating the final source of all knowledge acquisition, the reflection of the knowing person upon itself and its knowing life … Worked out radically, it is the motive of a philosophy based purely in this source. Therefore it is a universal philosophy with an ultimate foundation” (Husserl, 1954:10; see Phänomenologische Psychologie, 1962:298, where he characterizes complete phenomenology as “universal philosophy”).
Although the term transcendental highlights an element of similarity with Kant, the difference emerges from their respective views of what idealism means. As a “systematic unveiling of the constituting intentionality,” philosophy as transcendental idealism does not leave open, in the Kantian sense of a limiting concept (Grenzbegriff), a world of “things-in-themselves” (Husserl, 1950:118-119).
The final justification of knowledge reveals that Husserl ultimately takes refuge in an extreme epistemic intuitionism. The guiding norm for phenomenology is: “Accept nothing but that which we can master with insight as it is essentially presented within pure consciousness” (Husserl, 1913-I:142). This norm presupposes the authentic intuitionistic basic principle of Husserl's thought. Indeed, he speaks about the “principle of all principles: that every originally given intuition is a legitimate source of knowledge, that everything which is presented to intuition (so to speak in its lived-through reality) simply ought to be accepted as it is given, but that also merely within the boundaries within which it is given no conceivable theory can cause us to err” (Husserl, 1913-I:52). The transcendental phenomenology of Husserl is therefore explicitly intuitionistic: what is directly given in our intuition is the final source of all knowledge and within those limits, no theory can dethrone it!
Husserl and the mathematical intuitionism of Herman Weyl
In a lecture by Weyl at the University of Lausanne (1954), he explains that his belief in positivism was first shaken when he fell in love with “a young singer whose life was grounded in religion and who belonged to a circle that was led philosophically by a well-known Hegelian.” The effect of this shock continued until he married a pupil of Husserl's: “So it came to be Husserl who led me out of positivism once more to a freer outlook upon the world” (Weyl, 1969:287).
Husserl's shift to transcendental idealism inspired Weyl to deduce the following intuitionistic ground rule: “The immediate ‘seeing’ not just the sensory, experiencing sight but seeing in general, as given in ordinary consciousness of whatever kind, is the ultimate source of justification for all reasonable assertions. What offers itself to us in our intuition, is simply to be accepted in the form in which it gives itself, but only within the limits within which it gives itself” (cf. Weyl, 1969:288 and Husserl, 1950:52).
The basic motive at the root of Husserl's phenomenological intuitionism
Setting aside the natural attitude (Husserl, 1913-I:65) with one stroke (Husserl, 1913-I:67) is a matter of full freedom (“meine volle Freiheit’ – Husserl, 1913-I:67; a matter of our complete freedom – Husserl, 1913-I:65). It is indeed through complete freedom that Husserl ensures the validity of his intuitionistic (transcendental-idealistic) phenomenological science ideal. He does not wish to return to the pre-Kantian rationalistic science ideal. In Krisis, he disqualifies this “rationalistic science ideal” (Husserl, 1954:119).
The crisis that Husserl discerns in respect of Europe and the disciplines is merely rooted in what he calls a misguided rationalism (an “verirrenden Rationalismus”) (Husserl, 1954:337). In opposition to such a misguided rationalism, Husserl posits the unlimited possibilities of the intuitionistic, phenomenological reason. This trust is fundamentally threatened by the increasing influence of naturalism and objectivism, as well as the irrationalism of his own student, Heidegger (Sein und Zeit/Being and Time). Husserl experiences this with a sense of hopelessness – as the crisis of Europe and the academic disciplines. He writes:
In order to comprehend what is wrong in the present crisis the concept Europe once again has to be viewed by means of the historical directedness towards the infinite aims of reason; it must be demonstrated how the European world was borne from reason-ideas, that is, out of the spirit of philosophy. The crisis will then clearly emerge as the apparent failure of rationalism. The basis of this failure of a rational culture, however, … is not inherent to rationalism, since it is only found in its externalization, in its decay into naturalism and objectivism. The crisis of European existence provides only two options: the decline of Europe in the alienation from its own rational existential meaning, the decay into an animosity towards the spiritual and a lapse into barbarism, or the rebirth of European existence through the spirit of philosophy, particularly through a heroism of reason that will consistently triumph over naturalism (Krisis, 1954:347-348).
His deepest trust in the intuitionistically conceived of (transcendental-idealistic, phenomenological) philosophical reason explains why he compares the “total phenomenological attitude” and its accompanying epochè with a religious conversion, because it indeed harbours the largest existential change that confronts humankind as a task (Husserl, 1954:140).
Through complete freedom, the European is called to establish the intuitionistic, phenomenological science ideal as the only road to the rebirth of Europe through the spirit of philosophy. The slogan of his article: Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, continues to overarch his philosophical endeavours.
Yet he was unseccessful in containing the growing crisis he experienced. For that matter, his phenomenology – in the hands of Heidegger, Sartre and Merlau-Ponty – was turned into its opposite: an irrationalistic and existentialistic freedom motive, which derives its motivating power not from an intuitionistic science ideal, but from the ideal of an autonomously free personality. This development ruined his dream of philosophy as an irrefutable, apodictically certain science:
Philosophy as science, as a serious, exact, yes apodictic exact science – der Traum ist ausgeträumt” (Husserl, 1954:508 – “the dream is dreamed”).
Husserl, E. 1891. Philosophie der Arithmetik mit erganzenden Texten 1890-1901. (Expansion of his Habilitationsschrift). Den Haag: Nijhoff (1970).
Husserl, E. 1900-1901. Logische Untersuchungen (2 Vols.), 2nd edition 1913. Husserliana, Vols. 18 & 19. The Hague: Nijhoff (1975-1984).
Husserl, E. 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana, Band III, 1950. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. 1913a. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana, Band IV, l952
Husserl, E. 1935. Die Krisis des europaïschen Menschentums und die Philosophie, contained in: Husserl, 1954. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. 1950. Cartesianische Mediationen und Pariser Vorträge, Edited and introduced by S. Strasser. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
Husserl, E. 1954. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana Band VI, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. 1962. Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana Volume IX. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. 1979. Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910), Husserliana, Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke (Collected Works), Volume XXII, From the Husserl Archives in Leuven, guided by Samuel Ijsseling with the aid of Rudolf Boehm, Editor with text additions, Bernhard Rang, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Strauss, D.F.M. 2009. Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines [PDD]. Grand Rapids: Paideia Press (forthcoming on Kindle)
D.F.M. Strauss 03-03-2015
Strauss ! Excellent work, sir! But alas, the dream is ruined? I wonder, by that do you mean to imply the 'Krisis' was never a legitimate thing, or rather that it has in fact been exacerbated over another century of exasperation?
