For a start, I would like to suggest that you have a look at James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, especially chapt. 3 on subjectivism. It will answer some of your questions and also give you a conceptual framework in which these issues are typically discussed. An online pdf is available here:

http://www.tandon-books.com/Humanities/PL2064%20-%20Ethics%20and%20Technology/(PL2143)%20Elements%20of%20Moral%20Philosophy.pdf

Dear Karl, thank you for the reference. Yes, this is a common question of moral philosophy, aesthetics, religion, law etc.but unfortunately it creates almost unsormountable problems in  the philosophy of history, which is frequently based on value statements rather than on the investigation of  value statements of various ages and people. As Spengler said in the Decline of the West that unfortunately if one reads a book on history, it is easy to find out  which newspaper is read by the author.

In sum, one could assign the task of evaluation of two sets of statements to an  accountant the same way one can ask them to compare the summation of two sets of numbers.   The in sum concur or they do not.   One can agree or disagree in part with any scientist, or historian, or politician,  and as long as the parts can be considered cumulative,  there is only are only three possible answers:  agree, disagree, irrelevant.

The Challenger Space Shuttle blew up because the logical component parts were missing some critical information.  The critical parts did not add up to the whole of the result.   Deniers of Global Warming or Climate Change could postulate something is missing in the theory or could postulate someone is not adding the data together correctly.   In  a war or famine, a large number of people needlessly die.  The choice appears to always be:  agree, disagree or irrelevant.

Persistent and self-consistent agreement does add weight to what people think, to what keeps  ideas alive.   What  Euclid knew about Geometry does not need our concurrence to be correct, except  were some people to  "vote" both Geometry and Euclid are irrelevant,  that "vote"  would end up in things like the Challenger Disaster.

Seems to me  scientist need to have a voice in fields of history and politics only because when their objective view is not part of the discussion we all can be subjects of those who are only subjective. .   .  and grant to relevance to objective reality.

Walter.

Dear Walter, while fully understanding your position, I still maintain that the statement:

- A is X; where A is an object and X is a property, where X can be defined by a series of actions (e.g. by describing the measurement), common for everyone

and an other statement:

- A is Y, where Y is a property which describes the relation between the object Y and B, the subject (who expresses his/her opinion)

belong to tow, radically different categories. This difference is hidden by the fact that B is not explicitly mentioned in the latter statement, so it seems that Y is a property of A similarly as X is the property of A. It would be better to formulate: B says A is Y. Then it would be still valid that B cannot say A is Y ad A is not Y (or in one case he lies), that would be a contradiction in the logical sense, but if C says A is not Y does not contradict the previous statement. There is a conflict (between B and C) but not a contradiction.

If someone would say that in quantum mechanics the observed result depends on the observation, I would respond that it has nothing to do with it: it is irrelevant whether the electron is observed by, say B or C, not even any person is needed for the observation to change the result.

When I was a kid, we used to play Rock, Paper, Scissors.   Rock breaks scissors, scissors cuts paper, paper covers rock.  So two kids independently would choose one of the three and the winner of the game was determined by the rules.

What is most interesting is that [unlike tic tac toe in which once one learns the rules, one cannot actually lose],  in Rock Paper Scissors,  results were not random.   As soon as one person notices the other person is not choosing randomly,  the advantage is always to the one who notices the [non-random] pattern  and chooses accordingly.

I have a higher tolerance for chaos / randomness than most everyone I know.  The only possible effect of a force in the presence of a totally chaotic random space is to induce a local / localized order.    The fundamental question is then always:  is that local  / localized order self-replicating.    The irony shown by the Rock, Paper, Scissors game is that an orderly "viewing" of ordering messes up the chaotic process.   Viewing localized order, one can correspond to disrupting it, facilitating it, or  ignoring it. 

Beginning from a realm of maximum chaos,  force [maybe] could show up randomly.  And one is stuck with  as in [1 - x]  where 1>>>> x , 1  is still perturbed by x; when any localized space is ordered, the remaining space cannot be exactly random.

I actually view "viewing" like that: cannot actually know is any space is exactly random except by viewing it,  and  viewing [localized] what is not random then precludes the space from actually being random.    .       .

Thank for awakening these conversation and exploring where the conversations may lead. .    .

Walter.

This was one of the central questions explored by David Hume, who came to much the same conclusion as yourself: Hume's law, or Hume's guillotine, describes the "Is/ought" problem and asks: "given knowledge of the way the universe is, in what sense can we say it ought to be different?" concluding that the two domains of truth are fundamentally separate (i.e. separated by a "Guillotine").

Empirical realities that are subject to scientific modelling and predictions are part of the "Is", while moral determinations and value judgements are confined to the "ought". We can formulate theories in either dimension and test their implications, and in my own opinion there are some absolute truths in both which we are constantly attempting to discover through the refinement of existing theories (although we can never be completely certain when we're finished); the important point is that these two sets of questions are independent.

