Grice (1975) has mentioned a little bit about conventional implicature and a lot about conversational implicature. Because conventional implicature utilises lexical markers and grammatical markers, does conventional implicature still fall under the umbrella term of pragmatics?
Dear Hendi Pratama,
Notably, meaning can be conveyed both explicitly and implicitly. Most often, pragmatic meaning is made through the use of conventional lexis and grammar ; however, the true meaning is implied. As an illustration, a declarative statement like " It is hot in here." using ordinary language may instantiate a different meaning. This sentence implies a different illocutionary force reflecting a request denoting " open the window." As a consequence, it is not so much the conventionality of the text that creates the implicature than the semantic associations requiring an in-depth mental processing on the part of the listener in order to figure out the intended image in the formulated implicature.
Best regards,
R. Biria
Conventional Implicature is part of pragmatics because pragmatics makes uses of three major communication skills like using language, changing language and following rules. Semantics is limited to the relation of words to which they refer, whereas pragmatics covers the study of relationships between words, the interlocutors and also the context.
Both, of course. Semantically, we have to do with truth conditions while pragmatically, context of utterance (and conversational implcature) is also an important landmark in defining the scope of presupposition, in general.
Conventional Implicature falls within the realm of Pragmatics.. And this is such regardless of the its utilisation of lexical markers and grammatical markers which are, indeed linguistic elements used in language for effective communication...To recapitulate, let’s say that effective communication occurs only when the presupposition-implicature-inference tandem operates a functionally harmonious trade and allow mutually attuned negotiation..
For more details, Read (Yule, 1996; Dekker, 2008; Stockwell, 2007 ; Yule, 1996; Traugott & Pratt ,1980; and Kryk- Kastovsky, 2006
I just changed my picture to avoid confusion. I am a Mr. anyway. Sorry for the inconvenience.
Thanks Kiran for the global approach to the issue.
Stephen. The best thing I can learn from you is that pragmatics must deal with both truth-condition and felicity but not Semantics. I have to say that I will make your ground as my consideration in my dissertation proposal. I might quote your explanation here for my paper if you dont mind.
I am quite sure that conventional implicature had less attention in Pragmatics and pragmatics research. Most books of pragmatics only mention some example of 'and' & 'but'. I really want to put conventional implicature under the taxonomy of implicature. I would like to show that conventional implicature is worth researching. (Potts 2005 has done this alot)
Ashani thank you. I believe that you also support the idea that conventional implicature is part of pragmatics. I quite understand the tandem of presupposition and implicature. I dont really get they idea of pairing both of them with inference. I always think that inference something different. I think that presupposition and implicature are substantive species and inference is a process. Maybe you can help me with this Ashani.
R. Biria. I think you have explained more on the conversational implicature than the conventional one.
Daniela. Both are okay. At least it's an option.
Regards
Hendi
On this topic, I recommend the recent SALT 26 paper by Lauri Karttunen. http://web.stanford.edu/~laurik/. The paper is called "Presupposition: What went wrong?" It contains a discussion of conventional implicature, from Frege's Andeutung to Grice and Kent Bach.
A good discussion. Stephen and others thank you for your invaluable contributions. Quite interesting and experienced attempts there!
It is difficult to draw a dividing line between pragmatics ans semantics. It was not the same person who invented the concept of semantics and the concept of pragmatics. And it is a question how far both concepts are from the linguistic reality. If we follow the late Wittgenstein language is not a fixed structure imposed upon the world. It is a fluid structure that is intimately bound up with our everyday practices and forms of life. For him, creating meaningful statements is not a matter of mapping the logical form of the world. It is a matter of using conventionally-defined terms within ‘language games’ that we play out in the course of everyday life. „In most cases, the meaning of a word is its use“, he claimed in perhaps the most famous passage in the Investigations. So even a word has no fixed semantics. But it has a (social) ‘grammar’ (as Wittgenstein says) which could tell us in which ‘language-play’ in which situation at what time it might be used to express and understand what. Compared with this view semantics and pragmatics are abstractions which simplify the linguistic world, and which are not well-suited to each other. But in some regard they may be helpful to understand some aspects of the linguistic world.
If Grice’s concept of a ‘conventional implicature’ is helpful, is an interesting question. But if this concept belongs to pragmatics or semantics, is an academic question. It might lead us away from reality resp. gives to concepts like semantics and pragmatics too much reality.