Cheers,
Ryan
Husserl experienced what he called "einem sich verirrenden Rationalismus" (an "erring raitonalism") as what he wanted to avoid - but the reaction against rationality as such (co-determined by historicism at the time) was indeed for him a real crisis - as expressed in the title of the discussed work. So the Krisis was a genuine Krisis - amply reflected in his mentioned assessment: "Philosophy as science, as a serious, exact, yes apodictic exact science – der Traum ist ausgeträumt” (Husserl, 1954:508 – “the dream is dreamed”).
Dr. Strauss,
Thank you for taking the time to respond so thoughtfully. I am a young passionate scholar of history and philosophy who has found little to no support within my own intellectual and academic community in this endeavor I find so pressing. It is my position that when taken literally and in the context of contemporaneity, Husserl's position in "The Krisis" is grounds for a scientific revolution within the western academy that is long overdue.
I find Husserl's scathing indictment of Positivism to be quite compelling, being coherent from a theoretical standpoint as well as holding ground as historical fact. I also agree with you that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty profoundly failed in recognizing Husserl's phenomenology for what it was intended as. However, I believe his dream lives, regardless of how ruined and lost it may have once been, if for no other reason than it must. If his 'Krisis' was true then, it is certainly true now, the implications of which demand our respect, the entire academy's respect. Like your fellow esteemed countrymen, the late Errol Eustace Harris, I sense a 'foundation of metaphysics in modern science'. Such a foundation has been only more elucidated since the time of Husserl's passing, and it is my suspicion that the basis of phenomenological science Husserl laid out is coherent with the emerging revelations at the cutting edge of positivism in fields like cognitive science and quantum physics. How profound would it be if the cutting edge of positivism could retroactively prove the merit of Husserl's indictment of positivism? Another extremely important development to arrive since Husserl's time is the rebirth of esoteric studies in the western academy with the arrival of Francis Yates onto the scene in the 60's. When we begin to understand Hegel and Fichte among others to be 'Hermetic Thinkers' whose theories are rooted in the esoteric tradition, we find a startling correlation to the declaration of 'The Krisis' by Husserl. His historical telos and universal philosophy as science is not just reminiscent of the esoteric tradition's 'sacred task', they are one and the same. This correlation to Hegel and other thinkers within the esoteric tradition adds much needed cohesion to the stance Husserl was unable to finish formulating in life. What if Husserl's seemingly inexplicable radical shift stems from his contact with the esoteric tradition in Hegelian thought? This would make coherent Husserl's indictment of positivism, his transcendental phenomenology and the ancient esoteric tradition; what seems like an excellent starting point for the establishment of a foundation for metaphysics.
What do you think of all this? I have made it this far largely on my own without a mentor and am desperate for guidance if any is available. Thank you again for your thoughtful consideration.
Sincerely,
Ryan
Dear Ryan
Perhaps you may want to send your email address to me, then I can send some PDF books on these issues to you! My email address is [email protected] if you want to do this.
Best wishes
Danie Strauss
In B.C.Hopkins book "The Origin of The Logic of Symbolic Mathematics, E. Husserl and J. Klein, we find the following on page 516.:
The fragmentary investigations in the Crisis do not provide or otherwise investigate the self-evidence lacking in the case of symbolic mathematics, and its discussion of the mathesis universalis contains a footnote referring, "for a more exact exposition", (p. 45-46), to the accounts of it in the Logical Investigations and the Formal and Transcendental Logic, which we have shown to fall short of providing the evidence proper to the origination of the basic concept of the mathesis universalis or the formalization in which it originates. Husserl's phenomenological answer to the question of the origin of the logic of symbolic mathematics, in his final work remains, as in his others, general and therefore incomplete.
I want to thanks Sören Napoleon Stenlund for the quote from Hopkins. Allow me to add something about Husserl and the foundaitons of arithmetic. First: with his “eidetic logic” Husserl wanted to rejuvenate the idea of a mathesis universalis although he lost faith in the initial science ideal which assigned a creative power to mathematical thought.
In 1887 Edmund Husserl completed his habilitation with a study concerned with a psychological analysis of the concept of number – followed in 1891 by his extensive “Philosophie der Arithmetik”. In this work he connected the infinite both with the psychological nature of a collective synthesis (1970:64 ff.), and with the principle of succession (p.220). He questioned the actual infinite in the light of the finiteness of arithmetic. He even planned a second volume of his “Philosophie der Arithmetik,” but eventually realized that he could not achieve his aim without using the actual infinite. L. Eley (in the Preface to Husserliana, Vol. XII) saw in this failure the reason why this second volume was never published. From the unpublished manuscripts it is nevertheless clear that Husserl did not succeed in giving a foundation to general arithmetic without the acceptance of the actual infinite (which shows that he confronted himself with classical analysis).
[Bibliographical Note: I would like to know if the Hopkins Book is acquainted with T.H. De Boer, 1966: De Onwikkelingsgang in het Denken van Husserl; and B. Picker's work on the influence of mathematics for the philosophy of Husserl [Die Bedeutung der Mathematik für die Philosophie Edmund Husserls, Philosophia Naturalis, Vol. 7, 1961.]
I am greatful to Daniel FM Strauss' comments.
Hopkins book was published in 2011. There is no reference to (or mention of) De Boer or Picker in the book. Klein's work, and the relation between Klein and Husserl is very important for Hopkins. One section of the book (§ 206) is called: "Klein's de facto Completion of Husserl's Crisis.
I am very grateful for the comments both of you gentlemen have offered on this topic! My email is [email protected] and I am grateful for any insight that can be sent my way. The mention of Professor Hopkins' reference to the footnote on page 44-45 of "The Krisis.." gleamed for me some insight into the crux of his critique, though I have not yet had the opportunity to read the works of Klein or Hopkins, something I intend to expeditiously amend.
For now I will simply say that when Husserl refers us to his previous work in the passage referenced, I believe he is doing so with a significant degree of shameful disgrace. He regrets to experience such a 'Krisis' in the reflection of his life's work, a profound body of work that is in his mind at the time of his writing the "The Krisis", an utter failure; this is why one such as he who had definitively stated so much with so much gusto throughout the prime of his life, would come out of retirement so late with such a radical agenda explicitly and implicitly in mind. We must also consider that the profundity of "The Krisis" was something Husserl likely knew he would never see realized by his peers in his lifetime, a factor deeply embedded within the intentional form of the incomplete work. I will take some time to elaborate more on this point...
-Ryan
Dear Ryan
On page 109 of the Cartesianische Meditationen (CM - 1950) there are two statements that actually highlight the intimate connection between constancy and change. [The relevant phrases are: Husserl refers to the “transzendentalen ego” which is a “kompossibles nur in der universalen Einheitsform des Strömens” (this is translated in the middle of page 45 of the book of Hopkins) and “his reference to a “formale Gesetzmäßigkeit einer universalen Genesis” (a formal lawfulness/law-conformity of a universal genesis/process of becoming).]
