Is the hypothesis about “retinoid system” (by Professor Arnold Trehub), as described in “Consciousness and Cognition” 16 (2007) 310–330 and in the other works of Professor Trehub, a plausible hypothesis? What are its advantages and what are its problems?
Professor Trehub describes it in the following words:
“Activation of the brainʼs putative retinoid system has been proposed as the
neuronal substrate for our basic sense of being centered within a volumetric
surround –- our minimal phenomenal consciousness (Trehub 2007). Here, the
assumed properties of the self-locus within the retinoid model are shown to
explain recent experimental findings relating to the out-of-body-experience. In
addition, selective excursion of the heuristic self-locus is able to explain many
important functions of consciousness, including the effective internal
representation of a 3D space on the basis of 2D perspective depictions. Our
sense of self-agency is shown to be a natural product of the role of the heuristic self-locus in the retinoid mechanism.” (Abstract, from: Where am I? Redux.)
For the publications of Professor Trehub see:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Trehub
The question has been already discussed on the folowing thread:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_mathematics_a_human_contrivance_or_is_it_innate_to_nature
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A great MAN has gone in peace.
Arnold Trehub passed away peacefully at home on April 3, 2017 at the age of 93.
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Marc,
Not being an expert here, your statement seems logical to me – we will see if Arnold has some deeper insight that might come from his retinoid examinations and insights.
Yes Bernd, science is subjective from each individual scientist’s viewpoint. Therefore the best we can do is to work together in consensus which each other (although that would never be a guarantee to avoid grave errors). Have a good conference!
Permit me to add my explanation. This may help the discussion.
(1)
This is what I understood so far from your article in Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 310–330 (up to the section 3.4).
A receptive field is assumed and this requires a functional explanation that can be modelled as a functional "structure" like retinoid system. Retinoid system (network) is a functional (not anatomical) structure composed of autaptic cells (cells having their dendrites finishing also on own cell body). They make a net similar to one presented on the fig. 1. It serves to represent visual signals in a three dimensional form. It contains some short memory storage that permits 3D reconstruction of essentially two dimensional simultaneous or delayed input. The cells form a functional array and remind us of the gates operating, as some Boolean gate system.
The shift control system is a functional regulator that permits dynamic representation of the input signals on the retinoid array and is responsible for the reconstruction of complex pictures and movement. Those are modulated by upper or lower layers of functional neural "centres" of the retinoid system that are interconnected to the entire retinoid system.
Self locus. It has very well determined location and serves to position itself (has no afferent input) and build our relation to the representation of the surroundings.
The positioning of the received signals and reconstruction of the objects observed is determined by the "ego" localisation ("self" locus, determined by foveal lutea axis), by the vestibular and by the motor input. This helps us in space orientation.
The arrangement of the array into layers permits above mentioned functions to be so synchronised that special and temporal synthesis of the sensorial input is possible and representation of the external world is created so to match but is certainly not identical in some ordinary manner.
(2)
My conclusion from partial reading of the Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 310–330
I examined your paper up to the section 3.4 and think that this is CERTAINLY very interesting model that may be (partially) true. Indeed, anatomical localisation is probably very hard to establish. It is possible that the model explains many things that we see and how we understand our visual impressions or even help explain our imaging and synaesthesia. I will have to continue riding, of course. To test the model experimentally is not easy and I do not think that Arnold "has to do this". Let the others verify this attractive model.
I will add later the part (3) of what I understand of Arnolds ingenious model.
The opinions of neurophysiologists and other related experts is welcome.
Cross posted:
An interesting finding in the SMTT experiment [based on the retinoid model] is that there is a reliable phase transition threshold between perception and hallucination. The vertical oscillation rate of the upper dot must be equal to or greater than 4 cycles/second. This means that each autaptic neuron that is an element in the retinoid contour of the hallucination must be refreshed at an interval of ~250 milliseconds or less before the dots disappear and a triangle is consciously experienced/hallucinated.
Dragan: "Retinoid system (network) is a functional (not anatomical) structure composed of autaptic cells (cells having their dendrites finishing also on own cell body). They make a net similar to one presented on the fig. 1"
I propose that the retinoid system is a real brain mechanism. As such, it exists as an anatomical system, even though it consists of an organization of component neuronal mechanisms that are distributed over several different regions of the brain. It is the biological reality of the structure and dynamics of the retinoid system that predicts the systematic hallucinations demonstrated in the SMTT experiment.
