How important are human biology-based feelings in science practice?
Should efficient science be emotion-free, or not?
There seems to be a misconception, common in Western culture, that there is a dichotomy between rational, scientific processes (for example, in what some people call the" natural sciences") and intuitive, creative processes (for example, in what some label "arts and humanities"). Perhaps this is due to the vestiges of what some call "Cartesian duality", the illusion that we are spirits inhabiting bodies. The misconception exists on both sides of the academic divide, from chemists to visual artists. Being human (feeling, thinking, perceiving, interacting, contextualized bodies), there is always some combination of these sorts of cognitive processes going on. From my perspective (a social scientist with training in the visual arts), science is a conceptual and methodological toolbox for understanding ourselves and our surroundings. The universe is one, we are part of it, and there are no areas of inquiry that are not amenable to study from the scientific perspective.
I'll offer brief answers to both questions.
Q1: They're clearly important sometimes. For instance, a scientist might care deeply about her own theory, and feel attacked personally when someone else challenges it. This may spur her to work harder on the theory (e.g. to develop it further) or to devote time to corroborating it.
Q2: I don't think so. The trick to seeing why is to consider science at the group, rather than the individual, level. With reference back to question one, it could surely be bad for science if every scientist were so strongly emotionally attached to a dominant theory that they would never abandon said theory. But the fact that one scientist is emotionally attached to a theory, for instance, may be beneficial. (She might explore avenues that others would not, as a result. And the avenues might prove fruitful.) It's really a matter of context. I explore this theme in the paper _Kuhn Versus Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level_. You can find references therein to other work on the division of labour in science, e.g. by Kitcher and Strevens.
Article Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Res...
Article Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science, part ...
There seems to be a misconception, common in Western culture, that there is a dichotomy between rational, scientific processes (for example, in what some people call the" natural sciences") and intuitive, creative processes (for example, in what some label "arts and humanities"). Perhaps this is due to the vestiges of what some call "Cartesian duality", the illusion that we are spirits inhabiting bodies. The misconception exists on both sides of the academic divide, from chemists to visual artists. Being human (feeling, thinking, perceiving, interacting, contextualized bodies), there is always some combination of these sorts of cognitive processes going on. From my perspective (a social scientist with training in the visual arts), science is a conceptual and methodological toolbox for understanding ourselves and our surroundings. The universe is one, we are part of it, and there are no areas of inquiry that are not amenable to study from the scientific perspective.
Emotions organize adaptive action tendencies and their motivational underpinnings. In this sense they have a strong effect on consequent behaviour, often interrupting ongoing action sequence and create new vision and ideas and strategy. However, emotional experience and resultant response may not be same for all.
The choice of the method based on emotions?
Example:
Accepting that your statistical results will depend on the statistical tool used (e.g. SAS vs R), e.g. to discover subtle effects, what will be the probability to find the same results in a new study? Why searching for sublte effects when they are limited to local condtions?
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