Since this problem closely coheres with the opposition between rationalism and irrationalism both, taken together, directly relates to the Crisis which Husserl experienced close to the end of his life (one can also phrase it as a crisis generated by historicism). Another way to articulate this issue is therefore to address the relationship between relativity and relativism (entailing the threat of historicism against which Husserl had to fight).
Thanks for your e-mail address – now I can send to you two PDF files – the one dealing with, Relativity and relativism: historical and systematic considerations, in: Acta Academica Supplementum 2005(2):199-231.) and the other with a more encompassing plea for a non-reductionism ontology (716 pages) – Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines (2009).
Dr. Strauss,
I have received your email gladly, and am deeply appreciative for the compendium of information you have bestowed me with. I have only begun to delve into the work, but just from glancing through the table of contents, it is apparent that the work you have diligently accomplished will be of incredible utility to my efforts and the efforts of philosophy going forward; sections on the breakdown of the scientific approach to the genesis of life and embodied cognition stand out in particular. I hope do engage in a long discourse going forward. Very exciting developments long awaited, indeed! Here's to more to come . . .
Cheers,
Ryan
Dear Ryan
Thanks for your kind reaction! I appreciate it sincerely!
Best wishes
Danie
First and for most I want to clarify the discussion thus far. My question was of course looking for any and all possible direct confrontations made with the overall position that was initiated in "The Krisis" by Husserl, most explicitly against the notion of Positivism and the prevailing scientific trends of his time. This question was asked simply because I find his point to to be compelling and more importantly I find the ground(s) for his position to still be firmly and immediately in place if not more so today, due not in the least to the fact that his rather provocative position seems to have been largely dismissed/ignored currently and up till this point. In response, two highly esteemed scholars, Dr. Stenlund and Dr. Strauss, have brought to my attention the work of Klein and Hopkins. What Klein seems to be fixated on and what Hopkins finds so compelling of an answer to the 'Krisis', is largely Husserl's treatment of mathematics, something that, as Dr. Strauss has pointed out, Husserl had not been focused on since before the time during which Heidegger then Klein were his students. As has been noted, Husserl's lifetime as a scholar allowed him to engage many topics as he developed an ever more refined perspective, mathematics was one of the first things he pursued and one of the first to be abandoned as a means to his goal. Due to this profound diversity and tendency to be constantly morphing, a comprehensive understanding of Husserl's work as a whole taken collectively is extremely difficult. We can however see from the very nature of his mathematical investigations that he was indeed looking for a coherent scientific approach to the world as a universal object for study/experience, and yet when a mathesis universalis is found untenable it is abandoned. As he moves on into other area's of research he does so as an expert in arithmetic theory, which will undeniably influence the direction he takes and the means to get there, imbibing his work with a certain mathematical flavor that perhaps lingered far longer than he intended; what never changes is the ambition to find a universal theory for the world and human experience.
Thus it is paramount to be able to extricate Husserl's late and final work from his much earlier larger body of work. This has proven difficult for posterity due to the fact that the interpretation of "The Krisis" has largely leaned on correlative interpretations of his previous works. This has been the case for a medley of reasons; one being the explicitly radical nature of The Krisis causing a presumed need for corroborating evidence from the larger body in addition from what is explicitly stated plainly in the text itself; another being the fact that those who were most closely charged with its interpretation and critique were those who were considered the most diligent scholars of his work at large, something that in the specific cases of Heidegger, Derrida, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty created a conflict of interest due to the fact the positions they took up in the name of 'phenomenology' are specifically those not so subtly critiqued in The Krisis itself. Many of the more influential figures in philosophy and leading experts on 'Husserlian Thought' at the time, were men who had already established themselves on the basis of Husserl's previously published large body of work, a body of work that Husserl will directly call into question when he condemns the entire contemporary scientific endeavor (including those aspects he contributed to and/or manifested) as hopelessly devoid of meaningfulness. This is a rather uncommon historical occurrence, when someone who has contributed monumentally to the development of a large and diverse set of theory, dramatically calls into question that entire set before dying. Whats more, the declaration only gets disseminated decades later, after his most immediate intellectual lineage has already established themselves and his legacy far astray from where his dying words intended. Together these factors make the radical contents of The Krisis incredibly difficult to reconcile for his contemporaries and posterity alike. Husserl is intending The Krisis to be for the consumption of his formal pupils who are champions of his previous failures , as well as for the proceeding generations philosophers who may not have heard of him before they pick up his last most profound contribution. It is to this effect that he will constantly and subtly (though undeniably) refer to his most well informed former acolytes while also attempting to strike off in an entirely novel direction.
So what then is The Krisis about? If I am correct then it should be more or less made clear from the beginning; and in Part I we find almost immediately the context for the entire work to be established. He welcomes the controversy of his radical title, maintaining its literal truth despite the admitted incredible "rigorousness" and "convincingness" of the scientific praxis he intends to directly call into question. He names specifically in many ways the direct target of his attack as 'Positivism', and immediately explains by describing its shortcomings (where it cannot go) as the intended direction of his undertaking in The Krisis. It is not that science in itself is bad, or that it is being conducted in a manner unrefined or without effective method, Husserl repeatedly offers praise to the methodical rigor of contemporary science at his time. What is called into question instead is a more basic and original aspect of science, one attached intimately to its historical origins in philosophy, specifically how and in what way it serves mankind. By calling out scientific praxis as being unable to serve some of its most basic and vital tasks in the fields of the spirit and consciousness, Husserl is invoking a particularly ancient and original concept of Philosophy as a universal function to be carried out over the history of mankind, bringing us ever closer towards ever more coherent knowledge as science. Through these opening moments he establishes a clear context for the entire discussion to follow: A historical argument for a revolutionary change in the direction of scientific inquiry on the grounds of Philosophical efficacy.
This brings us to the subsection of The Krisis mentioned by Hopkins that seems to be the source of some of the confusion here. It takes place in the middle of Husserl's attempt at historically explaining how and why this crisis manifested itself in such a peculiar way as to require careful explication in order for proper realization, despite existing rampantly throughout the academy. Specifically Husserl is explaining the profound effect math theory of shape and measurement has had on the development of physics and thus on the larger advent of modern science in general, calling this process a "mathematization of the plena". His goal being to demonstrate how certain historical developments between math and physics have warped the practice of science, partly to the effect of establishing a rigorous method, while partly to the effect of isolating science as a whole within a particular context of 'measurement precision verification' (an enclosed world). In an effort to explain how in the process of establishing a necessary degree of methodological systematicness within science, modern scientific development has inadvertently stunted the scope of said science to the effect of denying it efficacy in its most basic and vital function, Husserl seeks to use the 'motive' of said development (Galileo's) to clarify this particular peculiarity. It is in the discussion of these inner motives to the historical development of the crisis that we find Husserl referencing his previous work in theoretical mathematics.