Here is a depiction of the SMTT experiment that might help convey what happens in this procedure.
Bernd,
Have you discussed inner space/retinoid space with Russell Epstein?
Dragan,
Russell Epstein (psychology) and Michael E Goldberg (neuroscience) are members of RG who have published important work related to this thread. Maybe you should invite them to participate in this discussion. Their input would be valuable.
Bernd: "Depending on size of LCD-blot there should occur a critical point in the dynamics."
Do you mean that a phase transition should be observed in the pupillary oscillatory response?
Erkki: "The retinoid system appeals to play a crucial role here, since we know pretty well on one hand its physical properties as well as its phenomenal characteristics on the other. What do you see as the next step or understanding in this development?"
Good question. Dragan has invited a discussion and critique of the retinoid system on this thread. As more participants examine the concept from various angles, I think the next steps will be put on the table. Do you have any suggestions on this question?
Bernd: "We paint a black blot on it with 6 mm diameter. We hold that slide in front of our eyes, at, say, 15 cm distance. Then an illusion sets in. The pupil starts to pulsate. There appears oscillation of the pupillary response, and the blot moves away and approximates again."
When you say "the blot moves away and approximates again", do you mean that the blot is consciously experienced as receding and then coming closer, or do you mean that the blot disappears and reappears? Is the "pulsation" of the pupil an expansion and contraction of pupillary diameter, or something else?
Arnold,
As there is now this specific thread (thanks to Dragan) about your retinoid system and specifically about your interpretation of the results of the SMTT experiment (as you report it) I take the opportunity to ask you my question once again.
Don't you want to make any comment on my last post to you about Ryad Benosman’s assertion that our eye doesn’t work like an ordinary camera, that it doesn’t produce a global image but sends information to our brain pixel by pixel, and only when something IS MOVING in our field of vision?
Mark,
I agree that the eye doesn't work like a camera. The field of sharp visual resolution is no more than 2 - 5 degrees, at the most, centered on the foveal axis. The retina sends information to the lateral geniculate, and then onto higher visual centers, via a bundle of parallel visual afferents (not pixel by pixel). Something does not have to move to be seen, but retinal receptors do quickly adapt to a fixed stimulus pattern. Naturally occurring micro-saccades prevent this from happening, so motionless stimuli do not disappear.
Arnold,
About Ağaoğlu et al.’s 2012 paper “Non-retinotopic Feature Processing in the Absence of Retinotopic Spatial Layout and the Construction of Perceptual Space from Motion” you wrote one month ago “This differs *significantly* from the retinoid model because space is NOT constructed from motion. In fact, the brain cannot represent an object in motion without FIRST having some kind of representation of space. This is one of the fundamental problems that the retinoid model solves”.
I don’t understand how it is possible to assert that “The brain cannot represent an object in motion without FIRST having some kind of representation of space”. To me, the brain cannot have a representation of the space per se but can only grasp the perceptual space through objects. Moreover, there is likely no space per se in the physical reality contrary to Newton’s belief.
Erkki, Bernd, Eugene,
Retinoid theory claims that all the theories of physics are about a universe that physicists experience ONLY in the subjective retinoid space of their brains -- their phenomenal world. Moreover, physical theories, as such, are invented by the recurrent interaction of the conscious content of retinoid space with its synaptically-linked preconscious cognitive mechanisms. All of this is composed as a system of particular kinds of biological MECHANISMS. So in order to understand the genesis of physical theory and the biophysical constraints on its possible content, we have to understand the biological structure and dynamics of the brain mechanisms that invent/construct scientific theory.
I wonder if Erkki, Bernd, and Eugene would agree with the above statement. If not, what would be the points of disagreement?
Bernd,
I am not aware that Feynman has ever said something about biology and particularly about neurophysiology. Richard Feynman was a too clever scientist to speak of something he had not deeply studied.
Actually I considered two totally different kinds of questions about space in my post to Arnold:
1. How can brain grasp the perceptual space? Which is a neurophysiological question;
2. Is the space in the physical reality absolute (as Newton thougth it was) or relative (as Einstein considered it in his gravitation theory)? Which is a pure physical question.
