Assuming that you are talking about routing protocol security, and admitting/excluding routers from participating?
If the MANET in question is OLSR/OLSRv2 based, then there's a good chunk of work going on in that area in the IETF. Take a look at RFC7181 (OLSRv2), and the two related security RFCs RFC7182 and RFC7183 (Attached to this posting).
You may also want to look at RFC7186, which analyzes the security vulnerabilities of NHDP - one of the constituent parts of OLSRv2 (Also attached) - another document is being developed for a similar analysis on "the rest of OLSRv2", draft-clausen-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats (link attached).
There's something interesting going on regarding identity-based signatures, which are also applicable for OLSRv2, and which is making its way through the standardization process - see draft-ietf-manet-ibs (link attached).
For a MANET routed by a reactive routing protocols (such as LOADng, DSR, AODV) it is somewhat harder to - at the same time - preserve the optimizations offered (such as "intermediate RREPs" or "caching of overheard source routes", and authenticating (or not) received information. I am aware of some academic work on S-AODV (Secure AODV) and ARIADNE (secure DSR - link attached), but none of which has made it into (as far as I know) standardization or deployments.
Dear it is very easy, just check your paper in most relevant journals and databases and check the latest work such as Scopus, ACM, IEEE and Science direct.
We did a case study on AODV. Details of the paper as follows:
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
July 2012, Vol.35(4):1249–1259, doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2012.01.019
Intelligent Algorithms for Data-Centric Sensor Networks
Review
Security threats and solutions in MANETs: A case study using AODV and SAODV
Jan von Mulert Ian WelchWinston K.G. Seah
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Abstract
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) security has become the focus of prolific research efforts. Driven by the unique and considerable difficulties of providing security arising from the dynamic nature of MANETs, many security schemes have been proposed. Rather than trying to encompass the entire field of MANET security, this paper focuses on networks using the popular Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol and a secure extension to AODV, the Secure AODV (SAODV) protocol. SAODV is representative of a number of secure versions of the AODV protocol in that it relies upon the use of cryptographic mechanisms to protect the routing control messages of AODV from being forged and/or altered by attackers. We conduct a vulnerability analysis of SAODV to identify unresolved threats to the algorithm, such as medium access control layer misbehaviour, resources depletion, blackholes, wormholes, jellyfish and rushing attacks. We then compare this vulnerability analysis to schemes that have been proposed to combat the identified threats. These proposals include multipath routing, incentive schemes, directional antennae, packet leashes, randomized route requests, localized self-healing communities and a reactive intrusion detection node blacklisting scheme.