This might get at some of your questions: Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.

doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.962018

By Shepherd, Joshua

Philosophical Psychology, Vol 28(7), Oct 2015, 929-946.

In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4, I contrast the absence of consciousness with the presence of consciousness in behaviorally identical agents. Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents. Focusing in particular on two leading views of free will and moral responsibility, namely, Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views, I argue that these results present philosophers of mind and action with the following explanatory burden: develop a substantive theory of the connection between consciousness on the one hand and free will and moral responsibility on the other that takes folk views on this connection seriously. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved)

Hendrika Vande Kemp, thank you very much for drawing my attention to this highly relevant paper. This is exactly the sort of work on 'folk' views that I am interested in reading. Unfortunately, Joushua Sheperd does not also provide a philosophical account of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility (understandably, given space constraints), noting that he "will be speaking of free will and moral responsibility interchangeably. In my view it is possible to tease these notions apart, but certainly many philosophers of action are primarily interested in the kind of free action that is necessary for moral responsibility." Hopefully other responses will be able to point me to further literature addressing this issue.

Below are a few of our papers, with varying degrees of philosophical considerations (high to low). Also look up numerous good papers by Eddie Nahmias and Al Mele.

Roskies, A. L., and Malle, B. F. (2013). A Strawsonian look at desert. Philosophical Explorations, 16, 133-152. doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.787439

Monroe, A. M., and Malle, B. F. (2014). Free will without metaphysics. In Mele, A. (Ed.), Surrounding free will (pp. 25-48). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Monroe, A. M., Dillon, K. D., and Malle, B. F. (2014). Bringing free will down to earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment. Consciousness and Cognition, 27, 100-108.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.011

Monroe, A. E., and Malle, B. F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate about, people’s folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 211-224.

Bertram Malle, thank you kindly for this extensive list. Judging from the titles, all of these papers will be highly relevant given my interests. I look forward to reading more.

I am writing a book on free will--but in essence if there is no free will there can be no moral responsibility--if you have no choice, you cannot help what you do--this is not a complicated issue except for people who try to justify having moral responsibility w/o free will--this does not work--

Edwin Locke, thank you for your response. Might you be able to point me in the direction of some authors who attempt to justify having moral responsibility without free will? I am interested in exploring outside of the typical Western intuition on this issue.

The one thing I read about is consequentialism--here is how it goes: it is true that people are not responsible for their crimes but they should be punished anyway as an example to others, so others will be conditioned to commit fewer crimes-here is the joke: the punishers are also determined so  how could they know how to set up the punishment system or to evaluate the results?

The free will issue is not based on intuition but reason--You might check The Oxford Handbook of Free Will edited by Robert Kane., 2nd Ed. You will find every idea under the sun in it.

Hi Jordan

Let me begin by saying that the concepts of free-will (i.e., one’s freedom to make choices that are sell-determined, not determined by external causes or even by divine intervention) and responsibility (see below) are important issues and have polemic, far-reaching psychological, educational, neural, legal, and even moral implications. To a great extent, one can associate free-will with Deci's theory of self-determination. In other words, the more one is self-determined, the more one is entitled to claim for his/her personal freedom and will-free.

In terms of psychological implications related to one's free-will, suffice it to say that because the concept of free-will refers to one’s freedom to initiate an activity for its own sake (e.g., it is  interesting and satisfying in itself -- intrinsic motivation ), such a concept is not accepted, for example, by behaviorists and neuroscientists, just to cite two examples. For the former, free-will is a myth, mainly because the variables of which human behavior is a function are in the physical and social environment. As such, radical behaviorists, such as Watson and Sinner, do not accept the idea of free-will, nor do they accept the idea of intrinsic motivation and self-determination. According to neuroscientists, does not make sense either to speak of ee-will and self-determination because one’s behavior is a function of one's brain. For example, we act morally/immorally because of our brain, not because of our free-will, self-determination, and intrinsic motivation. Parenthetically, it should be sad that different things happen (e.g., electrical firings) in our brain when we think/act morally/immorally. However, it is people as a whole, not their brains, who are moral/immoral, and the like. 

In terms of educational implications having  to do with one's free-will and self-determination, we can say that if students are self-determined and intrinsically motivated because of their free-will, then professors have a minor, if any, role in the teaching/learning process. At their best, teachers/professors role is to help pupils/students to be more intrinsically than extrinsically motivated. However, such way of thinking, one may object, amounts to falling prey to an oxymoron. Actually, if students become intrinsically motivated because of an external aid, how can they be considered as self-determined, intrinsically motivated and entitled to have free-will? Does this mean that free-will and self-determination are not to be seen as nothing-or-all phenomena?  However, to think of degrees of free-will and self-determination seems to ruin the concepts of free will and self-determination.  In fact, how does one reconcile free-will and self-determination with the existence of external motivation?  

In moral and legal terms, it makes much sense to think that the more one has free-will and is intrinsically determined and motivated, the more one is morally and legally responsible for his/her behaviors. In contradistinction, one may think that the less one has  free-will and is extrinsically determined or motivated, the less one is legally and morally responsible for his/her behavior. This shows that free-will, self-determination, and responsibility, be it moral, legal, or even causal, are deeply intertwined.  In other words, the more you are intrinsically determined or motivated and entitled to have free-will, the more it makes sense to say that: (a) you are the real actor of your behaviors, in causal terms; and (b) you are the only responsible for such behaviors in moral and legal terms. This clearly shows that there is a deep relationship between self-determination, will-free, and responsibility.