Bernd: "At any case, I would suggest that the absence of inner biological mechanisms do not render outer space annihilated."
Absolutely. The evolutionary emergence of retinoid space (inner space) could not happen without the existence of the outer space in which all organisms exist. Our scientific theories are aimed at understanding the systematic relationship between what is inner and what we believe is outer.
Erkki,
On the question of the "Hard Problem" (HP):
First, in order to understand phenomenal consciousness, we must accept our epistemological limitations. Just as we cannot fully understand how quantum processes produce all of the objects and events within our experience, so must we acknowledge that we will be unable to fully understand how brain processes produce our undeniable conscious experiences. Second, in contrast to sheer correlation, all explanation is theory bound, so we cannot expect to understand consciousness without an explanatory theory. Third, overwhelming evidence indicates that consciousness is produced by brain processes, so the challenge is to formulate a theory of brain processes that can be demonstrated to explain/predict relevant conscious experiences.
The problem is that naturalistic accounts must be consistent with scientific accounts, and in scientific accounts descriptions of one kind or another are all that we have to work with. This is why I have proposed that the “Hard Problem” is a problem of 1pp vs 3pp language, an epistemological problem rather than an ontological problem.
So Arnold, again you are reluctant to comment my assertions.
What is your answer when I assert that the brain cannot have a representation of an absolute space but only can grasp the perceptual space through objects?
Arnold,
According to David Chalmers the distinction between the HP and the Easy Problem is the latter requires only to specify the mechanism that can performance the function of perception consistent with our conception of natural phenomena. Since he believes that consciousness is nonphysical in nature this in fact constitutes the HP.
So even if we could solve the problem of 1pp vs 3pp as an epistemological problem, it would still only be the solution of an Easy Problem?
Bernd,
Ok, Richard Feynman could be fallible as a scientist (as all true scientists: only false scientists are not!).
But you don't show that Feynman has ever said something about biology and particularly about neurophysiology, do you? I would be interested in such findings.
Erkki,
Here is an exchange between David Chalmers and me in an online conference on consciousness:
…………………………………………………………
From the *Online Conference on Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness* (Feb 2012):
David Chalmers: “ … for any cognitive function one might explain, one can always raise the further question: why is that function (or that structure) accompanied by consciousness?”
Arnold Trehub: “Could this question be validly raised if activation of that brain structure and its intrinsic dynamics were to *constitute* consciousness?"
Arnold Trehub: “David, I’ve proposed that phenomenal events can be understood in terms of brain events if we adopt a bridging principle of corresponding analogs between 1st-person descriptions of of phenomenal events (generated within the brain of a subject) and 3rd-person descriptions of brain events (generated by observers of other brains). These two kinds of descriptions occupy different descriptive domains so we cannot assert mind-brain identity. However, if we can formulate biophysical models of brain mechanisms that generate good biophysical analogs of salient phenomenal events (matching features), I think we are justified in claiming (within the norms of science) that we can explain conscious content. What are the counter-arguments?”
David Chalmers: “arnold: all that is fine. It’s precisely the strategy that I adopt myself (see e.g..http://consc.net/papers/scicon.pdf ). But it is not a wholly reductive explanation, precisely because you have to appeal to a primitive bridging principle that is not itself explained.”
……………………………………………………………………….
What do you think about Chalmer’s argument?
Arnold,
It seems that Chalmers’ argument is so cleverly designed that whatever principle one might devise, cf. your bridging principle, he will always come up with a “why” question.
However in his “Philosophy Program”, scion.pdf, he seems to be less strict in that he devises possible strategies for investigating the contents of consciousness. Nevertheless in his “Obstacle” section it is clear that first person data is in principle impossible to study (unless you only allow your own perceptions), since they always become third person descriptions.
I agree with you that (it is also in fact my point of my "comunication paper") that a bridging principle based on fundamental laws should be able to explain conscious content. However I do not think that Chalmers would support such a claim as a contribution towards the HP.
I might add that in the communication archetype that I have proposed as the paradigm of evolution, the teleonomic process of interactions between two evolving life forms do both exchange first person data. The conscious content so obtained must go beyond the Easy Problem.
What do you think?
