The maxim ex injuria jus non oritur, which means “law does not arise from injustice,” offers a normative principle suggesting that rights or legal benefits should not be derived from inherently unlawful acts. In other words, if a treaty is concluded under conditions of coercion—an act that could be seen as fundamentally unjust or illegal—this maxim might be invoked to argue that such a treaty should not generate binding legal rights or obligations.

However, applying this principle to justify non-compliance with treaties made under coercion is a highly nuanced issue in international law. Here are some key points to consider:

1. Normative vs. Institutional Tensions: The principle reflects the idea that wrongful acts should not produce legal benefits. Yet, international law is undergirded by the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), which is essential for predictability and stability in global relations. Unilaterally rejecting treaty obligations on the ground of coercion challenges this foundational norm. For such a justification not to destabilize international law, it would require a rigorous and widely accepted standard for what constitutes coercion. This helps ensure that the maxim is not misapplied to discredit legitimate agreements and does not open the door to selective non-compliance.

2. Legal Mechanisms and Adjudication: International treaties and the legal system provide specific remedies for cases where coercion is alleged. For instance, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains provisions that address treaties procured by coercion or fraud. Rather than a unilateral invocation of ex injuria jus non oritur, the affected party is generally expected to seek dispute resolution or arbitration to have the treaty’s validity examined in a forum agreed to by the parties or through international adjudication. This process helps balance the need to correct injustice and maintain legal order.

3. Risk of Destabilization: While the maxim can offer moral and legal support for non-compliance in theory, its unstructured application may indeed have destabilizing effects. If states were to frequently cite coercion as a basis for non-compliance without clear, consistent international standards, it could erode trust in treaty obligations generally. The predictability of international relations depends on well-defined rules for treaty formation and enforcement. Therefore, any invocation of the maxim must be fact-sensitive and subject to collective determination rather than unilateral decision-making.

4. Practical Implications: In practice, if a state demonstrates that a treaty was concluded under coercion, it might argue that the treaty is voidable due to the illegitimacy of its formation. However, once a treaty has entered into force, international law tends to favor stability and continuity, meaning that even tainted agreements might only be reformed or terminated through established legal procedures rather than outright non-compliance. This careful balancing act helps mitigate the risk of destabilizing the international legal order, ensuring that the corrective measure of invalidating an unjust treaty doesn’t lead to broader uncertainty in treaty relations.

In summary, while ex injuria jus non oritur conceptually supports the idea that rights should not arise from unjust circumstances (such as treaties forged under coercion), its application as a blanket justification for non-compliance is problematic. For it to be valid without destabilizing international law, robust, consensual standards and legal mechanisms must be used to assess and address coercion in treaty-making. This ensures that any departure from established obligations occurs within a controlled framework that preserves the overall stability and predictability of the international legal system.

This discussion invites further exploration into how international legal institutions balance the need for accountability with the imperative of stability. For example, you might consider how dispute resolution mechanisms or re-negotiation processes play a role in addressing coercion-related grievances, or how historical cases have been handled when states have raised similar arguments.