I concur,  and the point of the Rock, Paper, Scissors discussion is that we actually get to respond to not only what is so, but also to what is not so, because responding  to  what is not so is ALSO  a space of localized order.  

People have burned witches when people simply created someone as a witch and then responded to that hypothesis.   People disbelieve empirical things about vaccines and that belief has them not be vaccinated which exposes their neighbors to a higher level of risk of disease.  Huge reservoir of "information" that is now no longer believed [e.g. anti-vivisection].  Cannot either escape that we cannot empirically know anything unless one is open to [and or monitoring] that it is true or not true.   Cannot know if the light in a Frig is on or off [or no longer on or off   or Cat dead or alive ] unless one actually does something to test that hypothesis.

My sense is that when non-scientist claim to be scientific,  we most probably not to share not just what we "know" but also how we got there.   Require that when non-scientist come to a conclusion that contradicts our personally held view of things,  we listen at least until we understand the pathway they used to get there. 

Always need to know if theories about a cat in a box are being viewed from inside or from outside the box.  Always need to know if the person inside or outside the box is the first one drawing  the box.

Walter.

One more thing.   I actually have a quite high regard for highly competent engineers, and am a little taken back because there is not a Nobel Prize in Engineering.

Using the model of Immanuel Kant,  Engineering is mainly in the realm of applied reason(ing) and people seem to forget the undeniably critical role engineering and innovative technology has in what scientists consider as advances in "pure" reason.

On any clear moonless night, one can attempt can attempt to count the uncountable number of stars.   And spectroscopy in the Hubble telescope allows identifying at each and every star whether it is moving towards us, away from us, whether H or He, or NH3  atoms are present, which other stars in that region of the sky are following in the same cluster and which are not.  Huge giga-bytes of information, invisible without the innovative precision tools engineers made.

I read and write in English and a little in German, and there is a huge almost uncountable reservoir of scientific and literature reference material in Chinese characters.  Have no access to that at all unless someone correctly translates that into a language that I can read.   Consider translation as a metaphor for what virtually all engineers do:  translate machine language into  a language the rest of us use.   Billions of years have stars traveled and traveling has left a signature of that  pathway.  Billions of Chinese people speak and write and converse and travel leaving a signature of that pathway.  What is missing in not information but access to information.

Had scientific equipment with then state of the art computers in the 1980s that would not work without first feeding in machine language into the computer.  The machine language by definition needed to be outside the computer that it was starting.  Machine language needs to be stored spatially discretely from memory "abstracted" or digitized information.   Co-mingling of the two would not be good.  Every piece of machine language was invented by some engineer somewhere in some hidden array of computer data somewhere.  .       .

The binary bits of information about stars or about Chinese characters or about Wiki-leaks of personal personnel  information is totally random numbers without machine language that translate it into something else.  So a fact based question to ask is whether the machine language invented by engineers is subjective or objective?

The question of whether computers can differentiate between fake news and news  or  fake science versus "real" objective science cannot to my mind be answered without including whether one trusts the machine language doing the translations, and the subjectivity or objectivity of those operating the machines who can do math  or at least addition flawlessly.

Walter.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Banhegyi,

Interesting formulation of related questions. You seem to react to the recent position of Hilary Putnam, in one of his last books:

The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays

Hilary Putnam

http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674013803

Here follows the publisher's description:

If philosophy has any business in the world, it is the clarification of our thinking and the clearing away of ideas that cloud the mind. In this book, one of the world’s preeminent philosophers takes issue with an idea that has found an all-too-prominent place in popular culture and philosophical thought: the idea that while factual claims can be rationally established or refuted, claims about value are wholly subjective, not capable of being rationally argued for or against. Although it is on occasion important and useful to distinguish between factual claims and value judgments, the distinction becomes, Hilary Putnam argues, positively harmful when identified with a dichotomy between the objective and the purely “subjective.”

Putnam explores the arguments that led so much of the analytic philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology to become openly hostile to the idea that talk of value and human flourishing can be right or wrong, rational or irrational; and by which, following philosophy, social sciences such as economics have fallen victim to the bankrupt metaphysics of Logical Positivism. Tracing the problem back to Hume’s conception of a “matter of fact” as well as to Kant’s distinction between “analytic” and “synthetic” judgments, Putnam identifies a path forward in the work of Amartya Sen. Lively, concise, and wise, his book prepares the way for a renewed mutual fruition of philosophy and the social sciences.

---End quotation

You wrote:

If I say "the book is good" I do not speak about the book alone, but about MY RELATION to the book. It is good FOR ME, i.e. I like it. It does not mean that it is subjective, but it tells something about a relation, the relation of A to X. If B says that the book is bad, it is a statement about the B-X relation. Therefore the principle of contradiction cannot be used. A value statement can be frank or untruthful, but (in relation to the object alone) it cannot be true or false to be decided by tests independently of the person involved. In a certain culture, in a certain period there may exist a "canon" of books against which the "goodness" of the book can be checked, but this is not like the weight of the book.

