Can Iran continue to produce enriched uranium? Are Middle Eastern countries familiar with the peaceful uranium enrichment model? How will Western countries allow Iran and Middle Eastern countries to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, including electricity, medicine, agriculture, etc., under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency? Can the infrastructure of a developed country be used for peaceful nuclear energy?

Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposed the creation

of a regional nuclear body called the Middle East Network for Atomic Research and

Advancement (Menara) in an op-ed in the Guardian on July 31.[1] Iran would almost

certainly demand to maintain domestic enrichment capabilities under such a

proposal.[2] Zarif stated that Menara would promote “peaceful nuclear cooperation” among member states.[3] Zarif added that countries would have to reject nuclear weapons and agree to verification mechanisms to be admitted to the regional body.[4] Zarif stated that Menara member states would “benefit from peaceful nuclear technology” and conduct “joint ventures,” including uranium enrichment, waste management, nuclear fusion, and medicine.[5] Zarif stated that a board of representatives from member states would monitor compliance and suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council could support the regional body.[6] Zarif suggested that Menara member states would share enrichment facilities.[7] The United States previously sought, before the Israel-Iran War, to establish a regional nuclear consortium outside of Iran that would provide Iran with uranium for civilian nuclear purposes but would not allow enrichment on Iranian soil.[8] Iranian officials stated that Iran was open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium's enrichment facilities were located in Iran.[9] Iran would similarly likely only support Menara if it allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil. An Iranian expert close to the regime stated that Menara cannot succeed without support from global powers such as the United States.[10] The United States has repeatedly insisted that Iran must halt domestic uranium enrichment.[11] The expert also stated that Israel would likely refuse to join this new nuclear body, which he stated would turn the Menara plan into “unilateral disarmament for Iran and Arab states.”[12]On August 1, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Fars News Agency announced the formation of a new “Defense Council” in Iran. The new council will reportedly assume strategic responsibilities for Iran’s national defense policy, and the regime will soon finalize its structure.[13] Fars News Agency announced that the Defense Council will be part of Iran’s “new” defense and security structure.[14] Fars News Agency also announced that the regime is likely to appoint Ali Larijani as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in the coming days.[15] Some Iranian media outlets and social media users have speculated in recent weeks that Larijani may soon be appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.[16] Fars News Agency reported that Ali Akbar Ahmadian, the current secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, will take charge of “several special and strategic files.”The announcement followed a July 30 Noor News report that “imminent changes” were likely to occur in Iran’s top security institutions following “necessary structural reforms.”[17] Noor News has historically been largely affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), but has recently increasingly aligned itself with Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of the SNSC. Iran had previously established a “Supreme Defense Council” after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to oversee Iran’s armed forces and manage defense-related matters, including coordinating the armed forces and overseeing national security during the Iran-Iraq War.[18] The announcement also followed a July 29 Noor News editorial that called on the regime to overhaul its decision-making system and establish a “strategic command center” with “cross-sectoral powers” to coordinate security, economic, and diplomatic responses to threats.[19]Key points • Iran’s nuclear program: In an article in the Guardian on July 31, former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposed the creation of a regional nuclear body called the Middle East Network for Atomic Research and Development (MENARA). Under such a proposal, Iran would almost certainly insist on maintaining domestic enrichment capabilities. The United States has repeatedly insisted that Iran must halt domestic uranium enrichment. • Iran’s defense establishment: affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Fars News Agency reported on August 1 the formation of a new “defense council” in Iran. The new council will reportedly take strategic responsibility for Iran’s national defense policy, and the regime will soon finalize its structure. The Fars news agency also said the regime would likely appoint Ali Larijani as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in the coming days.Iran

