The Cartesian view of avowals proposes that the inherent subjectivity of the linguistic act not only establishes its validity but also posits the speaker as the ontological source of the representation. Thus, this view grants an unchallengeable authority to self-ascriptions of mental states. In Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On argued for a neo-expressivist approach that separates the semantics of avowals from their epistemology. Is it not the case, however, that the conative nature of an avowal as a speech act allows for the expression of feeling, self-knowledge, etc., without actually involving any claim that the avowal is veridical? If one utters, “I am tired,” could the utterance function as an indirect speech act to persuade a response in the hearer? In such an instance, would the avowal, contrary to the Cartesian view, be truth-apt and challengeable?
I agree with you. In neuroscience, a sign, a movement of the lips, a word, activate the same brain areas devoted to to the emotions and the working memory, even if coming from different sensory sources. Furthermore, think to the mirror neurons, activated by a long series of different messages.
I have written a philosophically oriented paper that addresses -- I think -- this question. My idea is that avowals can be seen as moving on a scale from expressive ones to (self-)descriptive ones, with most being in a middle category where they are both expressive and descriptive. I'm influenced in this by the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. "I am tired" can in one context be a purely expressive speech act, where it is functionally equivalent to, e.g. a sigh, and not put forward as truth-evaluable. But in other contexts "I am tired" is a speech act that both describes my state of mind by expressing it, and expresses my state of mind by describing it. Such speech acts have a special authority, because I have a unique authority in expressing my own mental states. But they are also challengeable and truth-evaluable, because in interpersonal communication it can be questioned whether my avowal, however honestly expressive, is also a valid description of me according to some public standards. Most typically, it seems to me, when I avow "I am tired" I want to do both: Express my tiredness, and request that my avowal is also treated as true, i.e. that my state is recognized as one of tiredness.
This is a very interesting theme, and I am working on it!
Tero, I liked your paper very much. In several respects it supports the argument that I make in a paper to be published in March in the Journal of Pedagogic Development: "Composition and the Search for Self-Awareness."
Thank you very much, James! I'll definitely want to read your paper!
You are welcome! Always good to see other scholars whose investigations support one's own.
James
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