---End quotation

In contrast to Putnam's characterization of the fact-value dichotomy, you seem to want to avoid the charge of subjectivism or relativism concerning values, But when you paraphrase, " the book is good"  by "It is good FOR ME, i.e. I like it." You seem very close to a version of subjectivism.  "A value statement can be frank or untruthful," you write, "but (in relation to the object alone) it cannot be true or false to be decided by tests independently of the person involved." But by reference value judgments to particular persons, you seem to make them subjective in a very clear sense, and only true or false, apparently, relative to a person (or perhaps a person in a culture?)  

If value judgments are not objective, as you have, it, then the usual conclusion has been that they are in some way subjective. I would suggest that there is a fact to the matter concerning how the fact-value dichotomy has customarily been formulated, and you seem to depart from a noted expert in a specialized field of inquiry in making your distinctive formulation. Might we not, then be advised, on scholarly grounds to follow Putnam's characterization of the question? I wonder how you would answer this scholarly question. 

In criticism of what you say, it might be pointed out, e.g., that I can sensibly say, "The book is good, but I  didn't much like it." There is no contradiction in combining these two claims. That strongly suggests that "The book is good" differs in meaning from "I like the book." Your paraphrase seems to get us off on the wrong foot.

Admittedly, there is some tension involved in combining the two claims, but it doesn't seem to be a matter of a contradiction in terms. "X is good" doesn't mean "I like X." It is more that I wouldn't likely say, "The book is good" if I didn't like it. But let me make an analogy. Suppose we have someone who really only enjoys the "divine lightness" of Mozart's music. On hearing, say, Mahler or Brahms, the person might be genuinely impressed with the skill and imagination of Mahler or Brahms, and allow that it is really quite good--though he doesn't really like it. The point is that evaluations and value judgments express something more than personal likes and dislikes.

Can you clarify your position? 

H.G. Callaway 

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Here is a review of the Putnam book which may prove useful by way of summary:

http://commons.pacificu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=eip

I quote and early passage:

Hilary Putnam’s latest book is more or less a transcription from lectures he gave in November 2000 at the invitation of the Rosenthal Foundation and the Northwestern University of Law. The more casual nature of the talk makes for an enjoyable read that flows very much as one would expect from a lecture than one would normally get from reading a formally written book.

Putnam has constructed a brilliant, yet concise, exposition and argument for the failure of the fact/value dichotomy in philosophy. We are exposed to what Putnam keenly calls the “Final Dogma of Empiricism,” whereby philosophers of language and science have attempted to expunge values from the hallowed ground of scientific investigation and logic. But Putnam argues that value judgments creep into our preferences for one scientific view over another when we attempt to determine why one view is more reasonable than another. We are typically offered, as a response, the claim that views must be adjudicated on the basis of their plausibility, coherence, or simplicity. Putnam, however, argues that such “standards”

of objectivity are themselves infused with value preferences.

---End quotation

The review was written by Thomas Keith. I recommend both the book and the review. Putnam's development in this direction, after starting as a student of Hans Reichenbach, and after his work as a mathematicians and philosopher of science, show the deep influence of the American pragmatists on his thought. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear Prof Callaway

Thank you for your thoughtful comments. Actually I became interested in this problem during several discussions with my father when I was much younger. He, in his turn, became interested in the problem during several discussions with a forgotten, so to say non-professional Hungarian philosopher, Vilmos Fitos, who placed this question into the center of his thinking. He did publish some of this thoughts in Hungarian before WWI and between the two world wars, but never got any serious response.

I am aware of the fact that Hume, and probably other have tackled this problem. I try to clarify briefly my position in some of the ambiguities. In my usage "objective" is no synonymous with "true" and subjective with "arbitrary".

As I use these words "objective statement" is a sentence, in which we try to explain phenomena with reference to other phenomena and we try to use basic concepts which are (presumably) do not depend on our personal preferences. (I know that this is in idealization of the situation, I will come back to it). Such statements can be investigated by several methods which are not strongly dependent on the personal convictions of parties involved. In some cases the validity of objective statements can be simply decided by agreeing on the test methods and performing the measurement, in some other cases the chain of reasoning is much longer and immediate testing is not possible, nevertheless scientific rigor and checking probabilities are still possible and recommended.

“Subjective” value judgements are not arbitrary (unless we lie), that they are related to our personality structure and partly to our culture. It is also true that the notions used in our objective statements are also partly dependent on our culture, but are less personal than value judgements. This fact makes hard the comparison of sciences of various cultures. But this is not the main point here.

I also accept the “good” is not identical with “I like it”. Just to tell an example: I admit that Schumann is a great composer, nevertheless most of his compositions touch me much less than the compositions of several, much less rated composers. The statement: “Schumann is a great composer” still can be investigated in terms of the (“Western”) European aesthetic and musical conventions. These principles are not necessarily shared by a Chinese, Indian etc. artist not touched by European conventions. For that matter, there is not agreement on these principles within the European community either. One can speak of general principles such a “balanced” effects, “harmony” and the like but one can easily pick up artistic products which are neither harmonic, nor balanced, nevertheless great (at least for a considerable portion of the listeners). So the agreement may change from a few persons to larger groups, but the agreement will never be universal and, more importantly, cannot be decided by “cool” investigation of the facts.