Erkki: "It seems that Chalmers’ argument is so cleverly designed that whatever principle one might devise, cf. your bridging principle, he will always come up with a “why” question."
Exactly! That is why I conditioned my explanation as being "within the norms of science". In any scientific explanation one can always follow the explanation with the further question; "But WHY should that be the case?". In science our explanatory intuitions/theories are validated by successful prediction/post-diction of relevant observations in the public domain (3pp). I have to leave for some minor surgery, but will have more to say about Chalmer's "Philosophy Program" later.
Take care Arnold!
Looking forward to your comments! All the best wishes
erkki
Marc,
I think you will find some answers to your question to Arnold in his reference to Chalmers' paper How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?
(see e.g..http://consc.net/papers/scicon.pdf )
Erkki,
Thank you for answering instead of Arnold but:
- first, I don't see what you mean,
- second, I expect that Arnold, when he doesn't reply to my assertion, doesn't want to show that too many of us still value a work or an assertion only if we agree with their content.
Marc,
While reading Chalmer's paper it struck me that the section on pages 6-7 concerned in particular visual processing connected with ventral and dorsal streams, which bear on the various pathways related to the processing of object identification and the objects spatial location relevant to the viewer. I do not know if this answers your query, but we have to await Arnold coming back from minor surgery.
Best
erkki
Erkki,
I had a look on David Chalmers' paper and particularly on pages 6-7 you mention.
This is about the hypothesis that there are "distinct neural bases for conscious and unconconscious processes in perception".
Actually, I thought already very strongly established that it was so: are there any data that constrast with this hypothesis?
However, I don't see how such a hypothesis can answer my question to Arnold: do you agree when I assert that the brain cannot have a representation of an absolute space but only can grasp the perceptual space through objects?
Marc,
Not being an expert here, your statement seems logical to me – we will see if Arnold has some deeper insight that might come from his retinoid examinations and insights.
Yes Bernd, science is subjective from each individual scientist’s viewpoint. Therefore the best we can do is to work together in consensus which each other (although that would never be a guarantee to avoid grave errors). Have a good conference!
Marc: "Arnold: do you agree when I assert that the brain cannot have a representation of an absolute space but only can grasp the perceptual space through objects?"
1. I don't understand what you mean by "absolute space".
2. I do not agree with the claim that the {human] brain cannot have a representation of the volumetric space in which it exists. On the contrary, the only way that we could possibly have a conscious experience of the global world/universe around us is to have an innate system of mechanisms that represent the world from a fixed locus of perspectival origin. In the retinoid theory of consciousness, this is the self-locus (I!) which gives us our egocentric perspective.
3. It is important to understand that we cannot PERCEIVE space because we have no sensory transducers that can detect the space we live in. We have the experience of being immersed in the world -- the space around us -- which can contain all kinds of objects and events; this is a PRESENCE, not a perception. In fact, it is impossible to perceive any aspect of the world of our subjective experience without FIRST having a brain representation of the world in which we can direct our attention (the heuristic self-locus) to capture and perceive a selected aspect of it.
4. Any object that we might perceive must have spatial extension and egocentric location in space, so it is evident that a brain representation of the space around us (consciousness/activated retinoid space) is a PRECONDITION for the perception of objects.
3 Recommendations
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Artnold,
You assert that "In fact, it is impossible to perceive any aspect of the world of our subjective experience without first having a brain representation of the world etc:.":
Please, could you cite some recent relevant references which support such a thesis (of course any others than yours)?
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Marc: "Arnold, You assert that 'In fact, it is impossible to perceive any aspect of the world of our subjective experience without first having a brain representation of the world' ....Please, could you cite some recent relevant references which support such a thesis"
Marc, if I assert that it is impossible to perceive any words in this message without first having a brain representation of this message, would you ask me to "cite some recent relevant references which support such a thesis"?
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Erkki and All,
Chalmers wrote: "The most obvious obstacle to the gathering of first-person data concerns the privacy of such data. In most areas of science, data are intersubjectively available: they are equally accessible to a wide range of observers. But in the case of consciousness, first-person data concerning subjective experiences are directly available only to the subject having those experiences. To others, these first-person data are only indirectly available, mediated by observation of the subject’s behavior or brain processes. Things would be straightforward if there were a “consciousness meter” that could be pointed at a subject, revealing his or her subjective experiences to all. But in the absence of a theory of consciousness[1], no such consciousness meter is available[2]."
