Roy Bhaskar argues that critical realism entails epistemological relativism. We may recognise the possibility of true and false statements but this is relative to the particular context of the propositional discourse. There are no final or absolute, but merely temporary understandings that can be regarded as true 'for the moment' as it were.

My interest in this question is related to the contemporary adoption of critical realism by some theologians who think that it provides a more than relativist conception of truth. Does the concept of some sort of transcendent truth, one that gets past the transitive nature of particular perspectives, make sense?

Roy Bhaskar’s version of Critical Realism states that there is a complex and stratified world with multiple perspectives through which it can be seen. There are many lenses through which one may look at the world, and each lens sees something that is undeniably real. These lenses are coherent, but the totality of the real is not fully comprehended by any one of them. (Bhaskar, 1986, p. 92) Elsewhere he uses the term “ontological depth” to describe this stratification. (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 16) In such a world, one might expect entities which frustrate empirical efforts at explanation and detection. I find Bhaskar's understanding of truth to be that it is too complex for us to ever fully grasp. That seems reasonable.

Mike I have apparently overlooked, or missed entirely, Bhaskar's claims about this entailing relativism. When you credit him with saying this, do you think he is speaking in a macro or a micro sense? I can accept a small degree of epistemological relativism due to our ignorance, but I cannot accept it on a macro level of explanation.

Thanks Bill.

Bhaskar claims epistemological relativism as the handmaiden of ontological realism, (Realist Theory of Science 1997 Verso edition page 249).

What does he mean when he says the world is 'stratified' and where is the reference for this? I can understand a stratified perception, i.e. seeing at various levels, but I cannot understand what he means by stratification as intrinsic to reality. I can make little of the concept of ontological depth. Are we saying that there are different levels of being in terms of the material world ?

Does the view that truth is too complex for us to grasp the same as epistemological fallibilism ?. I find this position reasonable. I don't think that he is much use to theology, at least not when that is focused on some notion of transcendent truth.

Hello Mike,

The idea of it being stratified is here: Bhaskar, R. (1986). "London:Verso." Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (on page 92)

The concept of "ontological depth" occurs across his writings, but the phrase is here: Bhaskar, R. (1998). Critical realism essential readings. London:Routledge. (on page 16)

I agree that this is not much use to theology. I think it is used as a "defeater" for those setting forth thinking which amounts to "scientism". It is a concept which says that although we have some measure of access to reality, reality itself is too complex to be fully summed up under any one heading or category. Those propounding some form of scientism usually overstate their case, and critical realism can be accessed in order to "prick" the balloon of their totalizing statements.

Mike,

your question depends on one hand on what is meant by "contains a theory of truth". From a the perspective of a "Primitivist Theory of Truth" (see Jamin Asay: The Primitivist Theory of Truth, 2013) it is probably better to state that critical realism is built on the more fundamental idea of truth.

My opinion is that admitting that there is a "external" or "material" reality, which especially is relevant in natural science, brings up the question of how humans and human language or mathematics is related to this. Hence human perspectives are theoretically infinite but not arbitrary; rather anthropomorphic. Nietzsche once stated, that science cannot be fully objective because all such efforts of humans mean to "relate to" ("Erkennen ist aber immer „sich irgendwo in Bindung setzen“; Erkennen heißt „sich in Bindung setzen zu etwas“: sich durch etwas bedingt fühlen und ebenso es sich selbst unsrerseits bedingen..." Fragmentse1885-1887).

Hence because of the anthropomorphic restriction on one hand, which nevertheless does not mean that this is limited (language and mathematical modeling are infinite) a principal criterium of the relation between explanation and "real world" is fundamental. This is the idea of truth, the differentiation between pure fantasy (or delusion) and "what is". Therefor it seems to me that without a fundamental concept of truth critical realism as a position is impossible.

The ontologically differentiation you mentioned in my opinion is meant as a difference between our scribble on paper or verbal utters and the object of research. But in social science the problems are more complicated because the objects of research often are such scribbles and utters.

Reflecting the theological debate I think that a transcendent truth for science is not necessary, on one hand because truth is fundamental. And on the other hand, not knowing what reality as a whole is, does not imply that we have to assume that a transcendent truth exists, it only means that we don't know it.

(Sorry for my not perfect use of the English language, especially in discussing philosophical problems I always feel that I am very limited in the expression of what I mean.)

Thanks Thomas,

'critical realism is built on the more fundamental idea of truth'. What is this fundamental idea ? The fundamental idea of truth, I would take to be that expressed in Aristotle's statement, of truth, 'To say of what is that it is, and of what is not, that it is not' in other words a correspondence between propositions that purport to describe the world, and the reality of the world that is being described. What other idea of truth is more fundamental ?

Not to belie the philosophical subtleties of your question about language and maths in relation to reality, one might argue that they are human ways of organising reality according to our cognitive dispositions. Objects and events in reality are not counted or described until we do so.

