We know that sets exist in books or in our minds, and that we behave as if they existed independently of us. We, most of us, believe that the universe, even if we were not there, would be as it is. And of course, the sets would be there too – in some way. We believe this, don’t we? They “would be there” may be not exactly as we see them and understand them. Still, the universe would be coherent in a way that any “other” intelligence, that would be able to observe it, would have to admit - would have to see - that the universe would contain also sets. The sets would possibly be somehow different from "our" sets, but would be faithfully coherent sets - and they would be there.

But, are we sure? Would sets be still there? Not as some concepts but as the real, possible “descriptions” of the things that are inhabiting the world, objective descriptions of how the things that are there in the world really are?

Some basic references are given below.

Universals

http://www.iep.utm.edu/universa/

Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-mathematics/

Nominalism in Metaphysics

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/

Problem of universals

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals

Classification

http://www.iep.utm.edu/classifi/

Essential vs. Accidental Properties

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental/

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