The same is true of ethical statements. Yes, I read thick books on ethics (actually I even translated Christian ethics books to Hungarian) but most of them were suffused with value statements rather than with reasoning. This does not mean that I am a cold-blooded atheist, on the contrary, I am a devout Christian. But not because I can “prove” the validity of its teachings. No. On purely rational basis I probably would not be a Christian. I am deeply touched by the way Christ lived and taught. It is a personal commitment on my part. I want to be with Him and I believe his main claims. But I would not even try to “prove” it to anyone else, much less would try to force my views on them. These are real value judgements, for which one can live or die without being able to prove them.

But let me return to social sciences, and to the problem of indiscriminate use of value judgements and objective thoughts in books and articles. I believe that if we want to write science, we should investigate value judgements of various groups, classes, nations etc. as far as they exist as “homogenous” objects, and we can try to systematize and understand them, we can try to find out the factors creating and influencing such value judgements. This is a scientific task. But to prove the validity of one of them against all others (usually our own one) is no science at all. Rather we should live so as to make it attractive for others. (This is not science either, but it is a worthy goal). If this distinction is not made, science will be inextricably compounded with ideology and politics (as it has been so far) without the dimmest hope to reach an agreement.

I hope I managed to explain my views a bit more.

Mainz, Germany,

Dear Banhegyi & readers,

Many thanks for your thoughtful reply and clarification of your question.

I think that you are likely correct in thinking that the traditional dichotomy between facts and values has functioned to keep special pleading and ideology out of science. Its a noble motivation, but the dichotomy cannot be defended on the basis of the motivation alone, as I see the matter. I think it important to see that the dichotomy has also performed other functions, and that some of these are much more doubtful. People in all orders and classes of society make value judgments continually; and some of these are of gigantic scope, effecting people in their millions. In particular, the great and the good make these judgments and sometimes put the force of law behind them, and no philosophical qualms about facts and values are at all likely to stop them. The doubts engendered by the fact-value dichotomy will only inhibit value judgments in less powerful quarters.

The fact is that everyone alive already has values and acts on them. No one plausibly thinks that everyone has the same values or that they are substantially the same in every location and tradition. No doubt, values exist in cultural traditions, and these cultural traditions vary considerably. They are plausibly viewed as adaptations to local conditions and the specifics of history. As long as such cultural traditions are separate from each other, there is really no need to decide between them in the abstract; and comparatively abstract, purely universal reasoning would likely have little motivational traction in any case. 

The interesting and practical cases arise when people with different values are in contact and do interact. In such cases, genuine problems arise; and it is sometimes necessary to resolve such problems. In general terms, no one is going to be reasonably motivated to change their own values, unless they are in a position to draw upon their own pre-existing values as premises and points of vantage upon the problems that arise. The genuine and more significant problems concern the reform or modification of existing values or value commitments in the face of problems arising. Alternative reforms will always be possible in the abstract, just as alternative hypotheses often arise in the face of a scientific problem. Rejecting subjectivism, and following Putnam and his sources, it is only necessary to hold that there are better and worse solutions to outstanding problems and that we are sometimes able to see which are which. 

A good historical example might be the 19th-century conflict in the U.S. between the slave states and the free states --which culminated in the Civil War. Given the general and pervasive configuration of pre-existing values in our society, I submit, that the abolition of slavery was the better solution--though other, less through-going solutions were considered. This is a paradigm case argument in support of the thesis that there are better and worse solutions to outstanding problems and conflicts of values and that we can sometimes see which are better. 

Much more can be said along similar lines, but I hope you will find in this reply a brief sketch of a viable alternative to your own position.

H.G. Callaway 

Thanks for the answers and for the explanation. Still it seems to me that in the final analysis this a "realistic" answer in the sense that the validity of value judgements can be decided by force. That who has the most power can and should (!) use law (i.e. power) to enforce his value judgements. That is a possible answer but still this is no proof of validity, only that of power. And my question was related to this aspect (i.e. to the ability to decide value statements by intellectual means). I also admit that general worldviews used to argue in any culture contain value-laden elements (some more, some less) but that does not mean that in scientific discourse we should not refrain from value judgements as much as possible. I do not say that my discussion partners said the opposite I just tried to make their argumentation simpler (hopefully not distorting it).

Just because one can do arithmetic correctly does not mean one's check book will be balanced.   Just because one understands and is grounded in an internally self consistent set of beliefs does not preclude the effect of such a grounding shows up empirically in a demonstrably valid way.   Love the parable comparing the person who says yes, yes and does not do what he says, whereas the person who says definitely no, and then does the "right" thing.