As he describes the "incessant forward movement" of this "arithmetization" as a "formalization", he tells of how this formalization occurs precisely by the improvement of algebraic theory of numbers/magnitudes into purely formal analyses, a development that he was an intimate part of. Alluding to his failures in mathematics, he describes how despite this universal formalization there has not yet been a clear characterization of what a mathematical field is, causing the development to meaningfully end in a "theory of manifolds" he himself took part in early on. Thus the motive behind the mathematization was not misplaced, its only when it became blinded to the trajectory of theoretical development it was on, a sort of philosophical ineptness, that a problem formed. This is a reference to that wall he hit in math theory when considering the infinite, the realization that comes out of this theory is the fact that there is not a clear concise definition of math or its field; bringing the question back to consciousness/intuition. Considering his personal failures in mathematics to be the culmination of this mathematization process, he ends in referring to the specific work he accomplished in math theory's "definite manifolds" as an axiomatic system compossible with other such "totalities-in-general". This axiomatic system of definite manifolds is precisely a mathematization of language/logic he took part in directly, while also being a specific theory that many of his followers and others would take for granted. He is not referencing this previous work to more fully define something he is attempting to prove or elaborate on in the present, but instead to elucidate a specific problem as clearly and directly as possible. After explaining how the development of natural scientific formulae in the modern era was problematic for the future development of science, he points the reader to his well received contribution to said formulae as a perfect example of what can go wrong. If you want a complete and in-depth example of the problem he describes as this rampant 'mathematization' or the 'decisive accomplishment', look no further than his previous acclaimed work that the audience may even be basing some of their own current theory off of. He is merely offering his own failure as an example to give salient legitimacy to his claims against other such mathematizing theorists, as well as offering a more subtle yet direct critique of those who may find themselves engrossed in these particular past failures of his. Notice how he describes these 'accomplishments' of his as purely 'formal' in retrospect, when they were couched in a 'realist' intention at the time of their conception. It would certainly seem that he legitimately feared his former pupils who represented the academic establishment in question would intentionally dismiss this provocative last effort of his in order to preserve their own reputation.
One cannot critique the entirety of contemporary science, from within science as a scientist, without critiquing oneself; and so any critique of Husserl's position in The Crisis based on the efficacy of his own critique of his own previous work, seems rather tenuous. Of chief importance here is realizing that Husserl owned his failure in a universal algebra, also realizing his subsequent formal logic for what it was, merely formal. His phenomenological project is not an attempt at achieving that previous goal of a universal math, but rather an alternate route to another universal theory. He clearly demonstrates why that alternate route is necessary by explaining the futility of and then referencing his previous ambition of a mathesis universalis. The entirely legitimate concept of a universal algebra simply requires a preexisting and ongoing transcendental phenomenology in order to be achieved in actuality. Without a phenomenological investigation of 'form', any universal math is merely a formal analyses; the redundant verification of the same formula. Transcendental Phenomenology is the technique by which Husserl intended to escape the self enclosed formally deduced world of the 'natural attitude', the only means by which to actually come to know ourselves. And so we find Husserl attempting to negate all of his previous mistakes while wasting no time in going forward with a self-prescribed solution to the problem he admits he was a part of. This brief treatment of mathematics being his attempt to negate his damage in that realm without wasting time actually going there. Not knowing if he could complete the explication of either, Husserl made the treatment of both the 'crisis' and 'the solution' a simultaneous act. Unfortunately this Phenomenological project requires considerable intellectual resources that were never afforded it due to its direct competition with the prevailing normative positivist praxis.
I apologize for rambling on. To perhaps rephrase that briefly: The Krisis is obviously an incomplete work in progress, but we must also realize that even had it been completed before Husserl's death, it would only be a first stepping stone along the path to establishing a legitimate 'transcendental phenomenology', only the first shots of a long and probably arduous war; a war explicitly against the positivist scientific establishment. The most important point Husserl's was trying to establish was the placid historical and theoretical conclusion that an engrossing indoctrination of Positivism within the western academy is extremely BAD. The thesis of positivism is pretty clean cut, and so is Husserl's as the antithesis. The 'what', 'how' and 'why' of this 'Krisis' is the primary concern, for he believes that the most acute and endangering symptom of the 'Krisis' is that it does not seem to be realized within the consciousness of 'European humanity at large'; what for him constitutes a problem greater in magnitude than simply a technical problem for science, but nonetheless a problem for philosophy to solve through science.
Thus: Is it not the case that any effective critique of Husserl's position in the The Krisis, would necessarily involve a defense of positivism aimed specifically at defeating Husserl's attack on it? And so to rephrase my question more specifically, has anyone ever directly answered Husserl's indictment of positivism in defense of the still very much ongoing trend/doctrine? Or is it perhaps possible that Husserl's indictment of Positivism is not found to be clear? If no answer is found, is the lack of response in the face of its direct confrontation a de facto affirmation of his indictment?
cheers,
Ryan
Dear Ryan
Husserl wanted to transcend positivism and objectivism while holding on to the constituting role of the intentional consciousness. But by also holding on to rationality as such there is a continuity with his 1911 ideal of philosophy as rigorous science.
Perhaps I should say a bit more about the way in which Kant was impressed by the contribution of Galileo to the development of the modern natural sciences. Galileo's formulation of his law of inertia followed the way of a pure thought experiment. In his famous 1638 treatise on “two new sciences” Galileo merely thought about a body that is in motion on an indefinitely extended track and then argued that this body would continue its motion infinitely, i.e. it would not discontinue its motion except if something exerts power on it (e.g. gravity or friction). From this thought-experiment he deduced the law of inertia and applied it to the ‘objects’ of the senses. From this Kant draws the radical conclusion: if it is possible for Galileo to formulate a thought experiment out of the spontaneous subjectivity of his theoretical thought and then deduce a natural law from it – the kinematical law of inertia – this must mean that there are elements of knowledge present in the human mind, which in the first place makes our knowledge of reality possible: “Understanding creates its laws (a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to nature” (Prolegomena, §36). Kant elevated human understanding to become the formal (a priori) law-giver of nature. [I support Husserl's reaction to positivism – but with a different argument (see PDD pages 44-45).
This explains his defense of a sound rationalism – and it prompts me to repeat his own important explanation of the crisis in his thought as explained in Krisis.
“In order to comprehend what is wrong in the present crisis the concept Europe once again has to be viewed by means of the historical directedness towards the infinite aims of reason; it must be demonstrated how the European world was borne from reason-ideas, that is, out of the spirit of philosophy. The crisis will then clearly emerge as the apparent failure of rationalism. The basis of this failure of a rational culture, however, … is not inherent to rationalism, since it is only found in its externalization, in its decay into naturalism and objectivism. The crisis of European existence provides only two options: the decline of Europe in the alienation from its own rational existential meaning, the decay into an animosity towards the spiritual and a lapse into barbarism, or the rebirth of European existence through the spirit of philosophy, particularly through a heroism of reason that will consistently triumph over naturalism” (Krisis, 1954:347-348).
