The neocortex is distinctly different from the cerebellum in that when electrical stimulation is delivered to the neocortex, a detection response related to an evoked sensation is exhibited by subjects (from rodents to cats to primates) but such a response is not apparent following cerebellar stimulation (Bartlet and Doty 1980; Bartlett, Doty et al. 2005; Doty 1965, 1969, 2007; Doty et al. 1980; Koivuniemiand Otto2012; Penfield 1958, 1959, 1975; Penfield and Rasmussen 1952; Rutledge and Doty 1962; Tehovnik and Slocum 2013). Also, when eliciting a detection response from the neocortex, a human subject can describe the sensations produced in detail (Penfield 1958, 1959, 1975; Penfield and Rasmussen 1952). Furthermore, stimulation of the neocortex is such that once a detection response occurs, which can take several days of training, the response is transferred immediately between any site stimulated within a topographic map (Bartlett, Doty et al. 2005; Bartlet and Doty 1980; Doty 1965, 1969; Doty et al. 1980). For example, stimulation of area V1 can be transferred to any region within V1 including contralateral sites, but if the electrode is now moved to V4 there is no transfer until new training has been completed. This lack of transfer has been explained as stimulation of V1 and V4 producing distinctly different sensations of visual consciousness (Bartlett, Doty et al. 2005).
Finally, for areas of the brain that store elements individually devoid of any map such as the temporal or orbital cortex (or the hippocampal formation), no amount of training induces transfer between sites (Doty 1969). The reason for this is that here ‘declarative’ information is stored individually per neuron so that at the time of retrieval the information remains unadulterated and concatenated via connectivity loops (that include the cerebellum, Hasanbegović 2024) to summon a specific stream of consciousness, such as when giving a speech that depends on the elements of the speech as stored in specific locations of the language complex (Ojemann 1991). The storage configuration, which is unique per individual (Ojemann 1991), must depend on how one has learned the language (e.g., whether learned as a first, second, or third language; whether learned at childhood or adulthood; whether learned fully with writing and reading capability; and so on).
Tononi (2008) has argued that the reason consciousness is mediated by the neocortex and not by the cerebellum is that neurons within the neocortex are well connected, whereas those of the cerebellar cortex are not (see Fig. 1). This led Tononi to propose that the more integrated (or connected) the neurons of a brain region, the higher the level of consciousness. Thus, the total number of connected neurons in the neocortex/ telencephalon or a homologue (as it may apply to invertebrates) should affect the caliber of consciousness achieved by a species with the amoeba being ground zero for consciousness, as evidenced by the rudimentary learning and short lifespan of no more than two days by this single-celled animal (Nakagaki et al. 2000; Saigusa et al. 2008).
Figure 1: A model by Tononi (2008) of how information may be differentially integrated via synaptic connections in the neocortex (A), the cerebellar cortex (B), the afferent pathways (C), and the cortico-subcortical loops including the cerebellum (D). The Φ value represents the degree of connectivity to support consciousness, with a value of 0.4 (e.g., between cerebellar modules) indicating low connectivity and a value of 4 (between neocortical neurons) indicating high connectivity. A value of zero would indicate no connectivity. For other information see caption of Figure 4 of Tononi (2008).