Have a great affection for those grounded in engineering.  An artist can create a chair that will fall apart the moment one sits on it.   Nothing at all wrong with that.  The chair may not have been meant to sit on.   Every engineer I know would consider that a disaster:  why make a chair that would not stand up to being sat upon.  No engineer would ever design a car that would fall apart or fail to start after the first 1000 km.

The realm of philosophy that keeps showing up for me is: which engineer would design a war such that 1) one could not lose  or  such that 2) one could not win?

Also, should one leave the design of wars to engineers?  Would they do a better job at it than generals,  or statesmen, or scientists?

Also, why would people keep buying chairs that keep falling apart or were not meant to be sat upon?

We are left with pyramids,  Gothic Cathedrals,  works by Mozart and Verdi, amazing architecture in lands from Cambodia, Peru, Mexico, India, hundreds of languages that have their own rules of grammar, sounds, even written characters that are indecipherable by the vast majority of human beings.  I-phones,  computers, space travel.  Every one of them can be considered to have been "engineered,"  not randomly or accidentally showing up.   Functionality in a human realm appear to be almost universally as component of human design.  

So the question to you all who have spent way more time thinking about such things as I have:   what structures are we leaving in place that will be around one generation or seven generations from now?   Why bother to create something and pretend that it will last, knowing it cannot / will not?  

Mainz, Germany

Dear Banhegyi & readers, 

I find it a bit curious that you should see in my reply the kind of view you attribute. 

You wrote:

Still it seems to me that in the final analysis this a "realistic" answer in the sense that the validity of value judgements can be decided by force. That who has the most power can and should (!) use law (i.e. power) to enforce his value judgements. That is a possible answer but still this is no proof of validity, only that of power.

---End quotation

Of course, I said nothing of the sort. Quite the contrary. I sketched the prospect of intellectual-moral reform on the basis of pre-existing values. The prospect of deciding such things " by force" is just what is to be avoided --so far as possible. 

You also wrote:

And my question was related to this aspect (i.e. to the ability to decide value statements by intellectual means.) 

---End quotation

Here, of course, there is some threat of begging the question. Value problems are intellectual, or contain an intellectual element, but they also involve matters of moral and valuational sentiment. If the pre-existing configuration of values brings people to an impasse, then change to some element of content and related sentiment may become a viable option. When it comes to values, then intellectual content and emotion are inter-related, and that is the reason that such matters are more resistant to change and modification. Habits of the heart are more resistant to change, are more conservative than more purely intellectual matters.

Again, no one changes all their values at once. To motivate change or modification of a value which has become problematic, one has to come to see what the proposed modification may do for the new configuration of values containing something new but much that was already present. 

In any case, the paradigm of value change regarding slavery in the U.S. you might think of as taking place in the discourse and practice of the reforming abolitionists --who made use of persuasion to make their case. This is the " force" of the better argument. 

You may note that I said little or nothing about value judgments in science. But those that are present should not be the exclusive domain of insiders. Me thinkst thou doth (perhaps?) complain too much. 

H.G. Callaway

"Habits of the heart are more resistant to change, are more conservative than more purely intellectual matters.  Again, no one changes all their values at once."

I concur.  And in any journey or conversation, if one returns exactly to the same place one started, and nothing all [that matters] changes, in effect, nothing ever happened. 

In every journey or conversation [that matters], some, or a few, or many values are perturbed.   We can of course go one by one by one and restore values to the way they had been.   Then the "force" or "energy" or out of the box "stress"  just disappears and it is exactly [in effect] as if nothing had happened, as if the "force" or "energy" or out of the box "stress" had never happened.

We however also have "Humpty Dumpty" and "Pandora's Box" conversations as well.   Sometimes despite ones conscious or unconscious efforts,  cannot return back to the way things were before "something happened"  happened. .    .

Kind regards,

Walter.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Schmidt, 

Sometimes, as you say, nothing changes. On other occasions, there are deep changes in our values. The question, of course, is whether such changes can be rationally mediated. 

H.G. Callaway

Yes.   Find changes in our values can originate from anywhere: from literature, music, growing a garden, the kindness of strangers. .    .    ,  an otherwise random discussion.  .     .

Walter.

Dear Prof Callaway,

I also try to quote you precisely: "In particular, the great and the good make these judgments and sometimes put the force of law behind them, and no philosophical qualms about facts and values are at all likely to stop them. The doubts engendered by the fact-value dichotomy will only inhibit value judgments in less powerful quarters".

The "great and the good" are also value judgements (I also make such distinctions, of course) - we could cite examples where "great and good" people have put the force of law behind their value judgements. But probably not everyone would agree that these men are "great and good". If e.g. they defended the Christian religion against sacrilege, the Christians would agree. Muslims not. But if, say, these great men were Catholics, members of the reformed churches would not necessarily agree if the law defends specifically Catholic theses against them. Or if the force of law is put behind the supporters of a certain political party alone (as it frequently occurs) even less would agree. I know that this is a far reaching train of thought about the possible maintenance of stabiliy of poltical systems - but the problem is real, and value judgements together with the force of law engender only fight, not agreement, and they do not answer the question of validity or superiority of this or that set of values. It is even more true if we think of the "war of cilvilizations" as Huntington puts it. It is a power struggle. None of the parties involved will be conviced of the truth of the alternative opinion if exeriences threat or power behind it. Especally not if the threatened partyl clearly sees the material interest of the other party behind the threat. That is one reason why Christianity failed substanially when the presecuted position was exchanged by the presecutor position.