1. There IS a theory of consciousness. The retinoid theory is a well-developed theory of consciousness.
2. I wonder if others would agree that the SMTT apparatus is a kind of a "consciousness meter"?
Chalmers wrote: "Project 4: Find the Neural Correlates of Consciousness"
"This leads us to what is perhaps the core project of current scientific research on
consciousness: the search for neural correlates of consciousness (Metzinger 2000; Crick and Koch 2004). A neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) can be characterized as a minimal neural system that is directly associated with states of consciousness.[3] Presumably the brain as a whole is a neural system associated with states of consciousness, but not every part of the brain is associated equally with consciousness. The NCC project aims to isolate relatively limited parts of the brain (or relatively specific features of neural processing) that correlate directly with subjective experience.[4]"
3. If NCC is taken as the "core project" of scientific research on consciousness, then I think we would be on a futile path because the neural correlates (NCC) of consciousness are boundless. The "minimal neural system that is directly associated with states of consciousness" will always remain to be found. This brings us to the next point.
4. Chalmers fails to consider the role of a competent brain MECHANISM (not a correlate) that can be demonstrated to generate biophysical events that are not merely "associated with states of consciousness", but are ANALOGOUS to relevant conscious content and enable us to successfully explain/predict new kinds of conscious content. As the field stands now, the retinoid model of consciousness is a viable candidate theory in the search for an explanation of consciousness/subjective experience. What are the competing theories?
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Arnold,
As you don't understand what I mean let us be more accurate.
You seem to say that you disagree with the claim that nervous systems cannot have a representation of the volumetric space before having the capability to recognize things moving in such a space: can you cite references supporting your opinion?
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Marc: "You seem to say that you disagree with the claim that nervous systems cannot have a representation of the volumetric space before having the capability to recognize things moving in such a space: can you cite references supporting your opinion?"
I am NOT saying what you claim I SEEM to be saying. I am saying what you earlier quoted me as saying. What you are now talking about is the DETECTION of object motion, which is not the same thing as as PERCEPTION. For example, flies detect motion, but I doubt if they have the brain machinery to PERCEIVE what they detect. In order for a fly to perceive what it detects, it would need a brain with a retinoid system and some other cognitive mechanisms.
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Arnold,
In relation to the interesting exchange you have with Marc, I would add a comment to your statements concerning Chalmers. I think one can view the concept of "Neural Correlates", NC in at least in two ways.
In the traditional sense I understand this to mean that neurological examinations of brain activities seem to correlate with various reactions and perceptions that are conveyed by the "first person".
However, I think there could be a deeper meaning, viz. the neural spike trains (if now math is innate here) might be utilized by the life form to form the contents of the information responsible for the brain activity in question. Maybe here is the place for the retinoid system and also my own Spatio-Temporal Mnemonic System.
Best
erkki
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Erkki, "However, I think there could be a deeper meaning, viz. the neural spike trains (if now math is innate here) might be utilized by the life form to form the contents of the information responsible for the brain activity in question."
How we think about "information" is critical here. This is my take on the concept of information:
.........................................................................................
My definition:
*Information* is any property of any object, event, or situation that can be detected, classified, measured, or described in any way.
1. The existence of information implies the existence of a complex physical system consisting of (a) a source with some kind of structured content (S), (b) a mechanism that systematically encodes the structure of S, ( c ) a channel that selectively directs the encoding of S, (d) a mechanism that selectively receives and decodes the encoding of S.
2. A distinction should be drawn between latent information and what might be called kinetic information. All structured physical objects contain latent information. This is as true for undetected distant galaxies as it is for the magnetic pattern on a hard disc or the ink marks on the page of a book. Without an effective encoder, channel, and decoder, latent information never becomes kinetic information. Kinetic information is important because it enables systematic responses with respect to the source (S) or to what S signifies. None of this implies consciousness.
3. A distinction should be drawn between kinetic information and manifest information. Manifest information is what is contained in our phenomenal experience. It is conceivable that some state-of-the-art photo —> digital translation system could output equivalent kinetic information on reading English and Russian versions of War and Peace, but a Russian printing of the book provides me no manifest information about the story, while an English version of the book allows me to experience the story. The explanatory gap is in the causal connection between kinetic information and manifest information.