His deepest trust in the intuitionistically conceived of (transcendental-idealistic, phenomenological) philosophical reason explains why he compares the “total phenomenological attitude” and its accompanying epochè, with a religious conversion, because it indeed harbors the largest existential change which confronts humankind as a task (Krisis, 1954:140).
Husserl could not resolve the crisis which he discerned. Only insofar as the plea for a rational philosophical enterprise is still alive (for example in the thought of Habermas) is it possible to see an after-effect of Husserl's dream.
However, perhaps you may way to gain a better understanding of the basic motive of nature and freedom directing modern humanistic philosophy from Descartes up to the present. See the attachment “Roots of Western Culture” in my forthcoming e-mail to you!
Danie
I agree that Husserl does not even come close to resolving the crisis at hand, he does not have the chance to even approach it. His job was to effectively articulate this conundrum from a place of salient legitimacy, initiating the possibility for future approaches. His gravest concern was that no one would ever realize that a 'crisis' was ongoing until it was 'too late', and the means to solve it (Philosophy/science) were damaged beyond repair.
I do not believe Husserl had to demonstrate a solution to or in other ways resolve the 'crisis' in order to prove its existence or the significant gravitas of its existence. He does enough by clearly demonstrating the 'crisis' as a problem of inter-subjectivity. It follows rationally that the solution would also emerge from the concept of inter-subjectivity; something that I think in the most basic terms means the solution will be accomplished cooperatively from an inter-subjective position. This inter-subjective position has yet to be adequately established, an inexcusable shortfall when considering how long the concept has theoretically existed, as well as how close we seem to have come to unintentionally discovering it scientifically via backwards means. It is certainly not from lack of technical or intellectual resources that we have failed to achieve this fundamental concept coherently, but rather due to an utter lack of cooperation; a cooperation inherent to any individual subjective discovery of the mysterious force that is inter-subjectivity. Simply put we cannot solve this crises individually, nor in close knit circles, this must be a collective effort. No other problem of science has presented this type of humanistic burden, one which forces us to transcend our ego if only temporarily in some particular context, in order to achieve the collective goal of 'saving the life-world'.
If you and I are paddling down a river towards a collectively assumed destination on a trip of mutually agreed importance, and I point out several hippopotamus bulls blocking the path of our canoe up ahead, I should NOT need an alternate route already planned and mapped before I expect you to stop paddling!
I am eternally grateful for your taking up this discussion with me Dr. Strauss. It is an incredible relief to find someone established in the academy who agrees with Husserl about positivism. I will diligently read the work you have sent me. Thanks again for the insight.
Ryan
Dear Ryan!
I only now discover this discussion. All this about Klein and Hopkins is of course interesting, but it does not go to the core of the issue. My impression is that Husserl's diagnosis has never been contested by the incriminated party, but it has often been taken as a point of departure by scholars sympathetic to his description of the situation: apart from Husserl's direct followers, such as Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, some leading scholars which should be mentioned are Marcuse and Habermas, and of course many others (including myself). None of them (us) have really gone much further in the analysis of the crisis (and there has been so many unattended crises since then, so this is not surprising), so perhaps you are the one to accomplish this work. Nevertheless, your reference to esoteric traditions worries me. Husserl argued for a more completely rational approach than that offered by positivism.
Dear Göran
You are quite right - Husserl adhered to a "sound" rationalism and rejected an erring (or esoteric) rationalism (eine sich verirrenden Rationalismus).
He writes:
In order to comprehend what is wrong in the present crisis the concept Europe once again has to be viewed by means of the historical directedness towards the infinite aims of reason; it must be demonstrated how the European world was borne from reason-ideas, that is, out of the spirit of philosophy. The crisis will then clearly emerge as the apparent failure of rationalism. The basis of this failure of a rational culture, however, … is not inherent to rationalism, since it is only found in its externalization, in its decay into naturalism and object- ivism. The crisis of European existence provides only two options: the decline of Europe in the alienation from its own rational existential meaning, the de- cay into an animosity towards the spiritual and a lapse into barbarism, or the rebirth of European existence through the spirit of philosophy, particularly through a heroism of reason that will consistently triumph over naturalism (Krisis, 1954:347-348).
Precisely! When Husserl talks about Europe being born "out of the spirit of philosophy", that is a literal quotation of a phrase commonly used by representatives of the Radical Enlightenment (a lot of proofs of this are found in Jonathan Israel's books about the Enlightenment). I am also fond of a the story about Jan Patocka about Husserl giving him the lectern he received from Thomas Mazaryk and Patockas comment that so he became a heir to the Enlightenment tradition (I used the quote in one of my articles).
'esoteric' is a dastardly term, its use in benignity being always inadvisable. Thus I somewhat regret my attempts here. Do note however, that it worries me as well..
I have spent the last couple months trying to get a grip on the scholarly commentary surrounding the "esoteric" topic in general as it presents itself to the western academy, a task I will likely never accomplish, though I believe i am somewhat closer due to the work of Wouter Hanegraaff from U of Amsterdam among others. What flows under that bridge is a deluge of writings and commentary going back at least over a thousand years. when i spoke of the esoteric in reference to Hegel and Husserl, I certainly did not mean to invoke the entirety of that mess, and would have been better served by a more literal explication of what i was actually referring to. In short, "the esoteric tradition" is a terrible name for anything specific capable of being discussed seriously...
I must confess I am merely a novice erudite. my path to this discussion is far more rudimentary than that of your own. I went from Kant's "prolegomena to any future metaphysics", to William James' "the Will to Believe", then Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", and finally Husserl's "Krisis". Shortly after being first introduced to Hegelian dialectics by my debate coach, i ended up in the University of Amsterdam studying abroad. the three classes i took there were "Language and Cognition" where i first met Husserl through the "Krisis", another on "epistemology" where i got a good look at Quine and finally through some sort of luck a course called "Hermetica III" where i became for the first time exposed to the works of Giovanni Pico Mirandola and Giordano Bruno among others. At this point things started clicking. immediately upon returning to the states i obtained complete copies of both the "Phenomenology of Spirit" and "Krisis" and started doing for the first time what i consider to be actually serious philosophy. In that limited context i will try to explain my use of the "esoteric" here in what follows.
I also would offer enthusiastic greetings to Mr. Sonesson in welcoming him to this discussion, while also apologizing for neglecting this thread for over 8 weeks while i was lost in some books.
when we refer to the "esoteric" in the context of Hegel and Husserl we are predominantly concerning ourselves with a certain group of concepts.