I am also aware of the fact that there are methods developed in Ethics which help to decide between values but even these methods are not generally accepted. Those who believe in Divine revelation refer to sacred books, but again, the aceptance of these sacred books as Relevation is based rather on personal commitment than on scientific proof. I have read several books which tried to "prove" the validity of Christianity but I have to admit that most of them are intellectually not honest. The authors frequently use methods which they would not accept from their contestants.

In the field of ethics, politics, religion I can accept only the "mild method" of setting personal example to make it attractive for others. That is less effective but has more permanent effects. This kind of persuasion is, however, not a logical proof but personal attraction. It has nothing to do with logic. Of course, value judgements have also to be coherent, exhibit an inherent ogic, but the basic points are decided by faith or personal commitment.

In the case of aesthetics it is possible that a more formalized set of criteria can be established, but even these formalized sets will change with time and culture without the hope to achieve a common position.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Banhegyi & readers, 

It seems you already have an answer to your own question. You wrote:

Of course, value judgements have also to be coherent, exhibit an inherent logic, but the basic points are decided by faith or personal commitment.

---End quotation

I don't see that you make any concerted attempt to understand the approach I sketched. I have no doubt, of course, that there are people who will simply fail to consider alternatives to their own commitments. That, of course, is also a kind of value --often enough encountered. Since such commitments often come into conflict, and they offer no possibility of mediation, I have, myself, never thought them either very rational or persuasive. Mere closed commitment is, as you seem to acknowledge, a proof of nothing; and by the same token it establishes nothing. In particular, to notice that mediation of value conflicts is sometimes undesired does not establish that rational mediation of values conflicts is impossible. 

This is not to say, of course, that unwavering commitments are not effective, on occasion. Its frequently evident in varieties of power politics. But they seem, often enough, not very ecumenical in outlook. 

As a general matter, it seems clear that strength of commitment and adequate means of socialization are wanted in order that values are firmly held and can be effectively passed on from one generation to the next. On the other hand, sufficient flexibility and openness is wanted so that value commitments do not become so rigid as to be incapable of modification and development when the need arises and older commitments have grown problematic --and even inadequate to the purposes of those who hold them.

I don't see unwavering commitment as a virtue in the face of conflicts of values and the genuine problems arising from such conflicts. Mere tenacity has its charms, but it doesn't often persuade. It tends to become inward looking and in place of cooperation and discussion often turns to the trading of favors--and, ultimately to corruption?

H.G. Callaway 

Was driving north on  Route 50 past Baltimore [about  one or two dozen years ago] traveling 57 mph, and suddenly a car ahead of me is stopped or nearly stopped in the fast lane.   Insufficient time to stop, too unexpected to anticipate, changed lanes and passed him on the right; simultaneously,  the car behind me passed me on MY right on the shoulder.   Was shaken up.   Pulled over to the side of the road and just sat there for  15 minutes.

That is what Grace looks like to me.  Experienced that as an accident.  There was no accident.   Nothing bad actually happened.  What is so is an accident almost happened.  Being present to what could have happened, that was why a was shaken up.   Grace lives for me not so much in the “Happy and you know it, clap your hands” realm,  but in the moments of what nearly happened, what could easily have happened.  

My Mom did not drive until my brother Gunther taught her [while he was still a teenager].  She had been afraid of driving on the highway in a small car being passed by tractor trailers.

Am not enrolled in seeing a world free of danger, of pretending really nasty things never happen,   oblivious of injustice and cruelty.    Grace is what reminds me that, in the face of all that, what I say and do, can matter.   

For some people, Grace and Fate are the same thing.   For me, have no affinity for Fate.   In effect am indifferent to Fate as a rock solid constant in the natural order of things.  In effect, find a Grace in the water flow of things that happen surprisingly, even when tragic things [including floods, tsunami, drought] happen.    Yes, and sometimes tragedy turns into comedy, and other times comedy turns into tragedy.

Melodrama and farce typically are short-lived unless we subsidize their production.

Cannot to my mind escape the possibility that at any one moment, we can make a difference.   If for any philosophical or religious or scientific reason, we create that what we do cannot or will not make a difference, all the shows up is a Fate-like self-fulfilling prophecy.  The "value-added" tax we then pay results in our subsidizing the constancy of the Fate we created in the first place.

Cannot to my mind have an objective reality without creating oneself as an objective reality.   Rather live in a subjective reality in which I myself happen to also be a subject in that subjectivity. .  .     Cannot create a painting without also creating a painter and paint and a canvas.   Cannot create music without also creating musical instruments, and musicians, and subjective human emotions and connections to such human emotions.   There is no subjective reality without an objective reality in the foreground [and/or background].  Strange to me that someone can thing there would be a objective reality totally independent of a subjective reality.  .      .