A CBS News investigation published on July 31 found that 12 ship-to-ship oil transfers took place in the Riau Islands off the coast of Malaysia in a single day as part of Iran’s illicit oil trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[20] Iran and China use ship-to-ship transfers to conceal the origin of Iranian oil. The investigation found that the vessels involved in the ship-to-ship transfers used tarpaulins and nets to cover their names and identification numbers. All of the vessels also had their transponders turned off. The investigation comes after the United States imposed sanctions on dozens of vessels on July 30 for facilitating Iranian-Russian oil trade.[21] More than 92 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports were set to go to China by June 2025.[22] The United States on July 31 sanctioned five entities and one individual based in Iran, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China for providing technology to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Company (HESA).[23] Hesa Electronics Industries Company (HESA) is a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Support and produces the Ababil and Shahed drones.[24] Several sanctioned entities have provided Hesa Electronics Industries Company with computer numerical control (CNC) machines. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the equipment is used “to manufacture precision and durable parts for commercial and military aircraft.”[25] On July 31, an unknown assailant stabbed Ali Reza Mohammadi, the prosecutor of Rafsanjan, Kerman Province.[26] Ebrahim Hamidi, the chief prosecutor of Kerman Province, said the assailant stabbed Mohammadi in his home and fled.[27] The Law Enforcement Command (LEC) is investigating the case and is trying to determine the attacker’s motive.[28] The incident follows similar attacks targeting Iranian judicial officials, including the assassination of the head of the Shiraz Criminal Court in Fars Province in May 2025 and the assassination of two Supreme Court judges in Tehran in January 2025.[29] Iran continues to face severe water shortages. Kaveh Madani, director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, told CNN on July 31 that Tehran province could face water shortages within weeks.[30] Iranian President Masoud Pezzekian warned on July 31 that Tehran’s dams would be empty by September or October if Iranians did not reduce water consumption.[31] The CEO of Tehran Provincial Water and Sewage Company said on July 17.that citizens in Tehran must reduce water consumption by 20 percent to “overcome” the water crisis, and that there was a seven percent decrease in consumption so far.[32]The Iranian regime is unlikely to be able to meaningfully improve its water crisis if it does not address fundamental issues such as mismanagement and unsustainable development. On July 31, President Pezzekian met with regime officials, including Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi and Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni, to discuss potential solutions to the water shortage. [33] The Iranian government closed Tehran’s municipal offices on July 23 and is considering further closures to preserve water resources. [34] Pezzekian stated on July 30 that the closures were not enough to solve Iran’s water crisis and stressed the importance of implementing sustainable development practices. [35] The head of Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization told state media on July 31 that the lack of sustainable water management practices had caused the water crisis. [36]

Iraq:

Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, confirmed on July 31 that the Badr Organization would run independently in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[37] The Badr Organization ran in the 2018 and 2021 elections alongside other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Fatah coalition.[38] Amiri's announcement came after recent meetings between Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, commander of the IRGC's Quds Force, and several leaders of the Shiite Coordination Framework, including Amiri, to discuss forming a pre-election coalition.[39] The Shiite Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shiite political parties, some of which are supported by Iran. Iran has encouraged Shiite Coordination Framework leaders to unite ahead of upcoming elections to increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will retain control of the Iraqi parliament.[40] Iran has reportedly encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to run as a single party in the elections.[41] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that favored a more unified opposition.[42]

Syria:

The Syrian transitional government’s ability to hold its forces accountable for abuses committed during the recent sectarian violence in Sweida province will likely affect its ability to rebuild trust with the Druze community. On 31 July, the Syrian Ministry of Justice (MoJ) formed an investigative committee to investigate the recent sectarian violence in Sweida province.[43] The committee will investigate the violence and refer those involved in abuses and crimes to the judiciary.[44] The committee is composed of judges, lawyers, and officers from the Ministry of Justice, and will submit periodic reports and the committee’s findings to President Ahmed al-Sharaa within three months.[45] The committee includes:• Hatem al-Naasan: Al-Naasan is a judge and legal advisor at the Court of Appeal in al-Ra'i, a Turkmen-majority town in northern Aleppo Governorate.[46] Al-Naasan served as a judge in the Assad regime and was appointed deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department in September 2016.[47] • Hassan al-Hamwi: Judge al-Hamwi was appointed as the general prosecutor of the Damascus countryside in August 2023.[48] Hamwi was a vocal critic of Assad early in the civil war.[49] • Maysun al-Tawil: Judge al-Tawil is a Druze Suwaydawi advisor judge from Shahba and the first female judge from Suwayda.[50] During the civil war, al-Tawil presided over the Assad regime's courts in Suwayda, Damascus, and Damascus countryside governorates.[51] • Jamal al-Ashqar: Judge al-Ashqar was the head of the Syrian National Coalition's military court during the civil war and a member of the opposition-affiliated Syrian Free Lawyers Association.[52] • Muhi al-Din Harmush: Harmush served as the political security commander of Deir ez-Zor and Hama provinces under Assad before joining the Syrian opposition in 2012.[53] Harmush later became the Minister of Interior of the Syrian Interim Government in Exile in 2019.[54] • Tariq al-Kurdi: Kurdi is a lawyer and former head of the legal office of the opposition-affiliated Syrian Negotiations Commission.[55]