Mostly we are talking about a 'way of talking about' certain topics, particularly the mind/soul, the universe/god and the world in general. Leo Strauss in his "Persecution and the Art of Writing" touches on the various motivations and methods for "encoding" ones actual thoughts within their publicly available works of writing; notably the use of paradox and self contradiction is mentioned. My argument is simply that this concept is inherent to understanding coherently the history of philosophy and human thought in general, and more specifically that it is instrumental in comprehending certain thinkers/works. This method of communicating certain ideas has been historically used to encode the presence of a variety of ideas...
The arguable originator of these encoded ideas in the west was 'Universal Oneness' and its complimentary companions 'Infinity' and 'Divinity'. These ideas in their origins are metaphysical, dealing with what it is and how the universe works beyond its presentation to our experience. Likewise these concepts are utterly 'ineffable', while at once being cogently present within our mind. The only thing affirming their meaning being some inexpressible cogency in our minds, what emanates from their contemplation is the preeminence of 'consciousness' in all of our worldly knowledge. A radical thought always, back then and now more than ever.
Which brings us to another key 'esoteric' element here. Elementary to the idea of esoteric knowledge is the 'rite of initiation', a concept believed to stem from ancient 'mystery cults' or what we would call priesthoods devoted to mysticism. Here it is worth remembering Hegel's assertion that what in modern times is considered the "speculative" is dealing with the same content as concerned the 'ancient mystics'. Explicitly what went into an initiation was a 'mind altering' experience, often with the use of or in preparation for the use of hallucinogens/visionary plants. These visions/experiences of altered mind-states were considered revelatory/oracular, and were being induced by certain sects of learned elites for the purpose of contemplating them towards the elucidation of otherwise hidden truths, what they equate to 'conversing with the divine'. In other words we are talking about the heretofore unexplored realm(s) of consciousness that has been either barred from public access, denied or scorned by intellectuals ever since its discovery.
Essentially the outcome of varying ancient attempts at induced revelation (what today we call 'tripping') and its contemplation, was the concept of an 'infinite universal oneness' unified through the 'Mind'. This comes most directly from the works of Plotinus, who does not claim to have invented the major foundational concepts (Plato and other ancients). These ideas are the metaphysic that resulted after centuries of contemplating the ancient greeks/persians/babylonians etc. in places like the Library of Alexandria, and they would appear to largely have been sparked by the use of visionary plants in conjunction with philosophical contemplation.
What is key here is the 'world-view' manifest of this metaphysic, how it contrasts with the prevailing world view of modernity, and how the clash of these two longstanding world-views was historically both co-opted by various geopolitical powers (ie church) and suppressed. Long after Justinian closed down the 'mystery schools' the worldview continued to exist in secret, all the way into the 20th century, and almost always hidden in some form or another in plain sight; in code. The key to the code in general is possession of the prescribed world view, a sort of 'unified intention'. all the way through Hegel's time one could not dare speak explicitly or exoterically about these concepts or corresponding worldview. It was only in husserl's time that liberality had grown to allow such radical discussion as this. The catch was that by the time the 20th century had rolled around in the west, all interest in alternative worldviews when it came to science was exhausted, with the academy fully subservient to positivism...
David Carr would appear to pick up on this Hegel connection when translating the "Krisis", noting a certain 'Hegelian turn' in his translator's introduction. Husserl explicitly states that the ancient study of metaphysics represented a "theoretically necessary, longterm, yet to be internally reconciled project within the ancient universal philosophical ideal of 'science'". This 'universal philosophical ideal' is the same one held by Hegel. The Hegelian influence is near useless to us without a coherent regard of what Hegelian thought is, the problem being that there has never been a coherent consensus on what hegel was talking about. That problem turns out to be alleviated when we understand Hegel's worldview, namely that which he shared in common with contemporaries like Fichte and Holderlin who were mutually raised and educated in a similar part of southern Germany (Tubingen Stift). This worldview known as 'Swabian Pietism", which could certainly be considered esoteric, is rigorously outlined by Glenn Magee in "Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition".
Also, Mr, Sonesson, I must say I was only a little surprised when I found the 'Krisis' still left wholly not addressed by the 'accused'; though it still warranted asking I think, even just for sake of formality and making a certain statement. How could they respond without stopping what they were/are doing?? And obviously with this clearly stated crisis everywhere all around us, choking our life-world to death in front of our very eyes, if someone - anyone - had a clear concept of it or its perpetrators, how in all that is sacred could they just stand by in complicity? clearly two things are apparently true from the plain state of things: a) the 'Krisis' has never garnered a response from positivism or the academy at large, to do so would have been to concede or acknowledge the warrants for a vast scientific revolution against the establishment of the Anglo-American academy. b) the "Krisis" itself remains almost entirely misunderstood, ignored or undiscovered/forgotten.
However, perhaps all this was necessary and fortuitous; now with the advent of computers, the Internet and other forms of technology (clearly due to the advent and pursuit of positivism) we would appear to have exponentially more and stronger sets of tools at our disposal - we realistically could be in a place to solve this "world conundrum". We only need to further analyze the Krisis to the point that we can demonstrate it and spread its message. It is itself not so abstruse as it is volatile to contemporary belief, it being not necessary to rework what Husserl has already worked out, but only to pick it up where it was deserted and bear it with all expediency and vigor. If they are confused, we should point them to the more rudimentary passages and work through it with them; if they are ignorant of its contents and implications, then we are to confront and inform them; where it lies dormant and hidden under the error and corruption of its posterity, it is our solemnest DUTY as Philosopher to unearth it and hold it on high for all to see.
Thank You again for taking the time to listen and converse with me, one should not hope to do this alone, and I have been in dire need of mentors.
Sincerely,
Ryan
May I ask a question ?
Husserl characterises "modern science" by idealisation and mathematization of nature.
In my view, mathematization can be developped only when the good physical concepts have been discovered. Idealisation and mathematization of nature started with hellenistic science, for instance in statics, optic, and of course astronomy ."Modern science" arose when new physical concepts were discovered, first of all the principle of inertia, i. e. to consider uniform movement as a state, and not as a processus. It's a purely physical concept. Mathematezation could restart on this new basis.
Of course the principle of inertia needs some idealisation. But Husserl says any measurement needs some idealisation. So statics, optic, Archimedes'principle need alraedy idealisation.
So the true chracterisation of modern science is new physical concepts, not mathematisation.
What did or would Husserl say to this?
Thanks
Mathematization is an aspect of idealization. All physical concepts, old or new, are results of the idealization of Lifeworld (that is, everyday life) notions. Either I fail to understand your point, or there is no problem for Husserl in your question.
Thanks. The question is : what differentiates antique from modern science ? Is it mathematization /idealization, as Husserl claims?