Kindest regards,

Walter.

Walter:

RE: There is no subjective reality without an objective reality in the foreground [and/or background]. Yes, for sure. Subjective states are part of the causal nexus between many organisms and their environment.

RE: Strange to me that someone can think there would be a objective reality totally independent of a subjective reality. Surely not strange at all. There was a reality long before organisms with subjective states existed and there will still be a reality long after the sun goes nova even though no organisms will be around to experience that reality. The tenure of us subjective state–holders is but a brief interlude in the grand scheme of things.

What is life?

It is the flash of a firefly in the night.

It is the breath of a buffalo in the wintertime.

It is the little shadow which runs across

the grass and loses itself in the sunset.

   --Attributed to Crowfoot (ca 1830-1890), chief of the Canadian Blackfoot tribe.

Dear Karl, my main point is not the subjectivity-objectivity dichotomy. My point is that only objective statements can be false or true in the sense that in objective statements, which are intended to establish relations between phenomena. The explained phenomenon is considered to be specific, the other phenomenon, which is used for the explanation is considered to be general. Of course these "general" phenomena can be selected wisely  and cautiously and can be used to explain several particular phenomena. In this case the "theory" using the general notions is considered true and valid. But it may turn out to be invalid or having limited validity. This the way of science. Within a certain paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense) such "objective" statements can be investigated, improved upon etc. When there are major paradigm changes (or even a change in the whole cultural system) these explanatory schemes collapse and new ones are devised (new world views and new general notions used for explanation). Within a single paradigm the principle of contradiction can be used for "objective" statements. In the case of value judgements, however, there is even less agreement on the standards based on which the values can be decided. Value judgements semantically are similar to objective statements, but the speak about the relation of a subject to a certain phenomenon, therefore the principle of contradiction has a limited validity.

These are interesting and important areas of discussion.  I am sometimes harsher than most because a major flaw in logic is using logic to prove what in fact are just initial assumptions.  Often the initial assumptions are unstated and the logic of contradiction is in the mixture of initial assumptions which happen then to resurface upon full and rigorous examination.   Brilliant mathematicians prove or disprove mathematical theories.  Less brilliant mathematical minds might not actually be able to follow, let alone contest their findings.

I am much more interested in the framing of the assumptions we assume to be true, when in fact perhaps there are no facts in them  at all. 

In the excellent thought experiment involving Schrodinger's cat, the question is whether the fact that a cat is alive or dead DEPENDS on having information inside the box when the observer clearly is only outside the box.  Suppose the box we draw around the cat is a subjective reality box.  Then we cannot know the objective reality inside the subjective reality box unless one can see through the subjectivity box.

It is to my mind pure subjectivity to assume the box we draw around a cat is an objective reality.  A box is just a box, and the to me unavoidable question is whether the size and shape of the box is determined internally or externally.   In principle one could postulate that one gets the same answer either way.  That would be cool,  except that is to me only an assumption.

The question "is the cat alive" cannot be verified without being in the box. Is the box the cat is defined by the observer outside the box or the cat in the box?  That my friends is the internal logic contradiction one I cannot logically escape.  Said another way, does one place certainty inside the space of one's personal [perhaps biased] experiences, or does one place uncertainty in a space [a box] free from apparent potentially contradictory personal experiences?

Suppose someone observes a car accident.  A biased observer reports on the accident subjectively.  Is the answer better than no answer?   With no observer, there is no information at all.   Sometimes the subjective observer is on to something an "impartial" camera might have recorded.   The scientific method then is to look at both pieces of evidence and see if a better, more accurate version of the event is available from synthesizing from both subjective and objective pieces of evidence.

Also cannot all the time trust scientists or policemen or rulers to be 100.00000% precise, accurate and/or truthful.  Thus allowing only objective points of view to define what we see appears to me as only defining the box one is observing.  

"When there are major paradigm changes (or even a change in the whole cultural system) these explanatory schemes collapse and new ones are devised (new world views and new general notions used for explanation)."

For me major paradigm changes occur precisely when original assumptions are proven inadequate.  Einstein and Newton both lived in an identical universe.  Einstein just began from different assumptions. .    .     People often forget that Ptolemy was mathematically highly advanced and very precisely predictive of where and when Venus and Mars would show up.  No matter the model we use, we cannot escape that any model we use itself creates a barrier to knowing anything about anything that does not fit that m [subjectively or objectively].

Kind regards,

Walter.

A simpler example:  was measuring precisely the length of a board that was about a meter long to the nearest mm.  Very precise measurement required.  Then noticed the board did not fit the space in which it was designed to fit.  Ended up that the beginning measurement of zero length was a mm off.   The L  riveted at the beginning had become a little loose so even though I had read the observed end of the measurement correctly, the beginning was not so. Can never take an  end measurement any more exactly than one can take the beginning measurement.  Subjectivity at the beginning of a determination of an objective reality [the placement of a measurement in the space of zero] can precisely be the barrier to measuring the endpoint objectively.   Moreover, if the zero end of ruler were a mm off,  all measurements of length would contain the same bias.