.........................................................................................
How would you define *information*?
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Dear Arnold,
It is difficult to define information without involving encoding and decoding and the content dependence on the intelligent beings serving as emitter and receiver.
Another possibility is to adhere to the simple definition according to Shannon. He relates the measure of information as entropy, which is usually expressed by the average number of bits needed to store or communicate one symbol in a message. Hence entropy quantifies the uncertainty involved in predicting the value of a random variable.
Perhaps extending your advanced definition to incorporate information as a key ingredient of a communicating system, where the transmitter and receiver are properly included, which of course would additionally necessitate a definition of intelligence on the level commensurate with the possibilities inherently available in the information system.
Best erkki
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Erkki: "He [Shannon] relates the measure of information as entropy, which is usually expressed by the average number of bits needed to store or communicate one symbol in a message."
The concept of information in Shannon's terms has proven useful in the design of communication devices and systems, but I find it less useful when I think of intelligent biological systems. In particular, when we consider intelligent/cognitive systems without concern for the speed of processing or bandwidth, it is the *kind* of information transformations caused by the mechanisms of the cognitive system that are of the greatest interest. For example, consider the simulation of the cognitive system (retinoid and synaptic matrices) simulated in "Self-Directed Learning in a Novel Environment" on my RG page. Here, the design and operation of mechanisms for representing the global source of information, for parsing/perceiving it, for learning relevant parts of it, for classifying the parts, for recalling images of its parts, and for naming the parts, is treated independently of entropy constraints.
Erkki: "Perhaps extending your advanced definition to incorporate information as a key ingredient of a communicating system, *where the transmitter and receiver are properly included* [emphasis added], which of course would additionally necessitate a definition of intelligence on the level commensurate with the possibilities inherently available in the information system."
I agree. I think a proper conception of the transmitter (the world source) and the receiver (the brain of the scientist) is needed to resolve some of the basic gaps and dissonances in science.
2 Recommendations
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Arnold,
Maybe one should make an effort to define properly as succinctly as possible what is a cognitive system, from the "retinoid" point of view. Maybe you have done it in the "Self-Directed Learning" paper, but perhaps you can summarise it in one sentence.
Best
erkki
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Erkki: "Maybe one should make an effort to define properly as succinctly as possible what is a cognitive system, from the "retinoid" point of view. Maybe you have done it in the "Self-Directed Learning" paper, but perhaps you can summarise it in one sentence."
Ok, Erkki, here is my first try:
*A complete cognitive system embodies a global representation of the world from a fixed locus of perspectival origin[1], together with mechanisms that can parse selected aspects of the global representation for learning and recall to enable adaptive behavior.[2]*
1. This is consciousness/subjectivity, the egocentric content of retinoid space.
2. This is what is commonly referred to as intelligence -- learning and problem solving.
There all kinds of artifacts that do useful work under the rubric of intelligence , but there are no known artifacts that exhibit consciousness/subjectivity, so they are not complete cognitive systems. Humans are unique among living creatures in combining subjectivity with the highest levels of intelligence. This enabled humans to develop practices that dramatically change the world in which they exist; e.g., science and engineering.
Look at it this way::
Phenomenal World Analysis of Phenomenal World
(Conscious) ............................... (Pre-Conscious/Unconscious)
[Retinoid Space] [Synaptic Matrices, Semantic Networks, etc.]
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Arnold,
So can one say that a cognitive system is a subjective (egocentric) entity, complex enough (sufficiently intelligent) to interact (communicate) with its environment in order to self-direct learning?
I realise that one introduces additional concepts, but it is important not to exclude anything fundamental. The question is on what level do the cognitive system arises, and what is the "lower bound"?
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Erkki: "So can one say that a cognitive system is a subjective (egocentric) entity, complex enough (sufficiently intelligent) to interact (communicate) with its environment in order to self-direct learning?"