'that without a fundamental concept of truth critical realism as a position is impossible'. Roy Bhaskar presents ontological realism as epistemologically relative. Truth is relative to the transitive domain by which the intransitive is described and explained. There are different ways of seeing reality and different 'truths' that may be embedded in them. This is the critical realist position as I understand and I do not think it is impossible. Indeed it is a very practical way of looking at reality.

I am fully in accord with your observation re, social science. The intransitive social reality is a socially constructed one and in this respect, indeed it is doubtful if it can be referred to as intransitive. How might we characterise the ontological status of a courtroom or a school ? Both the intransitive and transitive seem to collide in these situations. Much is made of the use of critical realism by social researchers. Its popularity might be as a result of its (possibly illicit) association with critical theory. There is a great deal of tortuous prose devoted to critical realism and social theory but I have yet to get to the crux. If anybody can distil the position of CR is social theory it would be of great help in my own research.

Discussing these philosophical points in any other language than my native tongue would be quite beyond my capacities. I am extremely impressed with the fluency of fellow researchers like yourself, who manage this.

Regards, Mike.

Dear BiIl,

I cannot find the reference to ontological depth on page 16 (Essential Readings; Archer et al 1998 Routledge) but on page 437 he refers to 'ontological stratification within the constitution of our theoretical and practical agency'.

This is a classic example of the difficulties that Bhaskar presents in his prose. Is he saying that the transitive (theoretical understandings and human agency) is ontologically stratified? What is the ontological status of a theory ? I can understand the notion of different levels of theoretical understanding but how would this represent different levels of ontology. Does not a superficial explanation have the same ontological status as a complex or deep one? He can't really mean this - so if not this, what does he mean?

I've put in an order for 'Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation' - perhaps that will be a little clearer.

Mike.

Asay currently (2013) stated that "TRUTH is conceptually primitive" and "TRUTH may well be one of those concepts that we need in order to deploy any others" (p. 194). One of his conclusions is that truth is an indefinable concept. And he as well as others found problems in the correspondence theory of truth (there are a lot of alternative approaches of truth: semantic theory, performative theory, redundancy theory etc.). The position of Asay is built on thoughts of Frege who stated, that there is no additional information, adding the term "it is true that" (example: There is one even prime number. versus It is true that there is one even prime number). It is therefor not necessary to ad truth because it is already in.

I do not know the discussion about Roy Bashkars work, therefor I do not know enough. But I have the feeling that relativism in the context of truth has a problem, because stating that truth is relative would mean (referring to Asay and Frege), that "It is true that truth is relative!" and in consequence lead to a paradox, because this statement would also only be relative. So to me it means that it is not meant what is said.

In the moment I would agree that there are different ways to "see the reality" but that does not in the same time mean that there are different truths, because truth is not embedded in anything, it is more fundamental. A concept of reality depends on philosophical positions if we see it as outside reality, as holistic or as personal points of view etc. But with this a lot of critical questions are coming up, as for example are discussed in Thomas Nagels new book "Mind and Cosmos: Why The Materialistic Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False" 2012). I should think more about the relation of the concepts truth and reality.

Regards, Thomas

Sorry Mike, I must have given you the wrong reference. I'll look and see if I can find the correct one.

Mike it is in The Possibility of Naturalism, an older work which has been republished. It was originally released in 1979, and was re-released in 1998. The date of publication was what confused me. It is right there on page 16.

Here's a link: http://books.google.com/books?id=aVD7m4uSgj0C&pg=PT20&lpg=PT20&dq=%22but+only+a+concept+of+ontological+depth%22&source=bl&ots=D2c5RL_bgC&sig=ZAsw6AX9jVALPM6OE7KPikix-Wg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=GDP-Uqj9O8i0sQTai4GQAQ&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=%22but%20only%20a%20concept%20of%20ontological%20depth%22&f=false

The book is on Google books and you could just search within the book too. Sorry for the confusion.

That's o.k. Bill - Routledge seems to have a way of repeating material in Roy's publications - I have found little that wasn't originally in the the Realist Theory of Science, or in the Essential Readings from Critical Realism.

Looking at what he says about stratification in science and nature he seems to be saying that there are hidden mechanisms that are necessary and sufficient bases for causal relationships to be... what? Identified? But we can't do that because they are hidden and do not tie in with constant conjunctions. He says that the hidden mechanisms are a condition for science to make sense, but if we want to know how sceintists

sorry - if we want to know how science makes sense I was going to say that we perhaps should look at the practicalities of sceintific activity , but perhaps not. I am puzzling around this question of a hidden stratum of mechanisms that account for causal relationships and scientific laws. I can seen how the theological critical realists might take this as evidence of a 'hidden hand'. Bhaskar says that this is an apriori fact about science and therefore does not fall into the trap of the 'epistemic fallacy' but it seems to be a close run thing to me. He is making claims about reality from the basis of the way in which we understand it.

He says that science is a social construction so might not these hidden mechanisms that are implicit to science similarly be socially constructed ? That would put him back in the Kantian camp.

Any thoughts - am I misunderstanding something about stratification?

Mike.