My answer is no, Hellenistic science (Archimedes, Hipparcus, ....) already did mathematization /idealization,. If they did not succed in mathematizing the movement,it isnot by lack of mathematization /idealization,b ut by lack of a pure physical concept :inertia. Inertia of course has to do with idealisation, but if Archimedes did not discover it, it's that he stuck to the conception of movement as a processus and not as a state like rest. It's physics, not mathematics.
Is my question clear now?
Dear Jean-Pierre Castel,
It is. I do not feel any necessity to defend the absolute truth of Husserl's position, but I think it can be defended. He would certainly agree that idealization, including mathematization, started before Galileo: indeed, this is the whole point of his paper on the origin of geometry from land-surveying (According to some recent news, Pythagoras famous theorem was discovered well before the Greeks, in a Egyptian papyrus, of I remember correctly, so the process started well before Greek antiquity). In any case, I think Husserl's argument is really that there has been an ongoing idealization of the Lifeworld for a very long time, but that the difference between lived experience and this idealization only become a "crisis" in the early 20th century. I think it is obvious that, on the whole Aristotelean physics is closer to perceptual experience than is the physics of Galileo-Newton, and their physics is much easier to connect to our lifeworld than everything from relativity theory to quarks. Whether there really has been a crisis or if there is going to be one is another question. I think the Lifeworld is resilient. We still see the soon go up every day. So far, even the "discovery" of the Higgs particle has not had any notably consequences for our life in the Lifeworld, and even it is turns out to have such consequences in the future, as the splitting of the atom has certainly had, the Lifeworld experience which is produces will be completely different from what physics tells us about it.
Dear Göran Sonesson
Thanks a lot. You are bringing a new light, but I'm not sure I undesrtand correctly what you are saying. Do you say
1. was Husserl saying the devolment of science came to a real crisis only in n the early 20th century? I thought he placed the rupture with Galileo?
2. When he spoke of mathematisation, was it just a metaphore for abstraction? No one can deny that "modern" science is more distant from ordinary intuition than Aristotelician science. But this started already when Anaximander claimed the earth is not flat ! Of course inertia is distant from ordinary intuition, it is precisely the reason why it was so long to be discovered. The mission of science is to replace old prejudices by new representations offering a better capacity of explanation and prediction. The price to pay is a greater distance with intuition.If Husserl complains only on that, is it mere nostalgy ?
The question about Husserl and the related issue concerning the concept of matter prompted me to respond – but apparently since I tried to attach Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines [PDD] my response did not go through.
However, those interested in these issues can open up my Selected Research WEB-Site:
www.daniestrauss.com
and then look at the “Top 5” where you can download PDD [right click] and then look at pages 402-424 as well as 624-631.
Danie Strauss
29-08-2017
Daniel Strauss' book, which can be downloaded from his site, seems to be fascinating reading. On pages 402ff he talks a lot about the Greeks, and on page 624ff about Husserl. But, on a rapid overview, I cannot find that he really discusses Husserl's Krisis-philosophy (although the book is in his list of references). Therefore, I will still give a brief answer to Jean-Pierre Castel: 1) The idealization is a process which has gone on for a long time. It produced useful results with the discovery of geometry, and the like. Perhaps Husserl can be taken to see a first moment of crisis in the time of Galileo, but his late Krisis-lecture is about the exacerbation of this development at the time of his writing. In fact, Galileo's idealization was useful, as is that of the natural sciences in our time, but as a result, the distance between scientific explanation and the world in which we really live has become ever distance, and that is in itself a problem. 2) it is not only that Aristotelian science is closer to our direct experience (except perhaps when he leaves the sublunary world), it is also closer than any subsequent scientific description to the world of our experience, which does not change simply because the scientific description of it changes. We cannot live in the world described by the natural sciences. Even the natural scientist must take the Lifeworld for granted, for if he treats the laboratory in which he makes his studies, himself and his collaborators as constellations of qaurks or whatever, he cannot study the quarks which are his object of study.
On pages 630-631 of PDD I am quoting Husserl about the European Crisis (referene to matter refers to a different issue – new mathematical concepts in physics).
In PDD on pages 630-631 one can read:
The crisis that Husserl discerns in respect of Europe and the disciplines is merely rooted in what he calls a misguided rationalism (an “verirrenden Rationalismus”)(Husserl, 1954:337). In opposition to such a misguided rationalism, Husserl posits the unlimited possibilities of the intuitionistic, phenomenological reason. This trust is fundamentally threatened by the increasing influence of naturalism and objectivism, as well as the irrationalism of his own student, Heidegger (Sein und Zeit/Being and Time). Husserl experiences this with a sense of hopelessness – as the crisis of Europe and the academic disciplines. He writes: In order to comprehend what is wrong in the present crisis the concept Europe once again has to be viewed by means of the historical directedness towards the infinite aims of reason; it must be demonstrated how the European world was borne from reason-ideas, that is, out of the spirit of philosophy. The crisis will then clearly emerge as the apparent failure of rationalism. The basis of this failure of a rational culture, however, … is not inherent to rationalism, since it is only found in its externalization, in its decay into naturalism and objectivism. The crisis of European existence provides only two options: the decline of Europe in the alienation from its own rational existential meaning, the decay into an animosity towards the spiritual and a lapse into barbarism, or the rebirth of European existence through the spirit of philosophy, particularly through a heroism of reason that will consistently triumph over naturalism (Krisis, 1954:347-348). His deepest trust in the intuitionistically conceived of (transcendental-idealistic, phenomenological) philosophical reason explains why he compares the “total phenomenological attitude” and its accompanying epochè with a religious conversion, because it indeed harbours the largest existential change that confronts humankind as a task (Husserl, 1954:140).
Through complete freedom, the European is called to establish the intuitionistic, phenomenological science ideal as the only road to the rebirth of Europe through the spirit of philosophy. The slogan of his article: Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, continues to overarch his philosophical endeavours. Yet he was unseccessful in containing the growing crisis he experienced. For that matter, his phenomenology – in the hands of Heidegger, Sartre and Merlau-Ponty – was turned into its opposite: an irrationalistic and existentialistic freedom motive, which derives its motivating power not from an intuitionistic science ideal, but from the ideal of an autonomously free personality. This development ruined his dream of philosophy as an irrefutable, apodictically certain science: Philosophy as science, as a serious, exact, yes apodictic exact science – der Traum ist ausgeträumt” (Husserl, 1954:508 – “the dream is dreamed”).
Sorry, Daniel Strauss, I missed that passage. But I still think my answer more directly addressed Jean-Pierre Castel's question. Anyhow, I seriously thank you for making your book available, and sending the link, because it seems to contain a lot of interesting stuff.
Thanks, Gran Sonesson and Daniel Strauss.