Note, however, that the concept of responsibility has different meanings. It suffices to say that to be responsible for a previous behavior we performed, displayed, or exhibited is quite different from, for example, to be responsible to others’ needs. If the former leads us to think mainly of causality and agency, the latter leads us to think mainly of one’s duties and obligations. This second meaning of responsibility is also related to the concepts of self-determination, intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, and free-will. Let me put this in terms of Kohlberg’s theory of three levels and six stages of moral reasoning. “Are you obliged to steal to save, for example, a human life?” As I see it, different degrees of will-free and of intrinsic/extrinsic reasons/motivations can lead an individual to feel obliged to steal/ not to steal to save a human life. In this example, we may think of pre-conventional (Stages 1 and 2), conventional (Stages 3 and 4) and post-conventional {Stage 5 and 6) morally-oriented individuals. Think, for example, of an individual whose answer to the previous question is the following: “I feel obliged to save a human life because I want to become a famous, important individual. If this were the case, then we would be, as it were, before a Stage 1, and extrinsically-oriented individual. That is, an individual whose motivations to be feel obliged to save a human life are external and egocentric in their very nature. As such, that individual seems not to be entitled to have free-will because his/her moral obligation was externally-oriented.

Consider now the case of an individual whose motivation to not feel obliged to steal in such case is, for example, not to have problems with the police of his/her country. This individual could be considered a Stage 2, and also an extrinsically motivated individual. Again, this individual seems not to be entitled to have free-will because his/her moral obligation was also externally-oriented.

Consider now the case of an individual whose main motivation to feel obliged to steal in the example above is, for example, to receive approval from his/her peers, or to be considered a good, “nice guy” in conventional terms. Such individual would be a Stage 3-oriented individual, an extrinsically-motivated subject. Does one have free-will when one thinks or acts so as to receive social approval from his/her peers, for example? Consider now the case of a Stage 4-oriented respondent, whose  motivation to not feel obliged to steal in such circumstance might be to maintain the democratic functioning of his/her country. Such respondent could also be considered an extrinsically-motivated individual. Again, does one have free-will when one thinks that s/he obliged to steal to save a human so as to maintain, say, the normal functioning of his/her country? Although extrinsically-motivated, these two types of, say, conventional individuals are less extrinsically-motivated than their pre-conventional counterparts. In fact, the motivation for maintaining the normal functioning of one’s own or even other countries is less egocentric, and hence, less extrinsically motivated than that, for example, of having  possible problems with the police. All of this seems to reinforce the idea that intrinsic/extrinsic motivations, self-determination and free-will are not to be seen as nothing-or-all concepts.  In other words, there are degrees of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, self-determination and free-will. There is also mounting evidence that shows that as development proceeds, individuals actively attempt to transform an extrinsic motive (e.g., to be competent due to others’ pressure) into an intrinsic one (e.g., to be competent because it is satisfying in itself), and hence, are more equipped with an ability to self-determination and to decide themselves about their future (i.e., will-free). That an extrinsic motive may be transformed into an intrinsic one, only compounds the idea that extrinsic and intrinsic motives are not to be seen in purely dichotomous terms, but rather as two faces of the same coin (i.e., one’s motivations underlying his/her behaviors). Could the same the said of self-determination and will free? I think so. That is, self-determination and free-will speak in favor of human beings’ ability to greatly determine their destiny and future. Needless to say, self-determination and free-will are two powers human beings have which are consistent with a constructivist (not constructionist) approach to one’s development and learning. Because we capable of self-determination and free-will, we are the main responsible for our development and learning.     

When answering the above mentioned question (i.e., “Are we obliged to steal to save a human life?”), an individual may answer that s/h is (or feels) obliged to steal to save a human life because such obligation derives from his/her chosen moral principles, such as the golden rule. This individual would be a Kohlbergian postconventional individual, a truly self-determined subject, and a real will-free-oriented person. Consider now the example of an individual who feels obliged to steal to save a human life because s/he is fully aware that one’s right to live is a fundamental right of every human being. Again, we would be before a Kohlbergian postconventional individual, an intrinsically-determined or motivated subject, and a person showing what will-free really is. As the late Kohlberg [see Colby & Kohlberg (1987). The measurement of moral judgment, Vols.1 and 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] gave up of his initial Stage 6, the examples mentioned above could substantiate a Stage 5 or Stage 6-oriented individual, a highly intrinsically-motivated subject, and a person showing a high manifestation of free-will.

Note that when confronted with a moral dilemma (e.g., “Should /should we not steal to save a human life?”), Stage 5 individuals tend to think that certain legal and even moral norms, such as we should not steal, are to be seen in relative rather than absolute terms. Stage 6 moral reasoners tend to check their moral options in terms of, say, the test of reversibility (i.e., “Would I advocate the same conclusion if, in the conflict of interests or welfares at hand, positions were reversed?)” and of universalizability (“Did I reach a conclusion that would be acceptable  for all at times and places?”). As it is easily conceivably, Stage 5 and Stage 5- oriented individuals are more likely than their preconventional or conventional counterparts to be intrinsically-motivated and exhibit clear manifestations of will-free.  In other words, the more one is developed, for example, in terms of cognitive, social, emotional, moral development, the more one is likely to be self-determined, intrinsically-motivated, and capable of showing clear marks of will-free. This is so, because as development whatever goes on, individuals become more capable of going beyond the external, perceptual, and visible features involved in a given problem, task, situation, and the like, of being self-determined, and of displaying examples of will free. Needless to say, contrary to extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation has to do with personally endorsed and internalized values, motives, norms, principles, and the like [see, for instance, Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (Eds.), (2002). Handbook of self-determination research. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press].

I hope that I have got your points and questions and that this helps

.Best regards