Determining where zero is can look subjective.  The error bars around the point [0,0] or [0,0,0]  is a box or a cube.   GPS determined from three satellites can only be as accurate as their common zero point.   If the error bars in the zero point were  3.2 cm, cannot calculate the GPS coordinates to 2.3 cm accuracy without taking scores of measurements and averaging them.  

Part of the subjectivity through which non-scientists see scientists explaining global warming is exactly that they doubt the scientist's objectivity virtually independent of the scientific data itself.    That however is perhaps another question.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Banhgey & readers,

Let me examine your statement below:

... my main point is not the subjectivity-objectivity dichotomy. My point is that only objective statements can be false or true in the sense that in objective statements, which are intended to establish relations between phenomena.

---End quotation

I take it that you are still expounding your thesis of no objectivity in value judgments. But how about this. I'm strongly inclined to believe that,

The preservation of democracy is crucial to the survival of the human race, now that it has the power to destroy itself.

This I take it is a value judgment, and it may or may not be favored by various powers-that-be. In consequence, I take it that the willingness of people generally or in end effect to insist on this is not specifically relevant to its validity. To elaborate just a bit, I might expand " democracy" to " liberal democracy"  or perhaps to "mixed and balanced government including democracy."

No doubt, this statement may presuppose various other value judgments. But I take it that values inconsistent with this claim are subject to compelling, intellectual-moral criticism, also rationally (if not pragmatically) compelling.

Do you want to hold that it is impossible to defend this claim on rational grounds?

H.G. Callaway 

To the non-scientists I know, when a contradiction shows up that conflicts with their objective points of view,  rarely do they argue;  most often they attack the character and value of the person giving the contradictory opinion.  My sense is that hypotheses in and of themselves are innately "possible to defend this claim on rational grounds."   We have a long and noble historical tradition of doing so.  Every dissertation presented to a research committee is evaluated on the basis of a claim to be on rational grounds.  Peer review than agrees or disagrees.

Were objectivity the object,  all researcher would be doing is collecting and sorting data and perhaps agreeing or disagreeing whether any individual piece of data is "real."  Without the subject of a hypothesis, cannot actually see how this could fundamentally be scientific at all.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Schmidt & readers,

Please do regard the following as a hypothesis:

The preservation of democracy is crucial to the survival of the human race, now that it has the power to destroy itself.

How might it be tested and evaluated? It does seem to me that there is empirical evidence, and much human experience of relevancy. Political science specializes in related evidence. One quite traditional line of inquiry concerns the best methods for the control of the arbitrary use of power. How might we best keep government and government officials focused on the common good (or our best estimates of it). We talk about accountability of public officials to the public and about the "division of powers" between branches of government. Government is wanted to protect citizens against arbitrary uses of power--and to make peaceful relations plausible and sustainable. But that creates the further problem of control over the use of institutionalized power.  While it is not perfect, it seems that democratic forms provide the best means known to control the arbitrary use of power --including that implicit in humanity's present power to of self-destruction.

It would seem that if the hypothesis is questioned, then the best approach would be to look to the evidence available. It would be a mistake to expect mathematical precision or complete certainty of results. But if we make use of the best evidence available and adequate forms of argument and conceptual organization, then it would seem foolish to reject the results. 

I continue to assume that living human beings always already have values, that we can draw upon them as premises. 

H.G. Callaway

Albert Schweitzer in his second book on Civilization and Ethics demonstrated that validity can be determined in shared value statements, but only if the statements have internal validity. Example "most people wish to live and to live well." From this he constructed a valid and testable philosophy of civilization and ethics. In doing so, he demolished much of the preceding philosophy of other writers.  

Dear Readers, I maintain that values need not be objective to be important to us. On the contrary. Nobody would die or live, only for values. For the person who commits himself/herself to a value the value does not need to be defendable scientifically. Jesus has never tried to prove that he is right. He proclaimed his values, and he did refer to experiences which are, however, not available to us. Either we believe them or not. They cannot be proved, they should be trusted. This is true especially to moral or religious statements. Maybe aesthetic questions are less emotional for most of us, there common traditions may be more important.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Readers of this thread may find the following question of interest:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_significance_of_Wittgensteins_private_language_argument

H.G. Callaway

Thnks!   Do find these trains of thought interesting.  A problem with trains of thought is that their paths can be circular.  A second problem is figuring where on this path to get on, where to get off, and whether, when on the path, one ever really goes anywhere new.   What is in that logic box, as Schrodinger might say, can never be known unless one is actually inside the box.   Do not know if Schrodinger did say, if one is inside a [logic] box, can one ever know what is outside the logic box unless one also visits that space.   .       .     Thnks you all for your generous access to rather interesting questions and to the boundary conditions that contain them.

Walter.