My true concern is characterization of "modern science", that is of the revolution initiated by Galileo and completed by Newton : the dicovery of the laws of movement. My question is : who are the major authors responsible for the chracterisation of this revolution with mathematisation ? My impression is : Descartes and Husserl. Koyre and most contemporary historians of science follow, telling the same story
This characterisation seems to me wrong: you can mathematise only once you have settled the good physical concepts, and not the other way round. The Greeks could not mathematise the movement beacuse they remained stuck with the wrong concepts, movement as a processus and not as a state (as long as it straight and uniform), and not because they lacked mathematics and mathematisation. Hellenistic science proves the contrary, it was highly mathematised. Galileo and Newton succeeded because they found the adequate physical concepts : inertia, gravitation, ...These concepts don't derive from mathematics, they only allow mathematisation.
The law of inertia seems to me the best example. Therfore I started with it, asking how Husserl could tell inertia derives from mathemaitisation. Of course, the law of inertia needs some idealisation, but not much more than when astronoms identify planetary orbits with ellipses. Idealisation, mathematisation are instrumental. The Greeks knew these methods. But it did not allow them to discover the concept of inertia, a physicla and not a mathematical concept..
I doubt this type of questions will be of any interest to you. But I take my chance!
Thanks anyway
I did have the impression you were obsessed by inertia. Now, I am not sure how much is really in Husserl's text, and how much is what I have added from my own understanding of the history of ideas, but my scenario is as follows: mathematics may be the first case of idealization, that is, of abstracting in a systematic way from the Lifeworld. But probably some idealization would be needed beforehand. I don't think Husserl has anything to say about this. After all, he is primarily interested in the history of cognition.
If, as Husserl suggests, geometry is an abstraction from land-surveying, then the problem remains of going back from this abstraction to the application of it to physical problems, such as land-surveying, and of course whatever can be generalized from that. That is, I think, where the Greeks did not accomplish very much.
I have recently been reading about Vico, who thought that mathematics, contrary to natural science, but similarly to the human sciences, is something we have created ourselves, so we are able to understand it. No doubt Husserl would not accept this as it is formulated. Anyhow, I am not sure whether Husserl was right to give so much importance to Galileo, because, at least if we are to believe the contemporaries, it was Newton who managed to apply mathematics, once abstracted from real world behaviour, to physics, and thus integrated mathematics and some kind of idea about the real world.
So, before you can even think of inertia, for instance, you have to be able to abstract from the Lifeworld. And this is what Husserl is talking about.
"After all, he is not primarily interested in the history of cognition".
Dear Jean-Pierre Castel
Thaks for your clarification!
You are right in your emphasis on the prior presence of physical concepts. However, physical concepts inherently cohere with “mathematical concepts”. Mass, or example, is a physical quantity – therefore the concept mass reflects an arithmetical analogy within the structure of the physical mode. Likewise, the first main law of thermondynamics reflects a kinematic analogy: energy-constancy (constancy = uniform, rectilinear motion).
The distinction between the kinematic and the physical (energetic) is fairly common in natural scientific circles. Max Planck, for example, sharply and correctly distinguishes between a ‘mechanical’ and an ‘energetical’ view of nature (Planck,1973:65). In a different context, Janich also draws a clear distinction between phoronomic [kinematic] and dynamic statements. And inertia is not a physical concept, it is a kinematic concept. Galileo discovered it with the aid of thought experiment.
Before Galileo, the belief was held that any moving body needed some dynamic force to continue its movement. Galileo, however, claimed that a body in motion will continue this motion endlessly, except when some force impinges on it. In his Dialogues and mathematical demonstrations concerning two new sciences (1638) Galileo formulated this idea in terms of a thought-experiment: I imagine a body being placed on a horizontal plane without any impediment, from which it follows ... that the movement of this body on the plane would be uniform and ever-enduring, if the plane is extended into infinity.
The way in which Galileo formulated this principle of inertia strongly influenced Kant. C.F. von Weizsacker framed Kant's problem in terms of the question: What is nature, that it must obey laws which man could formulate with his understanding? Kant, in fact, in his conception of the categories, even moved a step further.
Galileo formulated his thought-experiment, without taking account of any real sense-experience, to arrive at his law of inertia. This law is derived and prescribed to moving entities out of the pure understanding of the human being in its spontaneous subjectivity. This represents the crucial epistemological turn in ascribing the primacy no longer to the object, but to the subject. In a somewhat different context, Kant wrote about the difficulty involved in this turn, namely how 'subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects' (CPR, 1787 B,122).
The way in which Kant tried to solve this problem, illustrates that, in line with the thought-experiment of Galileo, Kant drew the radical humanistic conclusion: the laws of nature are a priori contained in the subjective understanding of the human being: 'the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience' (B,161); 'Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances' (1787 B,163); 'Understanding creates its laws (a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to nature' (Prolegomena, 1783, II 36,320).
Indeed, Kant tried to consolidate and strengthen the preceding natural science-ideal, be it in the restricted form of the rationalistically elevated understanding which is considered to be (though limited to sensibility in order to save a separate super-sensory domain for the practical-ethical freedom of autonomous man), the a priori lawgiver of nature!
Husserl was actually critical of what he called the “rationalistic science-ideal” since Galileo (Krisis, page 119).
Danie Strauss
"before you can even think of inertia, for instance, you have to be able to abstract from the Lifeworld" : yes, but the Greeks did it, ther is no modern revolution about that
"That is, I think, where the Greeks did not accomplish very much." This is a wide spread opinion, which ignores the hellenistic science. It is true that most of their texts have been lost. But what remains and what Lucrece, Seneca, Plutarque tells of them shows that they did much. Best book about it : Lucio Russo, The Forgotten Revolution: How Science Was Born in 300 BC and Why It Had to Be Reborn. Berlin, Springer, 2004. (I can send you the pdf version if you are interested).See also Richard Carrier, The Scientist in the Early Roman Empire, Epub, 2014.
Many thanks!
Daniel Strauss,
The key point for me is when you say : Galileo discovered it with the aid of thought experiment.
This is what Kant, Husserl (I suppose), Koyré (I'm sure) and many after them tell. But Stillman Drake, Maurice Clavelin and others have now demonstrated that Galileo made true experiences, and that he came to the principle of inertia when he made the inclination of the plans where he let bowls roll vary from upwards to downwards. He concluded that when the inclination was 0 , the movement if any did not stop.
How he presents it in his Discorsi is another thing : the purpose there is to convince, not neceeessarily to show the backyard.
It's not only kinetic, because kinetic just describes, as the Galileo law of fall does. Prinicple of inertia is a principle, the first axiom of Newton's dynamic, it's not a pure kinetic description. Likewise, F=ma is not a pure kinetic formula.
The fact that it is not a mathematical necessity has been demonstrated by Henri Poincaré in « Le principe d’inertie », in La science et l’hypothèse, 1902, chapitreVI http://www.ebooksgratuits.com/html/poincare_science_hypothese.html. It just says that the order of the differential equation of movement is superior to one.
Thanks