Corruption in the public sector across many South American countries remains a deeply entrenched and systemic challenge, shaped by a combination of institutional weakness, historical legacies, and governance fragmentation. According to institutional theory, corruption can be understood not merely as a moral failure but as a normatively embedded practice in certain organizational fields where informal rules and personal networks dominate over formal procedures (North, 1990; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

In South America, various forms of public sector corruption—such as clientelism, nepotism, procurement fraud, and regulatory capture—are often reinforced by institutional voids, where legal frameworks exist but are inconsistently enforced, and where state capacity is uneven (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). These patterns generate low levels of trust in public institutions and constrain the development of effective, transparent, and accountable governance systems (O'Donnell, 1994).

Connecting this with my own research on digital transformation and institutional change in public sector organizations, it becomes evident that digital tools can act as both enablers and disruptors of corrupt practices. In South American contexts, municipal digitalization—such as the introduction of e-procurement platforms, open data systems, and digital public service portals—offers pathways to greater transparency and citizen oversight (Peña et al., 2020). These technologies can reduce opportunities for discretion and opacity, which are key drivers of corruption in administrative processes.

However, the adoption of such technologies must be accompanied by institutional reform. Without addressing the underlying institutional logics—such as patrimonialism or the normalization of informal practices—digitalization may result in only symbolic change, or even new forms of technologically mediated corruption (Heeks, 2005). This aligns with insights from my research on institutional isomorphism (Patalon & Wyczisk, 2024), where public sector organizations may mimic digital practices for legitimacy, without achieving substantive transformation.

The Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) framework further highlights that digital anti-corruption tools require a supportive technological infrastructure, organizational capacity, and an enabling policy environment. In many South American countries, gaps in these areas can limit the impact of digital initiatives unless supported by strong political will, civil society engagement, and institutional learning (Tornatzky & Fleischer, 1990; Fox, 2007).

In conclusion, tackling public sector corruption in South America requires institutional transformation and digital innovation to go hand-in-hand. As demonstrated in my work on digital transformation in rural municipalities, sustained change arises when technological solutions are embedded in broader efforts to reform governance structures, empower local actors, and foster accountability ecosystems.

Fox, J. A. (2007). The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability. Development in Practice, 17(4–5), 663–671.

Heeks, R. (2005). e-Government as a carrier of context. Journal of Public Policy, 25(1), 51–74.

Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725–740.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption. Cambridge University Press.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.

O'Donnell, G. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 55–69.

Peña, A. G., Pérez, C. A., & Durand, F. (2020). Digital transformation and open government in Latin America: Promises and limits. Information Polity, 25(3), 297–312. https://doi.org/10.3233/IP-190168 📷

Tornatzky, L. G., & Fleischer, M. (1990). The Processes of Technological Innovation. Lexington Books.

Patalon & Wyczisk (2024). Mapping Digital Transformation of Municipalities through the Lens of Institutional Isomorphism. International Journal on Social and Education Sciences (IJonSES), 6(1), 51–67

Uno de los principales problemas que estimula la corrupción, sino es la más importante, es la impunidad. Es decir, la no intervención oportuna del Estado para determinar responsabilidades y sanciones a los infractores demuestra una peligrosa relación de causa - efecto sobre la incompetencia gubernamental y el relajamiento de las instancias administradoras de justicia; cerrando esta cadena la inacción de las entidades fiscalizadoras y de control. Todo ello genera desconfianza y debilitamiento de la gobernabilidad; y por ende, del sistema democrático.