Mike I had Alister McGrath as a lecturer when I was a visiting student at Kellogg College, Oxford whilst he was Principal at Wycliffe Hall. At that time he had just released the second volume of his Scientific Theology. He used Bhaskar as I described above. The book is entitled "Reality". It is available online at Google Books, and I think you'll be able to see a lot of how he uses it if you do a "search inside book" using Bhaskar's last name. In my volume, which was purchased at Blackwell's, so it should be the same as what you have there in the U.K., pages xv and xvi tell you how he intends to make use of Bhaskar. Page 137 seems helpful, and then pages 199-244 have an ongoing discussion of ideas derived from McGrath's reading of Bhaskar. Although McGrath is a professor of Church History, he had his Ph.D. in molecular biophysics at a very young age prior to becoming a Christian, thus his ability to knowledgably comment on Bhaskar's claims.

I hope this helps as regards understanding how McGrath makes use of him. I cannot, however, comment on how other Christian writers may use him.

Best Wishes,

Bill

Thanks BIll.

Yes, Alister McGraph is my target. In that second volume you mentioned he opens chapter 10 with this comment;

'The term ‘critical realism’ has come to be used in theological circles to designate a style of realism which is sensitive to the historically situated and personally involved character of theological knowledge, while resolutely declining to let go of the ideals of truth, objectivity and rationality.'

I am not sure what the truth is as an ideal. What would be the ideal truth? But this is the reason for my question as to whether there is a theory of truth in critical realism. My sense is that there is not, at least not in the transcendent sense that McGraph is after. Bhaskar is an epistemological relativist. Truth in this case is relative to the transitive domain in which it is articulated. Insofar as religious forms are to be considered parts of a transitive domain, we might find different 'truths' in the context of different religious forms. As long as those 'truths' do not cause any harm to people then I see no problem with this, but it does call into doubt the limits of objectivity and rationality within religious belief (just as it does in scientific belief).

MIke.

Hello Mike,

It has been a long time since I was at Kellogg and I am a bit too busy right now with other projects to sit down and take the time to read through McGrath's "Reality" with a careful eye. So, I will answer based on what I think he means, but this is not a "searched out" answer.

I don't believe McGrath means "ideal truth" per se, so much as he means truth as a real possibility as over against relativism. Although Bhaskar may be a relativist at bottom, his notion of ontological depth would seem to indicate that there is a real truth of which we can speak, even if it be beyond our ken. It had become fashionable at the time when McGrath was writing for some Christian philosophers, who were viewing Deconstructionism as a boon rather than a bane, to constantly make reference to quantum indeterminacy as a rubric for reality. Seemingly only God could bring order out of an otherwise chaotic state of affairs. I believe that McGrath was using Bhaskar's notion somewhat polemically to say that although we may not have access to reality itself, due to its complexity, that is no reason to surrender the notion of there being a real truth. There is nothing of the sort of ideal which one associates with Plato in this thought process. I have, in my own personal taxonomy, placed Bhaskar's Critical Realism next to Polanyi's "Tacit Knowledge", which I understand to be saying that "we know more than we can explain". I purchased and read a number of Bhaskar's books back at that time, but I must say I was disappointed that the one who spoke of "ontological depth" did not speak of it at a level of sufficient depth to be as helpful as I had hoped. I am an ethical realist (not many of us around these days in the Academy), and had hoped that Bhaskar would give me more to work with than I actually found him to offer. I can certainly understand your surprise at McGrath's usage of Bhaskar.

Cheers,

Bill

Hi Bill,

Thanks for your thoughts.

From your interest in ethical realism I wonder if you might be interested in the following conference in the UK next January. I am thinking about submitting a paper challenging virtue ethics as a moral philosophy. I have had a few academic 'run ins' with the person who is organising it but I don't think that he will take it personally! It would be good to meet if you can get over. Oriel is a beautiful college in Oxford.

Regards, Mike.

Jubilee Centre for Character and Values

OPEN CALL FOR PAPERS

Varieties of Virtue Ethics in Philosophy, Social Science and Theology

Oriel College, Oxford

January 8 - 10, 2015

Full details available here.

We hereby send out an open call for presentations falling under the broad theme of ‘varieties of virtue ethics’. We ask interested parties to send us an abstract of about 500 words to [email protected] (marked ORIEL PROPOSAL in the subject line) before September 1, 2014. We will send out notifications of acceptance before the end of September.

Mike I am not a Virtue Ethicist, but I am close. I am an Aristotelian, and somewhat of a Thomist. That would interest me very much. My Bodleian card needs to be reactivated in order to make the trip fully worthwhile, but yes, I am very interested. Thank you. I have to run this morning, but I'll look more closely at this later. I was looking at the program you work with in education a couple of days ago and am interested in speaking with you about it.

Best Wishes - Bill

Hi Stefan, I wouldn't understand Popper as a Critical Realist - indeed Roy Bhasker who is probably the key figure in this philosophy, is critical of Popper.

Mike.

There are many different schools of thought which are referred to as "critical realism." Bhaskarian critical realism is historically unrelated to most of the others. Karl Popper can be considered a critical realist (in the pre-Bhaskarian sense), but many of his views are quite different from Bhaskar's. See my online resource:

http://markfoster.space/