Yes. I think this is a good succinct way to capture the idea of a cognitive system. But it presupposes the understanding that subjectivity is a global perspectival representation of the space around the cognitive entity. For example, simple organisms such as planaria can probably sense chemical gradients in their environment and learn to move into nutritious regions and move out of noxious regions in their environment without an internal representation of the space within which they move. So I don't think that this kind of reflexive interaction/communication with the environment indicates that the organism exhibits subjectivity. It has no phenomenal world, and having a phenomenal world, no matter how sparse its contents, is the "lower bound". See C1 (bottom pp. 327 - 328) in "Space, self, and the theater of consciousness" and "Evolution's Gift: Subjectivity and the Phenomenal World" on my RG page.
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Dear Arnold,
It seems to come down to how to grade the "complexity" of the interaction/communication between the subject and the environment. My intuition is to set this border "closer" to interactions according to present physical laws. One way would be to define the concept of a "complex enough system" that cannot be incorporated under the umbrella of the present physical laws of nature. Such a somewhat unprecise definition would nevertheless extend the notion of a cognitive system. The problem obviously would be to be able associate such a system with subjectivity. My contention is that this is feasible using Gödel's theorem.
What do you think?
3 Recommendations
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Arnold,
You wrote "I wonder if others would agree that the SMTT apparatus is a kind of a *consciousness meter*?".
IMO, it is nonsense to think of an apparatus to measure a conscious feeling by a human being or by any other animals.
It would be like thinking of an apparatus to measure pain when studying the effect of an analgesic drug!
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Arnold,
You asked Erkky "How would you define *information*?".
Personally, I think there cannot be any information if there is not an agent to interpret it for itself.
A given signal (e.g. X-ray emission) cannot represent any information for a given agent if the agent cannot perceive or measure it. For instance, before knowing the existence of X-rays human beings were unable to interpret the effects of specific compounds (i.e., radioactive ones) on the body.
As Christopher Fuchs said "It is amazing how many people talk about information as if it is simply some new kind of objective quantity in physics, like energy, but measured in bits instead of ergs. In fact, you’ll often hear information spoken of as if it’s a new fluid that physics has only recently taken note of. I’m not sure what the psychology of this is — why so many want to throw away the hard-earned distinction the concept of information affords between what’s actually out in the world and what an agent expects of it — but the tendency to ontologize information is definitely there in the physics community and is even more pervasive in the philosophy of science community" (Fuchs, 2012).
Reference:
Fuchs CA (2012). Interview with a Quantum Bayesian. arXiv:1207.2141v1 quant-ph 9 Jul 2012.
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Marc,
We have discussed the QBism construal before and as I did say before: The QBism interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is really not an alternative, it is a sneaky way, however interesting, to involve the mind of an observer into the discussion. Although cleverly designed it does not serve as an option to replace conventional quantum mechanics (or the existing 10-15 different interpretations).
To involve the environment to a quantum system necessitates a rigorous extension of quantum mechanics, as I have proposed many times before on RG.
Although Fuch’s statement is reasonably correct I do not think it qualifies to make a serious statement regarding neural correlates, cognitive classifications, retinoid systems etc. except in a very general philosophical context (which of course may be very interesting in itself).
I think Arnold, Bernd, Dragan etc. and I are aware of your point since we have discussed information already from several perspectives, from Shannon’s objective definition to various attempts to succinctly define the essentials of communication arrangements, cognitive systems etc. and to come to grips with the mystery (and possible obsoleteness) of the inner/outer division; or call it subject/object, or sets versus relations, individual moves/interaction, (as stated by Bernd).
2 Recommendations
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Erkki: "It seems to come down to how to grade the "complexity" of the interaction/communication between the subject and the environment[1]. My intuition is to set this border "closer" to interactions according to present physical laws. One way would be to define the concept of a "complex enough system" that cannot be incorporated under the umbrella of the present physical laws of nature[2]. ...... The problem obviously would be to be able associate such a system with subjectivity[3]. My contention is that this is feasible using Gödel's theorem[4]."
1. This interactive complexity would seem to depend on the complexity of both the environment (the world in which the subject exists), and the complexity of the subject's sensory-motor and sensory-cognitive mechanisms.
2. It seems to me that all currently known sensory systems are reasonably well covered by the present physical "laws of nature".Your "complex enough system" that is not incorporated in the current physical canon is the *retinoid system* which constitutes the very subjectivity needed to invent the "laws of nature".