6 Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project AEI 2025

• Ammar Izz al-Din: Al-Din is a lawyer and a member of the Transitional Justice Committee of the Homs Bar Association.[56] Al-Din served as the director of operations for the Syrian Independent Lawyers Association, a pro-opposition group.[57] Retaliatory kidnappings between local Druze and Bedouin factions in Sweida Governorate began on 13 July after Bedouin militias beat and robbed a Druze Sweida man.[58] The Syrian transitional government sent Ministry of Defense and Interior (MoDI) forces to Sweida Governorate on 14 July to end sectarian violence, but they were ambushed by Druze militias.[59] Ministry of Defense and Interior forces committed crimes against Druze fighters and civilians after they regained control of parts of Sweida province on July 15.[60] Druze militias and Bedouin fighters committed crimes against each other.[61] On July 18, the United States brokered a three-phase ceasefire agreement between Syria and Israel.[62] The violence has forced thousands of Bedouin civilians to flee Sweida province for fear of reprisals from Druze militias.[63] The Syrian transitional government promised on July 22 to hold members of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior responsible for the crimes accountable.[64] It is unclear how the transitional government committee will conduct its investigation, as Druze militias control much of Sweida province. The Sweida Crimes Investigation Committee may seek to exonerate the transitional government from responsibility for the recent violence, just as a separate government committee exonerated the government from responsibility for the March 2025 coastal violence. The Syrian National Commission of Inquiry investigated the March Alawite massacre and presented its findings to President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 13 July.[65] The commission found that the massacres were not centrally organized and emphasized the role of Alawite rebels in the crimes.[66] The Sweida Crimes Investigation Committee may also downplay the crimes of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in Sweida by blaming Druze militias for initiating the violence. Civilians in Sweida province protested on 1 August the transitional government’s plan to establish a committee to investigate the violence, calling instead for an international investigation.[67] To achieve meaningful accountability, the Syrian transitional government must investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators.The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced on 31 July that it would assign each General Security Service (GSS) officer a body camera and identification number to increase accountability for abuses.[68] The ministry is investigating abuses by the GSS, such as the recent torture and death of a young Syrian man in Damascus.[69] These incidents have likely prompted the GSS to equip its officers with body cameras to reduce such abuses. The use of body cameras could help prevent extortion by the GSS and restore trust between security forces and civilians. Body cameras could also improve discipline among GSS forces. Some GSS forces ignored orders from commanders during the March 2025 coastal violence, which led to sectarian and revenge killings.[70] It is not clear how the Syrian Ministry of Interior currently plans to finance this initiative. The Syrian Interior and Defense Ministries have been struggling to pay soldiers' salaries in several provinces.[71] Syrian Foreign Minister Asad al-Shaibani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 31 July to strengthen bilateral cooperation and possibly continue negotiations on the rights to Russian bases in Syria.[72] Shaibani stated that Putin intends to improve bilateral relations and "transform the historical relationship [between Russia and Syria]."[73] Putin expressed his interest in supporting efforts to rebuild Syria and strengthen ... Syria.7 Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats to Stability Project 2025.[74] Russia has been negotiating with the Syrian transitional government since January 2025 regarding the rights to Russian bases.[75] CTP-ISW had previously assessed that Russia may use Russian economic cooperation and reconstruction assistance as part of its negotiations regarding the rights to Russian bases in Syria.

Arabian Peninsula

According to local sources who spoke to a regional news outlet on 1 August, the Houthis are fortifying their coastal territory and conducting training exercises simulating attacks on international shipping in the Houthi-controlled province of Hodeidah.[76] “Hundreds” of armed Houthi fighters have reportedly been recently deployed to various areas of Hodeidah province to reinforce unspecified military infrastructure and tighten security measures.[77] These areas include Houthi-controlled areas around the city of Hodeidah and the Houthi southwestern coastal frontlines. The United States and Israel heavily targeted these areas in airstrikes against Houthi leadership and military and port infrastructure from March to July 2025. [78] Local sources reported that the Houthis had recently conducted training exercises, including hijacking ships, on five islands west of the city of Luhiya, in northern Hodeidah Governorate. [79] The Houthis sank two oil tankers, the Magic Seas and the Eternity Sea, in the Red Sea on 6 and 7 July, respectively, and kidnapped the crew of the Eternity Sea. [80] The Houthis have repeatedly threatened to attack Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea as part of their campaign to pressure Israel to stop the war in the Gaza Strip. [81]The Houthis have reportedly continued to import oil and other goods through Houthi-controlled ports that have been damaged in recent Israeli airstrikes.[82] The Houthis have reportedly attempted to fill the gaps left by the US and Israeli attacks with containers and scrap metal to allow ships to access these ports.[83] Maritime data available on the market confirmed that several cargo ships and tankers arrived at Houthi-controlled ports between 17 and 31 July, including six cargo ships at the port of Hodeidah, three cargo ships at the port of Salif, and four tankers at the port of Ras Issa.[84] The Houthis have also reportedly unloaded cargo from ships onto small boats at night when ships were unable to dock at the ports.[85]