3. Yes. So complexity of information is not the decisive issue. SUBJECTIVITY is the decisive issue.
4. You might be justified in claiming that Gödel's theorem is a key to associating a complex interaction/communication system with subjectivity, but I don't have a good grip on how Gödel's theorem gives us the answer. Can you explain this connection with Gödel to a mathematical novice like myself?
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Erkki,
You answer "We have discussed the QBism construal before and as I did say before: The QBism interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is really not an alternative etc.".
Actually my reply was not about QBism ideas (even if I quoted Christopher Fuchs about the notion of information) but about the assertion that there cannot be any information if there is no agent to interpret it for itself.
You say "Although Fuch’s statement is reasonably correct" but then add "I do not think it qualifies to make a serious statement regarding neural correlates, cognitive classifications, retinoid systems etc. except in a very general philosophical context (which of course may be very interesting in itself)".
How can a statement be correct and in the same time not appropriate when applied to "neural correlates" which illustrate the nervous system subjectivity and processing of any external signal transforming it in a useful information for a conscious agent?
Do you refute the fact that there cannot be any information if there is no agent to interpret it for itself?
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Arnold,
I agree with what you say. I will try to make the Gödel statement as succinct as possible. I will be back.
Marc,
I think a statement can be “reasonably correct” like a parrot saying: “it is raining, it is raining” perhaps I should say accidentally correct. Although I am not intending to imply that there should be any similarities whatsoever between a parrot and Fuchs and QBism!
In fact I am not refuting what you say – it is correct of course. My intention was to make the comment that our discussion (with Arnold in particular) had already moved beyond the point you were reiterating. So we agree!
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Erkki,
I am glad to see you agree with my statement that there cannot be any information if there is no agent to interpret it for itself (even if you consider it a trivial statement).
Regarding my answer to Arnold's question "I wonder if others would agree that the SMTT apparatus is a kind of a *consciousness meter*?" Arnold has not commented it yet but you, what do you think when I assert that it is nonsense to think of an apparatus supposed to measure our conscious feelings?
1 Recommendation
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Manuel,
Maybe Bayesian inferences carried to its limits and QBism interpretations of QM comes close to your approach and understanding.
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Erkki,
Where is Manuel's post to which you seem to reply?
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Sorry, I did answer Manuel on another thread, but for some reason my IPad played a game with me and added it wrongly. I have given my answer to Manuel in the "human contrivance..".
6th Jun, 2014
Arnold Trehub
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Marc, there are all kinds of conscious feelings/quale. Some might be easier to measure than others. We have to start with the easier ones. But even an easier measurement gives us a start on the problem of providing an objective measure of subjective experience. In the SMTT apparatus, the subject's creation of his/her own quale of a triangle with a base that is varied to match its independently varied height, and that can be concurrently experienced by many observers, it seems, is an example of measuring conscious content/quale.
2 Recommendations
6th Jun, 2014
Marc Tessera
Arnold,
At least do you agree that it is nonsense thinking of an apparatus to measure pain when studying the effect of an analgesic drug?
Generally speaking I think it is nonsense thinking of an apparatus to measure subjective things like conscious feelings.
In both cases, i.e., pain and feelings, the only relevant way to measure or identify these is to question the subject about these (subject, i.e., subjective!).
In your SMTT experiment shape distortions are only perceived by the subject who is doing the experiment (i.e., an anorthoscopic perception) even if the subject is able to figure shape distortions graphically by the use of an experimental apparatus.
For instance, when measuring a patient's pain we ask the patient to figure it on a visual analog scale: this seems to be the same principle as your experimental methodology, doesn't it?
Actually, what do mean by the expression "quale of a triangle"?
6th Jun, 2014
Erkki J. Brändas
Uppsala University
Arnold,
Regarding “Gödel”:
Gödel’s famous self-referential sentence “ This sentence is unprovable”, i.e it is true if it is unprovable, cf. also the liars paradox, is mapped onto a transition operator | ψ> and |θ>. The situation is reminiscent of what we call the non-crossing rule in molecular physics, where the crossing actually do appear off the real axis. These so-called “Gödel states” are “collapse protected” and display anomalous time evolution.
Now this idea can be generalized to arbitrary dimensions, e.g. to a sequence of transitions | ψ 1 >
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